Understanding Fire and Gas Mapping
Understanding Fire and Gas Mapping
W hite P aper
Kenexis
Table of Contents 1 2 3 Introduction 3 Overview of Fire and Gas Mapping The Cone of Vision 7 7
Introduction
For many years, the design of fire and gas detection and suppression systems was performed utilizing rules-of-thumb that were applied by seasoned experts. The heuristics that lead to the placement and orientation of fire and gas detector arrays were rarely documented to any significant degree. This made verification and validation of the design of fire and gas detection systems difficult and confusing, and the determination of whether or not a tolerable level of risk had been achieved impossible. For a few decades now, the process industries have become more adept and familiar with explicitly analyzing process risks. As the use of formal risk studies has increased, so has the sophistication and level of quantification employed in these studies. Risk management started out with qualitative analyses, such as Hazards and Operability (HAZOP) studies, and progressed to order-of-magnitude quantification, such as Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA). In some cases, very quantitative analyses are performed for special risk situations and equipment design tasks, such as calculation of the Safety Integrity Level (SIL) achieved by Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS). Since the late 1990s, many operating companies have been designing SIS in accordance with the IEC 61511 (ISA 84.00.01) 1, which requires the selection of a numerical performance target for each Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) which is essentially a control loop dedicated to the prevention of a specific hazard. The achievement of this target is the quantitatively verified using a combination of statistics, reliability engineering, and probability math. This performance-based approach has lead to a great deal of success in application. As a result, there is a strong desire to apply this approach to fire and gas detection and suppression systems, which were after all, instrumented systems. Once the IEC 61511 style approach began to be applied to Fire and Gas Detection and Suppression Systems (FGS), it was quickly determined that there were a few key weaknesses in the IEC 61511 approach, as applied to fire and gas systems, that made direct adoption problematic, if not entirely invalid. These problems are related to the fact the fire and gas systems are mitigative in nature, i.e., decreasing the magnitude of a consequences as opposed to preventing the loss of containment altogether. Prevention is the foundation upon which most of the techniques and calculations that underpin the IEC 61511 standard are based, although the standard neglects to explicitly state when and where the prevention assumption is made. Furthermore, the SIL concept only considers the random hardware failures of the equipment in determining the amount of risk reduction that a SIF can provide. For a fire and gas system a much more important component of achieved risk reduction is the coverage of the fire and gas detector array, as data 2 indicates that IEC 61511 Functional Safety: Safety Instrumented Systems for the Process Industry Sector. ANSI/ISA-84.00.01-2004 (IEC 61511 Mod) is the US version of the IEC 61511 standard. 2 Offshore Hydrocarbon Release Statistics, 2002, United Kingdom Health and Safety Executive.
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The rule of thumb based approach for placing fire and gas detectors that has traditionally been used has lead to inconsistent designs whose basis is usually poorly documented. This has made verification and validation difficult and confusing, and has made determination of whether or not the tolerable risk level has been achieved impossible
Figure 1 Typical Gas Detector Geographic Coverage Map for a Metering Station from Kenexis Effigy
ISA-TR84.00.07 Guidance on the Evaluation of Fire, Combustible Gas, and Toxic Gas System Effectiveness, 15 January 2010.
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Figure 2 Typical Gas Detector Scenario Coverage Map (Shown as Residual Geographic Risk) for a Metering Station for Kenexis Effigy
Geographic coverage is easier to calculate, and is only a function of the detector array itself, and any potential obstructions to the view of optical detection systems. Scenario coverage, on the other hand, is much more complicated to calculate because it requires not only knowing what the detector system is capable of (given the detrimental effect of obstructions), but also knowing where leaks will come from, how frequently they will occur, and what their shape will be given that they occur. Although scenario coverage is more complex to calculate, it is also a much richer measurement of the actual risk and required to perform a fully quantitative risk assessment of the effectiveness of FGS. While two different types of coverage have been defined, and sophisticated software should be easily capable of calculating results for either type of coverage, the geographic coverage approach is much more commonly used at this time, and is expected to be the de facto approach for most operating companies in the future, relegating the scenario coverage approach to special situations where the risk is high or poorly understood. The more straightforward approach of geographic coverage has been able to provide satisfactory results through rigorous calibration of geographic risk targets to actual risk reduction requirements (which is estimated using efficient order-of-magnitude style techniques, similar to LOPA). Additionally, techniques that limit the graded area 4 of a fire or gas detection zone to an area that is in proximity to leak sources has also vastly improved the efficacy of the more streamlined geographic coverage based techniques. Since the release of the technical report there has been a lot of interest and research into techniques and tools for performing coverage assessments. While the technical report identified the need to select and A graded area is a sub-section of a fire and gas zone to which performance targets are applied. The graded areas are usually established by identifying all equipment of concern that may be considered potential leak sources, and then establishing a perimeter around those equipment items for analysis.
