MOTION TO QUASH

COME NOW defendants, by counsel and unto this Honorable Court,

most respectfully move to quash the information filed against the
defendants on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
ARGUMENTS
Defendants are indicted for committing the crime of "Unjust Vexation"
that is punished under the Article 287, Paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code; Said provision states that:
"Any other coercions or unjust vexations shall be punished by arresto
menor or a fine ranging from 5 pesos to 200 pesos, or
both."(emphasis ours)

Defendants, however, most respectfully submit that this Honorable

Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the offense for the
reason that article 287, paragraph 2 of the revised penal code that
punishes "unjust vexations" cannot be a basis of any criminal
prosecution for being NULL AND VOID AND patently unconstitutional
on its face because of the FOLLOWING reasons:
a)Said penal provision condemns no specific or definite act or omission
thus failing to define any crime or felony;
b)Said penal provision is so indefinite, vague and overbroad as not to
enable it to be known what ACT is forbidden;
c)Such vagueness and overbreadth result to violation of the due
process clause and the right to be informed of the nature of the
offense charged;
d) such vagueness and overbreadth likewise amount to an invalid
delegation by Congress of legislative power to the courts to determine
what acts should be held to be criminal and punishable.
e) a criminal or penal legislation must clearly define or specify the
particular act or acts punished
It is a well-established doctrine that a criminal or penal legislation
must clearly define or specify the particular acts or omissions
punished. As early as 1916, in the case of "United States vs. Luling, 34
Phil. 725, our Honorable Supreme Court had the occasion to hold that:
1

"In some of the States, as well as in England, there exist what are
known as common law offenses. In the Philippine Islands no act is a
crime unless it is made so by statute. The state having the right to
declare what acts are criminal, within certain well defined limitations,
has a right to specify what act or acts shall constitute a crime, as well
as what act or acts shall constitute a crime, as well as what proof shall
constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and then to put upon the
defendant the burden of showing that such act or acts are innocent
and are not committed with any criminal intent or intention."(emphasis
and underscoring ours, cited in the fairly recent case of DizonPamintuan v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 111426, July 11,
1994) (emphasis and underscoring ours).
Two years later, this was followed by a scholarly exposition by Justice
Johnson in the case of In re: R. MCCULLOCH DICK, 38 Phil. 41, April
16, 1918, where he stated that:
"x x x In the Philippine Islands no act is a crime unless it is made so by
law. The law must specify the particular act or acts constituting the
crime. If that were not so, the inhabitants could not know when they
would be liable to be arrested, tried and punished. Otherwise the
mandatory provisions of the law, that all criminal laws shall be
prescribed, would prove to be a pitfall and a snare. The inhabitants of
the Philippine Islands, whether citizens, denizens or friendly aliens,
have a right to know, in advance of arrest, trial and punishment, the
particular acts for which they may be so tried. They cannot be arrested
and tried, and then be informed for the first time that their acts have
been subsequently made a crime, and be punished therefor. x x
x"(emphasis and underscoring ours).
Justice (later Chief Justice) Fernando in his concurring opinion in the
case of PEOPLE v. CABURAL, G.R. No. L-34105, February 4, 1983, also
made a similar observation, stating that:
"The maxim Nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege has its roots in
history. It is in accordance with both centuries of civil law and common
law tradition. Moreover, it is an indispensable corollary to a regime of
liberty enshrined in our Constitution. It is of the essence then that
while anti-social acts should be penalized, there must be a clear
definition of the punishable offense as well as the penalty that may be
imposed - a penalty, to repeat, that can be fixed by the legislative
body, and the legislative body alone. So constitutionalism mandates,

