Iran: Ghadir Submarine Maintenance-Fabrication Shop at Bandar-e-Abbas

One of the primary goals of Iranian defense planning is achieving self-reliance in building and maintaining its military equipment. This goal, inter alia, originated from Iran’s experience in the Iran-Iraq war, where Iran quickly became aware how sanctions could create shortages and decrease operational capacity.

The reasoning behind this goal was further highlighted recently after Rosoboronexport – at the behest of the USG – kept the S-300 (SA-10) SAM system out of Iranian hands despite inking the deal earlier in 2007.

According to the FARS news agency, Iran is in the process of filing a complaint against Russia with the International Court of Arbitration on the grounds the air defense system was not included in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929. Regardless of the court’s findings, it is highly unlikely Iran will get the prized double digit SAM system any time soon unless a Belarus or a Ukraine is ready to sell theirs.

As a side note, Russia will be delivering the S-400 missile system to Belarus in the near future which may free up Belarusian S-300 equipment for transfer.

As a result, Iran will certainly be under additional pressure to actively pursue agreements to further develop its indigenous production capacity and decrease dependencies on international supply chains.

With that in mind, a review of satellite imagery on 22 March 2005 shows Iran breaking ground on what will be the Defense Industries Organization’s Ghadir (SSC) submarine fabrication-maintenance shop at Bandar-e-Abbas. By 10 February 2008, imagery shows the majority of the construction, including the base for the wharf and the transverse table, complete while a gantry crane is waiting to be assembled. Imagery from 9 June 2009 confirms the maintenance-fabrication shop operational but also suggests the facility was being utilized at a much earlier date.

Brigadier General Vahidi

The imagery confirmation of the Ghadir maintenance-fabrication shop at Bandar-e-Abbas further supports past remarks by Brigadier General Vahidi on Iran’s ability to mass produce Ghadir (SSC) coastal submarine. However, due to the timing of its construction, the Ghadir (SSC) may have initially been built elsewhere or Iran may not have domestically produced the first few units further supporting initial assessments of North Korean arms transfer links. Before making any conclusions, this essay will review some potential targets on imagery as well as open source reporting.

 

Potential Imagery Targets

Prior to constructing the Ghadir (SSC) maintenance-fabrication shop at BeA, Iran had only four major port-shipyard facilities identified on satellite imagery that could support local production and repair. These facilities included:

ISOICO Shipyard                               27.051833 N, 55.977317 E

Bandar-e Abbas                                  27.142104 N, 56.211704 E

Sadra Shipyard                                    28.969710 N, 50.860817 E

Bandar-e Anzali (Caspian)                   37.468271 N, 49.462675 E

Of those facilities listed, the Sadra and the ISOICO Shipyards are the only two located along the Gulf coast outside of Bandar-e-Abbas. These shipyards will be our primary points of interest. Sadra and ISOICO belong to the Industrial Development and Renovation Organization (or IDRO), the largest developmental organization in Iran, and are therefore considered sister companies.

Seyed Majid Hedayat

The IDRO is headed by Seyed Majid Hedayat, a New York State BS Mechanical Engineering degree holder, whose focus in 2010 was to speed up the projects currently underway. Recent press reports show Mr. Hedayat visiting Zhongguancun Haidian Science Park, China’s equivalent of Silicon Valley, in April 2011, which may suggest future procurement priorities as the Iranian New Year started on 21 March.

Target Background

SADRA

The Iran Marine Industrial Company, or Sadra, is not to be confused with its subsidiary Sadra-Jurang, a joint venture between Singapore and Iran based at Bandar-e-Abbas.

Sadra was originally founded by a US company in 1968 as a small shipyard in Bushehr. Since then, it has quickly managed to become a leader in Iran’s ship building and maintenance industry. Following the revolution, Sadra diversified its capabilities in 1981 moving into the offshore oil and gas sectors in order to tap the potential revenue streams in the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea.

Sadra’s continued growth and rapid development, especially in the following decade, has been largely tied to developing partnerships with international firms and acquiring subsequent expertise in the offshore oil and gas industries. As a result, Sadra has managed to continue its competencies in shipbuilding and ship repair through its offshore revenue, but often at a loss.

According to imagery, Sadra’s current shipbuilding-repair capacity includes work mainly on fishing boats, utility vessels, small-medium tankers, cargo ships and fast patrol boats. However, imagery may not be conclusive as Sadra utilizes affiliated companies’ marine facilities located in and around the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea in order to expand operational capacity.

ISOICO[i]

In regards to shipbuilding, Sadra’s sister company, the Iran Shipbuilding and Offshore Industries Complex (ISOICO), may be the government favorite of the two as it is conveniently located within Iran’s Special Economic Zone for shipbuilding based in Hormozgan province.

