DEVELOPMENT CONTROL AS TOOL FOR SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT OF THE FEDERAL CAPITAL
TERRITORY (F.C.T.) ABUJA
BY
Godswill A. Essein 1 Musa Amodu2
B.Sc. (Land Econs.); M.Sc. (Env. Mgt.); ANIVS; RSV; MNES B. Sc., M.Sc. (Arch); M.Sc. (Env. Res. Mgt.); Ph. D (In view)
MNES, MIMC, ANIM, MAARCHES
3
Joseph A. Yacim
HND, PGD (Est Man); M.Sc (in view)
1 2
Department of Estate Management Department of ArchitecturalTechnology
Federal Polytechnic Nasarawa. Nasarawa State, Federal Polytechnic Nasarawa, Nigeria
Nigeria.
3
Department of Estate Management
Federal Polytechnic Nasarawa. Nasarawa State,
Nigeria. .
ABSTRACT:
Abuja is one of the strongest growth poles in sub-Saharan Africa today, and the impact of
urbanization and population growth pressure on the health of residents and facilities cannot be
overstressed. Development control as a potent tool for city management ensures that the growth
and development of cities can be such that will make for orderliness and improved city image and
aesthetic appeal while ensuring that environmental challenges resulting from city growth can be
reduced to tolerable levels or even out rightly eliminated. Purposeful development control of
Abuja, the new federal capital, remains the most viable approach so that its area and population
growth can be anticipated, articulated, guided and managed in order to achieve the goal of
sustainable development. This paper highlights the meaning and context of development control,
as well as its prospects in urban development. It also highlights the implications of lack of
development control and the relevance of development control to Abuja. The paper also
highlights the factors for consideration in development control programmes and recommends
that development control, as a strategy, can be employed for the sustainable management of the
city so that the advantages of urban concentration can be preserved for its residents and the
disadvantages minimized.
Key words: Development control, urbanization, population growth pressure, sustainable
development, new federal capital territory.
INTRODUCTION
In spite of the increase in the knowledge of modern planning and number of planners, physical
development across towns and cities in Nigeria remains an array of chaos and disorder (Owei,
2007). Numerous factors account for this situation namely, rapid urbanization, exorbitant real
estate rents and prices, lack of executive capacity to implement relevant urban and regional
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planning laws and the ubiquitous Nigerian factor. This paper examines the meaning and context
of development control as a tool for sustainable management of Abuja, the new federal capital
territory (F.C.T.) given the fact that there is nowhere in Nigeria that development control has
been carried out massively and with success on such a large scale as Abuja with the
demonstration of its potency and uniqueness as a tool for city management. Abuja was
conceptualized and built as a modern city, a federal capital that will be the pride of the Nigerian
nation as well as a model for Africa where everything is expected to work together as integral
parts of a harmonious whole. In the course of plan implementation, however, confusion came
and the master plan was compromised, distortions were introduced and created dislocations that
were never imagined during the design of the master plan.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Development control (also known as planning) is seen as a mechanism put in place to maintain
standard. It is a process laid down in legislation, which regulates the development and use of land
and buildings. It is the professional activity carried out by town planners in order to ensure
compliance with an approved master plan thereby ensuring orderliness. It reduces the negative
effects that accompany physical development. It can be either pre-development, during
development or at post-development stage of a project which is sited in an unapproved location.
It is a highly sensitive exercise which must be done with precaution, precision, firmness and with
deep sense of responsibility by the authority concerned. Fairness, justice and equity should be the
watchwords in development control programmes. If done properly and in a humane manner, it
will be widely accepted. However, when it is haphazardly done with bias and favouritism in the
society, it could be explosive and may lead to violent reactions from affected members of the
community concerned.