with its stress on jurisdictio rather than guvernaculum. The judiciary as

the dispenser of justice through law must be aware of the limitation on
its own power." (emphasis and underscoring ours).
The rationale of said doctrine that a criminal or penal legislation must
clearly define or specify the particular act or acts punished is ably
explained by the United Stated Supreme Court in the case of
LANZETTA v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 306 U.S. 451, where it held that:
"x x x It is the statute, not the accusation under it, that prescribes the
rule to govern conduct and warns against transgression. x x x No one
may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to
the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to
what the State commands or forbids. x x x" (emphasis and
underscoring ours).
Article 287, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code condemns no SPECIFIC
act or omission!Therefore, it does not define any crime or felony.
Paragraph 2 of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code does not define,
much less specify, the acts constituting or deemed included in the term
"unjust vexations" resulting to making the said provision a sort of a
"catch-all" provision patently offensive to the due process clause;
The right to define and punish crimes is an attribute of sovereignty.
Each State has the authority, under its police power, to define and
punish crimes and to lay down the rules of criminal procedure.
Pursuant to this power to define and punish crimes, the State may not
punish an act as a crime unless it is first defined in a criminal statute
so that the people will be forewarned as to what act is punishable or
not. The people cannot be left guessing at the meaning of criminal
statutes;
Moreover, Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code defines felonies (delitos)
as "acts or omissions" punishable by law. Article 287, Par. 2 of the
Revised Penal Code condemns no specific act or omission! Therefore, it
does not define any crime or felony!
Philippine Jurisprudence is replete with examples that would readily
show that Art. 287, Par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code has not been used
to prosecute a well-defined or specific criminal act.Instead, it was used
as a "catch-all" provision to prosecute acts which are not expressly
made criminal by any other provision of the Revised Penal Code. This

is anathema to criminal due process that requires notice of what

specific act or omission is punished by law;
An examination of the annals of our jurisprudence would likewise show
that Art. 287, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code has not been used to
punish a specific act:
a)In People v. Reyes, 60 Phil. 369, August 23, 1934, accused were
found guilty of unjust vexation by their act of disturbing or interrupting
a ceremony of a religious character;
b)In Lino v. Fugoso, 77 Phil. 983, January 30, 1947, it was used to
prosecute the accused of unjust vexation committed by stopping the
jeep driven by the complainant in a threatening attitude and without
any just cause therefor and telling him to stop driving for the City of
Manila while the strike of city laborers was still going on;
c)In People v. Reyes, 98 Phil. 646, March 23, 1956, it was held that
the act of seizing, taking and holding possession of passenger jeep
belonging to complainant, without the knowledge and consent of the
latter, for the purpose of answering for the debt of the said owner,
constitutes unjust vexation;
d)In People v. Yanga, 100 Phil. 385, November 28, 1956, accused was
convicted of unjust vexation for the act of compelling the complainant
to do something against his will, by holding the latter around the neck
and dragging him from the latter's residence to the police outpost;
e)In People v. Abuy, G.R. No. L-17616, May 30, 1962, the accused was
prosecuted for unjust vexation for the act of embracing and taking
hold of the wrist of the complainant;
f)In People v. Carreon, G.R. No. L-17920, May 30, 1962, accused was
convicted of unjust vexation by the act of threatening the complainant
by holding and pushing his shoulder and uttering to the latter in a
threatening tone the following words: "What inspection did you make
to my sister in the mountain when you are not connected with the
Bureau of Education?"
g)In People v. Gilo, G.R. No. L-18202, April 30, 1964, the Court held
that the absence of an allegation of "lewd design" in a complaint for
acts of lasciviousness converts the act into unjust vexation;

h)In Andal v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-29814, March 28,
1969, accused were found guilty of unjust vexation under an
information charging them with the offense of offending religious
feelings, by the performance of acts notoriously offensive to the
feelings of the faithful;
i)In People v. Maravilla, G.R. No. L-47646, September 19, 1988, a
accused was convicted of unjust vexation for the act of grabbing the
left breast of the complainant against her will; and
j) Recently in Kwan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113006, November
23, 2000, the act of abruptly cutting off the electric, water pipe and
telephone lines of a business establishment causing interruption of its
business operations during peak hours was held as unjust vexation;
From the above-cited cases, it clearly appears that Art. 287, par. 2 of
the Revised Penal Code does not punish a specific act.Instead, any and
all kind of acts that are not specifically covered by any other provision
of the Revised Penal Code and which may cause annoyance, irritation,
vexation, torment, distress or disturbance to the mind of the person to
whom it is directed may be punished as unjust vexation; art. 287, par.
2 of the revised penal code suffers from A CONGENITAL DEFECT OF
vagueness and must be stricken down.
The term "unjust vexation" is a highly imprecise and relative term that
has no common law meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or
administrative precedents; Thus, for its vagueness and overbreadth,
said provision violates due process in that it does not give fair warning
or sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize;
This kind of challenge to the constitutionality of a penal statute on
ground of vagueness and overbreadth is not entirely novel in our
jurisdiction. In an en banc decision in the case of GONZALES v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. L-27833, April 18, 1969, re: Constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 4880, our Honorable Supreme Court had the occasion
to rule that the terms "election campaign" and "partisan political
activity" which are punished in said R.A. 4880 would have been void
for their vagueness were it not for the express enumeration of the acts
deemed included in the said terms. The Supreme Court held:
"The limitation on the period of "election campaign"or "partisan
political activity" calls for a more intensive scrutiny. According to
Republic Act No. 4880: "It is unlawful for any person whether or not a

