Filing # 227688672 E-Filed 07/21/2025 [Link] PM

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL

CIRCUIT IN AND FOR MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA

CASE NO: 2025-012463-CA-01

SECTION: CA25
JUDGE: Valerie R. Manno Schurr

Emilio Tomas Gonzalez

Plaintiff(s)

vs.

City of Miami (The) et al

Defendant(s)

____________________________/

ORDER DENYING THE CITY OF MIAMI’S EMERGENCY MOTION TO DISMISS AND

GRANTING THE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

THIS CAUSE came before the Court on July 16, 2025, on Defendant City of Miami’s
(“City”) Emergency Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff Emilio Tomás González’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion
for Summary Judgment. Upon consideration of both Motions, the Parties’ Responses and Reply
briefs, oral arguments, the record, and being otherwise duly advised in the premises, the Court
DENIES the City’s motion and GRANTS the Plaintiff’s motion for the reasons set forth below.

THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1. The material facts in this case are undisputed.

2. The Florida Constitution dictates that the Miami-Dade County charter “[s]hall provide” the
“exclusive method by which each municipal corporation in Dade County shall have the power to
make, amend or repeal its own charter,” and that “the Legislature shall have no power to amend or
repeal the charter of any municipal corporation in Dade County.” Art. VIII, §6(e), Fla. Const.

3. The Miami-Dade County Home Rule Charter (“Miami-Dade Charter”) provides that “any
municipality in the county may adopt, amend, or revoke a charter for its own government,” and that
any “proposed charter amendment, revocation, or abolition” must be “submitted to the electors of
the municipalities.” Art. VI, §6.03(A), Miami-Dade Charter.

4. The City of Miami is a municipality in Miami-Dade County.

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 5. The City of Miami has enacted a Charter that, by its own terms, serves as “the Constitution of the
City of Miami” and ensures the City’s citizens that the City shall abide by all of its express
provisions,” and provides standing to “[r]esidents of the City . . . to bring legal actions to enforce
the City Charter.” City of Miami Municipal Charter (“City Charter”), at Citizens’ Bill of Rights
(A)(1).

6. Section 7 of the City Charter dictates that “[a] general municipal election for the mayor and city
commissioners shall be held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November in odd-
numbered years.” City Charter, at §7. This year, that falls on November 4, 2025.

7. Section 4(b) of the City Charter establishes a two-consecutive term limit for the mayors and city
commissioners, and sets terms of office at four years.

8. Under section 6.03(A) of the Miami-Dade County Charter, any “amendment, revocation, or
abolition” of the foregoing election dates and terms imposed by sections 7 and 4(b) of the City of
Miami Charter must be “submitted to the electors” of the City of Miami.

9. The Plaintiff is a resident of the City of Miami.

10. The Plaintiff has lived in the City of Miami continuously for decades, including continuously
for more than one year immediately preceding the date of qualifying, as required by section 4(c) of
the City of Miami Municipal charter, and is qualified for mayoral candidacy.

11. The Plaintiff is a registered voter in Miami-Dade County.

12. The Plaintiff was a candidate running for Mayor of the City of Miami in the November 4, 2025,
election.

13. However, the City of Miami has announced that it is now cancelling that election, and moving
it to 2026, which affects the Plaintiff as both a candidate for that office, an elector eligible to vote
in the election, and a resident of the City of Miami granted standing to enforce the City’s Charter.

14. On June 26, 2025, the City Commission of the City of Miami, by a vote of three commissioners
to two, passed Ordinance 14376 (“the Ordinance”) without submitting the issue “to the electors” of
the City. The City’s Mayor thereafter signed the Ordinance.

15. Section 2 of Ordinance 14376: (1) cancelled the portion of the municipal election that was
scheduled on November 4, 2025 (as mandated by section 7 of the City Charter) relating to the
election of the mayor and city commissioners in Districts 3 and 5; and (2) changed the timing of
future general municipal elections to the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November in even-
numbered years - as opposed to odd-numbered years as required by section 7 of the City Charter -
to run concurrent with statewide and countywide elections. Section 3 of the Ordinance, in turn,
extended the terms of all sitting commissioners and the incumbent mayor by one year.

