Avoid -E and -M options inconsistencies with no libcrypto

[tcpdump] / print-macsec.c

diff --git a/print-macsec.c b/print-macsec.c
index 892f2c332baabd8632c59c2d7fd290deba26d921..5fca392279451252eee6f2d43a73d672a03466cc 100644 (file)
--- a/print-macsec.c
+++ b/print-macsec.c
@@ -21,17 +21,12 @@
 
 /* \summary: MACsec printer */
 
-#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
-#include "config.h"
-#endif
+#include <config.h>
 
-#include <netdissect-stdinc.h>
-
-#include <string.h>
+#include "netdissect-stdinc.h"
 
 #include "netdissect.h"
 #include "addrtoname.h"
-#include "ethertype.h"
 #include "extract.h"
 
 #define MACSEC_DEFAULT_ICV_LEN 16
@@ -89,9 +84,31 @@ static const struct tok macsec_flag_values[] = {
        { 0, NULL }
 };
 
+static void
+macsec_print_header(netdissect_options *ndo,
+                   const struct macsec_sectag *sectag,
+                   u_int short_length)
+{
+       ND_PRINT("an %u, pn %u, flags %s",
+                GET_U_1(sectag->tci_an) & MACSEC_AN_MASK,
+                GET_BE_U_4(sectag->packet_number),
+                bittok2str_nosep(macsec_flag_values, "none",
+                                 GET_U_1(sectag->tci_an) & MACSEC_TCI_FLAGS));
+
+       if (short_length != 0)
+               ND_PRINT(", sl %u", short_length);
+
+       if (GET_U_1(sectag->tci_an) & MACSEC_TCI_SC)
+               ND_PRINT(", sci " SCI_FMT, GET_BE_U_8(sectag->secure_channel_id));
+
+       ND_PRINT(", ");
+}
+
 /* returns < 0 iff the packet can be decoded completely */
-int macsec_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char **bp,
-                u_int *lengthp, u_int *caplenp, u_int *hdrlenp)
+int
+macsec_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char **bp,
+            u_int *lengthp, u_int *caplenp, u_int *hdrlenp,
+            const struct lladdr_info *src, const struct lladdr_info *dst)
 {
        const char *save_protocol;
        const u_char *p = *bp;
@@ -103,7 +120,7 @@ int macsec_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char **bp,
        u_int short_length;
 
        save_protocol = ndo->ndo_protocol;
-       ndo->ndo_protocol = "MACsec";
+       ndo->ndo_protocol = "macsec";
 
        /* we need the full MACsec header in the capture */
        if (caplen < MACSEC_SECTAG_LEN_NOSCI) {
@@ -132,7 +149,7 @@ int macsec_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char **bp,
        } else
                sectag_len = MACSEC_SECTAG_LEN_NOSCI;
 
-       if ((GET_U_1(sectag->short_length) & ~MACSEC_SL_MASK) != 0 || 
+       if ((GET_U_1(sectag->short_length) & ~MACSEC_SL_MASK) != 0 ||
            GET_U_1(sectag->tci_an) & MACSEC_TCI_VERSION) {
                nd_print_invalid(ndo);
                ndo->ndo_protocol = save_protocol;
@@ -140,21 +157,8 @@ int macsec_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char **bp,
        }
 
        short_length = GET_U_1(sectag->short_length) & MACSEC_SL_MASK;
-       if (ndo->ndo_eflag) {
-               ND_PRINT("an %u, pn %u, flags %s",
-                        GET_U_1(sectag->tci_an) & MACSEC_AN_MASK,
-                        GET_BE_U_4(sectag->packet_number),
-                        bittok2str_nosep(macsec_flag_values, "none",
-                                         GET_U_1(sectag->tci_an) & MACSEC_TCI_FLAGS));
-
-               if (short_length != 0)
-                       ND_PRINT(", sl %u", short_length);
-
-               if (GET_U_1(sectag->tci_an) & MACSEC_TCI_SC)
-                       ND_PRINT(", sci " SCI_FMT, GET_BE_U_8(sectag->secure_channel_id));
-               
-               ND_PRINT(", ");
-       }
+       if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
+               macsec_print_header(ndo, sectag, short_length);
 
        /* Skip the MACsec header. */
        *bp += sectag_len;
@@ -166,8 +170,30 @@ int macsec_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char **bp,
 
        if ((GET_U_1(sectag->tci_an) & MACSEC_TCI_CONFID)) {
                /*
-                * The payload is encrypted.  Tell our
-                * caller it can't be dissected.
+                * The payload is encrypted.  Print link-layer
+                * information, if it hasn't already been printed.
+                */
+               if (!ndo->ndo_eflag) {
+                       /*
+                        * Nobody printed the link-layer addresses,
+                        * so print them, if we have any.
+                        */
+                       if (src != NULL && dst != NULL) {
+                               ND_PRINT("%s > %s ",
+                                       (src->addr_string)(ndo, src->addr),
+                                       (dst->addr_string)(ndo, dst->addr));
+                       }
+
+                       ND_PRINT("802.1AE MACsec, ");
+
+                       /*
+                        * Print the MACsec header.
+                        */
+                       macsec_print_header(ndo, sectag, short_length);
+               }
+
+               /*
+                * Tell our caller it can't be dissected.
                 */
                ndo->ndo_protocol = save_protocol;
                return 0;
@@ -190,6 +216,13 @@ int macsec_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char **bp,
        }
        *lengthp -= MACSEC_DEFAULT_ICV_LEN;
        *caplenp -= MACSEC_DEFAULT_ICV_LEN;
+       /*
+        * Update the snapend thus the ICV field is not in the payload for
+        * the caller.
+        * The ICV (Integrity Check Value) is at the end of the frame, after
+        * the secure data.
+        */
+       ndo->ndo_snapend -= MACSEC_DEFAULT_ICV_LEN;
 
        /*
         * If the SL field is non-zero, then it's the length of the
@@ -216,7 +249,7 @@ int macsec_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char **bp,
                if (*caplenp > short_length)
                        *caplenp = short_length;
        }
-               
+
        ndo->ndo_protocol = save_protocol;
        return -1;
 }