Did a Genocide Take Place in the Dersim Region of Turkey in 1938?

Did a Genocide Take Place in the Dersim Region of Turkey in 1938? by Özgür Inan Boztas A. Introduction For centuries Dersim has been a remote and inaccessible district of central Eastern Turkey, which is encircled with high mountains, narrow valleys, and broad rivers. Until 1937 this region was the last part of Turkey that had not been brought under government control, neither by the Ottomans nor by the Kemalists. Several military campaigns by the Ottomans to subdue the people of Dersim ended in failure. A centuries-long defensive struggle and the constant siege by foreign powers led largely to the preservation of traditional culture and religion of the population living in Dersim. This resulted in Dersim being a mono-ethnic province, inhabited almost exclusively by the Zaza-Alevi. A minority group, that was to be found at this time only in the region of Dersim. B. Who are the Zaza-Alevi people? First of all the Zaza-Alevi speak neither Turkish nor Kurdish, but Zazaki. In Contrast to Turkish, which is a Turkic language, the Zazaki is a Iranic language and belongs to the northwestern group of the Indo-European languages. Although related to the Kurdish, Zazaki is a language of its own. Until the late 40´s of the last century, Zazaki was the lingua franca in Dersim and very few people spoke Turkish there. This changed drastically after the events took place that are subject to this paper. Furthermore, besides speaking Zazaki, the Zaza-Alevi of Dersim adhere to a heterodox and syncretic conception of Islam, called Alevism. There are three key characteristics that distinguish the Alevism from the orthodox Sunni Islam at the first glance. First of all, the Alevi women do not wear headscarves and are not separated from men in daily and religious life. Secondly, the consume of alcohol is not forbidden for Alevis, quite the contrary, alcohol is even an integral part of the worship of the Alevis, the so-called "Ayin-i cem", during which a glass of wine or an anise liquor is consumed by the attendants1. Finally the overwhelming majority of Alevis do not visit mosques for prayers, instead they have their own houses of prayer in which they hold their ritual gatherings, the so-called "Cem evleri". On closer inspection, there are of course much more differences between the heterodox and syncretic Alevi Islam and the orthodox Sunni Islam. Alevi beliefs in general are hard to describe because of its syncretism. Alevism combines different, in part seemingly contradictory beliefs since it is a diverse movement without any central authority. The teaching is based on an orally transmitted tradition which has generally been kept secret from outsiders for centuries. But there are three corner posts of Alevism, which weld all Alevis together. The First corner post is the veneration of Ali ibn Talib, the cousin and son-in-law of the prophet Muhammad. The Ali-worship goes so far in Alevism that he appears as superior to 1 Önder: “Türkiye´nin etnik yapisi“, 49. 1 Muhammad in numerous songs and hymns, which are traditional sources of Alevi belief2. This is for the followers of orthodox Islam plain blasphemy and contributes to the irreconcilability of these two denominations within Islam. The second corner post of Alevism is the repudiation of the five pillars of Islam. The five pillars of Islam are considered mandatory by Sunni and Shia Muslims and constitute the fundament of Muslim religious life. The five pillars of Islam are: the Shahada, the Islamic creed, Salat, the prayer five times a day, Zakat, the alms giving to poor Muslims, Sawm, the fasting during the holy month of Ramadan and the Hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in a lifetime. The Alevis observe not one of the five pillars and repudiate them completely. Instead they have their own religious service, the “Ayin-i cem”, ministered not by imams or other religious scholars, but by a “dede”, a spiritual leader who is believed to be a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad3. During the Ayin-i-cem ceremony, which is held not in Arabic but in Turkish or Zazaki, religious poems, the so-called nefes, are sung and ritual dances are carried out by men and women together4. Finally, Alevis reject the orthodox Sunni interpretations of the Quran, because for them the true word of God lies in the human being himself. Instead of sticking to the wording of the Quran, they use a moral code to guide their daily lives. Thus, the ideal Alevi is "master of his hand, his tongue, and his loins". This means that theft, lies, and adultery are forbidden. These differences between the Alevism and the orthodox Sunni Islam led to the arising of multiple prejudices among the Sunni majority against the Alevi minority. The upcoming of prejudices against the Alevis was encouraged by the Turkish governments, which sought to sanitize the Sunni orthodox way of life by the degradation of the Alevis. In the course of years the prejudices against Alevis among the majority population stiffened and the Alevis were persecuted because of their religion. C. The politics of the Kemalist regime regarding minorities Subsequent to the victorious war of independence, the Kemalists had proclaimed that the new Turkey alone belonged to the Turks. The non-Turkish individuals from ethnic minorities, such as the Kurds, the Laz, the Albanians, the Greeks, the Circassians, or, the Zaza should be induced to assimilate into the Turkish culture5. For this purpose the ethnic groups of Turkey were divided into four categories6. Into the first category all those were classified who spoke Turkish and lived the Turkish culture, these were the members of the Turkish majority population. The second category included those groups who used to live according to the Turkish culture, though not spoke Turkish. These were in particular the Laz People and the Albanians who were living in Turkey for centuries7. The assumption was, that these minorities could be easily assimilated into the Turkish people. The third category comprised all those groups who spoke neither Turkish nor lived according to 2 Kehl-Bodrogi: Die Kızılbaş-Aleviten , 123 Kehl-Bodrogi, 181; Bumke: Kizilbas-Kurden in Dersim (Tunceli, Türkei). Marginalität und Häresie, in: Anthropos 1979 (74), 537. 4 Kehl-Bodrogi, 181. 5 Kirisci “Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices“, in Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 3, 8. 6 Ersanli: İktidar ve tarih. Türkiyeʼde "resmî tarih" tezinin oluşumu: (1929-1937)104. 7 Kazgan, in: Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, Vol. 6, 1556. 