16. Before the passage of Ordinance 14376, Mayor Francis Suarez and Commissioner Joseph
Carollo were set to reach their respective term-limits imposed by section 4(b) of the City Charter in
November 2025.

17. Four days after the Ordinance was passed, on June 30, 2025, the Plaintiff sued the City and

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 certain other nominal defendants, asserting two claims: (1) a claim for declaratory relief (Count I);
and (2) a claim for injunctive relief (Count II). Dkt. No. 2.

18. On July 1, 2025, the City filed its Emergency Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 5, and briefing
followed, Dkt. Nos. 35, 42.

19. On July 8, 2025, the Plaintiff filed his Motion for Summary Judgment on his declaratory
judgment claim, Dkt. No. 27, and briefing followed, Dkt. Nos. 34, 41.

20. On July 16, 2025, this Court conducted a hearing on the parties’ competing motions.

21. On July 17, the Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its claim for injunctive relief (Count II), leaving

only its claim for declaratory relief (Count I) at issue in this case.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

As a matter of law, Ordinance 14376 is unlawful for two reasons. First, the “general law” statutes
do not grant the City the authority to enact Ordinance 14376, as the City contends. Second, the
“general law” statutes conflict with the Art. VI, section 6.03(A) of the Miami-Dade County
Charter; and thus, are unconstitutional under Article VIII, section 6(e) of the Florida Constitution.

I. The Statutes Do Not Grant the City the Authority to Pass the Ordinance.

The City’s justification for enacting Ordinance 14376 (“the Ordinance”) is based on three “general
law” statutes: (1) section 166.021, Fla. Stat.; (2) section 100.3065, Fla. Stat.; and (3) section
101.75, Fla. Stat. A careful review of those statutes, however, reveals that they do not individually
or collectively grant the City the authority to enact the ordinance. Indeed, section 166.021(3)(d)
expressly prohibits it. Furthermore, the Court finds that based on a reading of each statute, it is
clear they defer to controlling county charters.

A. Section 166.021

In its briefing, the City quotes section 166.021 for the proposition that the Legislature permits the
City to amend, by ordinance, “the selection of election dates and qualifying periods for candidates
and for changes in terms of office necessitated by such changes in election dates.” §166.021(4),
Fla. Stat. (2025). However, as the Plaintiff appropriately asserts, the City overlooked and omitted
paragraph (3)(d) of section 166.021, which reads:

(3) The Legislature recognizes that pursuant to the grant of power set forth in s. 2(b),
Art. VIII of the State Constitution, the legislative body of each municipality has the
power to enact legislation concerning any subject matter upon which the state
Legislature may act, except:

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 …

(d) Any subject preempted to a county pursuant to a county charter adopted

under the authority of ss. 1(g), 3, and 6(e), Art. VIII of the State Constitution.

§ 166.021(3)(d), Fla. Stat. (2025) (emphasis added).

Based on a plain reading of the text, this provision prohibits “the legislative body of each
municipality” from “enact[ing] legislation” on “[a]ny subject preempted to a county pursuant to a
county charter adopted under the authority of ss. 1(g), 3, and 6(e), Art. VIII of the State
Constitution.” Here, the Miami-Dade Charter governs the process for amending municipal
charters. The City’s ordinance deviates from the “exclusive” process set forth in the Miami-Dade
Charter. As such, pursuant to subsection (3)(d) of the section 166.021, the City lacked the authority
to enact such an ordinance. See also Miami-Dade Charter, §6.03(a). Accordingly, the City’s
reliance on section 166.021 is misplaced.

B. Section 100.3605

The City’s reliance on section 100.3605(2) of the Florida Election Code is similarly misplaced.
The City cites this provision for the proposition that “by ordinance,” the City may “change the
dates for qualifying and for the election of members of the governing body of the municipality and
provide for the orderly transition of office resulting from such date changes.” §100.3605(2), Fla.
Stat. (2025).

However, the City omits what is stated in the preceding subsection, which reads: “The Florida
Election Code, chapters 97-106, shall govern the conduct of a municipality’s election in the
absence of an applicable special act, charter, or ordinance provision.” §100.3605(1), Fla. Stat.
(2025) (emphasis added). In light of subsection (1), subsection (2) applies only in the absence of
an applicable charter provision. Here, there are two charters that together apply and control: the
Miami-Dade Charter and the City Charter. Section 100.3605, therefore, cannot be construed to
authorize the City’s passage of the Ordinance.