Abuja: A City with Myriads of Development Problems
The implementation of Abuja master plan commenced smoothly and accordingly before the
digression because of unnecessary alteration without recourse to the provisions of the original
master plan; some of the problems were created by the government while others came from the
private sector. The city which was conceived to be populated and occupied gradually and in
phases, suddenly received a federal military government order for compulsory movement in 1996
of all federal ministries and parastatal headquarters. This influx of people, mostly civil servants, in
disregard for the carrying capacity of the city, from the point of view of human population and
land area, caused several socio-economic problems and unprecedented pressure on facilities and
even land that were planned to develop gradually and on incremental basis. Family lives and ties
were disrupted; there was acute shortage of accommodation and real estate rents and prices
escalated all across the city. In the wake of such unplanned movement, unexpected
developments and unanticipated population growth, distortions and violations of Abuja master
plan ensued and this brought severe problems that stared all stakeholders in the face. In clearing
up the mess that resulted in the violations, it is interesting to note that there were no sacred
cows as all violators of the master plan had the same treatment meted to them in the form of
demolition of such illegal structures.
The problems relating to development control identified in the course of this study range from
gradual deviation from Abuja Master Plan through distortions, alterations and outright violations
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of the plan; to unilateral and unannounced alterations in the master plan; the main violators
include both public and private sectors and the categories of contraventions made on the plan in
different parts of the city as well as the lapses and inefficiencies or compromises made by the
government agents in charge of development control in Abuja.
Abuja which is a new Federal Capital built on a virgin land is meant to showcase what Nigerians
can make of an orderly development in place of Lagos, its former capital, which has been widely
known to be disorganized, largely unplanned, overcrowded, full of slums and squatter
settlements with shanty towns is incapable of accommodating a befitting capital for a modern
Nigeria. It is also, by implication, expected to demonstrate how development control can be a
tool for city development and management, if all other factors relating to its development are
kept constant and are applied according to the specifications of the original master plan.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This study utilized fieldwork and recognizance survey of sites where violations of the city’s master
plan were carried out. The various sites where there had been contraventions of the master plan
were physically visited, analyzed and categories of violations recorded. Data was therefore
collected from different locations in Abuja city namely: Garki, Wuse, Maitama, Asokoro, Nyanya
and Garki II. The data captured also came from observations of what had been done to the sites
recovered from illegal development and structures. Data for this research work was also collected
from secondary sources such as Abuja Master Plan and other relevant documents.
Factors necessitating development control in Abuja.
(a) The Philosophy of behind the development of Abuja as a new Federal Capital Territory
(F.C.T.)
Abuja was conceptualized by the Murtala – Obasanjo regime (1976-79) based on some
principles, three of which are highly relevant to this study. These principles are:
(i) The principle of environmental conservation;
(ii) The principle of “city beautiful”;
(iii) The principle of functional city.
These highly commendable and lofty ideals were at the back of the mind of, and guarded
jealously by, the founding fathers of Abuja. Unfortunately, however, as soon as the regime ended,
the succeeding administrations in Nigeria of made changes to and deviated from the original plan
as shown in Table 1.1
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Table 1.1: Distortions/deviations from the original plan, the period and the consequences with
regard to Abuja Development
S/No Administration Period Distortions/Deviations Result
1. Military 1976-79 Selective resettlement of Costly distribution
human population leading to abuses and
squatter development
2. Civilian 1979-83 Land for accelerated Emergence of Shanty-
distribution to house towns and squatter
workers given settlements.
haphazardly to party
faithful
3. Military 1984-93 Presidential Villa located Encouragement of
in wrong place haphazard
development.
4. Military 1993-98 Abandonment of phased Sporadic slum and
movement in place of squatter settlements
deadline for movement to and over population.
Abuja.
Source: Researchers’: Fieldwork 2007
These distortions outlined in Table 1.1 provide the background to the distortions/deviations in
the implementation of the master plan which have altogether cumulated in the development, as
well as environmental, problems in Abuja. The various military and civilian administrations that
were expected to ensure strict compliance to the implementation of Abuja master plan and
enforce relevant development control, deviated from the master plan and failed to enforce
relevant development control measures as a tool for the development and management of the
city. Indeed they did not only relegate development control to the back burner, but behaved as if
there is no such thing by being leaders in the violation and distortions of the master plan.
