Technology

RBI for Offshore Pipelines

Risk based inspection (RBI) has become quite popular since the inspection budget can be used much more efficiently compared to conventional inspection procedures. The RBI normally starts with the determination of all relevant risk driving effects for the specific pipeline, the definition of acceptance criteria and the assessment of the residual lifetime for the pipeline. These tasks require a close co-operation between the pipeline operator and the RBI-experts. This paper describes some of the major aspects of the methodology developed to estimate the risk of 60 offshore pipelines. Based on this risk assessment an optimised inspection strategy is developed. Each pipeline investigated is divided in specific segments taking into account the differences in essential parameters over the pipeline length, such as wall thickness, environmental loads, or corrosion condition. Although only basic data has been available this was sufficient to work out reliable results within a semi-quantitative risk approach. In a final step the results of the risk assessment are used for the optimisation of the inspection intervals within the proposed risk based inspection framework.
Qualitative methods are based on few essential data and lead to a rough estimation of the failure probability. Semi-quantitative methods use more information and some calculations are carried out, which results into a more accurate failure probability. The quantitative methods consider fully probabilistic approaches and lead to an accurate determination of the existing failure probability. However, in engineering praxis the data required for the fully quantitative approach is typically not available. Therefore, in the following the semi-quantitative approach is used. This approach gives a more detailed failure probability than the pure qualitative approach and is normally applicable. Details of the complete risk assessment, i.e. by also taking into account the consequences, are given below. As the risk is not constant along the pipeline route, a segmentation of the pipeline

n the pipeline industry much effort has been taken to ensure safety. Therefore, in-depth research has been carried out with respect to allowable failure probabilities. Since also the consequences of failure play a more important role, risk based approaches are becoming more common. They can be used during design as well as during operation. The focus is here on the operational phase regarding risk based inspection. The implementation of a risk based inspection (RBI) procedure starts with the determination of the relevant failure modes that should be regarded (Figure 1). After identification of the relevant failure modes, the corresponding probability and consequence have to be estimated. The probability of failure can be estimated by using different methods, such as Qualitative methods S e m i - q u a n t i t a t i v e methods Quantitative methods.

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is carried out. After estimating the risk related to each segment, an appropriate inspection strategy has to be developed. The inspection effort and interval should be determined taking into account the current and the future risk of the segment regarded.

Modelling the Risk

The combination of probability of failure (PoF) and consequence of failure (CoF) yields the risk. Several qualitative and quantitative risk assessments exist (e.g. code based [1], [2] or from the literature [8]). The risk can be represented in a matrix with the columns and rows as probability and consequence respectively. This matrix can be of any dimension, however often a square matrix as e.g. 5x5 is used (as shown in Figure 2). In Figure 2 the probability of failure and the consequence of failure are categorised from negligible to serious. Negligible (Neg.) probability of failure and negligible consequence correspond to the lowest risk.

The risk increases with the operation time due to time-dependant failure modes. Time-dependant effects are e.g. growth of corrosion flaws or cyclic loads during the operation. After inspection, corrective measures can be considered, e.g. Reassessment of the flaws, Rechecking and replacement or strengthening of critical parts. This may lead to a reduction of the risk predicted before the inspection. When the inspection scheduling is based on risk evaluation, the current risk matrix is required. This approach allows the focus on high risk areas for the inspection instead of time-based inspection of the entire system. A traffic-light system, derived from the risk matrix, is used with the following meanings for the inspection planning / maintenance:

Risk acceptance criteria are the limits above which the operator will not tolerate risk for the pipeline. The highest risk is presented by the red areas with an extreme consequence and a high or serious failure probability. Such areas are unacceptable and should be avoided. The orange areas present a high risk level and indicate that measures should be taken very soon. The yellow areas indicate a medium risk where action is required by a certain due date. The acceptable risk is presented by the green areas.

Since a lot of data has to be evaluated for the risk assessment and inspection scheduling it is advantageous to use software. A suitable software tool is GALIOM which has been developed at the Germanischer Lloyd (GL), cf. [11], [12] for more details about GALIOM software. The risk-based traffic light colours from Figure 3 are also used for the components in the Overview tree of GALIOM, as shown on the left of Figure 4.

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In GALIOM the parent component has the worst colour of its children. So it is easy to identify which component / part of the pipeline has the highest risk and thus requires the most attention.

the time dependent effects. The total failure probability will be obtained by the highest failure probability of both assessments. Index Procedure In Figure 6 it is shown the structure for estimating the failure probability when using the index procedure. Each index part (e.g. design, corrosion, operation) will be assigned a value between 0 and 100, where 100 is the best result and 0 the worst case. These values will be scaled with suitable weighting factors. The sum of all weighting factors is equal to one. Thus, the sum of the weighted index part values is also a result between 0 and 100 and can then be used for the assessment. Each index value is either derived by equations or by qualitative assessments. The design index is used to describe the influence of the design parameters to the condition of the pipeline. Design failure can cause serious damages and a conservative design leads to a reduction of the failure probability. As corrosion is an important failure mode the corrosion index is introduced. Corrosion