3 2 the Turkish culture, but at least were Islamic8. The Kurds and the Zaza were ranked in this category9. The fourth category included those minorities who neither spoke Turkish nor were Muslim10. These groups should no longer be allowed to remain in significant strength in Turkey and were either persecuted and driven out, or, as in the case of the Greek minority, resettled in the course of an agreed exchange of populations. A new nationalist ideology was implemented, with the aim to achieve the creation of a mono-ethnic Turkey. The core of this Kemalist Turkish nationalism was, that from now on every individual had to regard himself Turkish regardless of his ethnic background. The political climate for non-Turkish minorities in Turkey at this time is best described with a quotation from Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, then Minister of Justice of the Republic of Turkey, who portrayed the new state doctrine of the Kemalist Regime as follows: “It is my idea and conviction that this country is purely Turkish. Who is not a pure Turk, has only one right in this country. That right is to be a servant, a slave.”11 Therefore, the Turkish government had decided that the non-Turkish minorities either had to be assimilated or annihilated. The Kemalist regime sought in particular a final solution for the so-called “Dersim Problem”12. Between 1926 and 1936 twelve reports on the conditions in Dersim and the possibility of a Turkification of the Zaza-Alevi were commissioned by the government. Especially remarkable is the Report of the Chief of the General Staff of the Turkish armed forces Fevzi Cakmak. Cakmak was asked to give a military assessment of the solvability of the situation regarding the Turkification of the Zaza-Alevi of Dersim and submitted his report in 193113. The Cakmak report can ex post be seen as a blueprint for the military intervention of the Turkish Republic in Dersim in the years 1937 and 1938. As a first step to solve the “Dersim-Problem” Cakmak recommended, that “all weapons must be collected” from the tribes in Dersim and that “the tribal chieftains and religious leaders must be deported to West Turkey with the prospect of never coming back”. After the tribal chieftains and religious leaders were removed, ”a large part of the population needs to be deported to very distant places in the country and placed in pure Turkish communities"14. As a second step Cakmak suggested, that the “the administration department in Dersim should have the powers that are customary in the administration of colonies”. Furthermore, he proposed “great efforts in the propaganda in Dersim to show the people the superiority of Turkishness” in comparison to the ethnic heritance of the Zaza-Alevi. Beyond that Cakmak demanded “to ensure that the Zazaki is removed and Turkish is spoken exclusively” by the Zaza-Alevi. 8 Sevim/Öztoprak/Tural, Atatürk´ün Söylev ve Demecleri 1906 – 1938, 104 f. Bozarslan, in Kieser (Ed.), “Kurdistan und Europa“, 229. 10 Ülker: “Assimilation of the Muslim communities in the first decade of the Turkish Republic (1923 – 1934)”, in: European Journal of Turkish Studies, 5. 11 Cumhuriyet, 09-18-1930. 12 Kalman: Belge ve tanıklarıyla Dersim direnişleri, 355. 13 ibid. 151. 14 ibid. 151. 9 3 Ultimately, Cakmak drew the following conclusion to his report: “Briefly: 1. It is very dangerous if our politics regarding Dersim continue as before. The moral of the people of Dersim will continue to rise. 2. The people of Dersim cannot be won by pats. An armed military intervention with massive violence will make a great impression on the people of Dersim and make sure that they let themselves being civilized. 3. Dersim necessarily has to be treated as a colony. Within the Turkish national community their Kurdishness must be melted down and destroyed in order to transform Dersim into a purely Turkish region”15. On December 25, 1935 the “Law on Administration of the Tunceli Province“ was passed. The Province of Dersim was given the Turkish name Tunceli and placed under military administration. The announced aim of the Law was to "civilize" the People of Dersim, which means that a large Turkification project was launched by the Turkish Government. However, the progress of the assimilation politics was slow and most of the Zaza-Alevi refused to learn Turkish, and identify themselves as Turks. In 1937 the Turkish government was convinced that a peaceful Turkification of the Zaza-Alevi would be impossible and a military solution was needed to solve the Dersim-Problem“16. D. What happened in Dersim in 1937 and 1938? In 1937 a military campaign against Dersim was launched in response to a relatively minor incident, when a wooden bridge in Pah was burned down and telephone lines in Kahmut were cut by local tribesmen. I. The operations of 1937 - War against the tribes of Dersim On 4 May 1937 the strike against Dersim began as the Council of Ministers ordered to kill all who used or had used arms and to destroy the tribes of Dersim by killing the tribal chieftains17. The military campaign of 1937 lasted until October and was concentrated especially on the area between Pah and Hozat, where the most powerful and influential tribes of Dersim could be found. Therefore, all towns and villages in this area were intended to be depopulated and razed to the ground. For this purpose the villagers were gathered together and were either killed or deported to West-Turkey. The villages were burned down to prevent the return of the deported population. In October 1937 the Turkish soldiers withdrew from Dersim, as the basic goals of the campaign of 1937 had been largely achieved. The five powerful tribes of the Abbasan, Kureysan, Haydaran, Yusufan, and Demenan were almost entirely exterminated and their tribal leaders where killed without exception. Furthermore, a majority of the villages and 15 Kalman, 152. T.C. Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi Baskanligi Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Ayaklanmalar (1924-1938), appendix 4. 17 ibid. 383 ff. 16 4 towns between Pah and Hozat had been depopulated. Most people from these places were deported to West-Turkey. The real strike against Dersim was yet to come, and the next spring the operations were resumed with even greater force. While the operation of 1937 was targeted at the tribes and the tribal chieftains, the new attack was directed straight against the people of Dersim. II. The operations of 1938 – War against the Zaza-Alevi of Dersim Turkish government officials labeled the new campaign of 1938 forthright as a punishment campaign. Newly appointed Prime Minister Celal Bayar gave an insight what was planned in Dersim, while giving a speech at the Grand National Assembly of Turkey on 30. June 193818: “We have started a civilizing and re-education program in Dersim. In order to continue this program, it is necessary for us to continue the military offensive.(...) Our army will perform its duties and carry out a punishment campaign to eradicate this problem permanently from its very roots. (...)However, the people of Dersim must finally hear our warnings. They should know that both our benevolence and our fury can be overwhelming.“ The attack that followed has been of massive violence. In the first instance, the army determined an area that was stretched between the four valleys of Munzur, Merho, Mercan, and Kalan, accounting for about one-fifth of the area of the province and lying in its very heart. This area was labeled as “forbidden zone“ where no one was permitted to remain, and that should thereby be completely depopulated19. For this purpose the Turkish army used a two-step approach. The first step was the so-called “purge“ of the forbidden zone. The soldiers moved into the villages, "cleaned" them from the local population, and set fire to the houses and fields, in order to lay the village in ruins. The aim was to expel the population entirely from the heartland of Dersim and to concentrate the remaining inhabitants of the province in more accessible and better controllable areas20. The Turkish Army followed a certain modus operandi during the purge of the forbidden zone21. First the battalions marched into the villages and gathered all inhabitants in a central square. After making sure that in fact all the villagers had gathered there, they were told that they have to abandon their homes and that they will be deported to nearby towns like Mazgirt and Hozat. After this, the villages were set to fire, and the villagers where marched away. The destination of the march was in most cases not another town nearby, but a gorge or a slope. At this place the group was separated. Women and children were collected on one side, the men on the other side. The men were bound together with robes and told to stand in a line. Then, machine guns were set up and the men were shot. Often, to save ammunition, the women and children were stabbed with bayonets. After having killed the people, the bodies of the dead were stacked and set to fire. 18 Kalman, 364. T.C. Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi Baskanligi, 417. 20 ibid. 417. 21 See for accounts of the massacres ibid. 457, 477 ff.; Demir: Dersim’ den Tunceli'ye. 38 katliamı tanıklıkları, 176 ff.; Kalman, 376 ff. 19 5 Many of the Zaza-Alevi had heard of the killings and had fled in anticipation of the purges from their villages, and sought to hide themselves from the soldiers. The existing caves in the mountains of Dersim were suited to accommodate a large number of people. The military reported that there were caves in Dersim, where several thousand people could seek refuge22. In 1938 many people, especially women, children, and the elderly had fled into the caves of Dersim to escape the purges. But before the start of the campaign the Turkish military, with the assistance of local collaborators, had already launched a recon mission and knew exactly the caves where the Zaza-Alevi of Dersim would hide themselves in case of a military attack23. Once the recon platoons confirmed that people were staying in a cave, combat troops were requested and the caves were besieged by the soldiers and bombarded. One example for such a massacre in a cave is the Lac valley massacre, on June 15th 1938. On June 14th, the military command gave the following order to the Mameki-brigade: “Finally, the bandits will be annihilated in the Lac valley. This destruction operation will take place with such speed and force that the bandits will have no way to escape.”24 On the progress of the operation, the military gave following account: “The resistance of them was broken. They took refuge in caves, ledges, and under trees. The caves in which the bandits hid were besieged by our brave soldiers and bombarded. The pioneer battalion detonated explosive devices at the cave entrances. As a result, most of them were killed in the caves. Those, who had survived the bombs, jumped out of the caves and were taken under fire and killed. In the end, 216 people were killed within the operation. In addition, the bodies of 12 bandits were spotted drifting on the Munzur River.”25 Furthermore, the Turkish soldiers had several especially prepared places where captured people could be killed easily, and the bodies of the dead could be disposed. One example for such a killing place is the Kutu valley. The soldiers had anchored several heavy machine guns, and designated fields where the captives had to stand before being killed26. Additionally, holes were dug in the ground, where the bodies could be set afire. Because of these prepared killing places, a division of work was possible and killings could be performed faster. Mehmet Ali Ciftci, a Turkish soldier who participated in the killings describes the operations in the Kutu valley as follows: “To capture the people we went to the villages, and sometimes we took them out of the caves. There were women and old people and many children. They had fled in fear in large numbers into the caves. We captured these people and took them with us. We gathered them and brought them to the Kutu valley. There, heavy machine guns were already assembled. We pushed them in the direction of the slope and retreated. Then, the firing order was given. All were dead. The bodies were stacked and set on fire. Wherever we went, these fires were burning. Once, after they had done this to a group of women and children, a child stood up, it 22 T.C. Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi Baskanligi, 366. ibid. 477. 24 ibid. 434 25 ibid. 436. 26 Boztas: Völkerstrafrechtliche Aufarbeitung der Handlungen der türkischen Republik an den Zaza-Aleviten in Dersim in den Jahren 1937 und 1938, 99. 23 6 had been missed by the shots. They killed this child with the bayonet. Then, we went into the next villages and collected people and killed them. And it went on and on, collecting, and killing. It was easy because we never encountered resistance.” 27 To give an insight into the thinking of the Turkish soldiers that carried out the massacres against the Zaza-Alevi, we can take an interview with Ahmet Demirtas, who was send with his battalion from Kars to Dersim. There, he participated in the killings and clearings of the villages: "We gathered the villagers at a central place of the village. There, we told them that we will protect and save them, and that they have to follow us now. Then, we brought the villagers into a deep gorge or to another place we saw as appropriate, and riddled them with our machine guns. Regardless of whether they were women, children, babies, old or young, we killed them all. Our officers told us that we should not let one Alevi alive. After we killed them, the soldiers savaged like wolves on the dead bodies. There ensued a fierce rivalry, who captures most pieces of jewelry and valuables from the bodies of the dead. It was important these days to kill Alevis to go to paradise, and lead simultaneously in this life a good life with the captured gold.”28 The hatred against Alevis played obviously a great part in the motivation of the soldiers. Mehmet Ali Ciftci, too, describes similar incidences in his battalion: “Every time when the soldiers beat the women, they cried, “Ali, Ali, Ali, Ali”. The soldiers shouted, “Look at this fucking heathens, they worship to Ali, not to God” and beat them with even greater force”29. The second step of the punishment campaign was the deportation of tens of thousands of Zaza-Alevi to Western Turkey. The deportations can be considered as a part of the purges, since those who survived the purges by the Turkish armed forces within the forbidden zone were deported to western Turkey. The Turkification of the Zaza-Alevi was intended to be achieved by means of deportation in purely Turkish villages and extensive dispersal of this group around West Turkey30. There they were relocated in towns and villages inhabited by so called “pure Turks“, meaning Turkish speaking people of orthodox Sunni faith. At the same time it was meticulously taken care that the displaced Zaza-Alevi could not contact other deported from their group, to increase the pressure to assimilate themselves into the Turkish culture31. E. Victims For decades there have been no officially recognized figures how many people died or were deported during the military campaign of the Turkish Republic in 1937 and 1938. The events in Dersim in these years were a taboo in Turkey for over 70 years. This taboo was broken in 2009 by the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who spoke of the "Dersim 27 Boztas, 100. Kalman, 393. 