(b) Resettlement Programme
In order to appreciate the enormity and complexities of the problems that face development
control in Abuja, it will be essential to have a cursory look at issue of resettlement which was not
properly handled and which has continued to create squatter settlements that were recently
partially addressed and handled by immediate past administration in its peculiar and unique way.
This data is as shown in table 1.2
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Table 1.2 Data for Resettlement 1981
Items Phases 1-5 Rest of FCT Total
Total villages 106 730 845
Total households 4,923 34,400 39,333
Total population 22,442 157,000 179,442
Source: Abumere (1981)
From table 1.2, it could be seen that a total of one hundred and six villages were supposed to be
resettled in phases i-iv and 730 villages in other parts of the FCT. Table 1.3 shows the level of
success of the resettlement program.
Table 1.3: Level of Success of the Resettlement Programme
Total villages earmarked for As at 2008 % achieved
resettlement in phases I – IV
Resettled Still to be resettled
106 42 64 39.62
Source: Reasearchers’ Fieldwork 2008
Table 1.3 shows that only 39.62 percent of the resettlement of the villages has been achieved as
at 2008. There is a deficit resettlement of 60.38 percent. This failure rate created distortions in
the demolition exercise of President Obasanjo’s administration as implemented by Mallam El-
Rufai the erstwhile Minister of the Federal Capital Territory. Hence within demolished villages and
squatter settlements such as Karmo, Kuchingoro, Karamajiji, Gwagwa, Jiwa and so on, one could
still see, as at January 2008, pockets of existing and un-demolished dwellings, which are usually
labeled “Gwari houses”. These have been earmarked for final demolition when the Gwaris are
finally resettled at designated different locations within the Federal Capital Territory
(c) The issue of integration versus demolition.
A case which is still pending is that of either integration of Garki village into the phase 1 or its
demolition and complete re-planning and re-development into the phase 1 to avoid a case of
“two contrasting cities” and to achieve uniformity in the standard of design in phase 1. Virtually
all structures in Garki village have been numbered and are awaiting eventual demolition. What is
delaying the demolition of Garki village is the fact that houses where the Gwaris are expected to
be resettled in Apo area have not yet been completed. Yet there is strong plea for re-
development and re-planning of Garki village so as to integrate it with phase 1. Once Garki village
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is demolished, the whole issue of integration would have been finally dropped as a policy option
of development control.
(d) FCT land use Projections
The FCT land use projections for 1998-2000 is as shown in table 1.4
Table 1.4: F.C.T. Land use projections 1998-2000
S/No Land Use Total (ha) % Total
Residential 12,486 48.67
561 2.19
Commercial Business District
891 3.44
Institutional 920 0
1,705 6.65
Industrial Research Training
500 1.96
Transportation 160 0.62
8,435 32.87
National Government
Sports and Recreation
Parks, Open Space
Total 25,658 100.00
Source: FCT Plan p.78
Table 1.4 shows that 32.87 percent of the land use of FCT has been projected for parks and open
places. On the other hand, 48.67 percent of the land is given for residential use, which is almost
half of the land in yet squatter settlements and illegal structures abounded necessitating
demolition action. As it stands now, most of the illegal structures demolished by Mallam El-Rufai
were residential structures. Also worthy of note is that in Abuja, just like in other urban areas, all
building plans are expected to be approved after a thorough check to ensure strict compliance
with planning and development control regulations, by relevant approving authority. In Abuja,
there is a statutory unit called Development Control Department. Despite the existence of such a
specifically dedicated department for development control, and all their paraphernalia of office;
despite the good will of the citizens and the political will by government, being a statutory
established body; they have not been able to carry out development control effectively in Abuja.
The development control department was formerly under and together with the Department of
Land, and Surveys before being up – graded to a full fledged department of its own. They never
took advantage of the fact that they have Abuja master plan in their possession saddled with the
primary responsibility for building plan approval and to supervise the development of projects
and programmes that would make the F.C.T. realize the dreams of her founding, realizing that the
Abuja master plan is expected to specifically fathers provide for the following among others:
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(a) Natural vegetation and landscape protection areas including drainage courses and
community gardens and reservoirs
(b) Parks, comprising national arboretum, botanical gardens, areas for passive and active
recreation parks, formal landscape areas and public spaces.