Failure Probability
The probability of failure can be estimated by different methods. The approach used most often is the evaluation of historical damage data. This approach can be used to identify the major threats and their contribution to pipeline failure. Different sources such as e.g. Parloc [9] and [10], US department of transportation [13] are available. An evaluation of different data bases shows regional differences between the failure distributions, see e.g. Figure 5. As the failure modes have time dependent as well as time independent aspects, they have to be considered both. The approach proposed here covers both effects in different ways: Index procedure, Remaining life time. The index procedure describes the general condition of the pipeline and the remaining life time considers directly

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can lead to a leak as well as to fracture of a pipeline. Third party damage occurs for offshore as well as for onshore pipelines. Regarding e.g. offshore pipelines an anchor impact or interaction with fishing equipment can lead to failure. These failure modes are assessed in the third party index. The operation conditions of the pipeline also influence the failure probability. If e.g. the pipeline is operated close or above the design pressure it will fail more likely than a pipeline operated at 50% of the design pressure. These types of dependencies are covered in the operation index. The combination of all four index values by considering weighting factors leads to the result of the index procedure. Remaining Life Time Approach The remaining life time approach is an alternative approach for estimating the probability of failure. The remaining life time of the pipeline can be calculated taking into account different issues, see Figure 7.

spans are time dependent issues for pipeline failures and should therefore be considered.

Consequences of Failure
Different types of consequences are regarded: (Human) safety, Environmental impact, Assets (economical consequence) and Reputation / political consequence. The first three items are of similar importance for the total consequence. The consequence with respect to reputation or political aspects has to be determined and weighted in agreement with the operator, see Table 1. Typical acceptance criteria for the consequences can also be found in [4].

The remaining life time with respect to corrosion can be estimated based on e.g. measured flaw dimensions and growth rate. Also the design life should be considered. If the design life is reached a detailed assessment of the pipeline as proposed in [14] should be carried out before further operation. Fatigue due to operational loads and especially free

Safety (of persons) is the most important issue. Here, the location, specifying the population density close to the pipeline, type of content, pressure and spill volume have to be considered. The environmental impact is mainly influenced by the medium transported, the potential release (spill) volume, and the location (protective areas

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like the Wadden Sea). The financial aspect is very client specific and therefore not included in this paper.

Pipeline Segmentation
As the risk is not constant along a pipeline route, it is beneficial to divide the pipeline in different segments. The idea is that every single pipeline segment has approximately a constant probability of failure and a constant consequence of failure. Figure 8 shows a pipeline divided into different parts, so called TAGs. The pipeline shown in Figure 8 starts at an offshore platform with a riser, which normally has a higher wall thickness than the pipeline. The consequence of a failure is also higher in the vicinity of the platform, because personnel could be directly affected. Along the pipeline route the probability and consequence of failure may change due to different wall thickness, environmental conditions, water depth, locations like crossings, etc. For each segment the PoF and CoF should be nearly constant and have to be assessed.

determined. An example is given in Table 2. Note that the inspection frequency factor is also related to the risk color according to Figure 3. Based on the normal inspection interval, provided by the operator, the new interval can be determined risk based, by considering the corresponding frequency factor from Table 2.

Risk Based Inspection and Maintenance

Based on the results of the risk approach suitable inspection / preventive maintenance frequencies have to be determined. They depend on the considered TAG and on the operator requirements; i.e. they have to be agreed and adapted with the operator. Different approaches can be used for the determination of the suitable maintenance frequency, cf. [5], [7]. One possibility is the determination of a so-called inspection frequency factor (IFF). Based on the obtained risk the inspection frequency factor can be

Application of RBI to Offshore Pipelines

Data gathering was performed for 60 aged offshore pipelines. Some of the data was available in electronic format, some in paper format. For some pipelines only basic data was available, like outer diameter, wall thickness, operating pressure and transported medium. The pipeline diameters range from 4 inch to 42inch. The media transported are gas, water, glycol and oil. The regarded pipelines were installed between the 1973 and 2003.

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Identification of Failure Modes An identification of the failure modes has been carried out by evaluating the historical data provided by the operator and a FMEA workshop with the operators staff. The following major threats have been identified: Corrosion, Impact, Fatigue, especially at free spans, Static over loads, especially at free spans. Segmentation Based on the data collected and the identified failure modes the pipelines have been divided into several TAGs. As most of the regarded pipelines have a length smaller than 10km, they are treated as one TAG. The major transport pipelines with several km length and changing wall thickness and consequences have been divided into several TAGs. In total 68 pipeline segments are regarded in the following. Risk Assessment For the risk assessment the probability of failure and the consequence are evaluated. The probability of failure is determined by two different approaches: remaining life time and index procedure, as described above. The remaining life time is assessed for corrosion, free spans and with respect to the design life. The design life is expired for 51% of the pipeline segments. Therefore, the remaining life time due to design is expired until a life time extension analysis has been performed. For the remaining 33 pipeline segments (49%) twenty-four show a remaining design life time smaller than 10 years, seven have a design life time between 10 years and 15 years and the rest have a remaining life time due to design greater or equal 15 years. Only for some of the pipelines the allowable free span lengths could be determined clearly and not for all pipelines the inspection data with respect to free spans was available. Therefore, for 32% of

