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Perception and Its Objects Strawson

The document discusses Ayer's account of perception and its objects. It analyzes Ayer's view that ordinary perceptual judgments imply more than a strict account of sensory experience. The author aims to clarify some doubts about Ayer's realist form of realism and compare it to Mackie's views. The author stresses that accounts of sensory experience must be faithful without relying on the truth of associated judgments.

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Milica VuloVic
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
694 views9 pages

Perception and Its Objects Strawson

The document discusses Ayer's account of perception and its objects. It analyzes Ayer's view that ordinary perceptual judgments imply more than a strict account of sensory experience. The author aims to clarify some doubts about Ayer's realist form of realism and compare it to Mackie's views. The author stresses that accounts of sensory experience must be faithful without relying on the truth of associated judgments.

Uploaded by

Milica VuloVic
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Download as RTF, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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PERCEPTION AND ITS OBJECTS

P. F. STRA WSON
Ayer has aIways given the proIe! o" per#eption a #entraI pIa#e in is thin$ing. ReasonaIy so% "ar a phi&osopher's views on this
()estion a"e a $ey oth to is theory o" $nowIe*ge in generaI an* to is !etaphysi#s. The !ove!ent o" Ayer's own tho)ght has
een "ro! pheno!enaIis! to what he *es#ries in is Iatest treat!ent o" the topi# as 'a sophisti#ate* Corro o" rea&is!'.+ The
epithet is *o)Iy apt. No a*e()ate a##o)nt o" the !atter #an e si!pIe% an* Ayer's a##o)nt, whi&e *isting)ishe* y is
a##)sto!e* I)#i*ity an* e#ono!y o" sty&e, is notaIy an* s)t&y responsive to a&I the #o!pIe-ities inherent in the s).e#t itse&"
an* to a&I the press)res o" !ore or Iess pers)asive arg)!ent whi#h ave !ar$e* the #o)rse o" its treat!ent y phi&osophers. /et
the "or! o" rea&is! he *e"en*s has another $in* o" sophisti#ation ao)t whi#h it is possiie to ave reservations an* *o)ts% an*,
tho)gh I a! #ons#io)s o" eing "ar tra! #&ear on the !atter !yseI", I sha&& try to !a$e so!e o" !y own *o)ts an* reservations
as #&ear as I #an. I sha&& ta$e as !y te-t Chapters 0 an* 1 o" The Centrai Questions oj Philosophy; an* I sha&& aiso #onsi*er a
*i""erent $in* o" rea&is!2that a*vo#ate* y
J. 3. 4a#$ie in is oo$ on 3o#$e.5 There a"e points o" #onta#t as we&I as o" #ontrast etween Ayer's an* 4a#$ie's views. A #o!2
parison etween the! wi&& heIp to ring o)t the nat)re o" !y reservations ao)t oth.
A##or*ing to Ayer, the starting2point o" serio)s tho)ght on the !atter o" per#eption #onsists in the "a#t that o)r nor!ai
per#ept)ai .)*ge!ents aIways 'go eyon*' the sensiie e-perien#e whi#h gives
Reprinte* y per!ission o" the a)thor an* 4a#!i&&an, 3on*on an* Basingsto$e,
"ro! 6. 4#Dona&* 7e*.8, Perception and Identity: Essays presented to A. J. Ayer 79:;:8, 092<=.
9 A. J. Ayer, The CentraI Questions oJ Philosophy 73on*on, 9:;>8 #hs. 0 an* 1,
pp. <?2999.
5 J. 3. 4a#$ie, ProblemsJrom Loce 7O-"or*, 9:;<8 #hs. 9 an* 5, pp. ;2;+.
rise to the!% "ar those .)*ge!ents #arry i!p&i#ations whieh wo)&* not e #arrie* y any 'striet a##o)nt' o" that e-perien#e.> Ayer
sees or*inary per#ept)a& .)*ge!ents as re"&e#ting or e!o*ying what he #a&&s the #o!!on2sense view o" the physiea& wor&*,
whieh is, a!ong other things, a rea&ist view% an* he sees that view itse&" as having the #hara#ter o" 'a theory with respe#t to the
i!!e*iate *ata o" per#eption'. 0 @e *evotes so!e spa#e to an a##o)nt o" how the theory !ight e seen as #apa&e o" eing
*eve&ope* y an in*ivi*)aI oserver on the asis o" the *ata avai&a&e to iro% tho)gh he *isavows any intention o" giving an
a#t)a& history o" the theory's *eve&op!en&. The p)rpose o" the a##o)nt is, rather, to ring o)t those "eat)res o" sensi&e e-perien#e
whieh !a$e it possi&e to e!p&oy the theory s)##ess")&&y an* whieh, in*ee*, .)sti"y a##eptan#e o" i&. For it is, he ho&*s, y an*
&arge an a##epta&e theory, even tho)gh the *is#overies o" physi#a& s#ien#e !ay re()ire )s to !o*i"y it in #ertain respe#ts.
Evi*ent&y no in"ant is *e&ivere* into the wor&* a&rea*y e()ippe* with what Ayer #a&&s the #o!!on2sense view o" i&. That view
has to e a#()ire*% an* it is open to the psy#ho&ogist o" in"ant &earning to pro*)#e at &east a spe#)&ative a##o)nt o" the stages o"
its a#()isition. Ayer insists, as I ave re!ar$e*, that is own a##o)nt o" a possi&e &ine o" *eve&op!ent or #onstr)#tion o" the
#o!!on2sense view is not inten*e* as a spe#)&ative #ontri)tion to the theory o" in"ant &earning. It is inten*e*, rather, as an
ana&ysis o" the nat)re o" !at)re or a*)&t per#ept)a& e-perien#e, an ana&ysis *esigne* to show .)st how #ertain "eat)res o" !at)re
sensi&e e-perien#e vin*ieate or s)stain the #o!!on2sense view whieh is e!o*ie* or re"&e#te* in !at)re per#ept)a&.)*ge!ents.
C&ear&y the two ai!s ere *isting)ishe*2the genetie2psy#ho&ogiea& an* the ana&yti#2phi&osophiea&2are very *i""erent in*ee*, an* it
wi&& e o" great i!portan#e not to #on")se the!. In partie)&ar it wi&& e i!portant to r)n no ris$ o" #hara#teriAing !at)re sensi&e
e-perien#e in ter!s a*e()ate at est on&y "or the #hara#teriAation o" so!e stage o" in"anti&e e-perien#e. It is not #&ear that Ayer
entire&y avoi*s this *anger.
What is #&ear is that i" we a##ept Ayer's starting2point, i" we agree that O)r or*inary per#ept)a& .)*ge!ents #arry i!p&i#ations
not #arrie* y a 'striet a##o)nt' o" the sensi&e e-perien#e whi#h gives rise to the!, then we !)st !a$e aso&)te&y s)re that o)r
a##o)nt o" that e-perien#e, in the "or! it ta$es in o)r !at)re &ire, is in*ee* stri#t2in
> Ayer, Centrai Questions! ?9, ?:. 0 Ii*. 88.
the sense o" stri(t&y #orre#t. On&y so #an we ave any prospe#to" !a$ing a #orre#t esti!ate o" the ")rther *o#trines that the
#o!!onsense view o"the wor&* has the stat)s o" a theory"ith respe#t to a type o" sensi&e e-perien#e whi#h provi*es data "ar the
theory% that this e-perien#e s)pp&ies the e#idence on whi#h the theory is ase*% 1 that the #o!!on2sense view #an e regar*e* as
in$erred or at &east in"erra&e "ro! this evi*en#e% an* that o)r or*inary per#ept)a& .)*ge!ents ave the #hara#ter o"
interpretations!% in the &ight o" theory, o" what sensi&e e-perien#e a#t)a&Iy presents )s with.
B)t #an we2an* sho)&* we2a##ept Ayer's starting2pointB 9 thin$ that, s)ita&y interprete*, we oth #an, an* sho)&*, a##ept it.
Two things wi&& e re()ire* o" a stri#t a##o)nt o" o)r sensi&e e-perien#e or o" any parti#)&ar episo*e or s&i#e o" sensi&e e-peri 2
en#eC "irst, as 9 ave .)st re!ar$e*, that it sho)&* in no way *istort or !isrepresent the #hara#ter o" that e-perien#e as we a#t)a&Iy
en.oy it, that is, that it sho)&* e a tr)e or "aith")& a##o)nt% se#on*&y, that its tr)th, in any parti#)&ar #ase, sho)&* e in*epen*ent
o" the tr)th o" the asso#iate* per#ept)a& .)*ge!ent, that is, that it sho)&* re!ain tr)e even i" the asso#iate* per#ept)a& .)*ge!ent
is "a&se. It is the se#on* re()ire!ent on whi#h Ayer &ays stress when he re!ar$s that those .)*ge!ents #arry i!p&i#ations whi#h
wo)&* not e #arri e* y any stri#t a##o)nt o" sensi&e e-perien#e% or, &ess happi&y in !y opinion, that in !a$ing s)#h .)*ge!ents
we ta$e a step eyon* what o)r sensi&e e-perien#e a#t)a&Iy presents )s with. B)t it is the "irst re()ire!ent to whi#h 9 now wish
to give so!e attention.
