This question is posted by ACE on behalf of Sal Peralta, Independent Party of Oregon.  

Question 

           The Independent Party of Oregon (United States), a legally recognized minor political party has conducted 3 binding statewide elections and a binding congressional special election using Internet voting.  

           They first used a challenge/authentication system administered by a private vendor. The other two binding statewide elections and the special election used the internet to deliver ballots, which were then signed and returned via mail, email, and fax.  

           As IPO secretary, I have a great deal of election and voter data and historical knowledge about the systems that we have used. I am interested in connecting with academics and researchers to discuss our experiences of Internet voting, best practices, etc. 

Summary of Responses 

Members of the Practitioners' Network first provided a few factors that accounted for the difficulty of internet voting. 

Balancing risk management with the opportunity to have free and secret ballots

The private challenge/authentication balloting system

The Carter Center

OSCE/ODIHR

EVOTE Conference

Contributing Members 

Connie Moon Sehat

Nadja Braun Binder

Marc Lemieux

When I was studying this topic during the Internet voting pilot in Norway 2013, examples of academics and researchers that I found helpful were: David Wagner and Alex Halderman (computer), Kåre Vollan and Barrat i Esteve et al, and others (bibliography here: http://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/democracy/Carter-Center-Norway-2013-study-mission-report2.pdf).  Election observation organizations such as The Carter Center and OSCE/ODIHR also publish handbooks on the topic.

For my own part, I continue to reflect.   One recent way that I've found helpful to think about this issue was provided to me by a colleague at the Georgia Institute of Technology; the "CIA Triad" -- confidentiality, integrity, availability -- of information security/risk management seems to aptly describe the tensions involved in the obligations to ensure the right and opportunity to vote, on the one hand, against a secret ballot on the other. 

Hope these references are helpful.

Hi Sal,

a good way to connect with European e-voting experts (but also experts from all over the world) is via the EVOTE conferences. The last one took place in 2014 in Bregenz (cf. http://www.e-voting.cc/en/service/conferences/evote2014/) The list of contributors to the various EVOTE confereces gives you a good overview of e-voting experts.

Best,

Nadja

ps: the update Focus On E-voting is now online... http://aceproject.org/ace-en/focus/e-voting/

I am available to discuss specific questions or help you orientate. I've been associated for 12 years with the swiss internet voting project in Geneva.

Michel ([email protected])