the pipeline segments the remaining life time due to free spans has been expired. For these pipelines a re-assessment of the measured free span or the measurement itself is required. For fourteen of the 68 pipeline segments an intelligent scrapper run was performed in the past in order to determine the corrosion condition of the pipeline. Using this limited data the corrosion growth rate was calculated based on theoretical models. By considering the growth rate and the installation date resp. the operation start date, the remaining life time based on the criteria of ASME B 31G [3] and Kastner [6] has been determined. For all assessed pipeline segments the remaining life time due to corrosion is greater than 0 years. Based on the remaining life time analysis (RL) in total the following results are obtained:

Additionally to the remaining life time assessment the index procedure (IP) is used. This approach allows a more general view on the pipeline.

For the design index one third of the pipelines is evaluated within the category low and negligible and two thirds within the category medium resp. high. For the corrosion index the values are shifted to a higher category. The third party index is evaluated with negligible to high for the pipeline segments. This reflects that some pipelines are infield lines with similar risk and restricted shipping traffic. The transport pipelines are partly buried and therefore have a different probability of failure with respect to third party damages. The

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operational index is negligible. The combination of the four index values uses a weighting based on the evaluation results of historic pipeline data presented in Figure 5. This leads to six pipelines in the category high and 51 in the medium category and 11 in the low category. Additionally to the failure probability the consequence assessment is carried out. The financial aspect of the consequence is not taken into account here. For the environmental and safety aspect the medium transported and the location are considered.

sult from the remaining life time approach and the index procedure is taken. The color code is chosen based on GL standard as presented in Figure 2 and Figure 3. Based on the risk color and the specific failure modes which are the main risk drivers the next inspection is proposed. For the investigated pipelines free spanning and life time extension are the most important issues. The free span inspection interval is adjusted based on the risk result. The following intervals are proposed:

The total consequence is determined by the worst value of safety and environment for each pipeline segment. 12% of the segments are evaluated with the highest category serious. 40% of the pipeline segments show a high consequence and the remaining 49% are medium, low or negligible. The risk results are presented in the risk matrix in Figure 9. For the probability of failure the worst re-

Alternatively to the free span inspection of the pipelines a re-analysis of the allowable free span length is proposed based on the current valid codes. For some pipelines intelligent pigging was not intended to be used on a regular basis, therefore no inspection intervals for intelligent pigging are proposed. For the others the following intervals are suggested:

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Conclusions
It can be concluded that the combination of remaining life time and index procedure is able to cover all relevant failure modes. When only using the remaining life time approach threats like impact damage, which is the reason for 30% of all pipeline damages, are not covered. The proposed procedure fits well within the framework suggested in current codes like DNV RP F116 [4] and has been successfully applied to different offshore pipelines.

Acknowledgments
Special thanks to Dr. Thomas Plonski, who developed the procedure together with the authors.

References
[1] API Standard 1160, Managing System Integrity for Hazardous Liquid Pipelines, November 2001 [2] API Recommended Practice 580, Risk-based Inspection, May 2002 [3] ASME B31G, Manual for determining the remaining strength of corroded pipelines. American Society of Mechanical Engineering, 1991 [4] DNV DNV-RP-F116, Integrity Management of Submarine Pipeline Systems, October 2009 [5] DNV RP G101, Risk Based Inspection of offshore topsides static mechanical equipment, January 2002 [6] Kastner, W., et al., Critical crack sizes in ductile piping, Int. J. Pres. Ves. & Piping Vol. 9, 187, page 197-219, 1981 [7] Khan, F.I., et al., Risk-based Integrity and Inspection Modelling (RBIIM) of Process Components/systems, Risk Analysis, Vol. 26 No. 1, 2006 [8] Muhlbauer, W., Pipeline Risk Management Manual, 3rd Edition, Elsevier, 2004 [9] PARLOC 96, The update of loss of containment data for offshore pipelines, OTH 551. Health and Safety Executive

[10] PARLOC 2001, The update of loss of containment data for offshore pipelines, Health and Safety Executive, July 2003 [11] Plonski, T. and Stadie-Frohbs, G., Risk Management of Ageing Pipeline Networks using GALIOM, 9 Congreso y Expo Internacional de Ductos, 2008 [12] Stadie-Frohbs, G. and Wiese, F., RBI for Offshore Pipelines Challenges in Theory and Practice, Subsea Pipelines Integrity Management Conference, 2011 [13] U. S. Department of Transportations Research and Special Programs Administration, Office of Pipeline Safety(RSPA/OPS) http://primis.rspa.dot.gov/pipelineInfo/stat_ causes.htm [14] ISO TS 12747:2011 Petroleum and natural gas industries Pipeline transportation systems Recommended practice for pipeline PP life extension

This publication thanks Dr. Gundula StadieFrohbs and Jrg Lampe, from Germanischer Lloyd SE for providing this paper.

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