On the Folly of Rewarding A,

While Hoping for B

STEVEN KERR
Ohio State University

Illustrations are presented from society in general, and

from organizations in particular, of reward systems that
"pay off" for one behavior even though the rewarder
hopes dearly for another. Portions of the reward systems
of a manufacturing company and an insurance firm are
examined and the consequences discussed.
Whether dealing with monkeys, rats, or human beings, it is hardly controversial to state that most organisms seek information concerning what
activities are rewarded, and then seek to do (or at least pretend to do)
those things, often to the virtual exclusion of activities not rewarded. The
extent to which this occurs of course will depend on the perceived attractiveness of the rewards offered, but neither operant nor expectancy theorists
would quarrel with the essence of this notion.
Nevertheless, numerous examples exist of reward systems that are
fouled up in that behaviors which are rewarded are those which the rewarder is trying to discourage, while the behavior he desires is not being rewarded at all.
In an effort to understand and explain this phenomenon, this paper
presents examples from society, from organizations in general, and from
profit making firms in particular. Data from a manufacturing company and
information from an insurance firm are examined to demonstrate the
consequences of such reward systems for the organizations involved, and
possible reasons why such reward systems continue to exist are considered.
SOCIETAL EXAMPLES
Politics

Official goals are "purposely vague and general and do not indicate . . .
the host of decisions that must be made among alternative ways of achieving
official goals and the priority of multiple goals . . ." (8, p. 66). They
Steven Kerr (Ph.D.City University of New York) is Associate Professor of Organizational Behavior, College of Administrative Science, The Ohio State University, Columbus,
Ohio.
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usually may be relied on to offend absolutely no one, and in this sense can be
considered high acceptance, low quality goals. An example might be
"build better schools." Operative goals are higher in quality but lower in
acceptance, since they specify where the money will come from, what
alternative goals will be ignored, etc.
The American citizenry supposedly wants its candidates for public office
to set forth operative goals, making their proposed programs "perfectly
clear," specifying sources and uses of funds, etc. However, since operative
goals are lower in acceptance, and since aspirants to public office need acceptance (from at least 50.1 percent of the people), most politicians prefer
to speak only of official goals, at least until after the election. They of course
would agree to speak at the operative level if "punished" for not doing so.
The electorate could do this by refusing to support candidates who do not
speak at the operative level.
Instead, however, the American voter typically punishes (withholds support from) candidates who frankly discuss where the money will come from,
rewards politicians who speak only of official goals, but hopes that candidates (despite the reward system) will discuss the issues operatively. It is
academic whether it was moral for Nixon, for example, to refuse to discuss
his 1968 "secret plan" to end the Vietnam war, his 1972 operative goals
concerning the lifting of price controls, the reshuffling of his cabinet, etc.
The point is that the reward system made such refusal rational.
It seems worth mentioning that no manuscript can adequately define
what is "moral" and what is not. However, examination of costs and benefits, combined with knowledge of what motivates a particular individual,
often will suffice to determine what for him is "rational."^ If the reward
system is so designed that it is irrational to be moral, this does not necessarily
mean that immortality will result. But is this not asking for trouble?
War
If some oversimplification may be permitted, let it be assumed that the
primary goal of the organization (Pentagon, Luftwaffe, or whatever) is to
win. Let it be assumed further that the primary goal of most individuals on
the front hnes is to get home alive. Then there appears to be an important
conffict in goalspersonally rational behavior by those at the bottom will
endanger goal attainment by those at the top.
But not necessarily! It depends on how the reward system is set up. The
Vietnam war was indeed a study of disobedience and rebellion, with terms
such as "fragging" (killing one's own commanding officer) and "search and
evade" becoming part of the military vocabulary. The difference in subordinates' acceptance of authority between World War II and Vietnam is
reported to be considerable, and veterans of the Second World War often
1 In Simon's (10, pp. 76-77) terms, a decision is "subjectively rational" if it maximizes an
individual's valued outcomes so far as his knowledge permits. A decision is "personally
rational" if it is oriented toward the individual's goals.