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Figure 3 Cone of Vision for Triple IR Optical Fire Detector for n-Heptane Pan Fire (Left) and Methane Jet Fire (Right) at Very High Sensitivity
When an equipment vendor presents a cone-of-vision drawing for an optical fire detector, the result usually looks somewhat like a baseball diamond with a 45 degree angle (depending on vendor) away from the center line on each side, and a roughly circular top whose curve gets more and more severe as the angle from the centerline increases (as a result of the Corona Effect). The cone-of-vision diagrams are created by plotting data obtained during an ANSI/FM Approvals 3260 5 performance test of the equipment. During this test, the distance (at various angles) where the detector is activated by the test case fire is tracked and recorded. ANSI/FM Approvals 3260 American National Standard for Radiant Energy-Sensing Fire Detectors for Automatic Fire Alarm Signaling
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The tests are performed with fire detectors and their target fires at roughly the same elevation, and with the fire detectors parallel to the ground. The results of these tests should form the basis for how any particular detectors capabilities should be quantified. As such, when a fire and gas mapping tool models the coverage of a fire detector scenario where the fire detector is parallel to the ground, and the elevation of interest is the same elevation as the elevation of the detector for a design basis fire whose radiant heat output matches the radiant heat of the cone-of-vision test case, the coverage map and the cone-of-vision drawings should be identical. This is demonstrated for Kenexis Effigy in Figure 4.
50 % Sensitivity
75 % Sensitivity
100 % Sensitivity
Figure 4 Kenexis Effigy Coverage Mapping Output for a Detronics X3301 Optical Fire Detector for n-Heptane Overlaid with the Published Coverage Map Three Sensitivity Settings
Two very important factors should be noted when viewing cones-ofvision, such as the ones presented in Figure 3. First the cone-of-vision that is obtained by any particular detector is unique to three factors. Fire Type (i.e., the chemical that is being combusted) Sensitivity (i.e., different sensitivity settings change results) Detector Model (i.e., each model from each vendor will have different results from cone-of-vision testing)
Each model of fire detector from the multitude of vendors who supply optical fire detectors is different, and fire and gas mapping will need to accommodate this fact. It is not possible to have a single generic detector that represents all sensitivities, of all models, for all components. As shown in Figure 3, the maximum centerline detectable distance for n-Heptane is twice the distance for methane. Use of generic detector maps that are intended to apply to any vendors equipment will lead to an unacceptable amount of error in the mapping. The attributes of each fire detector that need to be individually tracked by model including the following: Detector Technology Type Angle of View from Centerline to Sides (Sweep Angle)
Kenexis addresses this issue in the Kenexis Effigy software package by providing a comprehensive database of fire detection equipment that users can select from when performing an FGS Mapping project. The database includes factors for all of the items included in the table above and includes information for all major fire and gas equipment vendors. Additionally, Kenexis is willing and able to include data for any equipment item for which ANSI/FM 3260 test data has been collected. A screen shot that shows a portion of the data available in Kenexis Effigy is shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5 Effigy Screenshot Showing Detector List Including Sensitivity Settings by Detector and by Species of Interest
The maximum centerline distance is not sufficient for characterizing performance of a fire detector because it is based on a single design basis fire that may not be consistent with the design basis fire desired to be modeled for any particular project. A means needs to be included to scale the distance at which a projects design basis fire can be viewed by the detector based on the fire size used during the ANSI/FM3260 testing. In Effigy, this is referred to as the Sensitivity Factor. 7 The Corona Effect is the name given to the phenomenon whereby the decrease in viewable distance of an optical fire detector increases with increasing angle away from the centerline. A plot of angle from centerline versus decrease in distance makes the shape of a crown.
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Figure 8 Effect of Fire Detector Elevation Change Elevation of Interest = 1 m Detector Elevations, 1 m, 3 m, 5 m
Additionally as the detector angles down away from being parallel with the floor (or other plane of interest), the shape of the fire coverage map begins to be more curved. When the detector centerline is parallel with the floor the fire coverage map essentially makes straight lines away from the detector centerline. As the angle of declination increases, the map becomes more and more curved until it ultimately becomes a circle when the detector is pointing directly down, perpendicular to the plane of interest. Figure 9 presents a progression of angle of declination changes, beginning where the detector left off in Figure 8, at a declination angle of 0 (parallel to grade) along with an elevation of 5 meters, and then progressing through 23 and 45 at the same elevation.
Figure 9 Effect of Fire Detector Declination Angle Change Elevation of Interest = 1 m, Detector Elevation = 5 m Detector Declination Angles, 0 (parallel to grade), 23 and 45
Kenexis Effigy elegantly models detector cone-of-vision in all of these situations. It properly accounts for elevation above plane of interest, angle of declination created curvature, various angles away from centerline the different sensors are capable of measuring, and the various detection distances (considering multiple sensitivity settings, and multiple fire types) from different vendor products in different chemical applications. Additionally, this analysis can be performed at any elevation of interest as selected by the user. Figure 10 is a screen shot of a detector definition page, showing the variety of options that can be analyzed in the toolkit.