S)ppose a non2phi&osophi#a& oserver gaAing i*&y thro)gh a win*ow. To hi! we a**ress the re()est, '6ive )s a *es#ription o"
yo)r #)rrent vis)a& e-perien#e', or '@ow is it with yo), vis)a&Iy, at the !o!entB' Dn#a)tione* as to e-a#t&y what we want, he
!ight rep&y in so!e s)#h ter!s as theseC 'I see the re* &ight o" the setting s)n "i&tering thro)gh the &a#$ an* thi#$&y #9)stere*
ran#hes o" the e&!s% 9 see the *app&e* *eer graAing in gro)ps on the vivi* green grass . . .' an* so on. So we e-p&ain to hi!. We
e-p&ain that we want hi! to a!en* is a##o)nt so that, witho)t any sa#ri"i#e o" "i*e&ity to the e-perien#e as a#t)a&Iy en.oye*, it
neverthe&ess she*s a&I that heavy &oa* o" #o!!it!ent to propositions ao)t the wor&* whi#h was #arri e* y the *es#ription he
gave. We want an a##o)nt whi#h #on"ines itse&" stri#t&y within the &i!its o" the s).e#tive
1 Ii*. ?:.
< Ii*. 81.
episo*e, an a##o)nt whi#h wo)&* re!ain tr)e even i" he ha* seen nothing o" what he #&ai!e* to see, even i" he ha* een s).e#t
to tota& i&&)sion.
O)r oserver is ()i#$ on the )pta$e. @e *oes not start ta&$ing ao)t &ights an* #o&o)rs, pat#hes an* patterns. For he sees that to
*o so wo)&* e to "a&si"y the #hara#ter o" the e-perien#e he a#t)a&Iy en.oye*. @e says, instea*, 'I )n*erstan*. &'ve got to #)t o)t o"
!y report a&I #o!!it!ent to propositions ao)t in*epen*ent&y e-isting o.e#ts. We&I, the si!p&est way to *o this, whi&e
re!aining "aith")& to the #hara#ter o" the e-perien#e as a#t)a&Iy en.oye*, is to p)t !y previo)s report in inverte* #o!!as or
oratio o&i()a an* *es#rie !y vis)a& e-perien#e as s)#h as it wo)&* ave een nat)ra& to *es#rie in these ter!s, ha* I not
re#eive* this a**itiona& instr)#tion. Th)sC EI ha* a vis)a& e-perien#e s)#h as it wo)&* ave een nat)ra& to *es#rie y saying that
I saw, et#. . . . For, to *es#rie in these wor*s, 'I saw . . . et#.'G were it not "ar the o&igation to e-#&)*e #o!!it!ent to
propositions ao)t in*epen*ent&y e-isting o.e#ts.E In this way F#ontin)es the oserverG I use the per#ept)a& #&ai!2the #&ai! it
was nat)ra& to !a$e in the #ir#)!stan#es2in ar*er to #hara#teriAe !y e-perien#e, witho)t a#t)a&Iy !a$ing the #&ai!. I ren*er the
per#ept)a& .)*ge!ent internaI to the #hara#teriAation o" the e-perien#e witho)t a#t)a&&y asserting the #ontent o" the .)*ge!ent.
An* this is rea&&y the est possi&e way o" #hara#teriAing the e-perien#e. There a"e perhaps a&ternative &o#)tions whi#h !ight
serve the p)rpose, so &ong as they a"e )n*ersto o* as eing to the sa!e e""e#t2on the who&e, the !ore arti"i#ia& the etter, sin#e
their arti"i#ia&ity wi&& he&p to !a$e it #&earer .)st to what e""e#t they a"e inten*e* to e. Th)s we !ight aveC EIt sensi&y see!e*
to !e .)st as i" I were seeing s)#h2an*2s)#h a s#eneE or E4y vis)a& e-perien#e #an e #hara#teriAe* y saying that I saw what I
saw, s)pposing I saw anything, as a s#ene o" the "o&&owing #hara#ter . . .'E
I" !y oserver is right in this2an* I thin$ he is2then #ertain generaI #on#&)sions "o&Iow. O)r per#ept)a& .)*ge!ents, as Ayer
He!ar$s, e!o*y or re"Ie#t a #ertain view o" the wor&*, as #ontainIOg o.e#ts, vario)s&y propertie*, &o#ate* in a #o!!on spa#e
an* #ontin)ing in their e-isten#e in*epen*ent&y o" o)r interr)pte* an* re&ative&y "Ieeting per#eptions o" the!. O)r !a$ing o"
s)#h .)*gerne,nts i!p&ies o)r possession an* app&i#ation o" #on#epts o" s)#h OHe#ts. B)t now it appears that we #annot give a
veri*i#a& #hara#tenAation even o" the sensi&e e-perien#e whi#h these .)*ge!ents, as Ayer e-presses i&, 'go eyon*', witho)t
re"eren#e to those .)*ge!ents the!se&ves% that o)r sensi&e e-perien#e itse&" is thoro)gh&y per!eate* with those #on#epts o"
o.e#ts whi#h "ig)re in s)#h .)*ge!ents. This *oes noi !ean, that is, it *oes noi "o&&ow *ire#t&y "ro! this "eat)re o" sensi&e
e-perien#e, that the generaI view o" the wor&* whi#h those .)*ge!ents re"&e#t !)si e tr)e. That wo)&* e too short a way with
s#epti#is!. B)t it *oes "o&&ow, I thin$, that o)r sensi&e e-perien#e #o)&* noi ave the #hara#ter it *oes ave )n&ess2at &east e"ore
phi&osophi#a& re"&e#tion sets in2 we )n()estioning&y too that generaI view o" the wor&* to e tr)e. The #on#epts o" the o.e#tive
whi#h we see to e in*ispensa&e to the veri*i#a& #hara#teriAation o" sensi&e e-perien#e si!p&y wo)&* noi e in this way
in*ispensa&e )n&ess those whose e-perien#e it was initia&Iy an* )nre"&e#tive&y too$ s)#h #on#epts to ave app&i #ation in the
wor&*.
This has a ")rther #onse()en#eC the #onse()en#e that it is ()ite inappropriate to represent the generaI, rea&ist view o" the wor&*
whi#h is re"&e#te* in o)r or*inary per#ept)a& .)*ge!ents as having the stat)s o" a theory with respe#t to sensi&e e-perien#e% that
it is inappropriate to represent that e-perien#e as s)pp&ying the data "or s)#h a theory or the e#idence on whi#h it is ase* or "ro!
whi#h it is in$erred or in$errable; that it is inappropriate to spea$ o" o)r or*inary per#ept)a& .)*ge!ents as having the #hara#ter
o" an interpretation! in the &ight o" theory, o" the #ontent o" o)r sensi&e e-perien#e. The reason "or this is si!p&e. In or*er "or
so!e e&ie" or sei o" e&ie"s to e #orre#t&y *es#rie* as a theory in respe#t o" #ertain *ata, it !)si e possi&e to *es#rie the *ata
on the asis o" whi#h the theory is he&* in ter!s whi#h *o noi pres)ppose the a##eptan#e o" the theory on the pari o" those "or
who! the *ata ore *ata. B)t this is .)st the #on*ition we ave seen noi to e satis"ie* in the #ase where the so2#a&&e* *ata a"e the
#ontents o" sensi&e e-perien#e an* the so2#a&&e* theory is a generaI rea&ist view o" the wor&*. The '*ata' a"e &a*en with the
'theory'. Sensi&e e-perien#e is per!eate* y #on#epts )nre"&e#tive a##eptan#e o" the generaI app&i#ai&ity o" whi#h is a #on*ition
o" its eing so per!eate*, a #on*ition o" that e-perien#e eing what it is% an* these #on#epts a"e o" rea&isti#a&Iy #on#eive*
o.e#ts.
I !)si !a$e it ()ite *ear what I a! saying an* what I a! no& saying ere. I a! ta&$ing o" the or*inary non2phi&osophi#a& !an.