While it’s currently unclear how long the ISOICO has been developing its expertise, we do know from personnel recently interviewed by Iran’s Press TV that the company received its first dolphin floating dry dock and syncrolift by 1986. However, due to the Iran-Iraq war, the company had to restrict further expansion and limit its shipbuilding program in order to focus on ship repair.

According to Mostafa Karbalaie, a former managing director, shipbuilding wasn’t even discussed again until the mid-1990s when funding from the IDRO was made available due to the surplus of revenue from auto sales. The IDRO along with Iran’s Economic Council classified shipbuilding as a strategic industry and began to link domestic ship orders to local domestic ship fabrication capacity. In doing so, the Economic Council legislated the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Shipping Lines (IRISL) order six container ships, a $188 million contract, to further stimulate demand.

After acquiring funding, the company began negotiating with Germany’s major shipbuilders, the MPC and GL groups, in the early 2000s to hire advisors and acquire the technological knowledge to fulfill the contract. Subsequently, other contracts have been awarded to ISOICO from the IRISL and other international shipping lines providing greater opportunities to increase ship building proficiencies.

With the ISOICO’s growth and expanding market, many supplier companies began establishing offices in the UAE to further meet growing demand. However, additional international sanctions throughout the years have seriously constrained the procurement of parts through international supply chains. As a result, ISOICO has had to contribute a greater share of involvement by manufacturing parts locally, specifically with the latter ships coming out of the fabrication yard.

A few of the ships constructed by the ISOICO include:

1)      Iran Arak                     4) Iran Fahim

2)      Iran Shahre Kord         5) Tide

3)      Iran Kashan                 6) Unknown Oil Skimmer(s)

Converging Interests

According to Iran’s International Magazine, the fabrication activity for Iran’s shipbuilding orders is often carried out jointly by the ISOICO and Sadra. This connection has made many uncomfortable in the USG as the latter’s main controlling partner is the Khatam al-Anbia, the engineering arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC).[ii] While this support may be no different than other forms of state led growth seen in other parts of the world, state owned firms have increasingly become a topic of contention with Western governments.[iii]

Since the revolution, there has been a greater push by the IRGC to extract rents from strategic sectors of the economy so as to maintain a sense of self-sufficiency. In that regard, the IRGC has broadly interpreted various articles within the constitution in order to provide legitimacy for intervening and controlling certain sectors in the economy while excluding outside competition.

Imagery further supports these connections as the Ghadir (SSC) submarine, an IRGCN and IRIN asset, is confirmed to be manufactured at the ISOICO shipyard. Continued satellite coverage has shown the ISOICO shop expanding its maintenance-fabrication capacity with additional structures. These structures may correspond with the reported increase of Ghadir delivery over the 2009-2010 years despite the completion of the maintenance-fabrication shop at Bandar-e-Abbas (BeA) by 9 June 2009.

However, as the future capacity of the ISOICO shipyard will include two large dry docks over twice the size of those at BeA – putting greater importance on large ship fabrication – the manufacturing of the Ghadir may be in the process of shifting to BeA. Alternatively, the ISOICO shipyard may remain a primary Ghadir (SSC) manufacturing facility while the new fabrication-maintenance shop at BeA may simply expand production capacity and provide an alternate shop to continue routine maintenance on the Ghadir (SSC). More on this topic will be discussed in the implication section.

As an additional caveat, this article currently classifies the new maintenance-fabrication shop at BeA as a Defense Industries Organization project due to judgments about the Ghadir being mass produced and offered for export. However, it also seems very likely the BeA shop could be operated under Sadra or the ISOICO, and by extension the IRGC. This is a very important distinction to make as sales from one would contribute to the national military and the other to the IRGC.

Ghadir (SSC) Activity on Imagery

Multispectral Imagery on 7 June 2004 and 22 March 2005 from Digital Globe show the first appearances of probable Ghadir (SSC) submarine in open source imagery docked at the ISOICO shipyard and Badar-e-Abbas. Although inconclusive, the first glimpse of the Ghadir (SSC) at the ISOICO fabrication shop suggests it may have been produced locally. While some sources suggest North Korea transferred these submarines, it’s more probable they transferred the technical knowledge for local fabrication. This hypothesis follows closely with the operating strategies of Sadra and the ISOICO outlined in the prior background section.

Multispectral imagery from 7 November 2010 acquired from Geo Eye and freeze frames from a Ghadir fabrication video further support the ISOICO shipyard as the location of origin. The slant angle of the satellite in the 2011 imagery captured the side of the fabrication shop and its associated windows. The three layers of ventilation windows and the end of the bay clearly match those shown from the freeze frames.

Multispectral Imagery from 2008 and 24 Sept 2009 acquired from Geo Eye show the extension of the fabrication shop at the ISOICO shipyard. This additional support structure may further extend Ghadir production-maintenance capacity. The building currently measures 75 x 40 meters, more than adequate space to accommodate at least four Ghadir submarine. The new four-bay maintenance-fabrication shop at BeA is similar in size measuring 60 x 48 meters.