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have been quoted as being outraged at the mutinous actions of many Ameriican soldiers in Vietnam.
Consider, however, some critical differences in the reward system in use
during the two conflicts. What did the GI in World War II want? To go
home. And when did he get to go home? When the war was won! If he disobeyed the orders to clean out the trenches and take the hills, the war
would not be won and he would not go home. Furthermore, what were his
chances of attaining his goal (getting home alive) if he obeyed the orders
compared to his chances if he did not? What is being suggested is that the
rational soldier in World War II, whether patriotic or not, probably found it
expedient to obey.
Consider the reward system in use in Vietnam. What did the man at the
bottom want? To go home. And when did he get to go home? When his
tour of duty was over! This was the case whether or not the war was won.
Furthermore, concerning the relative chance of getting home alive by
obeying orders compared to the chance if they were disobeyed, it is worth
noting that a mutineer in Vietnam was far more likely to be assigned rest
and rehabilitation (on the assumption that fatigue was the cause) than he
was to suffer any negative consequence.
In his description of the "zone of indifference," Barnard stated that "a
person can and will accept a communication as authoritative only when . . .
at the time of his decision, he believes it to be compatible with his personal
interests as a whole" ( 1 , p. 165). In light of the reward system used in
Vietnam, would it not have been personally irrational for some orders to
have been obeyed? Was not the military implementing a system which
rewarded disobedience, while hoping that soldiers (despite the reward
system) would obey orders?
Medicine
Theoretically, a physician can make either of two types of error, and
intuitively one seems as bad as the other. A doctor can pronounce a patient
sick when he is actually well, thus causing him needless anxiety and expense, curtailment of enjoyable foods and activities, and even physical
danger by subjecting him to needless medication and surgery. Alternately, a
doctor can label a sick person well, and thus avoid treating what may be a
serious, even fatal ailment. It might be natural to conclude that physicians
seek to minimize both types of error.
Such a conclusion would be wrong.^ It is estimated that numerous Americans are presently afflicted with iatrogenic (physican caused) illnesses (9).
This occurs when the doctor is approached by someone complaining of a few
stray symptoms. The doctor classifies and organizes these symptoms, gives
them a name, and obligingly tells the patient what further symptoms may be
2 In one study (4) of 14,867 films for signs of tuberculosis, 1,216 positive readings turned
out to be clinically negative; only 24 negative readings proved clinically active, a ratio of 50
tol.

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expected. This information often acts as a self-fulfilling prophecy, with the

result that from that day on the patient for all practical purposes is sick.
Why does this happen? Why are physicians so reluctant to sustain a type
2 error (pronouncing a sick person well) that they will tolerate many type 1
errors? Again, a look at the reward system is needed. The punishments for
a type 2 error are real: guilt, embarrassment, and the threat of lawsuit and
scandal. On the other hand, a type 1 error (labeling a well person sick) "is
sometimes seen as sound clinical practice, indicating a healthy conservative
approach to medicine" (9, p. 69). Type 1 errors also are likely to generate
increased income and a stream of steady customers who, being well in a
limited physiological sense, will not embarrass the doctor by dying abruptly.
Fellow physicians and the general public therefore are really rewarding
type 1 errors and at the same time hoping fervently that doctors will try not
to make them.
GENERAL ORGANIZATIONAL EXAMPLES
Rehabilitation Centers and Orphanages

In terms of the prime beneficiary classification (2, p. 42) organizations

such as these are supposed to exist for the "public-in-contact," that is,
clients. The orphanage therefore theoretically is interested in placing as
many children as possible in good homes. However, often orphanages surround themselves with so many rules concerning adoption that it is nearly
impossible to pry a child out of the place. Orphanages may deny adoption
unless the applicants are a married couple, both of the same religion as the
child, without history of emotional or vocational instability, with a specified
minimum income and a private room for the child, etc.
If the primary goal is to place children in good homes, then the rules
ought to constitute means toward that goal. Goal displacement results when
these "means become ends-in-themselves that displace the original goals"
(2, p. 229).
To some extent these rules are required by law. But the influence of the
reward system on the orphanage's management should not be ignored.
Consider, for example, that the:
1. Number of children enrolled often is the most important determinant
of the size of the allocated budget.
2. Number of children under the director's care also will affect the size
of his staff.
3. Total organizational size will determine largely the director's prestige at the annual conventions, in the community, etc.
Therefore, to the extent that staff size, total budget, and personal prestige are valued by the orphanage's executive personnel, it becomes rational
for them to make it difficult for children to be adopted. After all, who wants
to be the director of the smallest orphanage in the state?