I a! ta&$ing o" )s a&I e"ore we "e&t, i" ever we *i* "ee&, any in*i nation to respon* to the so&i#itations o" a generaI s#epti#is!, to
regar* it as raising a pro&e!. I a! saying that it "o&Iows "ro! the #hara#ter o" sensi&e e-perien#e as we a&I a#t)a&Iy en.oy it that
a #o!!on2sense rea&ist view o" the wor&* *oes noi in generaI ave the stat)s o" a theory in respe#t o" that e-perien#e% whi&e Ayer,
as I )n*erstan* iro, ho&*s that it *oes. B)t I a! noi *enying that to one who has seen, or thin$s he has seen, that sensi&e
e-perien#e !ight ave the #hara#ter it *oes ave an* yet a rea&ist view or the wor&* e "a&se, to him the i*ea !ay we&I present
itse&" that the est way o" a##o)nting "ar sensi&e e-perien#e as having that #hara#ter is to a##ept the #o!!on rea&ist view o" the
wor&* or so!e variant o" it. &e !ight e sai* to a*opt, as a theory, the *o#trine that the #o!!on rea&ist view o" the wor&* is, at
&east in so!e asi# essentia&s, tr)e. B)t this wi&& e a phi&osopher's theory, *esigne* to *ea& with a phi&osopher's pro&e!. 7I sha&&
noi ere *is#)ss its !erits as s)#h.8 What I a! #on#erne* to *isp)te is the *o#trine that a rea&ist view o" the wor&* has, "ar any
!an, the stat)s o" a theory in re&ation to is sensi&e e-perien#e, a theory in the &ight o" whi#h he interprets that e-perien#e in
!a$ing is per#ept)a& .)*ge!ents.
To p)t the point s)!!ari&y, whereas Ayer says we ta$e a step eyon* o)r sensi&e e-perien#e in !a$ing o)r per#ept)a& .)*ge2
!ents, I say rather that we ta$e a step a#$ 7in generaI8 "ro! o)r per#ept)a& .)*ge!ents in "ra!ing a##o)nts o" o)r sensi&e
e-perien#e% "ar we ave 7in generaI8 to in#&)*e a re"eren#e to the "or!er in "ra!ing a veri*i#a& *es#ription o" the &atter.
It !ay see!, on a s)per"i#ia& rea*ing, that Ayer ha* anti#ipate* an* answere* this o.e#tion. @e intro*)#es, as ne#essary "ar
the #hara#teriAation o" o)r sensi&e e-perien#e, #ertain #on#epts o" types o" pattern, the na!es "ar whi#h a"e orrowe* "ro! the
na!es o" or*inary physi#a& o.e#ts. Th)s he spea$s o" vis)a& &ea" patterns, #hair patterns, #at patterns, an* so on.; At the sa!e
&i!e, he is #are")&, i" I rea* hi! right&y, to g)ar* against the i!pression that the )se o" this ter!ino&ogy #o!!its hi! to the view
that the e!p&oy!ent o" the #orrespon*ing physi#a&2o.e#t #on#epts the!se&ves is ne#essary to the #hara#teriAation o" o)r sensi&e
e-perien#e.? The ter!ino&ogy isappropriate 7he ho&*s8 si!p&y e#a)se those "eat)res o" sensi&e e-perien#e to whi#h the
ter!ino&ogy is app&ie* a"e the "eat)res whi#h govern o)r i*enti"i#ations o" the physi#a& o.e#ts we thin$ we see. They a"e the
"eat)res, 'i!p&i#it&y noti#e*' , : whi#h provi*e the !ain #&)es on whi#h o)r every*ay JD*ge!ents o" per#eption a"e ase*.
; Ii*. :9.
? Ii*. :<.
: Ii*. :9
This is ingenio)s, )i I *o noi thin$ it wi&& *o. This we #an see !ore #&ear&y i" we )se an invente*, rather than a *erive*
ter!ino&ogy "or these s)ppose* "eat)res an* then *raw )p a ta&e o" e-p&i#it #orre&ations etween the invente* na!es an* the
physi#a&o.e#t na!es. Ea#h arti"i#ia& "eat)re Da!e is sei against the Da!e o" a type o" physi#a& o.e#tC o)r per#ept)a&
i*enti"i#ations o" seen o.e#ts as o" that type a"e he&* to e governe* y i!p&i#it noti#ings o" that "eat)re. The nat)re an*
signi"i#an#e o" the "eat)re na!es is now ()ite #&ear&y e-p&aine* an* we ave to as$ o)rse&ves whether it is these rather than the
asso#iate* physi#a&2o.e#t ter!s that we o)ght to )se i" we a"e to give a ()ite stri#t an* "aith")& a##o)nt o" o)r sensi&e
e-perien#e. I thin$ it is #&ear that this is noi so% that the i*ea o" o)r or*inary per#ept)a& .)*ge!ents as eing invaria&y ase*
)pon, or invaria&y iss)ing "ro!, awareness o" s)#h "eat)res is a !yth. The sit)ation is rather, as I ave a&rea*y arg)e*, that the
e!p&oy!ent o" o)r or*inary, ")&&2&oo*e* #on#epts o" physi#a& o.e#ts is in*ispensa&e to a striet, an* stri#t&y veri*i#a&, a##o)nt
o" o)r sensi&e e-perien#e.
On#e again, I !)si !a$e it #&ear what I a!, an* what I a! noi, saying. I ave een spea$ing o" the typi#a& or stan*ar* #ase o"
!at)re sensi&e an* per#ept)a& e-perien#e. I ave no interest at a&I in *enying the thesis that there a&so o##)r #ases o" sensi&e
e-perien#e s)#h that the e!p&oy!ent o" ")&&2&oo*e* #on#epts o" physi#a& o.e#ts wo)&* noi e in*ispensa&e, an* !ay e
inappropriate, to giving a striet a##o)nt o" the e-perien#e. S)#h #ases a"e o" *i""erent types, an* there is ODe in parti#)&ar whieh
is o" interest in the present #onne#tion. An oserver, gaAing thro)gh is win*ow, !ay perhaps, y an e""ort o" wi&&, ring hi!se&"
to see, or even wi&&&ess&y "in* hi!se&" seeing, what he $nows to e the ran#hes o" the trees no &onger as ran#hes at a&&, )i as an
intrieate pattern o" *ar$ &ines o" #o!p&e- *ire#tions an* shapes an* vario)s siAes against a a#$gro)n* o" varying sha*es o" grey.
The "ra!e o" !in* in whi#h we en.o/%2i"2we ever *o en.oy, this $in* o" e-perien#e is a rare an* sophisti#ate*, noi a stan*ar* or
nor!a&, "ra!e o" !in*. Perhaps the "a#t, i" it is a "a#t, that we #an ring o)rse&ves into this "ra!e o" !in* when we #hoose !ay
e he&* to give a sense to the i*ea o" o)r 'i!p&i#it&y noti#ing' s)#h patterns even when we a"e noi in this "ra!e o" !in*. I" so, it is
a sense very "ar re!ove* "ro! that whi#h Ayer's thesis re()ires. For that thesis re()ires noi si!p&y the possi i&ity, )i the a#t)a&
o##)rren#e, in a&I #ases o" per#eption, o" sensi&e e-perien#e o" this $in*. ODe &ine o" retreat !ay see! to &ie open at this pointC a
retreat to the position o" saying that the o##)rren#e o" s)#h e-perien#es !ay e in$erred! even tho)gh we *o not, in the h)rry o"
&ire, genera&&y noti#e or re#a&& their o##)rren#e. B)t s)#h a retreat wo)&* e the "ina& irony. The ite!s in ()estion wo)&* ave
#hange* their stat)s ra*i#a&&yC instea* o" *ata "ar a #o!!on2sense theory o" the wor&*, they wo)&* appear as #onse()en#es o" a
sophisti#ate* theory o" the !in*.
This #on#&)*es the "irst stage o" !y arg)!ent. I ave arg)e* that !at)re sensi&e e-perien#e 7in generaI8 presents itse&" as, in
Iantian phrase, an immediate #ons#io)sness o" the e-isten#e o" things o)tsi*e )s. 'Immediate! o" #o)rse, *oes not !ean
in$allible.( @en#e, the #o!!on rea&ist #on#eption o" the wor&* *oes not ave the #hara#ter o" a 'theory' in re&ation to the '*ata o"
sense'. I ave not #&ai!e* that this "a#t is o" itse&" s)""i#ient to 're")te' s#epti#is! or to provi*e a phi&osophi#a& '*e!onstration' o"
the tr)th o" so!e "or! o" rea&is!% tho)gh I thin$ it *oes provi*e the right starting point "ar re"&e#tion )pon these enterprises. B)t
that is another story an* I sha&& not try to te&& it ere. 4y point so "ar is that the or*inary h)!an #o!!it!ent to a #on#ept)a&
s#he!e o" a rea&ist #hara#ter is not proper&y *es#rie*, even in a stret#he* sense o" the wor*s, as a theoreti#a& #o!!it!ent. It is,
rather, so!ething given with the given.
II
B)t we a"e phi&osophers as we&& as !en% an* so !)st e-a!ine !ore #&ose&y the nat)re o" the rea&ist s#he!e to whi#h we a"e pre2
theoreti#a&&y #o!!itte* an* then #onsi*er whether we a"e not rationa&&y #onstraine*, as 3o#$e an* 4a#$ie wo)&* !aintain we
a"e, to !o*i"y it ()ite ra*i#a&&y in the &ight o" o)r $now&e*ge o" physi#s an* physio&ogy. Sho)&* we not a&so, as phi&osophers,
#oosi*er the ()estion o" whether we #an rationa&&y !aintain any "or! o" rea&is! at a&&B Perhaps we sho)&*% )t, as a&rea*y
re!ar$e*, that is a ()estion I sha&& not #onsi*er ere. 4y !ain o.e#t, in the present se#tion, is to get a #&ear view o" the !ain
"eat)res o" o)r pre2theoreti#a& s#he!e e"ore #onsi*ering whether It IS *e"ensi&e, as it stan*s, or not, I go in a so!ewhat
ro)n*ao)t Way to wor$.
