Readers may remember Pekka Savola (@PekkaSavola, Legal Counsel at CSC-Scientific Computing Ltd and a researcher at University of Helsinki, Finland), for it was Pekka who authored a guest post on this weblog last month, "Hyperlinks, making available and the 'new public' -- or just a dead end?" (here). Well, we're pleased to offer our readers another guest post by Pekka, this time on yesterday's ruling in Case C-314/12 UPC Telekabel Wien (noted briefly
here on the 1709 Blog, and discussed in greater depth on the IPKat by Eleonora,
here). This is what Pekka has to say:
Website blocking in copyright injunctions: a further perspective
Copyright and related right-holders have
sought court orders to block access to websites facilitating copyright
infringement. The targets of these orders have typically been major internet
connectivity providers (ISPs) at the user end. The most prominent example has
been The Pirate Bay, which has been blocked in six EU/EEA states (Italy,
Denmark, UK, Finland, Ireland, and Belgium); in some others blocking requests
have been rejected or are being prepared.
In its 27 March 2014 judgment in UPC
Telekabel Wien (C-314/12) the CJEU held, in essence, that blocking by the user
end ISP is possible (ie. a contractual relationship to the infringing website
is not needed) and that the court does not need to specify the exact technical
means the ISP must use to implement blocking. The former was expected, whereas
the latter was in some ways somewhat surprising.
Unconditional right to request
blocking by any intermediary?
No contractual relationship to the
website or evidence of an ISP's customers actually using the infringing website
was deemed necessary. The latter implies the unnecessary nature of some
countries' (e.g. UK) national provisions on proving infringement and notifying
the ISP.
The former was expected. However, it is unfortunate
that the CJEU did not address the point raised by the Advocate General that
“subsidiarity” might have implications on proportionality of orders. The AG had
suggested that the right-holder should primarily target the website or the
website's ISP. This issue has also come up in various national proceedings.
Recital 59 of Directive 2001/29 states
that in many cases the intermediary is best placed to stop or prevent
infringement. This implies that it is not always best placed, and some degree
of subsidiarity may be called for. Some national courts have however noted that
this is not required by Article 8(3). Clarification on this would also have
been beneficial.
Complications of generic
blocking orders
The Advocate General had suggested that a
blocking order which does not specify the means is not acceptable. It would
undermine legal certainty for the ISP and it would be impossible to evaluate
the proportionality of such order, given that the properties of different
techniques vary significantly. He had however accepted that a specific blocking
order may be proportionate. This was reasonable.
The CJEU held that a generic blocking order
was compatible with EU law. It did not specifically rule out specific blocking
orders if national courts wanted to issue such, though it did point out that
the ISP should be able to choose the means. The court seemed to partially miss the
point that ISP's typically want specific conditions to be stated. This
ruling will likely increase the tendency of the courts to issue orders similar
to what was previously done in the UK. There the ISP was given discretion how to
implement the order, but for the benefit of doubt, the court explicitly stated an
implementation that at least would fulfill the obligation.
The CJEU needed to soften its position with
several constraints. Two of them are both important and somewhat surprising.
1.
Legal certainty requires that
the ISP must be able to get a court decision on whether the measures are
sufficient once the implementation measures are known and before penalties are
decided. The implication is that the ISP can change the measures if the court
were to find them wanting. Effectively this seems to undermine the purpose of generic
order and transform it to a court-sanctioned specific order. This also has an
interesting temporal and res judicata implication. If an approved measure turns out to be ineffective, the ISP would not need to change it except through a new court order. Courts may thus be wary of the terms of acceptance.
2.
Because a generic order could
violate the fundamental rights of the ISP's users, national procedural rules
must provide a possibility for internet users to assert their rights before the
court once the implementing measures are known. This seems to provide locus
standi for users, which is unheard of in many jurisdictions. Any affected
user could therefore address the court with a complaint that the specific
blocking method chosen affects his/her fundamental rights.
On the other hand, it was not quite clear
how effective means the ISP would be obliged to use. The CJEU required
“sufficiently effective” and “preventing access.. or making it sufficiently
difficult to achieve and of seriously discouraging internet users who are using
the [blocked] services”. The court also pointed earlier to “measures which may
represent significant cost for [ISP]”. These might imply that the ISP might
need to do a great deal. This would likely be disproportionate. Further, the
prohibition of generic monitoring of Article 15(1) of the E-Commerce Directive
(2000/31) implies that the ISP should not be placed in a duty to monitor and
block sites on its own (e.g. so-called torrent proxies or alternative domain
names). No guidance was provided to assess proportionality, however.
So where does this leave us?
The CJEU did not address the Advocate General's
point on whether the proportionality of blocking would be affected by whether
the right-holder had first attempted to target the infringing website or
website's connectivity provider. That is, is there an unconditional right to
sue any connectivity provider at all, or should there be some evidence that the
ISP is indeed “best placed” to stop or prevent this specific infringement?
The CJEU accepted a general blocking order
that leaves the technical measures to be determined by the ISP. However, with
the constraint imposed by legal certainty this essentially becomes a court-sanctioned
specific order. An ISP could first do a minimal implementation and if its effectiveness is contested, augment it as required by the court and in consequence obtain court approval on compliance. It also seems that this court-approved measure
cannot be forcibly changed later on without a new court order. One way to read
this is that generic orders are possible only if rather heavy requirements are
fulfilled by the national execution phase; few countries do.
Another interesting feature relates
to requirement to ensure that users' rights are respected. Apparently users of
the affected ISP gain locus standi before the court to argue that the
blocking order interferes with their fundamental right to lawfully access
information. This is unheard of in many jurisdictions. In many jurisdictions, e.g. the UK, the court has entrusted
itself to verifying that the terms of blocking agreed between right holders and
ISPs are proportionate also from the users' perspective. In some cases this has
been more of a lip service than rigorous testing. It is interesting to see how
this will develop. The fear of legal expenses might in some jurisdictions
inhibit complaints.
Finally, the degree how far the ISPs are
obliged to go in implementing a blocking injunction was left open. This might
be a challenge given that many measures are perforce somewhat ineffective and
the most extensive ones too expensive or intrusive such as with Scarlet
Extended (C-70/10). It is unfortunate how this was left unspecified. This
is also likely to produce CJEU referrals in the future.
All in all it would seem that it would have been more
straightforward to adopt the Advocate General's suggestion that generic orders are
not acceptable, and that proportionality of specific orders needs to be evaluated
in a case-by-case basis. With the introduced constraints and extension in the
direction of putative effectiveness the result seems to increase uncertainty. The
courts could possibly avoid these new constraints just by issuing specific orders. The reaction remains to be seen.