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If the reward system errs in the opposite direction, paying off only for
placements, extensive goal displacement again is likely to result. A common
example of vocational rehabilitation in many states, for example, consists of
placing someone in a job for which he has little interest and few qualifications, for two months or so, and then "rehabilitating" him again in another
position. Such behavior is quite consistent with the prevailing reward system,
which pays off for the number of individuals placed in any position for 60
days or more. Rehabilitation counselors also confess to competing with one
another to place relatively skilled clients, sometimes ignoring persons with
few skills who would be harder to place. Extensively disabled clients find
that counselors often prefer to work with those whose disabilities are less
severe.^
Universities
Society hopes that teachers will not neglect their teaching responsibilities
but rewards them almost entirely for research and publications. This is most
true at the large and prestigious universities. Cliches such as "good research
and good teaching go together" notwithstanding, professors often find that
they must choose between teaching and research oriented activities when
allocating their time. Rewards for good teaching usually are limited to outstanding teacher awards, which are given to only a small percentage of good
teachers and which usually bestow little money and fleeting prestige. Punishments for poor teaching also are rare.
Rewards for research and publications, on the other hand, and punishments for failure to accomplish these, are commonly administered by
universities at which teachers are employed. Furthermore, publication
oriented resumes usually will be well received at other universities, whereas
teaching credentials, harder to document and quantify, are much less transferable. Consequently it is i^ational for university teachers to concentrate
on research, even if to the detriment of teaching and at the expense of their
students.
By the same token, it is rational for students to act based upon the goal
displacement which has occurred within universities concerning what they
are rewarded for. If it is assumed that a primary goal of a university is to
transfer knowledge from teacher to student, then grades become identifiable
as a means toward that goal, serving as motivational, control, and feedback
devices to expedite the knowledge transfer. Instead, however, the grades
themselves have become much more important for entrance to graduate
school, successful employment, tuition refunds, parental respect, etc., than
the knowledge or lack of knowledge they are supposed to signify.
It therefore should come as no surprise that information has surfaced in
recent years concerning fraternity files for examinations, term paper writing
services, organized cheating at the service academies, and the like. Such
3 Personal interviews conducted during 1972-1973.

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activities constitute a personally rational response to a reward system which

pays off for grades rather than knowledge.
BUSINESS RELATED EXAMPLES
Ecology
Assume that the president of XYZ Corporation is confronted with the
following alternatives:
1. Spend $11 million for antipollution equipment to keep from poisoning fish in the river adjacent to the plant; or
2. Do nothing, in violation of the law, and assume a one in ten chance of
being caught, with a resultant $1 million fine plus the necessity of
buying the equipment.
Under this not unrealistic set of choices it requires no linear program to
determine that XYZ Corporation can maximize its probabilities by flouting
the law. Add the fact that XYZ's president is probably being rewarded (by
creditors, stockholders, and other salient parts of his task environment)
according to criteria totally unrelated to the number of fish poisoned, and his
probable course of action becomes clear.
Evaluation of Training
It is axiomatic that those who care about a firm's well-being should insist
that the organization get fair value for its expenditures. Yet it is commonly
known that firms seldom bother to evaluate a new GRID, MBO, job enrichment program, or whatever, to see if the company is getting its money's
worth. Why? Certainly it is not because people have not pointed out that
this situation exists; numerous practitioner oriented articles are written each
year to just this point.
The individuals (whether in personnel, manpower planning, or wherever)
who normally would be responsible for conducting such evaluations are
the same ones often charged with introducing the change effort in the first
place. Having convinced top management to spend the money, they usually
are quite animated afterwards in collecting arigorous vignettes and
anecdotes about how successful the program was. The last thing many
desire is a formal, systematic, and revealing evaluation. Although members
of top management may actually hope for such systematic evaluation, their
reward systems continue to reward ignorance in this area. And if the personnel department abdicates its responsibility, who is to step into the breach?
The change agent himself? Hardly! He is likely to be too busy collecting
anecdotal "evidence" of his own, for use with his next client.
MisceUaneous
Many additional examples could be cited of systems which in fact are
rewarding behaviors other than those supposedly desired by the rewarder. A
few of these are described briefly below.