I have spo$en o" o)r pre2theoreti#a& s#he!e as rea&ist in #hara#ter. phi&osophers who treat o" these ()estions #o!!on&y
*isting)ish I""erent "or!s o" rea&is!o So *o oth Ayer an* 4a#$ie. They oth !ention, at ODe e-tre!e, a "or! o" rea&is! whi#h
4a#$ie #a&Is 'naive' an* even 'very naive', )i whi#h !ight !ore appropriate&y e #a&&e* '#on")se* rea&is!'. A s)""erer "ro!
#on")se* rea&is! "aiJs to *raw any *istin#tion etween sensi&e e-perien#es 7or 'per#eptions'8 an* in*epen*ent&y e-isting things
7or 'o.e#ts per#eive*'8 )i is sai* 7y 4a#$ie e-po)n*ing @)!e8 to #re*it the "or!er with persistent )noserve* e-isten#e. IO It
sho)&* e re!ar$e* that, i" this is an a##)rate way o" *es#riing the naive rea&ist's #on#eption o" the !atter, he !)si e very
#on")se* in*ee*, sin#e the e-pression ')noserve*' a&rea*y i!p&ies the *istin#tion whi#h he is sai* to "aiJ to !a$e. Spea$ing in
is own person, 4a#$ie gives no positive a##o)nt o" the naive rea&ist's view o" things, )i si!p&y says that there is, histori#a&&y,
in the tho)ght o" ea#h o" )s, a phase in whi#h we "ai& to !a$e the *istin#tion in ()estion.&9 It !ay in*ee* e so. The point is ODe
to e re"erre* to the e-perts on in"anti&e *eve&op!ent. B)t in any #ase the !atter is noi ere o" any #onse()en#e. For we a"e
#on#erne* with !at)re per#ept)a& e-perien#e an* with the #hara#ter o" the s#he!e to whi#h those who en.oy s)#h e-perien#e a"e
pre2theoreti#a&&y #o!!itte*. An* it see!s to !e as #ertain as anything #an e that, as an integrai pari o" that s#he!e, we
*isting)ish, nat)ra&&y an* )nre"&e#tive&y, etween o)r seeings an* hearings an* "ee&ings2o)r per#eivings2o" o.e#ts an* the
o.e#ts we see an* hear an* "ee&% an* hen#e ()ite #onsistent&y a##ept oth the interr)pte*ness o" the "or!er an* the #ontin)an#e
in e-isten#e, )noserve*, o" the &atter.
At the opposite e-tre!e "ro! naive rea&is! stan*s what !ay e #a&I e* s#ienti"i# or 3o#$ian rea&is!o This "or! o" rea&is!
#re*its physi#a& o.e#ts on&y with those o" their properties whi#h a"e !entione* in physi#a& theory an* physi#a& e-p&anation,
in#&)*ing the #a)saI e-p&anation o" o)r en.oy!ent o" the $in* o" per#ept)a& e-perien#e we in "a#t en.oy. It has the #onse()en#e
that we *o not, an* in*ee* #annot, per#eive o.e#ts as they rea&Iy a"e. It !ight e sai* that this #onse()en#e *oes noi ho&* in an
)n()a&i"ie* "or!. For we per#eive 7or see! to per#eive8 o.e#ts as having shape, siAe, an* position% an* they rea&Iy *o ave
shape, siAe, an* position an* !ore or &ess s)#h shape, siAe, an* position as we see! to per#eive the! as having. B)t this rep&y
!is#onstr)es the inten*e* "or#e o" the a&&ege* #onse()en#e. We #annot in sense per#eption2the point is
an o&* one2e#o!e aware o" the shape, siAe an* position o"
IO 4a#$ie, Problems! <;. I& Ii*. <?.
physi#a& o.e#ts e-#ept y way o" awareness o" o)n*aries *e"ine*
in so!e sensory !o*e2"or e-a!p&e, y vis)a& an* ta#ti&e ()a&ities s)#h as s#ienti"i# rea&is! *enies to the o.e#ts the!se&ves% an*
no #hange in, or a**ition to, o)r sensory e()ip!ent #o)&* a&ter this "a#t. To per#eive physi#a& o.e#ts as, a##or*ing to s#ienti"i#
rea&is!, they rea&&y a"e wo)&* e to per#eive the! as &a#$ing any s)#h ()a&ities. B)t this notion is se&"2#ontra*i#tory. So it is a
ne#essary #onse()en#e o" this "or! o" rea&is! that we *o not per#eive o.e#ts as they rea&&y a"e. In*ee*, in the sense o" the pre2
theoreti#a& notion o" per#eiving2that is, o" i!!e*iate awareness o" things o)tsi*e )s2we *o not, on the s#ienti"i#2rea&ist view,
per#eive physi#a& o.e#ts at a&I. We a"e, rather, the vi#ti!s o" a syste!ati# i&&)sion whi#h ostinate&y #&ings to )s even i" we
e!ra#e s#ienti"i# rea&is!o For we #ontin)e to en.oy e-perien#e as o" physi#a& o.e#ts in spa#e, o.e#ts o" whi#h the spatia&
#hara#teristi#s an* re&ations a"e *e"ine* y the sensi&e ()a&ities we per#eive the! as having% )t there a"e no s)#h physi#a&
o.e#ts as these. The on&y tr)e physi#a& o.e#ts a"e ite!s syste!ati#a&&y #orre&ate* with an* #a)sa&&y responsi&e "or that
e-perien#e% an* the on&y sense in whi#h we con e sai* to per#eive the! is .)st that they #a)se )s to en.oy that e-perien#e.
These re!ar$s a"e inten*e* on&y as a description o" s#ienti"i# rea&is!o I *o not #&ai! that they show it to e )ntena&e. I sha&&
ret)rn to the topi# &ater.
In etween the 'naive' an* the 's#ienti"i#' varieties, Ayer an* 4a#$ie ea#h re#ogniAe another Corro o" rea&is!, whi#h they ea#h
as#rie to '#o!!on sense'. B)t there is a *i""eren#e etween Ayer's version o" #o!!on2sense rea&is! an* 4a#$ie's. For 4a#$ie's
version, )n&i$e Ayer's, shares ODe #r)#ia& "eat)re with s#ienti"i# rea&is!o
The theory o" per#eption asso#iate* with s#ienti"i# or 3o#$ian rea&is! is #o!!on&y an* reasona&y *es#rie* as a
representative theory. Ea#h o" )s see!s to hi!se&" to e per#ept)a&&y aware o" o.e#ts o" a #ertain $in*C o.e#ts in spa#e o)tsi*e
)s with vis)a& an* ta#ti&e ()a&ities. There a"e in "a#t, on this view, no s)#h o.e#ts% )t these o.e#t appearan#es #an in a roa*
sense e sai* to e representative o" those a#t)a& o.e#ts in spa#e o)tsi*e )s whi#h a"e syste!ati#a&&y #orre&ate* with the
appearan#es an* #a)sa&&y respons&&e "or the!. The interesting "eat)re o" 4a#$ie's version o" #H!!on2sense rea&is! is that the
theory o" per#eption asso#iate* With it is no &ess a representative theory than that asso#iate* with 3o#$ian rea&is!o The
*i""eren#e is si!p&y that #o!!on sense a##or*ing to 4a#$ie, views o.e#t appearan#es as !ore "aith")K representatives o" a#t)a&
physi#a& o.e#ts than the 3o#$ian a&&owsC in that #o!!on sense, grat)ito)s&y y s#ienti"i# stan*ar*s, #re*its a#t)a& o.e#ts in
spa#e o)tsi*e )s with vis)a& an* ta#ti&e as we&& as pri!ary ()a&itieso As 4a#$ie p)ts it, #o!!on sense a&&ows '#o&o)rs2as2we2see2
the! to e resemblances o" ()a&ities a#t)a&&y in the things' =95 On oth views, sensi&e e-perien#e has its Own, sensi&e o.e#ts%
)t the #o!!on2sense view, a##or*ing to 4a#$ie, a&&ows a $in* o" rese!&an#e etween sensi&e an* physi#a& o.e#ts whi#h the
s#ienti"i# view *oes not.