29 Boztas, 101. 30 Bozarslan, 228. 31 T.C. Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi Baskanligi, 451. 28 7 massacre" while giving a speech and formally apologized for the massacres in 2011. If asked for the specific number of victims of the massacres and deportations of the years 1937 and 1938, there is no general agreement between scientists. There are authors reporting about 50,000 dead and 100,000 displaced32. Others talk of 40,000 to 70,000 victims of the massacre of Dersim. These partly implausible figures are not scientifically sound, and can not be proved by the respective authors33. However, in 2009 a major breakthrough was achieved as documents of the fourth General Inspectorate of the Turkish Army were discovered which contained exact number of victims. This report was at that time the only historically reliable source that drew a death toll. According to this document, 13,160 people were killed and 11,818 deported during the military operation of 1937 and 1938 in Dersim. These figures could be verified in the meantime. In November 2011 the Turkish Prime Ministers office released a document of the Gendarmerie General Command of the Turkish armed forces that was held confidential for decades34. This Document indicates the number of victims in Dersim with 13,806 killed persons. F. Did a genocide take place in Dersim in 1938? After having outlined what has happened to the Zaza-Alevi of Dersim in 1937 and especially 1938, there arises one question: do the acts of the Army of the Republic of Turkey and the politics of the Turkish Government regarding the Zaza-Alevi of Dersim constitute a genocide. Article II of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide rules, that genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such: o (a) Killing members of the group; o (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; o (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; o (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; o (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. The chapeau of article II addresses the so called “mens rea“ of the crime of genocide, that is, the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such”. The five sub items of article II list the so called “actus reus“. I. The objective elements of genocide In order to fulfill the objective elements of genocide, the Zaza-Alevi have to be a protected national, ethnical, racial or religious group, that have been the object of acts as listed in paragraphs (a) to (e) of article II. 32 Alte, in Lemberg/Hösler/ Kessler (Ed.), Finis mundi. Endzeiten und Weltenden im östlichen Europa: Festschrift für Hans Lemberg zum 65. Geburtstag, 164. 33 Aygün: Dersim 1938 ve zorunlu iskan. Telgraflar, dilekc̦eler, mektuplar, 135. 34 Report of the Gendarmerie General Command, of 8th August 1939, Document No. 2. 8 1. Protected groups The chapeau of article II of the UN Genocide Convention states that the intent to destroy must be directed against a national, racial, ethnical or religious group. In the present case the classification of the group of Zaza Alevis as an ethnic group comes into consideration. An ethnic group is generally defined as a group whose members share a common language or culture35. It is based on cultural values and is characterized by a way of life, a way of thinking, and the same way of looking at life36. Particularly the common language, culture, and origin of the members are dominant criteria for classification as an ethnic group. It has been shown in detail that the Zaza Alevis maintain own customs and traditions and have a distinct culture that distinguish them from the rest of the population of Turkey. In addition, the Zaza Alevis speak with the Zazaki an own language. Therefore, the Zaza-Alevi can be classified as an ethnic group in accordance with article UN Genocide Convention. Furthermore, the Zaza-Alevi can also be classified as a religious group. The Alevism is a branch of Islam, which is easily distinguishable from other Islamic branches like Sunni Islam or Shia Islam. 2. Actus reus During the attacks in Dersim in 1937 and 1938, 13,806 Zaza-Alevis were killed. In carrying out the killings of group members, the armed forces of the Turkish Republic used different approaches. Firstly, there were mass killings of members of the group during the purge of villages and towns within the "forbidden zone". On the other hand, there were mass killings during the destruction of hiding Zaza-Alevis in caves. Therefore, it is obvious, that the Turkish Republic killed members of the group of Zaza-Alevi in accordance with Article 2 paragraph (a) of the UN Genocide Convention. In summary, the actions of the Turkish Republic during the attack on Dersim in 1937 and 1937 fulfill the required objective Elements of the Crime of Genocide. II. The subjective elements of genocide The subjective requirements for genocide are given, if the perpetrator intents to destroy a protected group as such. The subjective element of genocide must be investigated in two steps. First, we need a general intent of the offender in terms of the specific criminal act and the knowledge of all the necessary factual circumstances. Furthermore, a so-called dolus specialis is required, a specific genocidal intent of the perpetrator. 35 36 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, note 73 above, para. 512. Schabas: Genocide in international law. The crimes of crimes, 126. 9 1. General intent To fulfill the requirement of the general intent concerning the genocide, the perpetrator must be aware of the material facts and consequences of his act, and must have consciously decided to act as he did37. In short, he must have acted knowingly and willingly. Furthermore, he must have been aware that the victim of his act is a member of the group that is aimed to be destroyed. This means, that the actual victim of the criminal act must have been selected by the perpetrator on the grounds that it is a member of the group which is aimed to be destroyed38. It was shown above, that the killings of the Zaza Alevis were carried out by order of the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces. Therefore, it is assumed that the acting soldiers executed the massacres knowingly and willingly. Nevertheless, it is a moot point, if the massacres in Dersim were executed because of the ethnic background of the Zaza-Alevi, in other words, if the actual victims of the killings have been selected by the perpetrators on the grounds that they were members of the group of Zaza-Alevi. The present military reports avoid statements that would point out that the aim of the killings were especially the Zaza Alevis. It is spoken in these reports of bandits, refugees, men capable of bearing arms or tribal leaders, but not explicitly stated that the targeted people were Zaza Alevis39. However, it is to state that the Dersim province was, at the time of the killings, inhabited almost exclusively by Zaza Alevis and there were only few people who had a different ethnic background or other faith. Additionally, the fact that Dersim was exclusively inhabited by Zaza Alevis was well known in Turkey at that time and was explicit highlighted in the media coverage of the military operations of 1937 and 193840. Thus, it was generally known that the province of Dersim was a Zaza Alevi enclave. In addition, statements of soldiers involved in the campaign are available that are suitable to provide information about the aims of the perpetrators concerning the Zaza-Alevi. So gives one soldier an account of the speech of the battalion captain on the day of the arrival of his battalion in Dersim: "Friends, do you know where we are going? In our center there is an abscess, we will cut of this abscess! These are all Kizilbas [author´s note: prejorative slang word for Alevi], did you know that?"41 Obviously, the soldiers were decidedly pointed out that the aim of the military operation was to punish the Zaza-Alevis. The same applies to the aforementioned statement of the soldier, who states that “it was important these days to kill Alevis to go to paradise”. In summary, the killings of the Zaza-Alevi have been carried out knowingly and willingly and with knowledge of the fact that the victims were members of the group Zaza Alevi. 