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Most coaches disdain to discuss individual accomplishments, preferring

to speak of teamwork, proper attitude, and a one-for-all spirit. Usually,
however, rewards are distributed according to individual perfonnance. The
college basketball player who feeds his teammates instead of shooting will
not compile impressive scoring statistics and is less likely to be drafted by
the pros. The ballplayer who hits to right field to advance the runners wiU
win neither the batting nor home run titles, and will be offered smaller
raises. It therefore is rational for players to think of themselves first, and the
team second.
In business organizations where rewards are dispensed for unit performance or for individual goals achieved, without regard for overall effectiveness, similar attitudes often are observed. Under most Management by
Objectives (MBO) systems, goals in areas where quantification is difficult often go unspecified. The organization therefore often is in a
position where it hopes for employee effort in the areas of team building,
interpersonal relations, creativity, etc., but it formally rewards none of these.
In cases where promotions and raises are formally tied to MBO, the system
itself contains a paradox in that it "asks employees to set challenging, risky
goals, only to face smaller paychecks and possibly damaged careers if these
goals are not accomplished" (5, p. 40).
It is hoped that administrators will pay attention to long run costs and
opportunities and will institute programs which will bear fruit later on.
However, many organizational reward systems pay off for short run sales
and earnings only. Under such circumstances it is personally rational for
officials to sacrifice long term growth and profit (by selling off equipment
and property, or by stifiing research and development) for short term
advantages. This probably is most pertinent in the public sector, with the
result that many public oflicials are unwilling to implement programs
which will not show benefits by election time.
As a final, clear-cut example of a fouled-up reward system, consider the
cost-plus contract or its next of kin, the allocation of next year's budget as
a direct function of this year's expenditures. It probably is conceivable
that those who award such budgets and contracts really hope for economy
and prudence in spending. It is obvious, however, that adopting the proverb "to him who spends shall more be given," rewards not economy, but
spending itself.
TWO COMPANIES' EXPERIENCES
A Manufacturing Organization
A midwest manufacturer of industrial goods had been troubled for
some time by aspects of its organizational climate it believed dysfunctional.
For research purposes, interviews were conducted with many employees and
a questionnaire was administered on a companywide basis, including plants
and ofSces in several American and Canadian locations. The company

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Strongly encouraged employee participation in the survey, and made available time and space during the workday for completion of the instrument.
All employees in attendance during the day of the survey completed the
questionnaire. All instruments were collected directly by the researcher, who
personally administered each session. Since no one employed by the firm
handled the questionnaires, and since respondent names were not asked for,
it seems likely that the pledge of anonymity given was believed.
A modified version of the Expect Approval scale (7) was included as
part of the questiormaire. The instrument asked respondents to indicate the
degree of approval or disapproval they could expect if they performed each
of the described actions. A seven point Likert scale was used, with one
indicating that the action would probably bring strong disapproval and
seven signifying likely strong approval.
Although normative data for this scale from studies of other organizations
are unavailable, it is possible to examine fruitfully the data obtained from
this survey in several ways. First, it may be worth noting that the questionnaire data corresponded closely to information gathered through interviews. Furthermore, as can be seen from the results summarized in Table 1,
sizable differences between various work units, and between employees at
/different job levels within the same work unit, were obtained. This suggests
that response bias effects (social desirability in particular loomed as a potential concern) are not likely to be severe.
Most importantly, comparisons between scores obtained on the Expect
Approval scale and a statement of problems which were the reason for the
TABLE 1
Summary of Two Divisions' Data Relevant to
Conforming and Risk-Avoidance Behaviors
(Extent to Which Subjects Expect Approvai)
Percentage of Workers
Responding
Dimension
Risk
Avoidance

Item
Making a risky
decision based on
the best information available at
the time, but
which turns out
wrong.

1, 2, or 3
Division
Total
and Sample Responses Disapproval 4

5, 6, or 7
Approval

A, levels
1-4 (lowest)

127

61

25

14

A, levels
5-8

172

46

31

23

A, levels
9 and above

17

41

30

30

B, levels
1-4 (lowest)

31

58

26

16

B, levels
5-8

19

42

42

16

B, levels
9 and above

10

50

20

30

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TABLE 1 (Continued)
Percentage of Workers
Responding
Dimension
Risk
A voidance
(Continued)

Conformity

Item
Setting extremely
high and challenging standards and
goals, and then
narrowly failing
to make them.