I hope it is a&rea*y #&ear that this version o" #o!!on2sense rea&is! is ()ite *i""erent "ro! what I ave #a&&e* o)r pre2
theoreti#a& s#he!eo What we or*inari&y ta$e o)rse&ves to e aware o" in per#eption a"e not rese!&an#es o" physi#a& things
the!se&veso This *oes not !ean, as a&rea*y re!ar$e*, that we ave any *i""i#)&ty in *isting)ishing etween o)r e-perien#es o"
seeing, hearing an* "ee&ing o.e#ts an* the o.e#ts the!se&ves. That *istin#tion is as "ir!&y a part o" o)r pre2theoreti#a& s#he!e as
is o)r ta$ing o)rse&ves, in generaI, to e i!!e*iate&y aware o" those o.e#ts. Nor *oes it !ean that we ta$e o)rse&ves to e
i!!)ne "ro! i&&)sion, ha&&)#ination, or !ista$e. We #an, an* *o, per"e#t9y a*e()ate&y *es#rie s)#h #ases witho)t what is, "ro!
the point o" view o" the pre2theoreti#a& s#he!e, the ()ite grat)ito)s intro*)#tion o" sensi&e o.e#ts interpose* etween )s an*
the a#t)a& physi#a& o.e#ts they a"e s)ppose* to represent.
The o** thing ao)t 4a#$ie's presentation is that at ODe point he shows hi!se&" to e per"e#t9y we&& aware o" this "eat)re o"
the rea& rea&is! o" #o!!on sense% "ar he writes, 'What we see! to see, "ee&, hear an* so on o . o ore seen as real thin)s "ithout
)s2that is, o)tsi*e )s. We .)st see things as eing si!p&y there, o" s)#h2an*2s)#h sorts, in s)#h2an*2s)#h re&ationso . . ' 9> @e
goes OD, o" #o)rse, to say that 'o)r seeing the! so is &ogi#a&&y *istin#t "ro! their eing so', that we !ight e, an* in*ee* a"e,
wrongo B)t he wo)&* s#ar#e&y *isp)te that what is th)s seen as rea& an* o)tsi*e )s is a&gH seen as #o&o)re*, as possessing vis)a&
()a&ities% that what is $elt as a rea& thing o)tsi*e )s is a&so "e&t as har* or so"t, s!ooth or ro)gh2s)r"a#e*2as possessing ta#ti&e
()a&itieso The rea& rea&is! o" #o!!on sense, then, *oes in*ee* #re*it physi#a& things with vis)a&
an* ta#ti&e properties% )t it *oes so not in the spirit o" a notion o"
95 Ii*. <0.
I> Ii*. <9.
representative per#eption, )t in the spirit o" a notion o" *ire#t or i!!e*iate per#eption.
4a#$ie's version o" #o!!on2sense rea&is! is, then, I !aintain, a *istortion o" the a#t)a& pre2theoreti#a& rea&is! o" #o!!on
sense, a *istortion whi#h wrong&y assi!i&ates it, in a ")n*a!enta& respe#t, 9= the 3o#$ian rea&is! he espo)ses. I *o not "in* any
#o!para&e *istortion in Ayer's version. Re apt&y *es#ries the physi#a& o.e#ts we see! to o)rse&ves, an* ta$e o)rse&ves, to
per#eive as 'vis)ota#t)a& #ontin)ants'. The s#he!e as he presents it a&&ows "ar the *istin#tion etween these ite!s an* the
e-perien#es o" per#eiving the! an* "ar the #a)saI *epen*en#e o" the &attee on the "or!er% an* *oes so, as "ar as I #an see, witho)t
intro*)#ing the a&ien "eat)res I ave *is#erne* in 4a#$ie's a##o)nt. It is perhaps *eata&e whether Ayer #an #onsistent&y
!aintain the s#he!e's "ree*o! "ro! s)#h a&ien e&e!ents whi&e #ontin)ing to represent it as having the stat)s o" a 'theory' in
re&ation to the '*ata' o" sensi&e e-perien#e. B)t, having a&rea*y set o)t !y o.e#tions to that *o#trine, I sha&& not p)rs)e the
point. .
So!ething !ore !)st e sai*, however, ao)t the position, in the #o!!on2sense s#he!e, o" the #a)saI re&ation etween
physi#a& o.e#t an* the e-perien#e o" per#eiving it. A&tho)gh Ayer a*!its the re&ation to a pIa#e in the s#he!e, he see!s to
regar* it as a so!ewhat sophisti#ate* a**ition to the &attee, a &ate#o!er, as it were, "ar whi#h roo! has to e !a*e in an a&rea*y
sett&e* arrange!ent.90 This see!s to !e wrong. The i*ea o" the presen#e o" the thing as a##o)nting "ar, or eing responsi&e "ar,
o)r per#ept)a& awareness o" it is i!p&i#it in the pre2theoreti#a& s#he!e "ro! the very start. For we thin$ o" per#eption as a way,
in*ee* the asi# way, o" in"or!ing o)rse&ves ao)t the wor&* o" in*epen*ent&y e-isting thingsC we ass)!e, that is to say, the
generaI re&iai&ity o" O)r per#ept)a& e-perien#es% an* that ass)!ption is the sa!e as the ass)!ption o" a generaI #a)saI
*epen*en#e o" o)r per#ept)a& e-perien#es on the in*epen*ent&y e-isting things we ta$e the! to e o". The tho)ght o" !y "&eeting
per#eption as a perception o" a #ontin)o)s&y an* in*epen*ent&y e-isting thing i!p&i#it&y #ontains the tho)ght that i" the thing ha*
not een there, I sho)&* not even have seemed to per#eive it. It rea&&y sho)&* e ovio)s that with the *Ist!#tion etween
in*epen*ent&y e-isting o.e#ts an* per#ept)a& awareness o" o.e#ts we a&rea*y ave the generaI notion o" #a)saI *epen*en#e o"
the &attee on the "or!er, even i" this is not a !atter
90 Ayer, Centrai Questions! ?;2?.
to whi#h we give !)#h re"&e#tive attention in o)r pre2theoreti#a& *ays.
Two things see! to ave i!pe*e* re#ognition o" this point. One is the "a#t that the #orre#tness o" the *es#ription o" a
per#ept)a& e-perien#e as the per#eption o" a #ertain physi#a& thing lo)ical*y re()ires the e-isten#e o" that thing% an* the lo)ical is
tho)ght to e-#&)*e the causai #onne#tion, sin#e on&y 9=gi#a&Iy *istin#t e-isten#es #an e #a)sa&&y re&ate*. This is noi a serio)s
*i""i#)&ty. The sit)ation has !any para&&eis. 6ion wo)&* noi e the historian o" the *e#&ine an* "a&& o" the Ro!an E!pire )n&ess
there ha* o##)rre* so!e a#t)a& se()en#e o" events !ore or &ess Correspon*ing to is narrative. B)t it is noi eno)gh, "ar hi! to
!erit that *es#ription, that s)#h a se()en#e o" events sho)&* ave o##)rre* an* he sho)&* ave written the senten#es he *i* write.
For hi! to ()a&i"y as the historian o" these events, there !)si e a #a)saI #hain #onne#ting the! with the writing o" the
senten#es. Si!i&ar&y, the !e!ory o" an event's o##)rren#e *oes noi #o)nt as s)#h )n&ess it has its #a)saI origin in that event. An*
the re#ent&y !)#h #anvasse* '#a)saI theory o" re"eren#e' !ere&y #a&Is attention to another instan#e o" the #a)saI &in$ whi#h
otains etween tho)ght an* in*epen*ent&y 7an* anterior&y8 e-isting thing when the "or!er is right&y sai* to ave the &atter as its
o.e#t.
The se#on* i!pe*i!ent is s&ight&y !ore s)t&e. We a"e phi&osophi#a&Iy a##)sto!e*2it is a @)!ean &ega#y2to thin$ing o" the
si!p&est an* !ogi ovio)s $in* o" #a)saI re&ation as ho&*ing etween types o" ite! s)#h that ite!s o" oth types a"e oserva&e
or e-perien#ea&e an* s)#h that oservation or e-perien#e o" either ter! o" the re&ation is *istin#t "ro! oservation or e-perien#e
o" the otherC that is, the #a)sa&&y re&ate* ite!s a"e noi on&y *istin#t e-isten#es, )i a&gH the o.e#ts o" *istin#t oservations or
e-perien#es. We !ay then #o!e to thin$ o" these #on*itions as #onstit)ting a re()ire!ent on a&I pri!itive e&ie" in #a)saI
re&ations, a re()ire!ent whi#h #o)&* e !o*i"ie* or aan*one* on&y in the interests o" theory. Sin#e we ovio)s&y #annot
*isting)ish the oservation o" a physi#a& o.e#t "ro! the e-perien#e o" oserving it2"or they a"e the sa!e thing2we sha&& then e
&e* to #on#&)*e that the i*ea o" the #a)sai *epen*en#e o" per#ept)a& e-perien#e on the per#eive* o.e#t #annot e even an
i!p&i#it pari o" o)r pretheoreti#a& s#he!e. )i !)si e at est an essentia&Iy theoreti#a& a**ition to it.