37 Safferling: Internationales Strafrecht. Strafanwendungsrecht, Völkerstrafrecht, europäisches Strafrecht, 172; Werle: Völkerstrafrecht, 808. 38 Safferling: in Safferling/ Conze (Ed.) “The Genocide Convention Sixty Years after its Adoption, 169. 39 e.g. T.C. Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi Baskanligi 430; 436; 443. 40 see Tan of 17th June 1937; Cumhuriyet of 18th June 1937. 41 Boztas, 183. 10 2. Dolus specialis or specific genocidal intent Article II UN Genocide Convention rules, that the perpetrator of genocide must “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such“. This intent requirement or dolus specialis in the chapeau of article II UN Genocide Convention is called specific intent and constitutes the core element of the crime of genocide. The dolus specialis distinguishes the genocide under international law from mere homicide. Even if genocide as such is not codified in the domestic criminal law of a nation, the perpetrator will be subject to prosecution for most of the acts described in the subparagraphs of article II of the Convention. The core acts of article II, killing and causing serious harms, are punishable under all domestic penal codes. Therefore, the core offense of the genocide lies not in perpetrating one of the enlisted acts, but in the special intent that lies beneath the act, namely, to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such. What makes the genocide an international crime is therefore the denial of the right to existence for a protected group, as the destruction of a human being as such is a matter for the national criminal law, and does not concern the international community42. After having highlighted how important the dolus specialis for the crime of genocide is, the next step is to define the requirements of the specific intent. To start from the wording of article II UN Genocide Convention, the perpetrator must intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such. Therefore, the perpetrator of genocide must obviously intent to end the existence of a protected group. If one asks at which point a group stops to exist and is extinct from earth´s surface, than one possible answer is, that a group is destroyed if the members of the group are destroyed physically or biologically. This means, that a group certainly stops to exist the moment when its group members stop to exist, with other words, the moment the individuals that form the group are killed. It is thus commonly accepted that the specific intent of genocide is at least given, if the perpetrator intents the physical or biological destruction of a protected group43. Therefore, we have to examine the ambitions and goals of the Turkish Republic before and during the massacres in Dersim to find out, if it was intended by the decision makers of the Turkish Republic to destruct the group of Zaza-Alevi physically or biologically. After all sources available, a physical-biological destruction of the group Zaza Alevi was not the goal of the Turkish Republic during the operations in Dersim of 1937 and 1938. Neither the existing victim statements nor available reports from the military leadership can support the assertion that all Zaza Alevis should be completely wiped out physically, especially when keeping in mind, that a big part was just deported to western Turkey. The Zaza-Alevis were indeed undoubtedly classified by the Turkish Republic as a "problem group", and they should not be permitted to remain in Dersim in the present composition. But 42 Safferling (2010) in Safferling/ Conze (Ed.) “The Genocide Convention Sixty Years after its Adoption, 167. Schabas, 229; Fronza, in Lattanzi/Schabas (Ed.), “Essays on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court“, Vol. 1, 118 ff.; Werle (2007), in Hettinger/Zopf/Hillenkamp (Ed.), Festschrift für Wilfried Küper zum 70. Geburtstag, 676 ff. 43 11 the decision makers of the Turkish Republic saw the solution to the "Dersim problem" not in the physical destruction of this group, but in the Turkification of them. In particular, the aforementioned report of the Chief of the General Staff Fevzi Cakmak states in remarkable clarity that the aim of the Turkish Republic regarding the Zaza-Alevi of Dersim was a Turkification of this group. The aim to assimilate the Zaza-Alevi with force was absolute consensus within the leadership of the Turkish Republic. Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inönü said in a speech, a couple of years before the attacks against the Zaza-Alevi were mounted, the following: “We can speak open about the fact that we are nationalists and nationalism is what holds us together. Compared to the Turkish majority, other groups have no rights. We must at all costs turkify the inhabitants of our country“44. On the way to the complete assimilation of the Zaza-Alevi, their social system, and therefore the tribal culture of the Zaza Alevis, as well as their insular and secret religious organization were seen as major obstacles. Since it was assumed that the social system and in particular the strong bonds within the tribes and religious communities would prevent a voluntary abandonment of the Zaza culture, the Turkish Republic decided to eliminate this culture completely by force of arms. At the end of this program, the result should be that there was no longer a group of Zaza Alevis. For this purpose, the three cornerstones of Zaza Alevi culture were attacked in the years 1937 and 1938. First, the tribal structures were dissolved as the tribes were fought and defeated in 1937. Due to the arrest and execution of the tribal leaders, the tribes were leaderless and practically wiped out. This made it easier for the government to strip the defenseless simple tribesmen of their culture and promote their forced assimilation. Simultaneously with the extinction of the tribal society, there was also a blow against the religious communities of Alevis. Although the religious leaders of the Alevi communities were not all killed, they were at least deported to Western Turkey and separated from their communities. There remained not one Dede with his community45. Knowing this peculiarity of Alevism, namely the heavy reliance of the religious life of the community on their religious leaders, the Turkish Republic consistently sought the resolution of the Alevi religious communities by the expulsion of the community leaders. As the third cornerstone of Zaza Alevi society, and most important pillar of the culture of the Zaza Alevis, the Zazaki language was identified. The Turkish Republic provided the utmost importance that the Zaza Alevi stop to use their own language and instead use the Turkish language. It was regarded as the most important step in the assimilation of the Zaza-Alevi into the Turkish culture. The fastest possible learning of the Turkish and stop using their own language can therefore be considered as the main reason for the deportations carried out. Using the Zazaki in the expulsion and in Dersim was forbidden from now on. Therefore, except for the required amount of needed killings for successful assimilation of Zaza Alevis, the majority of the Zaza Alevis should remain physically intact and be "civilized" by becoming Turks. 