1, 2, or 3
Division
Total
and Sample Responses Disapproval 4

5, 6, or 7
Approval

A, levels 1-4

122

47

28

25

A, levels 5-8

168

33

26

41

A, levels 9-1-

17

24

70

B, levels 1-4

31

48

23

29

B, levels 5-8

18

17

33

50

B, levels 9+

10

30

70

Setting goals which A, levels 1-4

are extremely easy A, levels 5-8
to make and then
making them.
A, levels 9-1-

124

35

30

35

171

47

27

26

17

70

24

B, levels 1-4

31

58

26

16

B, levels 5-8

19

63

16

21

B, levels 9 +

10

80

20

A, levels 1-4

126

46

17

37

A, levels 5-8

180

54

14

31

A, levels 9 +

17

88

12

B, levels 1-4

32

53

28

19

B, levels 5-8

19

68

21

11

B, levels 9 +

10

80

10

10

Being a "yes man"

and always agreeing with the boss.

Always going
along with the
majority.

Being careful to
stay on the good
side of everyone,
so that everyone
agrees that you
are a great guy.

A, levels 1-4

125

40

25

35

A, levels 5-8

173

47

21

32

A, levels 9-f

17

70

12

18

B, levels 1-4

31

61

23

16

B, levels 5-8

19

68

11

21

B, levels 9-|-

10

80

10

10

A, levels 1-4

124

45

18

37

A, levels 5-8

173

45

22

33

A, levels 94-

17

64

30

B, levels 1-4

31

54

23

23

B, levels 5-8

19

73

11

16

B, levels 9 +

10

80

10

10

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survey revealed that the same behaviors which managers in each division
thought dysfunctional were those which lower level employees claimed were
rewarded. As compared to job levels 1 to 8 in Division B (see Table 1),
those in Division A claimed a much higher acceptance by management of
"conforming" activities. Between 31 and 37 percent of Division A employees at levels 1-8 stated that going along with the majority, agreeing
with the boss, and staying on everyone's good side brought approval; only
once (level 5-8 responses to one of the three items) did a majority suggest
that such actions would generate disapproval.
Furthermore, responses from Division A workers at levels 1-4 indicate
that behaviors geared toward risk avoidance were as likely to be rewarded as
to be punished. Only at job levels 9 and above was it apparent that the
reward system was positively reinforcing behaviors desired by top management. Overall, the same "tendencies toward conservatism and applepolishing at the lower levels" which divisional management had complained
about during the interviews were those claimed by subordinates to be the
most rational course of action in light of the existing reward system. Management apparently was not getting the behaviors it was hoping for, but it
certainly was getting the behaviors it was perceived by subordinates to be
rewarding.
An Insurance Firm
The Group Health Claims Division of a large eastern insurance company provides another rich illustration of a reward system which reinforces
behaviors not desired by top management.
Attempting to measure and reward accuracy in paying surgical claims,
the firm systematically keeps track of the number of returned checks and
letters of complaint received from policyholders. However, underpayments
are likely to provoke cries of outrage from the insured, while overpayments
often are accepted in courteous silence. Since it often is impossible to tell
from the physician's statement which of two surgical procedures, with different allowable benefits, was performed, and since writing for clarifications
will interfere with other standards used by the firm concerning "percentage
of claims paid within two days of receipt," the new hire in more than one
claims section is soon acquainted with the informal norm: "When in doubt,
pay it out!"
The situation would be even worse were it not for the fact that other
features of the firm's reward system tend to neutralize those described. For
example, annual "merit" increases are given to all employees, in one of the
following three amounts:
1. K the worker is "outstanding" (a select category, into which no more
than two employees per section may be placed): 5 percent
2. If the worker is "above average" (normally all workers not "outstanding" are so rated): 4 percent

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3. If the worker commits gross acts of negligence and irresponsibility