voter or candidate, or for any group or association of persons, whether

or not a political party or political committee, to engage in an election
campaign or partisan political activity except during the period of one
hundred twenty days immediately preceding an election involving a
public office voted for at large and ninety days immediately preceding
an election for any other elective public office. The term 'candidate'
refers to any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office
regardless of whether or not said person has already filed his
certificate of candidacy or has been nominated by any political party as
its candidate. The term 'election campaign' of 'partisan political
activity' refers to acts designed to have a candidate elected or not or
promote the candidacy of a person or persons to a public office . . ."
"If that is all there is to that provision, it suffers from the fatal
constitutional infirmity of vagueness and may be stricken down. x x x x
x x x x x x x x.
"There are still constitutional questions of a serious character then to
be faced. The practices which the act identifies with "election
campaign" or"partisan political activity" must be such that they are
free from the taint of being violative of free speech, free press,
freedom of assembly, and freedom of association. What removes the
sting from constitutional objection of vagueness is the enumeration of
the acts deemed included in the terms "election campaign" or
"partisan political activity." (emphasis and underscoring ours).
Article 287, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code punishes "unjust
vexations" and that is all there is to it! As such, applying the
incontestable logic of the Supreme Court in said case of GONZALES v.
COMELEC would lead us to the inescapable conclusion that said penal
provision suffers from the fatal constitutional infirmity of vagueness
and must be stricken down;
In the case of Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385,
cited by our own Supreme Court en banc in the case of Ermita-Malate
Hotel and Motel Operators Assn., Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, G.R. No.
L-24693, July 31, 1967), the United States Supreme Court ruled:
"That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be
sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct
on their part will render them liable to its penalties is a well-recognized
requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the

settled rules of law; and a statute which either forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application
violates the first essential of due process of law." (emphasis and
underscoring ours).
In fact, it is worst in the case of the 2nd Paragraph of Article 287 of
the Revised Penal Code because it punishes "unjust vexations" without
even defining or enumerating the acts constituting the said crime thus
leaving men of common intelligence necessarily guessing at its
meaning and differing as to its application in complete disregard of
constitutional due process;
Our Supreme Court in the case of U.S. v. NAG TANG HO, 43 Phil. 1,
held that one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law that fails to
set up an ascertainable standard of guilt. Said ruling cites the
landmark case of U.S. v. L. COHEN GROCERY CO., 255 U.S. 81, where
the United States Supreme Court in striking down Section 4 of the
Federal Food Control Act of August 10, 1917, as amended, as
unconstitutional, stated that:
"The sole remaining inquiry, therefore, is the certainty or uncertainty
of the text in question, that is, whether the words 'that it is hereby
made unlawful for any person willfully ... to make any unjust or
unreasonable rate or charge in handling or dealing in or with any
necessaries,' constituted a fixing by Congress of an ascertainable
standard of guilt and are adequate to inform persons accused of
violation thereof of the nature and cause of the accusation against
them. That they are not, we are of opinion, so clearly results from
their mere statement as to render elaboration on the subject wholly
unnecessary. Observe that the section forbids no specific or definite
act. It confines the subject matter of the investigation which it
authorizes to no element essentially inhering in the transaction as to
which it provides. It leaves open, therefore, the widest conceivable
inquiry, the scope of which no one can foresee and the result of which
no one can foreshadow or adequately guard against. In fact, we see no
reason to doubt the soundness of the observation of the court below in
its opinion to the effect that, to attempt to enforce the section would
be the exact equivalent of an effort to carry out a statute which in
terms merely penalized and punished all acts detrimental to the public
interest when unjust and unreasonable in the estimation of the court x
x x (emphasis and underscoring ours).
7