C. Section 101.75

Section 101.75, governing municipal elections, likewise fails to support the City’s position for
similar reasons. While the City correctly recites section 101.75 as providing that
“[n]otwithstanding any provision of local law or municipal charter, the governing body of a
municipality may, by ordinance, move the date of any municipal election to a date concurrent with
any statewide or countywide election,” this provision has no application in light of section

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 100.3605(1) of Florida’s Election Code. As noted above, section 100.3605(1) defers to the election
process set forth in Article VI, section 6.03 of the Miami-Dade Charter. Indeed, the City concedes
that section 6.03 of the Miami-Dade Charter unambiguously prohibits the City from cancelling an
election, moving an election, or extending the terms in office for city officials without the consent
of the electorate given at a properly held election.

Furthermore, the Court will not presume that the Legislature intended section 101.75 to be
construed as permitting municipalities to extend existing terms or change the term limits in the
absence of express text granting such authority. This omission stands in stark contrast to section
166.021(4), which expressly allows a municipality to effectuate “changes in terms of offices
necessitated by . . . changes in election dates,” provided the issue is not “preempted to a county”
under the Florida constitution. §166.021(3)(d), Fla. Stat. Reading these statutes in pari materia, the
Court finds that by including provisions addressing changes in the term of office in section
166.021(4), yet excluding such provisions in section 101.75, the exclusion was intentional. Scalia
& Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 252 (2012) (noting that the “[r]elated-
[s]tatutes” canon instructs that “laws deal [] with the same subject” should be read “in pari
materia” and “if possible interpreted harmoniously”). In addition, the Court does not believe the
provisions of section 101.75 address county charters. Based on a plain reading of section 101.75, it
appears to override only a “local law or municipal charter,” which are enactments under the control
of municipal governing bodies. It does not authorize a carveout against a constitutionally protected
county charter like Miami-Dade County’s.

Accordingly, the Court finds that section 101.75 does not support the City’s position that it can
enact an ordinance that changes the term-limits of elected officials and extends the terms of
incumbent elected officials.

D. Medina Is Unpersuasive

The Court also finds that Hector Medina, et al. v. City of North Miami, et al., Case No. 2023-
002691 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. 2023), which the City’s cites as persuasive authority on the construction
of the above-noted statutes, does not support the City’s position.

First, Medina is a non-binding trial court opinion. While the Third District Court of Appeal
affirmed the trial court opinion in Medina v. City of North Miami, 389 So. 3d 516 (Fla. 3d DCA
2023), by issuing a per curium affirmance, the decision has no precedential value. An affirmance
without a written opinion does not establish precedent for future actions. See Dep’t of Legal Affs.
v. Dist. Ct. of Appeal, 5th Dist., 434 So. 2d 310, 311 (Fla. 1983) (“The issue is whether a per
curiam appellate court decision with no written opinion has any precedential value. We hold that it
does not.”). As such, the Medina decision does not have precedential significance as to this case,
notwithstanding that such an affirmance establishes the law which binds the parties of the Medina
case.

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 Second, this Court finds that the trial court’s ruling in favor of the City in Medina was due, in part,
to the plaintiffs’ failure to name Miami-Dade County as a defendant. The trial court deemed the
County as an “indispensable” party whose absence made it impossible for the court to adjudicate
the matter and grant any conceivable relief without affecting the County’s interest. Therefore, the
City prevailed because the trial court was limited by the specifics of the case before it.

Third, the court in Medina did not consider the language in section 166.021(d)(3), which expressly
prohibits the City from enacting an ordinance in which the subject is preempted by the Miami-
Dade County charter. See infra §III. Its omission vitiates the City’s position since the City
effectively concedes that none of the statutes alone independently grant it the power it claims,
arguing instead that the three statutes, when read together, grants the City its authority. Dkt. No. 34,
at pp. 11 (where the City argues that “[t]aken together, sections 166.021, 100.3605, and 101.75
confer clear authority to change the date of a municipal election”); Id. at 15 n.6 (where the City
describes section 166.021(4) as “one piece of the puzzle, one of three statutes cited by the City”).
Accordingly, a deficiency in one statute would cause the City’s entire argument to fail.