(c) Parks within residential areas and works
Thus, it is quite clear that ample allowance up to approximately 33 percent of the total land use
projection was reserved for parks, gardens and open spaces. As can be seen in table 1.4 it is
therefore an irony that it is these open spaces, parks; drainage courses and sewer lines that
became objects of abuse, violation and places of construction of illegal structures of all sorts
necessitating extensive demolition exercise across the length and breadth of the city.
Some of the reasons for these abuses and violations of open spaces and pars have been
enumerated to include:
(i) Lack of serious attitude towards development control.
(ii) No clear guideline and documentation on physical design and development. The
illegal developers seem to have had a field day by taking advantage of this, hence
the uncontrolled physical developments all around city.
(iii) Absence of job specification until recently, as to which Section/Department of
FCDA that is responsible for specific activities and director assignment of
responsibilities to each unit. The Land Planning and Survey Department thus
became a jack of all trades and could not effectively master one. It became too
amorphous, insensitive and over concerned with land, sale of land than planning,
survey and providing guidelines to be strictly monitored and adhered to.
(iv) Lack of adherence to open space, parks and recreation guidelines and policies;
(v) Slow pace and indeed lack of commitment to the development of open spaces to
standards required.
(vi) Abandoned and unkempt open spaces which tempt and attract would be
speculators and violators and encourage outright encroachment of such lands.
(vii) Unencumbered open spaces which became derelict with no sign posts, fences and
other structures to deter and discourage encroachment to such lands.
(viii) Over-development of phase 1 area which was meant to provide mainly for
buildings and a population of 250,000 but has nevertheless since exceeded over 2
million.
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It is no wonder therefore that a ministerial commitment on plots of land allocated within the FCT
designated as Green Areas, status of revoked plots and charges of land use from 1996-98
identified the situation in Table 1.6
Table 1.6: Cases of Land Use Contraventions
District Cases of Contraventions Land/….. to open spaces and green
areas over the period in (ha)
Central Area 4 20.72
Garki 8 42.49
Asokoro 7 28.87
Wuse 11 89.12
Maitama 21 86.85
Total 51 268.05
Source: FCDA (1998) Final Report of Ministerial Committee on Plots of Lands Allocated within
FCT Designated as Green Areas, status of Revoked Plots and Changes of Land Use from 1996-98
Table 1.6 shows that a total of 268.05 hectares of land were lost to various contraventions and
developments which were contrary to what the land was originally planned and reserved for. The
ratio between the planned and the altered or violated is as shown in table 1.7
Table 1.7: Ratio of violated to planned land
Total land in Phase 1 Land Violated % Violated
995 ha 268.05 26.9
Source: Researchers’ Fieldwork 2008-02-02
Table 1.7 reveals a figure approximately 27 percent of land in phase 1 alone which were violated
by conversion to use other than what they were originally planned for disturbing.
The situation in table 1.7 was nevertheless changed through government intervention and order
that some of the contraventions be reversed. Table 1.8 shows the cases of contraventions
recommended for restoration to its originally planned use.
Table 1.8: Cases of contraventions recommended for restoration
District Case of Cases Reserved % Reversion
contraventions
Central Area 4 2 50
Garki 8 4 50
8
Asokoro 7 2 28.5
Wuse 11 9 81.8
Maitala 21 16 76.1
Total 51 33 57.2
Sources: Researchers’ Fieldwork (2008)
Table 1.8 shows that 57.2 percent of the contraventions have been recommended for restoration.
It is, however, not clear as to why the remaining 49.8 per cent contraventions are not to be
reversed is not stated. It could be that those projects have been taken as fait accompli and their
reversion will have no positive impact on the purpose as well as the environment.