B)t the *i""i#)&ty is sp)rio)s. By *ire#ting o)r attention to #a)sai re&ations etween objects o" per#eption, we ave si!p&y een
&e* to over&oo$ the spe#ia& #hara#ter o" per#eption itse&". O" #o)rse, the re()ire!ent ho&*s "ar #a)sai re&ations etween *istin#t
o.e#ts o" per#eption% )t not "ar the re&ation etween per#eption an* its o.e#t. When + is a physi#a& o.e#t an* y is a per#eption
o" +! then + is obser#ed an* y is enjoyed. An* in ta$ing the en.oy!ent o" y to e a per#eption o" +! we ore i!p&i#it&y ta$ing it to e
#a)se* y +.
This #on#&)*es the se#on* phase o" !y arg)!ent. I ave trie* to ring o)t so!e !ain "eat)res o" the rea& rea&is! o" #o!!on
sense an* o" the asso#iate* notion o" per#eption. Fro! the stan*point o" #o!!on2sense rea&is! we ta$e o)rse&ves to e
i!!e*iate&y aware o" rea&, en*)ring physi#a& things in spa#e, things en*owe* with vis)a& an* ta#ti&e properties% an* we ta$e it "ar
grante* that these en*)ring things a"e #a)sa&&y responsi&e "ar o)r interr)pte* per#eptions o" the!. The i!!e*ia#y whi#h
#o!!on sense attri)tes to per#ept)a& awareness is in no way in#onsistent either with the *istin#tion etween per#ept)a&
e-perien#e an* thing per#eive* or with the #a)sai *epen*en#e o" the "or!er on the &attee or the e-isten#e o" other #a)sa&&y
ne#essary #on*itions o" its o##)rren#e. Neither is it in#onsistent with the o##)rren#e o" per#ept)a& !ista$e or i&&)sion2a point, &i$e
so !any others o" i!portan#e, whi#h is e-p&i#it&y !a*e y Iant. 91 Both Ayer an* 4a#$ie, e-p&i#it&y or i!p&i#it&y, a#$now&e*ge
that the #o!!on2sense s#he!e in#&)*es this ass)!ption o" i!!e*ia#y24a#$ie in a passage I ave ()ote*, Ayer in is *es#ription
o" the #o!!on2sense s#he!e. Dn"ort)nate&y, 4a#$ie's a#$now&e*ge!ent o" the "a#t is e&ie* y is *es#riing #o!!on2sense
rea&is! as representative in #hara#ter an* Ayer's a#$now&e*ge!ent o" it is p)t in *o)t y is *es#riing the #o!!on2sense
s#he!e as having the stat)s o" a theory in re&ation to sensi&e e-perien#e.
999
It is ODe thing to *es#rie the s#he!e o" #o!!on sense% it is another to s).e#t it to #riti#ai e-a!ination. This is the thir* an*
!ost *i""i#)&t paTL o" !y tas$. The !ain ()estion to e #onsi*ere*, as a&rea*y in*i#ate*, is whether we a"e rationa&&y o)n* to
aan*on, or ra*i#a&&y to !o*i"y, the s#he!e in the &ight o" s#ienti"i# $now&e*ge.
Be"ore a**ressing o)rse&ves *ire#t&y to this ()estion, it is worth stressing2in*ee*, it is essentia& to stress2the grip that #o!!on2
91 Iant, 'The Re")tation o" I*ea&is!', in Criti,ue -. Pure /eason! B5;02:.
sense non2representative rea&is! has on o)r or*inary thin$ing. It is a view o" the wor&* whi#h so thoro)gh&y per!eates o)r
#ons*o)sness that even those who a"e inte&&e#t)a&&y #onvin#e* o" its "a&sity re!ain s).e#t to its power. 4a#$ie a*!its as !)#h,
saying that even when we a"e trying to entertain a 3o#$ian or s#ienti"i# rea&is!' 'o)r &ang)age an* o)r nat)ra& ways o" thin$ing
$eep p)&&ing )s a#$' to a !ore pri!itive view. 9< Consi*er the #hara#ter o" those or*inary #on#epts o" o.e#ts on the
e!p&oy!ent o" whi#h o)r &ives, o)r transa#tions with ea#h other an* the wor&*, *epen*C o)r #on#epts o" #aages, roa*s, twee*
#oats, horses, the &ips an* hair o" the e&ove*. In )sing these ter!s we #ertain&y inten* to e ta&$ing o" in*epen*ent e-isten#es
an* we #ertain&y inten* to e ta&$ing o" i!!e*iate&y per#epti&e things, earers o" pheno!ena& 7vis)o2ta#ti&e8 properties. I"
s#ienti"i# or 3o#$ian rea&is! is #orre#t, we #annot e *oing oth at on#e% it is #on")sion or i&&)sion to s)ppose we #an I" the
things we ta&$ o" rea&&y ave pheno!ena& properties, then they #annot, on this view, e physi#a& things #ontin)o)s&y e-isting in
physi#a& spa#e. Nothing per#epti&e2I ere *rop the ()a&i"i#ation 'i!!e*iate&y', "ar !y )se o" it sho)&* now e #&ear2is a
physi#a&&y rea&, in*epen*ent e-isten#e. No two persons #an ever, in this sense, per#eive the sa!e ite!C nothing at a&I is p)&i#&y
per#epti&e.
B)t how *eep the #on")sion or the i&&)sion !)st goJ @ow ra*i#a&&y it in"e#ts o)r #on#eptsJ S)re&y we !ean y a #aage a
$in* o" thing o" whi#h !ost o" the spe#i!ens we ave en#o)ntere* ave a #hara#teristi# range o" #o&o)rs an* vis)a& shapes an*
"e&t te-t)res% an* not so!ething )noserva&e, !enta&&y represente* y a #o!p&e- o" sensi&e e-perien#es whi#h it #a)ses. The
#o!!on #ons#io)sness is not to e "oe* o"" with the #on#ession that, a"ter a&&, the physi#a& thing has2in a way2a shape. The
way in whi#h s#ienti"i# rea&is! #on#e*es a shape is a&together the wrong way "or the #o!!on #ons#io)sness. The &over who
a*!ires the #)rve o" is !istress's &ips or the &over o" ar#hite#t)re who a*!ires the &ines o" a )i&*ing ta$es hi!se&" to e
a*!iring "eat)res o" those very o.e#ts the!se&ves% )t it is the vis)a& shape, the vis)a&&y *e"ine* shape, that he a*!ires. 4a#$ie
s)ggests that there is a gen)ine resemblance etween s).e#tive representation an* o.e#tive rea&ity as "ar as shape is #on#erne*%
9; )t this s)ggestion is ()ite )na##epta&e. It !a$es no sense to spea$ o" a pheno!ena& property as
9< 4a#$ie, Problems! <?.
9; Ii*., #hs. 9 an* 5, passim.
esemb*in) a non2pheno!ena&, astra#t property s)#h as physi#a& shape is #on#eive* to e y s#ienti"i# rea&is!o The property o"
&oo$ing s()are or ro)n* #an no !ore rese!&e the property, so #on#eive*, o" eing physi#a&Iy s()are or ro)n* that the property
o" &oo$ing inte&&igent or &oo$ing i&& #an rese!&e the property o" eing inte&&igent or eing i&&. I" it see!s to !a$e sense to spea$
o" a rese!&an#e etween pheno!ena& properties an* physi#a& properties, so #on#eive*, it is on&y e#a)se we give o)rse&ves
pi#t)res 2pheno!ena& pi#tHres2o" the &atter. The rese!&an#e is with the pi#t)re, not the p&#t)re*.
So, then, the #o!!on #ons#io)sness &ives, or has the i&&)sion o" &iving, in a pheno!ena&Iy propertie* wor&* o" per#epti&e
things in spa#e. We !ight #a&I it the &ive* wor&*. It is a&so the p)&i# wor&*, a##essi&e to oservation y a&IC the wor&* in whi#h
ODe !an, "o&&owing another's pointing "inger, #an see the very thing that the other sees. 7Even in o)r phi&osophi#a& !o!ents we
hait)a&Iy #ontrast the #o&o)rs an* vis)a& shapes o" things, as eing p)&i#&y oserva&e, with the s).e#tive #ontents o"
#ons#io)sness, private to ea#h o" )s, tho)gh not therey )n$nowa&e to others.8
S)#h a re!in*er o" the *epth an* rea&ity o" o)r hait)a& #o!!it!ent to the #o!!on2sense s#he!e *oes not, y itse&", a!o)nt
to a *e!onstration o" that s#he!e's i!!)nity "ro! phi&osophi#a& #riti#is!. The s#ienti"i# rea&ist, tho)gh no Iantian, !ay e
rea*y, y way o" !a$ing is !a-i!)! #on#ession, with a rep&y !o*e&&e* on Iant's #o!ination o" e!piri#a& rea&is! with
trans#en*enta& i*ea&is!o @e !ay *isting)ish etween the )n#riti#a& stan*point o" or*inary &iving an* the #riti#aI stan*point o"
phi&osophy in"or!e* y s#ien#e. We a"e h)!an&y, or nat)ra&&y2he !ay say2#onstraine* to 'see the wor&*' in ODe way 7that is, to
thin$ o" it as we see! to per#eive it8 an* rationa&&y, or #riti#a&&y, #onstraine* to thin$ o" it in ()ite another. The "irst way 7eing
itse&" a #a)saI pro*)#t o" physi#a& rea&ity8 has a $in* o" va&i*ity at its own &eve&% )t it is, #riti#a&Iy an* rationa&&y spea$ing, an
in"erior &eveJ. The se#on* way rea&Iy is a #orre#tion o" the "irst.