Fourth, the plaintiff in Medina did not raise the constitutional argument the Plaintiff raises here.
Since the trial court in Medina did not have an opportunity to analyze that critical issue, its ruling
has no persuasive value regarding the constitutionality of the ordinance in this case.

II. In All Events, the Ordinance is Unconstitutional.

Even assuming the foregoing “general law” statutes could be construed - individually or
collectively - as granting the City the power to change the provisions of its Charter by ordinance,
the Florida Constitution and Florida Supreme Court precedent make clear that the Miami-Dade
Charter supersedes any conflicting “general law” in this setting, as further explained below.

A. The Constitution, the Miami-Dade County Charter, and the City Charter

1. Florida’s 1885 Constitution Creates a “Home Rule” Amendment

Unique to Miami-Dade County

The Florida Constitution establishes the framework governing amendments to municipal charters
within Miami-Dade County. Article VIII, section 6(e) of the Florida Constitution expressly
preserves and adopts the language in Article VIII, section 11 of the 1885 Constitution (the “Home
Rule Amendment”), which governs Miami-Dade County’s unique home rule powers.

Case No: 2025-012463-CA-01 Page 6 of 16

 Section 11(1)(g) of the 1885 Constitution provides:

(1) The electors of Dade County, Florida, are granted the power to adopt, revise, and
amend from time to time a home rule charter of government for Dade County, Florida,
under which the Board of County Commissioners of Dade County shall be the
governing body. This charter: . . .

(g) Shall provide a method by which each municipal corporation in Dade County shall
have the power to make, amend, or repeal its own charter. Upon adoption of this home
rule charter by the electors this method shall be exclusive and the Legislature shall
have no power to amend or repeal the charter of any municipal corporation in
Dade County.

Art. VIII, §11(1)(g), Fla. Const. (1885) (emphasis added).

The process by which municipalities within Miami-Dade County may amend their own charters is
exclusively governed by the Miami-Dade County Home Rule Charter. The Legislature has “no
power” - whether through general or special law - to interfere with this process. Id. The Florida
Supreme Court has recognized Miami-Dade County’s distinct constitutional status. See Metro
Dade Cty. v. City of Miami, 396 So. 2d 144, 146 (Fla. 1981) (“[T]he metropolitan government of
Dade County is unique in this state due to its constitutional home rule amendment.”).

2. The Miami-Dade County “Home Rule” Charter Requires a Municipality to

Conduct an “Election” to Amend its Municipal Charter

On May 21, 1957, consistent with section 11(1)(g) of the 1885 Constitution, Miami-Dade County
adopted the Miami-Dade Charter. In doing so, Miami-Dade County exercised its constitutional
power to adopt a framework under which municipalities in Miami-Dade County, including the City
of Miami, may adopt and amend their own municipal charters:

Except as provided in Section 6.04 any municipality in the county may adopt,
amend, or revoke a charter for its own government or abolish its existence in the
following manner. Its governing body shall, within 120 days after adopting a
resolution or after the certification of a petition of ten percent of the qualified electors
of the municipality, draft or have drafted by a method determined by municipal
ordinance a proposed charter amendment, revocation, or abolition which shall be
submitted to the electors of the municipalities. Unless an election occurs not less
than 60 nor more than 120 days after the draft is submitted, the proposal shall be
submitted at a special election within that time. The governing body shall make copies

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 of the proposal available to the electors not less than 30 days before the election.
Alternative proposals may be submitted. Each proposal approved by a majority of the
electors voting on such proposal shall become effective at the time fixed in the
proposal.

Article VI, §6.03, Miami-Dade Charter (emphases added).

Thus, under section 6.03 of the Miami-Dade Charter, the City must hold a public election to amend
its municipal charter.

3. The City of Miami Charter Governs Election Logistics

and the Terms of the City’s Elected Officials

On September 4, 1984, pursuant to section 6.03 of the Miami-Dade Charter, the City of Miami
adopted its current version of the City Charter. Section 7 of the City Charter specifies that “[a]
general municipal election for the mayor and city commissioners shall be held on the first Tuesday
after the first Monday in odd-numbered years.” Id. at §7 Election of City Commissioners and
Mayor. Section 4(b), in turn, establishes a four-year term, and a two-term limit, for the mayor and
commissioners. City of Miami, Subpart A, The Charter §4(b) Election of Mayor and City
Commission; Terms of Office.

