Shumaker 1 John Shumaker Professor Bolton ENG 101 18 March 2014 Scientific Research: Whos Responsible? Heather E.

Douglas, in her essay entitled The Dark Side of Science, asserts that scientists should bear the responsibility, to some degree, for the ways in which their research and development are used, assuming the usage is readily foreseeable in specific detail (125). She further clarifies her opinion of scientific responsibility to include both the impacts they intend and some of the impacts they do not intend (124-125). Basically, Douglas is saying that scientists should be held accountable for the consequences of their research, whether or not these consequences are a specific objective of their work. She argues that various examples of research being done in synthetic biology could potentially be used with malicious intent when she writes, Consider, for example, the knowledge of how to build a virus like smallpox from the ground up or how to create other pathogenic, tailored organisms --- targeted either to humans or the foods on which we depend. If it is readily foreseeable that such knowledge could be used for nefarious purposes, the scientistsare partially responsible for an attack that could ultimately cause millions of deaths. (125) Though her claim is a possibility, one could also see this as an overreaction to an event with a lower probability than she infers. She suggests a method of potential mediation of responsibility whereby some type of oversight group could regulate what projects could be acted upon or who could access the results. Although I agree with Douglas that scientists are responsible for the

Shumaker 2 consequences of their research, as it pertains to their objectives, she seems on more dubious ground when she claims that they should also bear responsibility for the impacts that result from others using their research in a malicious manner and that a potential solution would be to limit freedom of research through regulation. I agree with Douglass claim that responsibility for the impact of the scientists intentional research objectives lies with the scientists. She supports this claim when she states, Einstein was not responsible for the use of his E = mc2 equation to build an atomic bomb and its use in wartime, though the scientists at Los Alamos were (125). Douglas is illustrating that Einsteins research into harnessing the enormous power of the atom was done for the betterment of mankind and even though others later took his research and applied it to the development of the atomic bomb, Einstein was not to blame for this unintended use. My own view is that if Einsteins goal had been to develop his energy equation for the purpose of creating the atomic bomb, history would have judged him much differently and he would have been responsible, in a large part, for its use in this manner. It is apparent that responsibility is assumed when the scientist achieves his intended goal, whether the goal is for good or bad. However, Douglass claim that responsibility for any unintended impact of scientific research falls partially on the scientists rests upon the questionable assumption that her terminology, readily foreseeable in specific detail (125), can be defined in both professional and legalistic terms. I cannot agree with her suggestion that scientists can come together to decide how to proceed, or ask for input from ethicists, social scientists, or even the broader public (126) because of the subjective nature of this terminology; a concept of this type needs to be quantitative. The examples she uses to support her case for the subjective assignment of responsibility are not logically sound. She states that research that is targeted either to

Shumaker 3 humans or the foods on which we depend (125) is an example of the type that should be scrutinized and will make the scientists involved inherently responsible for its use. This is blatantly obvious to anyone with an ounce of morality. Its intent is clearly an objective of the research; however, it does not provide a logical basis for unintended goals. Douglas continues with a doomsday scenario indicated by her statements, Scientists can no longer hope naively that people will only use science for the public good. The world will always have the mentally unbalanced, the delusional, the vicious, and the sociopathic members of society, some of whom will also be intelligent enough to use the results of science (126). Douglas has firmly established a slippery slope from the humanitarian scientist to the evil villain. One cannot assume that research which serves the greater good will be used for malicious purposes. If that were the case, we would have regulated the manufacturing and distribution of hammers by now. Just because I use a hammer to build a house does not necessitate that someone will take that hammer and hurt others with it. Hence, due to the fallacies in her logic, Douglas does not support her claim of responsibility of scientists for unintended impacts nor does she provide quantifiable criteria. A final point with which I disagree is Douglass inference that freedom of research should come at the cost of regulation. She emphasizes that scientists could decidethat some forms of regulationbe imposed on the field of synthetic biology, to reduce the risks (126). She has now introduced her viewpoint on how to control one of the most fascinating aspects of science, its creativity. By offering regulation as the means to reduce risks, she opens the door to other questions. How much regulation is enough? Who should be regulated? Who should be the regulating body? Rather than regulation, why not develop cooperation both within and across the various fields of science? In this manner, creativity is maintained and enhanced,

Shumaker 4 while the risk of misuse through malicious objectives is lessened by exposure to a larger group of scientists. Though I am not nave enough to presume that this is a perfect solution, I do believe that this is a more efficient alternative to regulation. In my opinion, regulation is rarely the solution. While the resulting consequences of research for blatantly malicious intent should be an issue to be ruled upon by the legal systems of the world (indictment rather than regulation), the possibility for the enrichment of mankind through scientific research outweighs the probability of unintentional use by nefarious entities. To conclude, I concede that scientists are responsible for the intentional impact of their research, but I still insist that, in the end, mankind will be less enriched by stifling regulation that limits freedom of research imposed upon us by those who the define the criteria for unintended impact. If we follow Douglass proposal of mediation through regulation, one has to wonder how many cures and technological advances will be delayed or abandoned because the risk of possible misuse is too great. Risk and possibility are a part of everyday life. We all gamble with the decisions of what will make our lives better or worse. Why should scientists be any more responsible for their actions than we are? Perhaps we should give scientists more credit than Douglas does and allow them the freedom to choose their path of research and keep at the forefront of their objectives the words that, as people say, with great power comes great responsibility.

Shumaker 5 Works Cited Douglas, Heather. The Dark Side of Science. The Norton Field Guide to Writing with Readings and Handbook, 3e. Ed. Marilyn Moller. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 2013. 124-126. Print.