for which he might be discharged in many other companies: 3 percent.
Now, since (a) the difference between the 5 percent theoretically attainable
through hard work and the 4 percent attainable merely by living until the
review date is small and (b) since insurance firms seldom dispense much
of a salary increase in cash (rather, the worker's insurance benefits increase,
causing him to be further overinsured), many employees are rather indifferent to the possibility of obtaining the extra one percent reward and
therefore tend to ignore the norm concerning indiscriminant payments.
However, most employees are not indifferent to the rule which states that,
should absences or latenesses total three or more in. any six-month period,
the entire 4 or 5 percent due at the next "merit" review must be forfeited.
In this sense the firm may be described as hoping for performance, while
rewarding attendance. What it gets, of course, is attendance. (If the absencelateness rule appears to the reader to be stringent, it really is not. The
company counts "times" rather than "days" absent, and a ten-day absence
therefore counts the same as one lasting two days. A worker in danger of
accumulating a third absence within six months merely has to remain ill
(away from work) during his second absence until his first absence is more
than six months old. The limiting factor is that at some point his salary
ceases, and his sickness benefits take over. This usually is sufficient to get
the younger workers to return, but for those with 20 or more years' service,
the company provides sickness benefits of 90 percent of normal salary,
tax-free! Therefore . . . .)
CAUSES
Extremely diverse instances of systems which reward behavior A
although the rewarder apparently hopes for behavior B have been given.
These are useful to illustrate the breadth and magnitude of the phenomenon,
but the diversity increases the difficulty of determining commonalities and
establishing causes. However, four general factors may be pertinent to an
explanation of why fouled up reward systems seem to be so prevelant.
Fascination with an "Objective" Criterion
It has been mentioned elsewhere that:
Most "objective" measures of productivity are objective only in that their
subjective elements are a) determined in advance, rather than coming into play
at the time of the formal evaluation, and b) well concealed on the rating
instrument itself. Thus industrial firms seeking to devise objective rating
systems first decide, in an arbitrary manner, what dimensions are to be rated,
. . . usually including some items having little to do with organizational
effectiveness while excluding others that do. Only then does Personnel Division
chum out official-looking documents on which all dimensions chosen to be
rated are assigned point values, categories, or whatever (6, p. 92).

Nonetheless, many individuals seek to establish simple, quantifiable standards against which to measure and reward performance. Such efforts may

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be successful in highly predictable areas within an organization, but are

likely to cause goal displacement when applied anywhere else. Overconcern
with attendance and lateness in the insurance firm and with number of
people placed in the vocational rehabilitation division may have been largely
responsible for the problems described in those organizations.
Overemphasis on Highly Visihle Behaviors
Difficulties often stem from the fact that some parts of the task are highly
visible while other parts are not. For example, publications are easier to
demonstrate than teaching, and scoring baskets and hitting home runs
are more readily observable than feeding teammates and advancing base
runners. Similarly, the adverse consequences of pronouncing a sick person
well are more visible than those sustained by labeling a well person sick.
Team-building and creativity are other examples of behaviors which may
not be rewarded simply because they are hard to observe.
Hypocrisy
In some of the instances described the rewarder may have been getting
the desired behavior, notwithstanding claims that the behavior was not
desired. This may be true, for example, of management's attitude toward
apple-polishing in the manufacturing firm (a behavior which subordinates
felt was rewarded, despite management's avowed dislike of the practice).
This also may explain politicians' unwillingness to revise the penalties for
disobedience of ecology laws, and the failure of top management to devise
reward systems which would cause systematic evaluation of training and
development programs.
Emphasis on Moraiity or Equity Rather than EfRciency
Sometimes consideration of other factors prevents the establishment of a
system which rewards behaviors desired by the rewarder. The felt obligation
of many Americans to vote for one candidate or another, for example, may
impair their ability to withhold support from politicians who refuse to discuss the issues. Similarly, the concern for spreading the risks and costs of
wartime military service may outweigh the advantage to be obtained by
commiting personnel to combat until the war is over.
It should be noted that only with respect to the first two causes are
reward systems really paying off for other than desired behaviors. In the
case of the third and fourth causes the system is rewarding behaviors
desired by the rewarder, and the systems are fouled up only from the standpoints of those who believe the rewarder's public statements (cause 3), or
those who seek to maximize efficiency rather than other outcomes (cause 4).