Recently, in COATES v. CITY OF CINCINNATI, 402 U.S. 611, the United

States Supreme Court passed upon the issue of constitutionality of a
Cincinnati, Ohio, ordinance that provides that:
It shall be unlawful for three or more persons to assemble, except at a
public meeting of citizens, on any of the sidewalks, street corners,
vacant lots, or mouths of alleys, and there conduct themselves in a
manner annoying to persons passing by, or occupants of adjacent
buildings. Whoever violates any of the provisions of this section shall
be fined not exceeding fifty dollars ($50.00), or be imprisoned not less
than one (1) nor more than thirty (30) days or both. Section 901-L6,
Code of Ordinances of the City of Cincinnati. (emphasis and
underscoring ours).
In hammering down the constitutionality of the above-cited Cincinnati,
Ohio ordinance in its landmark decision, the United States Supreme
Court held that:
Conduct that annoys some people does not annoy others. Thus, the
ordinance is vague, not in the sense that it requires a person to
conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative
standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is
specified at all. As a result, men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning. Connally v. General Construction Co.,
269 U.S. 385, 391.
It is said that the ordinance is broad enough to encompass many types
of conduct clearly within the city's constitutional power to prohibit. And
so, indeed, it is. The city is free to prevent people from blocking
sidewalks, obstructing traffic, littering streets, committing assaults, or
engaging in countless other forms of antisocial conduct. It can do so
through the enactment and enforcement of ordinances directed with
reasonable specificity toward the conduct to be prohibited. It cannot
constitutionally do so through the enactment and enforcement of an
ordinance whose violation may entirely depend upon whether or not a
policeman is annoyed.(emphasis and underscoring ours).
Same things can be said of Art. 287, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code
that punishes unjust vexations. As previously shown, the term"unjust
vexations" is broad enough to encompass many types of acts or
conduct. But while these acts of types of conduct are within the State's
police power to prohibit and punish, it cannot however constitutionally

do so when its violation may entirely depend upon whether or not

another is vexed or annoyed by said act or conduct and whether or not
said act or conduct is unjust is the estimation of the court;
ARTICLE 287, PAR. 2 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IS AN INVALID
DELEGATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWER to DEFINE what acts should
be held to be criminal and punishable.
The failure of Art. 287, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code to define or
specify the act or omission that it punishes likewise amounts to an
invalid delegation by Congress of legislative power to the courts to
determine what acts should be held to be criminal and punishable.
Potestas delegata non delegare potest. What has been delegated
cannot be delegated. This doctrine is based on the ethical principle
that such as delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to
be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own
judgment and not through the intervening mind of another (United
States v. Barrias, 11 Phil. 327, 330);
Congress alone has power to define crimes. This power as an attribute
of sovereignty may not be delegated to the courts. When a criminal
legislation leaves the halls of Congress, it must be complete in itself in
that it must clearly define and specify the acts or omissions deemed
punishable; and when it reaches the courts, there must be nothing left
for the latter to do, except to determine whether person or persons
indicted are guilty of committing the said acts or omissions defined
and made punishable by Congress. Otherwise, borrowing the immortal
words of Justice Isagani Cruz in Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court
(148 SCRA 659), the law becomes a "roving commission," a wide and
sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it
from overflowing," in short a clearly profligate and therefore invalid
delegation of legislative powers;
Art. 287, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code fails to set an immutable
and ascertainable standard of guilt, but leaves such standard to the
variant and changing views and notions of different judges or courts
which are called upon to enforce it. Instead of defining the specific acts
or omissions punished, it leaves to the courts the power to determine
what acts or types of conduct constitute "unjust vexation". Moreover,
liability under the said provision is also made dependent upon the
varying degrees of sensibility and emotions of people. It depends upon
whether or not another is vexed or annoyed by said act or conduct. As

previously intimated, one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law

that fails to set up an immutable and an ascertainable standard of
guilt.
Conclusion
In view of all the foregoing, Defendants submit that Art. 287, par. 2 of
the Revised Penal Code that punishes "unjust vexations" is
unconstitutional on its face for its fatal failure to forbid a specific or
definite act or conduct resulting to its congenital vagueness and
overbreadth which are anathema to constitutional due process and the
right to be informed of the nature of the offense charged;
Moreover, by leaving it to the judiciary to determine the "justness" or
"unjustness" of an act or conduct that is not clearly defined or
specified by law constitutes a fixing by Congress of an unascertainable
standard of guilt and therefore an invalid delegation, if not an
abdication, of legislative power;
Therefore, the conclusion is inevitable that Art. 287, par. 2 of the
Revised Penal Code, being facially unconstitutional, cannot be a basis
of any criminal prosecution. As such, there is no offense to speak of
and consequently, this Honorable Court cannot acquire any jurisdiction
whatsoever to try the defendants of the charge of "unjust vexation".
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, it view of all the foregoing, it is most respectfully prayed
that the information be quashed, and defendants discharged.
Other relief just and equitable are likewise prayed for.
_____________, Philippines, __Date__.
(COUNSEL)
(NOTICE OF HEARING)
(EXPLANATION)
COPY FURNISHED:
OPPOSING COUNSEL

10