44 45 this speech was reported by Sir E. Lindsay to Chamberlain, Konstantinopel, 28.04.1925, FO E 2634/194/44. Aygün: Dersim 1938. Resmiyet ve hakikat, 75. 12 It was assumed that it is in principle possible to assimilate the Zaza Alevis, since although they spoke no Turkish, they at least belonged to Islam. However, a complete Turkification of them was seen only possible through the complete abandonment of the own culture and language of the Zaza-Alevi. In summary, the destruction of the social existence of the group of the Zaza Alevis was the aim of the Turkish Republic, not the physical destruction of the group. Consequently the commonly accepted definition of the specific intent of genocide is in this case not fulfilled. This leads to the question, if the special intent of genocide is given only when the perpetrator intents the physical-biological to destruction of the group, or if there are other possibilities to attain a special intent within the meaning of article II UN Genocide Convention. 3. Physical or social destruction of the group? Heavily debated is the question, whether the intended destruction must be physical, or, if it could suffice for a genocidal intent within the meaning of Art. II UN Genocide Convention, that the perpetrator intends to destroy the social existence of a protected group. The Federal Court of Justice of Germany and the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany ruled that in order to fulfill the requirements of the genocidal dolus specialis, it is sufficient, if it is intended to destruct the social existence of the group46. The German Court opted for broad definition of specific genocidal intent, and stated that the statutory definition of genocide defends a supra-individual object of legal protection. Therefore, genocide would protect the social existence of a persecuted national, racial, religious or ethnic group and not the individual group member47. Consequently, the German courts concluded, that the offense of genocide "does not necessarily require that the perpetrator seeks the physical destruction of the group"48. Rather it ruled, that it is sufficient for specific genocidal intent, if the perpetrators intents to destruct the group in its social existence, as only the existence of the group as such is protected by the Genocide Convention. On the contrary, the international tribunals favor a narrow definition of the specific genocidal intent. In particular the ICTY opted in its Krstic Judgment for a narrow approach and ruled that the genocide protects groups only against physical or biological destruction by the perpetrators. It therefore concluded, that attacks only to the cultural and social characteristics of the group are not sufficient to achieve genocide. Therefore, the ICTY ruled that it is for the adoption of an intent to destroy not sufficient that the perpetrator intends to destroy the social existence of the group49. The ICTY stated in its Krstic decision, that “An enterprise attacking only the cultural or sociological characteristics of a human group in order to annihilate these elements which 46 BVerfG NJW 2001, 1848 ff.; BGHSt 45, 65 ff. BGHSt 45, 81. 48 BGHSt 45, 81 49 See Prosecutor v Radislav Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Trial Chamber, para. 578 f. 47 13 give to that group its own identity distinct from the rest of the community would not fall under the definition of genocide“50. The ICTY justified its approach by stating that it must interpret the Convention with due regard for the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. This fundamental law principle rules that there can be no crime committed without a violation of penal law as it existed at the moment of the alleged offence. This means that only those penalties that had already been established for the offence in the time when it was committed, can be imposed. The ICTY argued that “despite recent developments, customary international law limits the definition of genocide to those acts seeking the physical or biological destruction of all or part of the group“51. Furthermore, the ICTY pointed out, that the drafting history of the UN Genocide Convention supports a narrow definition of the dolus specialis, by stating that “although the Convention does not specifically speak to the point, the preparatory work points out that the “cultural” destruction of a group was expressly rejected after having been seriously contemplated. The notion of cultural genocide was considered too vague and too removed from the physical or biological destruction that motivated the Convention”52. After having given an introduction to this debate, I would like to state my point of view and show why I prefer the broader view of the German courts and think, that a group is already destroyed as such if it no longer exists socially, even if the group members may physically survive the genocide. There are, in particular in the legislative history and the wording of the Genocide Convention and the case law of the international tribunals, some important considerations that can not be ignored. There are basically four points that need to be considered in this debate: (1) Wording of article II UN Genocide Convention Firstly, the wording of article II UN Genocide Convention has to be taken into account. An overall view of the acts enumerated in article II UN Genocide Convention shows, that the crime of genocide is on no account based solely on physical violence. Article II contains three individual acts, which exert no direct physical impact on the protected group and have yet found entrance into the Genocide Convention. For a start article II lit. b UN Genocide Convention rules “Causing serious (…) mental harm to members of the group" as a genocidal act. Furthermore, article II lit. e UN Genocide Convention regulates that “forcibly transferring children of the group to another group" is a genocidal act. Subjecting these acts to closer inspection, it is clear that none of the mentioned actions is appropriate to result in a direct and immediate physical destruction of a protected group. Although causing serious mental harm to group members can, in the long run, cause the physical extermination of a group, however, a physical annihilation of the group members is 50 ibid. para. 580. ibid. para. 580. 52 ibid. para. 576. 