STUDY HYPOTHESIS
The study also sought to know whether or not more of the contraventions were perpetuated by
the public sector. The main hypothesis of the study therefore states that:
Ho: The public sector had more cases of contraventions than the private sectors
Hi: The public sector did not have more cases of contraventions than private sector. In order
to test this hypothesis the list of contraventions will be used as shown in Table 1.9
Table 1.9: List of Contraventions by Types of Developers
Agencies Central Garki Wuse Maitama Asokoro Total
District
Government Agencies 7 0 4 3 5 19
Private Sector 2 14 19 41 4 80
Diplomatic Mission 0 0 0 1 0 1
Total 9 14 23 45 9 100
Source: FCDA (1998) Final Report of Ministerial Committee on Plots of Land Allocated within
FCT designated as Green Areas.
Table 1.9 shows that contravention was promoted by both public and private concerns. A case of
contravention was even done in favour of a diplomat. Although table 1.9 shows that most of the
pressures for development came from the private sector, which has 80 out of he 100 cases of
contravention, Government itself was not left out. It has 19 cases while the remaining one odd
case was by an Embassy. This was a most disturbing trend and a rather bad example. It could
even be plausibly argued that it was the Government that is the custodian of Abuja Master Plan
that violated the plan by carrying out developments contravening the plan and encouraged the
private sector to do the same. The private sector had the effrontery and audacity to carry out
contraventions and distortions of Abuja Master Plan with the hope that they could hide behind
contraventions of the plan by the Government and its agencies. They felt that they were secured
since the Government agents were equally involved and guilty of the same offence. Their belief is
that whatever is good for the goose should be good for the ox and that they too should be
treated like sacred cows.
Table 1.9 shows that 45 of all cases of contraventions came from Maitama District, which is one
of the highbrow areas of the city. Wuse had the second largest cases of contravention with 23
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cases, followed by Garki with 14 cases. Both Asokoro and the Central District had 9 contravention
cases each.
Testing of the hypothesis
This hypothesis was tested using chi-square (42) distribution test.
(a) 42 = ∑ (O – E) 2 where O = Observed frequency
E and E = Expected frequency
(b) Contingency table
Number observed Number expected
20 100
Expected frequency
Central Garki Wuse Maitama Asokoro
District
NO 7 0 4 4 5
NE 9 14 23 45 9
NO = Number observed
NE = Number expected
(c) Calculation of chi-square
Observed Expected Frequency O–E (O - E)2
Frequency (O) (E)
7 9 -2 4
0 14 -14 196
4 23 -19 361
4 45 -41 1681
5 9 -4 4
4 = ∑ (O – E) 2 = 2246 = 22.46
E 100
(d) Degree of freedom = V
V = (Rars – 1) (Columns - 1)
= (2 - 1) (5 - 1) = (1) (4) = 4
(e) Table value at 4 degree of freedom = 9.488
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(f) As the calculated value (22.46) is greater than the table value (9.488), we reject the null
hypothesis. The public sector did not have more cases of contraventions than the private
sector.
Despite the result of the hypothesis, the public sector/government agencies can not be
commended for the fact that contrary to the norms of government, they too got involved
in contravening the layout plan designed in Abuja Master Plan. The study went further to
ascertain why development control has not been able to impact on development and
compliance with the master plan of the Federal Capital Territory
From this study, it is quite clear that development control ethics has not taken proper roots in
Nigeria. Some of the other factors responsible for its weakness include:
(a) Lack of proper implementation of Abuja Master Plan using Development Control as a
tool for ensuring that the plan is strictly adhered to.
(b) Non-Compliance by both the public and private sectors to development control.
(c) Inability of the Development Control Department of the FCDA to ensure compliance
with their orders.
(d) Weak mechanism for prevention and enforcement of development control in Abuja,
the Federal Capital.
(e) Development Control Department of FCDA had become a toothless bull dog prior to
commencement of demolition of illegal structures under Minister Mallam El-Rufai.
The Department had compromised all the ethics and rules of development control and
was therefore ineffective.
(f) Development Control in Abuja had become “medicine after death” as it were instead
of following the expected maxim of “prevention is better than cured”.