The erection of the structure corresponds with the reported delivery of seven Ghadir (SSC) to the IRGCN and IRIN during years 2009 and 2010. However, this analysis is speculative and is still inconclusive. This structure may also have been erected to accommodate the IDRO’s increased exports and the additional industrial marine projects acquired in 2008.

However, this structure along with the Ghadir’s continued presence may still suggest the ISOICO’s continued role in the Ghadir supply chain.

Imagery from 10 February 2008 acquired from Digital Globe show two probable Nahang (SSC) and two Ghadir (SSC) docked at Bandar-e-Abbas at the Northeast wharf near 27.144085 N, 56.215775 E. The Nahang (SSC) has recently been discussed in a previous post here.

Imagery from 10 February also show the Ghadir fabrication shop almost complete with the wharf and transverse table in place while a gantry crane is waiting to be assembled.

Multispectral Imagery on 9 June and 28 June 2009 acquired from Geo Eye show the Ghadir (SSC) submarine being fitted out or undergoing maintenance at Bandar-e-Abbas. Due to the lack of coverage and imagery resolution, it is difficult to confirm if these are two different Ghadir (SSC) located at the end launch slipway across from the maintenance-fabrication shop. In the case this is one Ghadir (SSC) being fitted, imagery suggest at least a 19 day stay in the maintenance-fitting out process at the end launch slip way. However, as the marine railway now has a 46m covering, it would be difficult even with increased coverage to visually confirm the average time Ghadir remain at this location until operational. Please see prior posts on D&D at Bandar-e-Abbas.

Multispectral Imagery on 24 Sept 2009 and 8 February 2010 acquired from Geo Eye show one Ghadir (SSC) submarine docked to the breasting platform adjacent to the syncrolift at the ISOICO shipyard. In addition, the shipyard has added an additional slipway (red circle) since 24 Sept 2009 suggesting ISOICO has taken on the maintenance of smaller craft.

This is the first open source imagery available of the ISOICO shipyard in Google Earth since 7 June 2004. The continued presence of Ghadir (SSC) at this facility may suggest they are still manufactured here.

Please note, due to low imagery fidelity, the colors and contrast of the left image have been altered to make the image more discernable.

Multispectral Imagery from 7 November 2010 acquired from Geo Eye show the Ghadir maintenance-fabrication shops at Bandar-e-Abbas and at the ISOICO shipyard. Two Ghadir (SSC) were docked at the ISOICO shipyard at the breasting platforms adjacent to the syncrolift while one Ghadir (SSC) was docked at the Northeast wharf at Bandar-e-Abbas. Another Ghadir (SSC) was cradled on the marine rail at the wharf waiting to be launched by the gantry crane. Alternatively, the Ghadir on the wharf may be there for maintenance.

The imagery from 7 November is the only imagery available where both the ISOICO and Bandar-e-Abbas fabrication shops were simultaneously captured. Interestingly, only four Ghadir could be accounted for. However, this does not discount that the Ghadir (SSC) could be under cover undergoing maintenance, out on patrol, or dispatched to Chah Bahar: the often speculated location of future Iranian submarine deployment.  Unfortunately, the last open source imagery available for Chah Bahar dates back to 2 March 2005.

Multispectral Imagery on 28 January 2011 acquired from Geo Eye show two Ghadir (SSC) at the maintenance-fabrication shop at Bandar-e-Abbas near 27.140359 N, 56.211459 E. Imagery suggest one Ghadir recently launched while another is still in the maintenance-fitting out process. An additional Ghadir (SSC) is located at the Northeast wharf at the normal deployment location.

 

Collateral

On 23 July 2011 Ayatollah Khamenei visited Bandar-e-Abbas and made an address to the naval officers stationed there:

“The days of hegemonic powers which determine the fate of other nations by imposing their military might has come to an end…”

Such statements correspond with previous remarks by Khamenei which emphasize Iran’s navy as the primary foundation in which its long term goals can be achieved.

Ali Fadavi, the IRGC Navy Chief, further explained the reasons behind Khamenei’s visit as a way to boost morale for the navy as their forces were on Iran’s frontlines from Chah Bahar to Arvand-rud. 

Fadavi went on to support Khamenei’s message by emphasizing the naval capacity of the US as a major factor of hegemony which he viewed as the most likely area for potential confrontation.

After the address, Khamenei went on to tour Bandar-e-Abbas and specifically, the maintenance-fabrication shop, which showed the Ghadir (SSC) in various possible states: being overhauled, fitted for operation, or undergoing maintenance.