51 14 certainly not an inevitable and immediate consequence thereof. In particular, to forcibly transfer children of the group to another group is even in the long term not suited to destroy a group in its physical-biological existence. In fact, these actions may serve to destroy the group in its social existence, as severely traumatized group members can contribute to the stability of a group just as little as children who have been raised in the culture and language of another group. However, it would be a contradiction in terms to require from a perpetrator in the actus reus of the crime to transfer children of the group safe and sound to another group, but to require in the mens rea that he must intend to destroy the group physically by transferring the children. Such a request would be utterly pointless and would require contradictory behavior on the part of the offender. The aforementioned also applies to the situation that an offender must have caused objectively mental harm to members of the group, with the intention to physically exterminate the group. It is apparent that with the request that the intended destruction must be physical-biological, the acts in article II lit. b and e UN Genocide Convention if occurring isolated, could be punished only in exceptional cases as genocide. This follows from the fact that it would simply be unrealistic to expect that a person wants to achieve the physical destruction of a group by transferring children or causing serious psychological damage to members of the group. In addition, the wording of article II UN Genocide Convention provides further evidence that the legislature had not only provided the physical-biological destruction of a group. For instance article II lit. c UN Genocide Convention regulates that the deliberately infliction of conditions of life, which are calculated to bring about the "physical destruction" of the group, is punishable by law. Would the genocide be exclusively focused on the protection of the physical existence of a group, there would be no need to explicitly reference to the physical destruction in article II lit. c. In fact, it becomes clear that the physical destruction of the group is seen as one possible way to destroy a group as such, but that this is not the only way. It is also noteworthy that article II lit. c UN Genocide Convention only speaks of the physical destruction of "the group", while in the chapeau of article II the destruction of the "group as such" is mentioned. From a comparative view of article II lit. c UN Genocide Convention with the chapeau of article II it becomes apparent that the drafters wanted to install a wider concept in the chapeau of article II for the dolus specialis and had not only the physicalbiological destruction of the group in mind. Have a limitation of the scope of the genocide only on the biological existence of the group been intended, it would have been unnecessary to separately mention the "physical" destruction of the group within the acts, if it have been seen anyway as the only possible way to destroy a group. (2) Group definition of the international tribunals The feature that defines a group within the meaning of article II UN Genocide Convention is either the feeling of togetherness within the group, or, the discrimination of the members of the group through others. This follows from the case law of the ad hoc tribunals, which determine the existence of a group from a subjective perspective by focusing on self- 15 identification by group members or the external identification by others53. For example, “an ethnic group is one whose members share a common language and culture”54. Thus, both, the self-identification and the identification by others rely exclusively on a social context. But if the existence of a group depends on its members and their feeling of togetherness and connection by a common language, culture or religion, then otherwise the continuity of the group obviously cannot be destroyed only by the extinction of its members. While this is obviously the most direct way to destroy a group, as the cohesion generating features such as common language, culture, customs and common religion are wiped out with the group members, the existence of the group as such depends in particular on the continued existence of these cohesion generating features. Following this initial hypothesis, it is apparent that a group must already be regarded as destroyed when the features are destroyed, that generate the feeling of togetherness within the group. Are the connecting features between the members wiped out, the group is just a collection of people without any connection to each other. The existence as a group is ended although the former members of the group continue to exist physically. Groups, be they of ethnic, racial, national or religious nature, are entirely social structures. There is no scientific principle that states that two people of the same ethnicity, race, nation or religion automatically feel associated with each other by means of biological processes. Only when the physical existence of the members is joined by additional common characteristics and a social connection, these people identify themselves as a group, or are identified as such by others. Therefore, from a purely logical point of view, for the question of the existence of a group, the answer can never depend on the sheer biological existence of the group members. This simply follows from the fact that groups within the meaning of the UN Genocide Convention are biologically absolutely arbitrary. Therefore, it is absolutely crucial for the existence of a group that a social cohesion exists between the group members. This notion is, as shown above, obviously shared by the international tribunals when it comes to the question of the existence of a protected group. If the tribunals, however, on the one hand determine the existence of a group on the basis of social cohesion, it is, on the other hand, entirely inconsistent to demand regarding the destruction of the group a physicalbiological extermination of the group members. Thus, the international tribunals contradict themselves evidently in this point. (3) Drafting history of the UN Genocide Convention In addition, the direct legislative history of the Genocide Convention also contains clear evidence that speaks against the limitation of the intent to destroy within genocide on a purely physical destruction of the protected group. The United Nations resolution 96 (I) shows clearly the motivation of the international community in the condemnation of genocide. Already in the introduction it is stated that the 53 See Prosecutor v Goran Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Trial Chamber, para. 70 f.; Prosecutor v Clement Kayishema et al. ICTR-95-1-T, Trial Chamber, para. 98. 54 Prosecutor v Clement Kayishema et al. ICTR-95-1-T, Trial Chamber, para. 98. 