(g) As a result of lapses, inefficiencies and ineffectiveness of the Development Control
Department, government had to spend colossal sums of money to carry out the
demolition exercise so as to bring sanity in the implementation of Abuja Master Plan.
(h) The Development Control Department of FCDA had glorified disorderliness, and
accepted haphazard growth of Abuja as if it is a city without a real Master Plan.
(i) Although Abuja Master Plan is well thought out, advance and carefully designed,
development control practices fell far too short of the standards expected to sustain
the development of the city.
(j) One major drawback of development control as revealed in this case study of Abuja is
the non-participation, non-transparent and unaccountable process of the land use
charges and the poor records of land transfer.
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(k) In the battle for encroachment, residential and commercial land use topped the list,
followed by hotel and tourism development. Yet these projects are required by law to
obtain planning permission and approved building plans from FCDA before
implementation. The violations therefore show lack of proper co-ordination between
the organs of FCDA that were responsible for processing such developmental projects.
CONCLUSION
Effective strategies should be developed to critically examine, control and monitor the impact of
urbanization and population growth and pressure on resources in Abuja which is one of the
leading growth centres in Sub-Saharan Africa today. There is no doubt that a positive strategy is
that of Development Control. The type of development control required in Abuja as revealed in
this research is a pro-active tpe that carries out both preventive and prompt curative assignments
and steps so as to ensure sustainable management of the city. There is no real alternative to a
dedicated and uncompromising stand on the effective implementation of Abuja Master Plan to
prevent anarchy and ensure sustainable growth and development and to achieve the dream of
Abuja as a city, where everything is expected to work harmoniously. In this way, development
control can become a potent tool for sustainable management of Abuja.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The haphazard and forced movement of all Federal Ministries and staff to Abuja in 1996 by the
Military regime whether development, houses and necessary facilities were on the ground or not
no doubt led to the unprecedented level of distortions and contraventions of Abuja Master Plan.
The mistakes have been made. However in order to prevent a re-occurrence of similar events
that may lead to further distortions, there will be need for the following actions to be taken not
only in the overall interest of Abuja residents in particular and of the Federal Capital Territory in
general:
(a) A review of Abuja Master Plan to see what modern/current issues and needs or
development that can be adequately provided in the plan without necessarily
compromising the vision and high hopes of the founding fathers of Abuja.
(b) Overhauling of the Development Control Department as presently constituted to make
it more effective.
(c) Provision of stiff sanctions to officers and men of Development Control found to have
compromised their duties and condoned contraventions of Abuja Master Plan.
(d) Making scape goats and if possible prosecuting such errant officers to serve as
deterrent to officers of that Department in the future.
(e) Ensuring that violation of the Master Plan and especially developers of illegal structure
are made to pay for demolition, clearance and restoration of the land to its original
land use pattern.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abumere,(2001) Resettlement Then and Now – The Review of Abuja Master Plan, Ministry
of Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, Nigeria.
Ahmed, T.A. (1997) “The Growth, Development and Management of Capital Cities: A Case
Study of Abuja” Workshop Paper presented at the Conference of Directors
and Heads of Town Planning Organization in Nigeria at Owerri, Imo State,
10th – 11th July 1997.
FCDA (1986) “Abuja – the Making of a New Capital City for Nigeria” published by Federal
Capital Development Authority, Abuja January 1986, 2 nd (Ed.).
FCDA (1998) Final Report of Ministerial Committee on Plots of land Allocated within FCT
Designated as Green Areas, Status of Revoked Plots and Changes of Land
Use from 1996 – 98.
FCDA (1996) Development Control Regulations for FCDA, Abuja published by FCDA
Abuja, April 1996.
IPA (1979) “The Master Plan for Abuja – the New Federal capital of Nigeria” prepared
by International Planning Associates, Feb. 1979.
Olorunlona S.A.’, (1998) “The Planning and Implementation of Abuja Master Plan – a Technical
Update” delivered at a Seminar organized by Federal Ministry of Works
and Housing, Abuja, 9 – 12 Jan. 1998.
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