The a)thenti#a&&y Iantian #o!ination is open to o.e#tion in !any ways% )t, y reason o" its very e-travagan#e, it es#apes
ODe spe#i"i# Cor! o" *i""i#)&ty to whi#h the s#ienti"i# rea&ist's soerer variant re!ains e-pose*. Iant )n#o!pro!ising&y
*e#&ares that spa#e is in )s% that it is 'so&e&y "ro! the h)!an stan*point that we #an spea$ o" spa#e, o" e-ten*e* things et#.', 9?
that things as they
9? Iant, 'Re")tation o" I*ea&is!', in Criti,ue! B05.
a"e in the!se&ves a"e not spatia& at a&I. This wi&& not *o "ar the s#ienti"i# rea&ist. The pheno!ena&&y propertie* ite!s whi#h we
ta$e o)rse&ves to per#eive an* the apparent re&ations etween whi#h yie&* 7or #ontri)te vita&&y to yie&*ing8 o)r notion o" spa#e,
a"e in*ee* *e#&are* to ave no in*epen*ent rea&ity% )t, when they a"e anishe* "ro! the rea&! o" the rea&, they a"e s)ppose* to
&eave ehin* the!2as o##)pants, so to spea$, o" the eva#)ate* territory 2those spatia&&y re&ate* ite!s whi#h, tho)gh ne#essari&y
)noserva&e, neverthe&ess #onstit)te the who&e o" physi#a& rea&ity. Ayer re"ers in severa& p&a#es to this #onse()en#e% an*
()estions its #oheren#e.9: @e writes, "ar e-a!p&e, 'I *o)t whether the notion o" a spatia& syste! o" whi#h none o" the e&e!ents
#an e oserve* is even inte&&igi&e.'
It is not #&ear that this *i""i#)&ty is ins)pera&e. The s#ienti"i# rea&ist wi&& #&ai! to e a&e to astra#t the notion o" a position in
physi#a& spa#e "ro! the pheno!ena& integ)!ents with whi#h it is origina&&y an* *e#eptive&y asso#iate*% an* it is har* to thin$ o"
a #on#&)sive reason "ar *enying hi! this power. @e wi&& say that the p&a#es where the pheno!ena&&y propertie* things we see! to
per#eive see! to e a"e, o"ten eno)gh, p&a#es at whi#h the #orre&ate* physi#a&&y rea& ite!s rea&&y a"e. S)#h a #&ai! !ay !a$e )s
)neasy% )t it is not ovio)s nonsense.
Sti&I, to say that a *i""i#)&ty is not #&ear&y ins)pera&e is not to say that it is #&ear&y not ins)pera&e. It wo)&* e etter to avoi*
it i" we #an We #annot avoi* it i" we e!ra#e )na*)&terate* s#ienti"i# rea&is! an* in#i*enta&&y anno)n#e o)rse&ves therey as the
s)""erers "ro! persistent i&&)sion, however nat)ra&. We #an avoi* it, perhaps, i" we #an s)##ee* in #o!ining e&e!ents o" the
s#ienti"i# story with o)r #o!!on2sense s#he!e witho)t *owngra*ing the &atter. This is the #o)rse that Ayer re#o!!en*s,5= an*,
9 s)spe#t, the #o)rse that !ost o" )s se!i2re"&e#tive&y "o&&ow. The ()estion is whether it is a #onsistent or #oherent #o)rse. An* at
otto! this ()estion is ODe o" i*entity. Can we #oherent&y i*enti"y the pheno!ena&&y propertie*, i!!e*iate&y per#epti&e things
whi#h #o!!on sense s)pposes to o##)py physi#a& spa#e with the #on"ig)rations o" )noserva&e )&ti!ate parti#)&ars y whi#h
an )n()a&i"ie* s#ienti"i# rea&is! p)rports to rep&a#e the!B
9 approa#h the ()estion in*ire#t&y, y #onsi*ering on#e again 4a#$ie's version o" #o!!on2sense rea&is!o A##or*ing to this
9: Ayer, Centrai Questions! ?0, ?<2;, 99=. 5= Ii*. 99=299.
version, it wi&& e re!e!ere*, physi#a& things, tho)gh not *ire#t&y per#eive*, rea&Iy possess vis)a& an* ta#ti&e ()a&ities whi#h
rese!&e thoSe we see! to per#eive the! as possessing% so that i", per impossibile! the vei& o" per#eption were *rawn asi*e an*
we saw things in their tr)e #o&o)rs, these wo)&* t)ro o)t to e #o&o)rs in*ee* an*, on the who&e, .)st the #o&o)rs with whi#h we
were naive&y in#&ine* to #re*it the!. 4a#$ie *oes not represent this view as as)r* or in#oherent. @e .)st thin$s that it is, as a
!atter o" "a#t, "a&se. Things could rea&Iy e #o&o)re*% )t, sin#e there is no s#ienti"i# reason "or s)pposing they a"e, it is
grat)ito)s to !a$e any s)#h s)pposition.
4a#$ie is s)re&y too &enient to is version o" #o!!on2sense rea&is!o That version e""e#ts a #o!p&ete &ogi#a& *ivor#e etween
a thing's eing re* an* its eing re*2Ioo$ing. A&tho)gh it is a part o" the theory that a thing whi#h is, in itse&", re* has the power
to #a)se )s to see! to see a re* thing, the &ogi#a& *ivor#e etween these two properties is aso&)te. An*, as "ar as I #an see, that
*ivor#e rea&Iy pro*)#es nonsense. The as#ription o" #o&o)rs to things e#o!es not !ere&y grat)ito)s, )t sense&ess. Whatever
!ay e the #ase with shape an* position, #o&o)rs a"e visii&ia or they a"e nothing. I ave a&rea*y pointe* o)t that this version o"
#o!!on2sense rea&is! is not the rea& rea&is! o" #o!!on senseC that rea&is! e""e#ts no &ogi#a& *ivor#e etween eing re* an*
eing re*2Ioo$ing% "or it is a per#ept)a&Iy *ire#t an* not a per#ept)a&Iy representative rea&is!o The things seen as #o&o)re* a"e
the things the!se&ves. There is no 'vei& past whi#h we #annot see'% "or there is no vei&.
B)t this *oes not !ean that a thing whi#h is re*, that is, re*&oo$ing, has to &oo$ re* a&I the &i!e an* in a&I #ir#)!stan#es an* to
a&I oservers. There is an irre*)#i&e re&ativity, a re&ativity to what in the roa*est sense !ay e #a&&e* the per#ept)a& point o"
view, )i&t in to o)r as#riptions o" parti#)&ar vis)a& properties to things. The !o)ntains a"e re*2Ioo$ing at this *istan#e in this
Jight% &)e&oo$ing at that *istan#e at that &ight% an*, when we a"e #&a!ering )p the!, perhaps neither. S)#h2an*2s)#h a s)r"a#e
&oo$s pin$ an* s!ooth "ro! a *istan#e% !ott&e* an* grainy when #&ose&y e-a!ine*% *i""erent again, perhaps, )n*er the
!i#ros#ope.
We asor this re&ativity easi&y eno)gh "or or*inary p)rposes in o)r or*inary ta&$, ta#it&y ta$ing so!e range o" per#ept)a& #on2
*itions, so!e per#ept)a& point o" view 7in the roa* sense8 as stan*ar* or nor!a&, an* intro*)#ing an e-p&i#it a#$now&e*ge!ent
o" re&ativity on&y in #ases whi#h *eviate "ro! the stan*ar*. 'It &oo$s p)rp&e in this &ight,' we say, ')t ta$e it to the *oor an* yo)
wi&& see that it's rea&&y green.' B)t so!eti!es we *o so!ething e&se. We shi"t the stan*ar*. 4agni"ie*, the "ari# appears as
printe*' with tiny &)e an* ye&&ow *ots. So those a"e the #o&o)rs it rea&&y is. Does this as#ription #ontra*i#t 'it's rea&&y green'B No%
"ar the stan*ar* has shi"te*. 3oo$ing at photographs, in .o)rna&s o" pop)&ar s#ien#e, o" pat#hes o" h)!an s$in, vast&y !agni"ie*,
we say, '@ow "antasti#a&&y )neven an* ri*gy it rea&&y is.' We st)*y a sa!pie o" &oo* thro)gh a !i#ros#ope an* say, 'It's !ost&y
#o&o)r&ess.' B)t s$in #an sti&I e s!ooth an* &oo* e re*% "ar in another #onte-t We shi"t o)r stan*ar* a#$. S)#h shi"ts *o not
#onvi#t )s o" vo&ati&ity or #on*e!n )s to internaI #on"&i#t. The appearan#e o" oth vo&ati&ity an* #on"&i#t vanishes when we
a#$now&e*ge the re&ativity o" O)r 'rea&&ys' .
