Papers by Ehsan Karimi Torshizi
In the current controversy surrounding the dichotomy of theism-atheism, most people, particularly... more In the current controversy surrounding the dichotomy of theism-atheism, most people, particularly in academic milieux, tend to reduce the whole matter into the sphere of rationality, arguing on whether or not the belief that "God exists" is rationally justified (cf. Draper, 2017). Lacking such a justification in behalf of science and sound reason, theism is considered by atheists to be an untenable position and hence deemed to be abandoned 1 . Over against atheism, theists desperately strive to defend their position by insisting on the rationality of their belief in God. Thus, the theism-atheism debate revolves, for the most part, around the rational arguments for and against the existence of God. To put in other words, both camps take for granted that religious faith is to be an essentially rationalistic enterprise, that is to be thoroughly located within the framework of inferential knowledge. This is the very assumption upon which this paper intends to cast doubt by accentuating an imponderable moment inherent in religious faith which always defeats any rational attempt at demystifying it. Henceforth, we refer to this as "bi-lā kayfa" feature of religious faith.
The Phenomenology and “The Anthropological Ban” on the Legitimacy of a Phenomenological Anthropology, 2020
In early 20th century, a widespread tendency toward a philosophical anthropology was dominant ove... more In early 20th century, a widespread tendency toward a philosophical anthropology was dominant over the intellectual space in Germany, and it was so deep and extensive in its influence that phenomenology had to react and take a stance against it. This initial stance appeared be an essential conflict of a sort, so that Blumenberg coined the term “anthropological ban” regarding Husserl’s and Heidegger’s Phenomenologies. In this paper, we have tried to illustrate that such a confliction is neither essential nor absolute, meaning that it is quite legitimate to talk about a philosophical anthropology of a sort based on Husserl’s and Heidegger’s Phenomenologies. Thus, the plot and general characteristics of such a phenomenological anthropology, in terms of Heidegger's existential analysis of Dasein as a Fundamental ontology in his Sein und Zeit, has been depicted, and its fundamentally different anthropological pattern comparing with that of a traditional anthropology has also been demonstrated.
The Transition from Existential to a Pure Geometrical Space and Its Phenomenological Validity, 2018
In this paper, we will demonstrate that, from Heidegger's perspective, the Cartesian approach to ... more In this paper, we will demonstrate that, from Heidegger's perspective, the Cartesian approach to the extended thing (res extensa) and the assumption of extension as a fundamental determination of a thing are not devoid of phenomenological validity, although his ontology lacks sufficient richness to explain the relation between space and Dasein’s spatiality. To clarify Heidegger’s position, we first examine the characteristics of existential space and its ontological foundations, showing that existential space ultimately relies on Dasein’s existence "here." We then describe the transition from existential space to Cartesian extended space, illustrating how the latter emerges through a process of "world-diminishing," in which the meaningful and Dasein-oriented character of existential space is stripped away.
In this ontological framework, we clarify, on the one hand, the relationship between Cartesian space, existential space, and Dasein’s spatiality, and on the other hand, the ontological deficiency of Cartesian space. Ultimately, we argue that assuming extension as the essential determination of a thing—and consequently, considering Cartesian space as an entirely neutral and decontextualized infrastructure—results in a limited and impoverished understanding of spatiality.
The preoccupation of Dasein with its surrounding environment, which underlies existential space, possesses both phenomenological dimensions and an orientation that ultimately leads to paradigm shifts in mathematical and theoretical physics.
German Idealism and the Origins of Pure Mathematics: Riemann, Dedekind, Cantor, 2021
When it comes to the relation of modern mathematics and philosophy, most people tend to think of ... more When it comes to the relation of modern mathematics and philosophy, most people tend to think of the three major schools of thought-i.e. logicism, formalism, and intuitionism-that emerged as profound researches on the foundations and nature of mathematics in the beginning of the 20 th century and have shaped the dominant discourse of an autonomous discipline of analytic philosophy, generally known under the rubric of "philosophy of mathematics" since then. What has been completely disregarded by these philosophical attitudes, these foundational researches which seek to provide pure mathematics with a philosophically plausible justification by founding it on firm logico-philosophical bases, is that the genuine self-foundation of pure mathematics had been done before, namely during the 19 th century, when it was developing into an entirely new and independent discipline as a concomitant of the continuous dissociation of mathematics from the physical world. This selffoundation of the 19 th-century pure mathematics, however, was more akin to the German-idealist interpretations of Kant's transcendental philosophy, than the postfactum, retrospective 20 th-century researches on the foundations of mathematics. This article aims to demonstrate this neglected historical fact via delving into the philosophical inclinations of the three major founders of the 19 th-century pure mathematics, Riemann, Dedekind and Cantor. Consequently, pure mathematics, with respect to its idealist origins, proves to be a formalization and idealization of certain activities specific to a self-conscious transcendental subjectivity.
Philosophical Investigations, 2021
As it is well known, Aristotle in his Metaphysics seeks a science subsumed under different rubric... more As it is well known, Aristotle in his Metaphysics seeks a science subsumed under different rubrics of "prime philosophy", "wisdom", "the study of being qua being", and "theology". The relation between these different titles of Metaphysics has been formulated by Paul Natorp as an insoluble paradox: the subject matter of prime philosophy cannot be both being qua being (being in general) and divine being (the supreme being) at the same time. Since Natorp, there has always been a controversy on this paradox as well as the problem of integrity of different books of Metaphysics. The purpose of this paper, therefore, is twofold. Firstly, we shall scrutinize the neo-Kantian foundation of Natorp's interpretation of Aristotle; secondly, we shall present Octave Hamelin's exegesis of Aristotle's theory of being as an interpretation on the basis of which two seemingly contradictory aspects of Aristotle's metaphysics can be reconciled, and t...
DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals), Dec 1, 2021
Helmuth Plessner, beside Max Scheler and Arnold Gehlen, is known
as one of the great founders of... more Helmuth Plessner, beside Max Scheler and Arnold Gehlen, is known
as one of the great founders of new philosophical anthropology
movement. From among new anthropological theories, however,
perhaps none has recently come to the center of attention and begun
to flourish more than Plessner’s, not only in the field of philosophical
anthropology, but also in science and technology. The ground for such
a so-called “Plessner Renaissance” shall be immediately known in this
article, once the special place Plessner’s theory occupies in both the
prominent contemporary explanatory paradigms, in general, and
philosophical-anthropological theories, in particular, is specified. In
doing so, Plessner’s philosophical contribution is determined as:
• A non-reductive naturalistic explanatory paradigm as a middle
ground between new Darwinism, social-cultural-historical
constructivism, and naive transcendentalism.
• A phenomenological-hermeneutical account of the biological life,
in general.
• A biological-based transformational philosophical anthropology, in
particular.
The focus of the present article is on Plessner’s contribution to the
philosophy of biology as well as philosophical anthropology.
Conference Presentations by Ehsan Karimi Torshizi
International Conference on Rationality: Theism, and Atheism, , 2021
This paper examines the theological and philosophical dimensions of the bi-lā kayfa doctrine, a k... more This paper examines the theological and philosophical dimensions of the bi-lā kayfa doctrine, a key concept in Islamic theology that affirms divine attributes without questioning their modality. Originating as a middle ground between anthropomorphic and rationalist readings of scripture, the doctrine has often been dismissed as an anti-intellectual stance. However, this study argues that bi-lā kayfa harbors profound epistemological and anthropological implications. Drawing on Kant’s critique of metaphysics and Heidegger’s concept of Dasein, we explore how this doctrine challenges the limits of rational inquiry and highlights the role of the irrational in religious faith. We propose that bi-lā kayfa is not merely a theological position but a broader philosophical stance that resists reduction to rational categories. In doing so, it offers a fresh perspective on contemporary debates about faith, reason, and the nature of religious belief.
The International Conference on Ibn Sina’s Philosophical Anthropology, Iranian Research Institute of Philosophy (IRIP)., 2022
Ibn Sina (Avicenna) begins the Third Class of al-Isharat wa al-Tanbihat on psychology with a dire... more Ibn Sina (Avicenna) begins the Third Class of al-Isharat wa al-Tanbihat on psychology with a direction: “Return to yourself and reflect”. In the few ensuing chapters, he accordingly gives certain admonitions with the intention of establishing and determining some general characteristics of human selfhood, or self-conscious subjectivity, as the most fundamental principle that a genuine philosophical anthropology must take as its point of departure. The opening direction thus seems to be highly consequential and determinative for any further methodic and thematic advances, providing the prospect of an entirely novel philosophical anthropology, a “metaphysics of human subjectivity”, that centers around the idea of a non-reflexive, self-conscious subjectivity. It goes without saying that such a philosophical anthropology is essentially different from the kind of Aristotelian psychology. Having proved that this self-conscious subjectivity is essentially identical to the soul—in its Aristotelian sense: Psūchê (ψυχή) as the first actuality of a naturally organized, or organic, body—however, he begins to shift the approach and regresses to the Aristotelian kind of philosophical psychology, as the prevailing and conventional way of doing anthropology in the medieval and pre-modern era. The rest of the Third Class is thus devoted entirely to reiterating traditional arguments for the existence of soul, explicating its ontological constitution, structure, and faculties together with a detailed account of their epistemological functions and operations. This radical shift in the anthropological approach raises a question about the status and function of the principle of human subjectivity in Ibn Sina’s philosophical anthropology as a whole.
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Papers by Ehsan Karimi Torshizi
In this ontological framework, we clarify, on the one hand, the relationship between Cartesian space, existential space, and Dasein’s spatiality, and on the other hand, the ontological deficiency of Cartesian space. Ultimately, we argue that assuming extension as the essential determination of a thing—and consequently, considering Cartesian space as an entirely neutral and decontextualized infrastructure—results in a limited and impoverished understanding of spatiality.
The preoccupation of Dasein with its surrounding environment, which underlies existential space, possesses both phenomenological dimensions and an orientation that ultimately leads to paradigm shifts in mathematical and theoretical physics.
as one of the great founders of new philosophical anthropology
movement. From among new anthropological theories, however,
perhaps none has recently come to the center of attention and begun
to flourish more than Plessner’s, not only in the field of philosophical
anthropology, but also in science and technology. The ground for such
a so-called “Plessner Renaissance” shall be immediately known in this
article, once the special place Plessner’s theory occupies in both the
prominent contemporary explanatory paradigms, in general, and
philosophical-anthropological theories, in particular, is specified. In
doing so, Plessner’s philosophical contribution is determined as:
• A non-reductive naturalistic explanatory paradigm as a middle
ground between new Darwinism, social-cultural-historical
constructivism, and naive transcendentalism.
• A phenomenological-hermeneutical account of the biological life,
in general.
• A biological-based transformational philosophical anthropology, in
particular.
The focus of the present article is on Plessner’s contribution to the
philosophy of biology as well as philosophical anthropology.
Conference Presentations by Ehsan Karimi Torshizi