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The minimum cloud size that can cause harm is a commonly utilized approach in the process industries for hydrocarbon gas detection. This approach is the basis for the spacing for the traditional grid that has historically been used to place gas detectors. When using this paradigm the fundamental concept is that any gas cloud that is sufficiently large that if ignited it will create an explosion that will cause significant damage should be detectable by the installed gas detection array. A report from the UK Health and Safety Executive 8 and conventional wisdom have agreed that a significant explosion is one where the flame front of the ignited gas cloud reaches speeds sufficient to generate a peak overpressure in the resultant shock wave of greater than 150 Offshore Technology Report OTO 93 002 Offshore Gas Detector Siting Criterion, Investigation of Detector Spacing, United Kingdom, Health and Safety Executive
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Scenario coverage provides much richer insight into the true risk reduction capabilities of a FGS, but is also exponentially more difficult and time consuming to perform than geographic coverage. As a result, scenario coverage is typically only done when a full QRA style FGS design basis is required which would typically only occur for a very special or unique hazard or during the calibration process for semiquantitative tools for determination of geographic risk targets. In general, scenario coverage calculation requires the following steps to be executed.
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Figure 21 Geographic Risk Profile (Scenario Coverage) for One Release Point and No Detectors
The next step in the process is to include all of the scenarios for ALL of the equipment items from which a leak could emanate. This composite geographic risk profile (still with no beneficial effect of FGS equipment) is shown in Figure 22.
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Figure 22 Geographic Risk Profile (Scenario Coverage), Multiple Release Points, No Detectors
Once the unmitigated risk profile is created, the impact of fire and gas detection equipment can be determined. In order to do this, each individual release scenario must be assessed in order to determine whether or not the detector array will be able to detect the release. This can be as simple as a gas cloud plot crossing over a point gas detector. Somewhat more sophisticated analysis is required to make this assessment for open path detectors and optical fire detector arrays. If a scenario is detected by the FGS system, it is removed from the plot of geographic risk, and its frequency deducted from the total frequency. The ultimate output of this effort is a geographic risk profile drawing that only shows the release scenarios that are NOT detected along with a tabulation of the percentage of release scenario frequency that is detected, as shown in Figure 23.
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Understanding Fire and Gas Mapping Software and Effigy Using Graded Areas to Limit Analysis to Hazardous Areas
Based on the previous section, the power of scenario coverage calculations is readily apparent, but the extreme level of effort is also quite obvious. In practice, the much less time consuming task of scenario coverage calculation has been able to provide results with a similar degree of accuracy with significantly less effort as long as the risk tools are appropriately calibrated and the analysis is limited to an appropriately sized graded area. The limitation of geographic coverage of not being able to address where leaks are coming from can be addressed in a geographic coverage modeling technique and modeling tool by limiting the area that is to be considered in the course of the analysis to areas where leaks are expected to occur or where gas clouds or fires are expected to be present. Using a systematic approach to establish the extents and grading (risk ranking) of graded areas will significantly improve FGS design. The improvement comes from a decreased cost associated with installing fewer detectors because they will only be located where a hazard actually exists, and also allowing for a higher coverage targets (more risk reduction) in areas where a true risk exists. Graded area determination is an exercise in identifying potential leak sources for flammable materials, and then establishing an inclusion zone around the leak source that represents the area where a gas cloud or fire might exist if a release from a potential leak source were to occur. For instance, an organizations fire and gas design philosophy might include three grades of fire coverage. Each grade of fire coverage will also include a distance away from each leak source (which is a graded piece of process equipment) that must be included in the analysis. The process is very analogous to establishing electrical area classifications. The result of this process is a graded area map, such as the one shown in Figure 24, where each equipment item results in a grade, along with an extents-of-graded-area for which coverage results will be calculated.
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Understanding Fire and Gas Mapping Software and Effigy Conclusion and Path Forward
As a result of the ISA TR84.00.07 technical report, industry has made great strides in making the process of developing a design basis for fire and gas detection and suppression systems more systematic and consistent. The use of computer-aided fire-and-gas mapping tools can greatly improve the design process, limiting the amount of equipment that is required while also ensuring that tolerable goals are met. With the release of Kenexis Effigy this technology is now available, proven, and ready for use.
This document was prepared using best effort. The authors make no warranty of any kind and shall not be liable in any event for incidental or consequential damages in connection with the application of the document. This report is copyright 2012, Kenexis Consulting Corporation, all rights reserved. No part of this document may be circulated, quoted, or reproduced for distribution other than the above named client without prior written approval from Kenexis Consulting Corporation.