4y e-a!p&es a"e anaI. B)t perhaps they s)ggest a way o" reso&ving the apparent #on"&i#t etween s#ienti"i# an* #o!!on2
sense rea&is!o We #an shi"t o)r point o" view within the generaI "ra!ewor$ o" per#eption, whether ai*e* or )nai*e* y arti"i#iai
!eans% an* the *i""erent sensi&e2()a&ity as#riptions we then !a$e to the sa!e o.e#t a"e not seen as #on"&i#ting on#e their
re&ativity is re#ogniAe*. Can we not see the a*option o" the viewpoint o" s#ienti"i# rea&is! as si!p&y a !ore ra*i#a& shi"t2a shi"t to
a viewpoint "ro! whi#h no #hara#teristi#s a"e to e as#rie* to things e-#ept those whi#h "ig)re in the physi#a& theories o"
s#ien#e an* in 't# e-p&anation o" what goes on in the physi#a& wor&* in the pro#esses whi#h &ea* to o)r having the sensations an*
per#eptions that we have'B59 We #an say that this is how things rea&&y a"e so &ong as the re&ativity o" this 'rea&&y' is re#ogniAe* as
we&&% an*, when it is re#ogniAe*, the s#ienti"i# a##o)nt wi&I no !ore #on"&i#t with the as#ription to things o" vis)a& an* ta#ti&e
()a&ities than the assertion that io o* is rea&&y a !ain&y #o&o)r&ess "&)i* #on"&i#ts with the assertion that it is right re* in #o&o)r.
O" #o)rse, the s#ienti"i# point o" view is not, in ODe sense, a point o" #ie" at a&I. It is an inte&&e#t)a&, not a per#ept)aI, stan*point.
We #o)&* not o##)py it at a&&, *i* we not "irst o##)py the other. B)t we #an per"e#t&y we&& o##)py oth at on#e, so &ong as we
rea&iAe what we a"e *oing.
This !etho* o" re#on#i&ing s#ienti"i# an* #o!!on2sense rea&is! re()ires )s to re#ogniAe a #ertain re&ativity in o)r #on#eption
o" the rea& properties o" physi#a& o.e#ts. Re&ative to the h)!an per#ept)a& stan*point the grosser physi#a& o.e#ts a"e vis)o2
ta#ti&e
59 4a#$ie, Probiems! 18.
#ontin)ants 7an* within that stan*point the pheno!ena& properties they possess a"e re&ative to parti#)&ar per#ept)a& viewpoints,
ta$en as stan*ar*8. Re&ative to the s#ienti"i# stan*point, they ave no properties )t those whi#h "ig)re in the physi#a& theories o"
s#ien#e.
S)#h a re&ativisti# #on#eption wi&& not p&ease the aso&)te2!in*e*. Ayer re#o!!en*s a *i""erent pro#e*)re. @e s)ggests that we
sho)&* #on#eive o" per#epti&e o.e#ts 7that is, o.e#ts per#epti&e in the sense o" the #o!!on2sense s#he!e8 as eing &itera&&y
#o!pose* o" the )&ti!ate parti#&es o" physi#a& theory, the &atter eing i!per#epti&e, not in prin#ip&e, )t on&y e!piri#a&&y, as a
#onse()en#e o" their eing so !in)te. 55 I *o)t, however, whether this proposa&, whi#h Ayer right&y *es#ries as an atte!pt to
blend the two s#he!es, #an e regar*e* as satis"a#tory. I" the i!possii&ity o" per#eiving the )&ti!ate #o!ponents is to e viewe*
as !ere&y e!piri#a&, we #an sensi&y as$ what the #on#ept)a& #onse()en#es wo)&* e o" s)pposing that i!possii&ity not to e-ist.
The answer is #&ear. Even i" there were so!ething whi#h we #o)nte* as per#eiving the )&ti!ate parti#&es, this wo)&* sti&I not,
"ro! the point o" view o" s#ienti"i# rea&is!, #o)nt as per#eiving the! as they rea&&y a"e. An* nothing #o)&* so #o)nt% "ar no
pheno!ena& properties we see!e* to per#eive the! as having wo)&* "ig)re in the physi#a& e-p&anation o" the #a)saI !e#hanis!s
o" o)r s)##esso B)t, so &ong as we stay at this point o" view, what goes "ar the parts goes "ar any who&es they #o!pose. @owever
gross those who&es, they re!ain, "ro! this point o" view, i!per#epti&e in the sense o" #o!!on sense.
Ayer atte!pts to "or! one viewpoint o)t o" two *is#repant viewpointsC to "or! a sing&e, )ni"ie* *es#ription o" physi#a& rea&ity
y &en*ing "eat)res o" two *is#repant *es#riptions, ea#h va&i* "ro! its own viewpoint. @e #an see! to s)##ee* on&y y *oing
vio&en#e to one o" the two viewpoints, the s#ienti"i#o I a#$now&e*ge the *is#repan#y o" the two *es#riptions, )t #&ai! that, on#e
we re#ogniAe the re&ativity in o)r #on#eption o" the rea&, they nee* not e seen as in #ontra*i#tion with ea#h other. Those very
things whi#h "ro! one stan*point we #on#eive as pheno!ena&&y propertie* we #on#eive "ro! another as #onstit)te* in a way
whi#h #Hn on&y e *es#rie* in what a"e, "ro! the pheno!ena& point o" M&ew, astra#t ter!s. 'This s!ooth, green, &eather ta&e2
top', we say, 'is, #onsi*ere* s#ienti"i#a&&y, nothing )t a #ongeries o" e&e#tri# #harges wi*e&y separate* an* in rapi* !otion.' Th)s
we #o!ine the two stan*points in a sing&e senten#e. The stan*point o"
55 Ayer, CentraI Questions! 99=.
#o!!on2sense rea&is!, noi e-p&i#it9y signa&&e* as s)#h, is re"&e#te* in the senten#e's gra!!ati#a& s).e#t phrase, o" whi#h the
wor*s a"e e!p&oye* in no esoteri# sense. The stan*point o" physi#a& s#ien#e, e-p&i#it9y signa&&e* as s)#h, is re"&e#te* in the
pre*i#ate. On#e re&ativity o" *es#ription to stan*point is re#ogniAe*, the senten#e is seen to #ontain no #ontra*i#tion% an*, i" it
#ontains no #ontra*i#tion, the pro&e! o" i*enti"i#ation is so&ve*.
I re#ogniAe that this position is )n&i$e&y to satis"y the *eter!ine* s#ienti"i# rea&ist. I" he is on&y !o*erate&y *eter!ine*, he !ay
e partia&Iy satis"ie*, an* !ay #ontent hi!se&" with saying that the s#ienti"i# viewpoint is superior to that o" #o!!on sense. Re
wi&& then si!p&y e e-pressing a pre"eren#e, whi#h he wi&& noi e-pe#t the artist, "or e-a!p&e, to share. B)t, i" he is a har*2&iner, he
wi&& insist that the #o!!on2sense view is who&Iy )n*er!ine* y s#ien#e% that it is shown to e "a&se% that the vis)a& an* ta#ti&e
properties we as#rie to things a"e nowhere )i in o)r !in*s% that we *o noi &ive in a wor&* o" per#epti&e o.e#ts, as )n*erstoo*
y #o!!on sense, at a&I. @e !)si then a##ept the #onse()en#e that ea#h o" )s is a s)""erer "ro! a persistent an* ines#apa&e
i&&)sion an* that it is "ort)nate that this is so, sin#e, i" it were noi, we sho)&* e )na&e to p)rs)e the s#ienti"i# enterprise itse&".
Witho)t the i&&)sion o" per#eiv!g o.e#ts as earers o" sensi&e ()a&ities, we sho)&* noi ave the i&&)sion o" per#eiving the! as
spa#e2o##)piers at a&I% an* witho)t that we sho)&* ave no #on#epL o" spa#e an* no power to p)rs)e o)r resear#hes into the
nat)re o" its o##)pants. S#ien#e is noi on&y the o""spring o" #o!!on sense% it re!ains its *epen*ant. For this reason, an* "or
others to)#he* on ear&ier, the s#ienti"i# rea&ist !)si, however r)e")&Iy, a*!it that the as#ription to o.e#ts o" sensi&e ()a&ities,
the stan*ar* o" #orre#tness o" s)#h as#ription eing 7what we ta$e to e8 inters).e#tive agree!ent, is so!ething ()ite se#)re&y
roote* in o)r #on#ept)a& s#he!e. I" this !eans, as he !)si !aintain it *oes, that o)r tho)ght is #on*e!ne* to in#oheren#e, then
we #an on&y #on#&)*e that in#oheren#e is so!ething we #an per"e#t9y we&I &ive with an* #o)&* noi per"e#t9y we&I&ive witho)t.

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