Implication

1) The initial implication of the imagery and collateral observed suggests that Iran has shifted the manufacturing of the Ghadir (SSC) submarine from the ISOICO shipyard to Bandar-e-Abbas (BeA) further supporting Brigadier General Vahidi’s comments on mass production. However, the submarine’s continued presence at the ISOICO shop certainly raises some questions.

Due to a lack of coverage at the ISOICO, it is difficult to say definitively where exactly all Ghadir are being produced at.

2) While imagery and collateral suggest the new facility at BeA is operational – with what appear to be new unpainted Ghadir (SSC) cradled on the wharf – it is possible this could only be a command level maintenance shop. If that’s the case, one would have to question the operational capacity of the Ghadir (SSC) if they are frequently observed cradled on the wharf or the associated end launch slip way.

In addition, the 7 November 2010 imagery capturing both Bandar-e-Abbas and the ISOICO show only four Ghadir (SSC) total at both shops which supports the argument in favor of operational issues. While some analysts may point to Chah Bahar to explain the Ghadir (SSC) absence, Chah Bahar is an unlikely deployment location due to the depths of the waters. The Kilo (SSK) would be more suited for that type of forward deployment.

3) However, the prior analysis does not discount the existence of additional deployment locations or the possibility that the Ghadir (SSC) may be attached to motherships during patrols. Unfortunately, those possibilities cannot be confirmed on imagery at present.

4) Lastly, the additional construction observed at ISOICO and Bandar-e-Abbas may represent the increase in demand to manufacture the submarine in order to export or support an Iranian presence in the Red Sea.

In December 2009, Radio France International reported that Iran, backed by Khartoum, had docked at the Eritrean port of Assab. According to reports, the Iranian force included military ships and an unknown submarine.

The following December, Djibouti and Iran participated in a training exercise where Iran reportedly brokered a deal to use Djibouti as a logistical support base building upon prior cooperation agreements signed during Ahmadinejad’s visit in 2009.

Iran’s increasing engagement in Africa, specifically at another SLOC chokepoint, substantially increases Iran’s submarine threat perception by expanding options for its deterrence strategy.

Conclusion

While increasing international sanctions may be hurting the Iranian economy, it has precipitated further IRGC intervention within key sectors, supporting a greater focus on naval innovation. As a result, Iran’s shipbuilding industry is feeding its military capacity and appears to be helping Iran move up the value chain in submarine fabrication.

Like most developing countries, knowledge transfer from abroad remains an important factor for increasing Iran’s local military industrial base. Certainly assistance from North Korea, China, and Russia in recent years has help propel Iran well ahead of any other country’s naval fabrication capacity in the region.

The addition of the two Nahang (SSC) since 2006, its 11 reported Ghadir (SSC) in service and future plans to build the 1,000 ton Qaaem – whose capabilities include launching subsurface-to-surface cruise missiles – serve as highly visible indicators.

And now the new dedicated Ghadir (SSC) maintenance-fabrication shop at Bandar-e-Abbas supports the growing importance of Iranian submarine deployment capabilities and the emergence of an industry possibly separate from other ship building activity. Such a development corresponds with Iran’s growing economic and political influence in Africa whose ports have become the subject of Iranian diplomatic overtures for the last several years.

Not only will Iran seek to export the Ghadir, whose $19 million price tag is quite affordable for developing countries, the US may yet have to contend with an emergent Iranian naval presence beyond the Persian Gulf.

Certainly further Iranian thrusts into the Red Sea will add additional weight behind the reform of the Arms Export Control Act in order to further sell equipment abroad, especially to the GCC states.

Endnotes:
 [i] It is reported the ISOICO’s shipbuilding capacity will soon help propel the National Iranian Tanker Company, the world’s fourth largest oil tanker operator, into the number three position. Despite international sanctions, Iran continues to transport crude produced by Royal Dutch Shell Plc, Total SA, in addition to oil from Saudi Aramco and other producers in Kuwait and the UAE.

[ii] The 2009 – 2010 Iranian year saw the IRGC buy a 51.18% stake in Sadra and five months later a 50% stake in Iran Telecommunications Company. The latter acquisition may also further explain why Seyed Majid Hedayat visited China’s Zhongguancun Haidian Science Park in 2011.

[iii] In fact, the latest trade agreements proposed to the pacific region hope to address Western issues with state-owned enterprises and potential subsidies.


Related Reports on Iran's Submarines from OSGEOINT

1) OSGEOINT (20 Jan 2012) Iran: Underground Naval Base at Qeshm Complete

2) OSGEOINT (10 Oct 2011) Iran: Denial and Deception at Bandar-e-Abbas

3) OSGEOINT (16 Oct 2011) FIRST LOOK: Nahang Submarine Imagery Signature at Bandar-e-Abbas

4) OSGEOINT (27 Nov 2011) Iran Puts Three Additional Ghadir Submarine Into Service