16 United Nations conceive genocide not only a violation of the right of existence of groups, but also as a crime against human civilization55. The general assembly states that "such denial of the right of existence shocks the conscience of mankind, results in great losses to humanity in the form of cultural and other contributions represented by these human groups". Protected legal interest of the offense of genocide is therefore not only the right of existence of a protected group as such, but also the preservation of human civilization in its diversity of cultures. The motivation of the General Assembly, that the condemnation of genocide is also needed to preserve the human civilization in its cultural diversity, raises the question at which point the culture of a group and its contributions to human civilization are lost for mankind. The question is whether this is only the case if a group is physically and biologically wiped out. This is obviously not the case. The culture and tradition of a protected group, and consequently their civilizational achievements, are already effectively lost to humanity if the group as such does not exist anymore, in other words, when their social existence is ended. If the group is destroyed in its social existence, the loss to human civilization has already occurred, even if the members of the group physically persist. (4) Analysis of the Krstic judgment Finally the concerns of the ICTY in the Krstic judgment regarding the obtaining of a specific genocidal intent in the intended destruction of the social existence of a group need to be reconsidered. First, the chamber expressed concerns regarding the drafting history of the Genocide Convention. Thus, the concept of "cultural genocide" was discussed at length but the drafters expressly rejected its inclusion into the genocide convention. Therefore, the chamber of the ICTY decided to reject the broad scope used by the German courts regarding the dolus specialis of genocide with respect to the declared intention of the drafters during the legislative procedure of the Genocide Convention. In this point, however, the drafters of the Genocide Convention have been, with all due respect to the ICTY, misunderstood. Although the ICTY noted correctly that the "cultural genocide" has not become part of the Genocide Convention, because there were concerns among the representatives of the states, these concerns were related to the inclusion of the acts of cultural genocide into the actus reus of genocide56. In particular, the lack of comparability between the described acts of genocide and the cultural genocide was criticized and "a lack of logic and of sense of proportion" recognized "to include in the same convention both mass murder in gas chambers and the closing of libraries"57. The present debate, however, revolves not around introducing the acts of cultural genocide into the genocide. Rather, it is a question whether the dolus specialis as a subjective element 55 General Assembly Resolution, 96 (I) UN Doc. E/447, 26. 57 Lippman “The Drafting of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide“, in Boston University International Law Journal 3, 1985, 38. 56 17 of the genocide can be obtained if the perpetrator intends to destroy the social existence of the group. The actus reus of genocide thus remains completely unaffected by this problem. The reason for this lies in the conception and special structure of the genocide, as it requires from the perpetrator more on the mental side then it requires on the objective side. The subjective or mental requirement of the specific genocidal intent therefore, does not need to have an equivalent in the actus reus. The aforementioned is supported by the "dissenting opinion" of Judge Mohamed Schahabuddeen in the appeal judgment in the Krstic case58. Schahabuddeen stated that the chamber "overlooks a distinction between the nature of the listed ‘acts’ and the ‘intent’ with which they are done"59. Consequently, he concluded that "from their nature, the listed (or initial) acts must indeed take a physical or biological form, but the accompanying intent, by those acts, to destroy the group in whole or in part need not always lead to a destruction of the same character"60. Therefore, the concerns of the ICTY regarding the drafting history of the Genocide Convention are not valid. The same applies to the concerns about a violation of the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. The nullum crimen sine lege principle rules, as aforementioned, that there can be no crime committed without a violation of penal law as it existed at the moment of the alleged offence. Therefore, a closer look to what exactly is ruled in article II UN Genocide Convention is needed. The chapeau of article II UN Genocide Convention rules, that an intent to destroy the group “as such” is required for the specific genocidal intent. If the wording in the chapeau were to be understood that way, that only a physical-biological destruction of the group falls under the term "destruction", then the concerns of the chamber would be justified. But the wording of the chapeau does not limit the specific genocidal intent to a solely physical destruction of the group. In fact, it broadens the scope of the dolus specialis by using the words, that it must be intended to destruct the group “as such”. This wording extends beyond physical and biological extermination. This follows from the fact that after the natural sense of the words the required intend to destruct “the group as such'', covers more than the physical-biological destruction of the group alone. In other words, the addition that the acts must be committed with intent to destroy the group "as such", would be needless if the intent to destroy would only comprise the intended physical-biological destruction of the group. If the drafters of the Genocide Convention had the wish to narrow the scope of the dolus specialis to a purely physical-biological destruction of the group, it would have been sufficient to rule in the chapeau of article II, that “genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group”. The text of the law does therefore not compel the interpretation that the perpetrators intent must be to exterminate physically members of the group61. In summary, the arguments of the chamber in the Krstic judgment are not mandatory and cannot convince. Conversely, both drafting history and wording of the genocide convention 58 Prosecutor v Radislav Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber, para.para. 45 ff. Prosecutor v Radislav Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber, para.para. 48. 60 Prosecutor v Radislav Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber, para. 48. 61 BVerfG NJW 2001, 1850. 59 18 speak for the protection of the social existence of the group. In particular, it became clear that the opinion that favored a purely physical-biological protection of the groups is inconsistent and leads to criminal liability loopholes. For this reasons the intended destruction of the social existence of a protected group suffices to adopt a specific genocidal intent. III. Conclusion As shown above, the aim of the operation of the Turkish Republic during the attack on the Zaza-Alevi of Dersim was the annihilation of the social existence of the Zaza Alevi to give rise to the ultimate goal, "to develop a new center Turkishness in Central Anatolia"62. Therefore, the complete Turkification of the Zaza-Alevi was intended by the Turkish Republic. Consequently, the Turkish Republic acted with the intent to destroy the group of the ZazaAlevi within the meaning of Art. II UN Genocide Convention. The actions of the Turkish Republic in Dersim to the Zaza Alevis thus meet the definition of genocide. The social existence of the group of the Zaza Alevis should be wiped out in order to convert the group by forced assimilation into the group of Turks. To ensure the assimilation success, massacre of group members were carried out. The purpose of the massacres was to show the surviving Zaza Alevis what was awaiting them if they continued to resist the Turkification. 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