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CONCLUSIONS
Modern organization theory requires a recognition that the members of
organizations and society possess divergent goals and motives. It therefore is
unlikely that managers and their subordinates will seek the same outcomes.
Three possible remedies for this potential problem are suggested.
Selection
It is theoretically possible for organizations to employ only those individuals whose goals and motives are wholly consonant with those of management. In such cases the same behaviors judged by subordinates to be
rational would be perceived by management as desirable. State-of-the-art
reviews of selection techniques, however, provide scant grounds for hope
that such an approach would be successful (for example, see 12).
Training
Another theoretical alternative is for the organization to admit those
employees whose goals are not consonant with those of management and
then, through training, socialization, or whatever, alter employee goals to
make them consonant. However, research on the effectiveness of such training programs, though limited, provides further grounds for pessimism (for
example, see 3).
Altering the Reward System
What would have been the result if:
1. Nixon had been assured by his advisors that he could not win reelection except by discussing the issues in detail?
2. Physicians' conduct was subjected to regular examination by review
boards for type 1 errors (calling healthy people ill) and to penalties
(fines, censure, etc.) for errors of either type?
3. The President of XYZ Corporation had to choose between (a)
spending $11 million dollars for antipollution equipment, and (b)
incurring a fifty-fifty chance of going to jail for five years?
Managers who complain that their workers are not motivated might do
well to consider the possibility that they have installed reward systems which
are paying off for behaviors other than those they are seeking. This, in part,
is what happened in Vietnam, and this is what regularly frustrates societal
efforts to bring about honest politicians, civic-minded managers, etc. This
certainly is what happened in both the manufacturing and the insurance
companies.
A first step for such managers might be to find out what behaviors currently are being rewarded. Perhaps an instrument similar to that used in
the manufacturing firm could be useful for this purpose. Chances are
excellent that these managers will be surprised by what they findthat their

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firms are not rewarding what they assume they are. In fact, such undesirable
behavior by organizational members as they have observed may be explained largely by the reward systems in use.
This is not to say that all organizational behavior is determined by formal
rewards and punishments. Certainly it is true that in the absence of formal
reinforcement some soldiers will be patriotic, some presidents will be
ecology minded, and some orphanage directors will care about children.
The point, however, is that in such cases the rewarder is not causing the
behaviors desired but is only a fortunate bystander. For an organization to
act upon its members, the formal reward system should positively reinforce desired behaviors, not constitute an obstacle to be overcome.
It might be wise to underscore the obvious fact that there is nothing
really new in what has been said. In both theory and practice these matters
have been mentioned before. Thus in many states Good Samaritan laws
have been installed to protect doctors who stop to assist a stricken motorist.
In states without such laws it is commonplace for doctors to refuse to stop,
for fear of involvement in a subsequent lawsuit. In college basketball
additional penalties have been instituted against players who foul their opponents deliberately. It has long been argued by Milton Friedman and others
that penalties should be altered so as to make it irrational to disobey the
ecology laws, and so on.
By altering the reward system the organization escapes the necessity of
selecting only desirable people or of trying to alter undesirable ones. In
Skinnerian terms (as described in 11, p. 704), "As for responsibility and
goodnessas commonly definedno one . . . would want or need them.
They refer to a man's behaving well despite the absence of positive reinforcement that is obviously sufficient to explain it. Where such reinforcement
exists, 'no one needs goodness.' "

REFERENCES
1. Barnard, Chester I. The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964).
2. Blau, Peter M., and W. Richard Scott. Formal Organizations (San Francisco: Chandler,
1962).
3. Fiedler, Fred E. "Predicting the Eflfects of Leadership Training and Experience from
the Contingency Model," Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 56 (1972), 114-119.
4. Garland, L. H. "Studies of the Accuracy of Diagnostic Procedures," American Journal
Roentgenological, Radium Therapy Nuclear Medicine, Vol. 82 (1959), 25-38.
5. Kerr, Steven. "Some Modifications in MBO as an OD Strategy," Academy of Management Proceedings, 1973, pp. 39-42.
6. Kerr, Steven. "What Price Objectivity?" American Sociologist, Vol. 8 (1973), 92-93.
7. Litwin, G. H., and R. A. Stringer, Jr. Motivation and Organizational Climate (Boston:
Harvard University Press, 1968).
8. Perrow, Charles. "The Analysis of Goals in Complex Organizations," in A. Etzioni (Ed.),
Readings on Modern Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969).
9. Scheff, Thomas J. "Decision Rules, Types of Error, and Their Consequences in Medical
Diagnosis," in F. Massarik and P. Ratoosh (Eds.), Mathematical Explorations in Behavioral Science (Homewood, 111.: Irwin, 1965).
10. Simon, Herbert A. Administrative Behavior (New York: Free Press, 1957).

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11. Swanson, G. B. "Review Symposium: Beyond Freedom and Dignity," American

Journal of Sociotogy, Vol. 78 (1972), 702-705.
12. Webster, E. Decision Making in the Employment Interview (Montreal: Industrial
Relations Center, McGill University, 1964).