B. The Exclusive Authority Under the Florida Constitution and Miami-Dade Charter Requires a
Referendum for the City of Miami to Amend its Charter and Change the Date of its Elections.

The City argues that section 6.03 of the Miami-Dade Charter is superseded by the general laws of
the state, i.e., statutes that apply to one or more counties. However, the Florida Supreme Court has
ruled that any provision of the Miami-Dade Charter that is expressly authorized by the Florida
Constitution will supersede general laws to the contrary.

1. The Florida Constitution is Clear: “General Laws” Cannot Prevail Against

Section 6.03 of the Miami-Dade Charter

The thrust of the City’s position is that three separate Florida statutes, as “general laws,” supersede
the Miami-Dade County Charter, despite the express power granted to Miami-Dade County
through section 11(1)(g) of the Florida Constitution, which grants the County exclusive autonomy
to prescribe the process by which municipalities within Miami-Dade County may amend their own
charters. In support of its position, the City cites a different section of the Florida Constitution -

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 Article VIII, section 11(6) – which provides, in part, that general laws shall supersede any
provisions of the Miami-Dade Home Rule Charter which conflicts with the general laws. However,
if this Court were to adopt the City’s position, it would render section 11(1)(g) meaningless.

The Florida Supreme Court has already analyzed the interplay between section 11(1) and section
11(6) numerous times and has repeatedly offered the same guidance: “If [subsections (5) and (6)]
are read together, they show conclusively that the legislature intended to preserve the effect of
existing general laws and its lawmaking power in relation to Dade County, except as to those
matters expressly authorized in the [Home rule Amendment].” Gray v. Golden, 89 So. 2d 785,
791 (Fla. 1956) (emphasis added); Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Dade Cty. v. Wilson, 386 So. 2d 556,
560 (Fla. 1980) (“the provisions of the Home Rule Charter and the ordinances adopted pursuant
thereto must be in accordance with general law unless there is express constitutional
authorization otherwise.”) (emphasis added); Dade Cty. v. Young Democratic Club of Dade Cty.,
204 So. 2d 636, 638 (Fla. 1958) (“the electors of Dade County were prohibited from infringing on
the supremacy of the Florida Constitution and the general laws of Florida except as ‘expressly
authorized’ by specific grants of power given them by [the Home Rule Amendment]
(emphasis added); Metro. Dade Cty. v. City of Miami, 296 So. 2d 144, 146 (Fla. 1980) (“The
[Home Rule] Amendment gives Dade County numerous powers which set Dade apart from the
state’s other counties. One such difference is Dade County’s power to enact ordinances, when
expressly authorized by the home rule amendment, which conflict with . . . state law.”) (emphasis
added); see also City of Sweetwater v. Dade Cty., 343 So. 2d 953, 954 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (“[t]he
matter of changing boundaries of municipalities is one of the areas of autonomy conferred on Dade
County by the Home Rule Amendment, with the result that the method provided therefor by
the Home Rule Charter, pursuant to authorization by to Home Rule Amendment, is effective
and exclusive, notwithstanding the existence from time to time of a general state law which
makes provision for some other method.”) (emphasis added). In this case, §11(1)(g) of the
Florida Constitution has expressly granted Miami Dade County specific authority to regulate the
manner in which municipal charters may be amended. This authority is set forth in §6.03, of
Miami-Dade County’s Home Rule Charter, which requires municipal charter amendments to be
submitted to the electorate for approval. Therefore, general statutes cannot alter or supersede the
County’s authority to regulate municipal charters since it is a field specifically regulated by the
County’s Home Rule Charter.

In the Young Democratic Club of Dade County case, a judge of this Circuit was also asked to hold
that the “general law” prevailed over an express grant of authority in the Home Rule Amendment.
The trial court agreed, accepting the same argument that the City asserts here. 104 So. 2d 636. In
overturning the lower court, the Florida Supreme Court observed: “His holding was apparently
based on the theory that such [Charter] provisions were in conflict with the general election laws.”
Id. at 639. This, the Court held, “was in error.” Id. at 639. As the Court added: “[T]he general laws
of Florida [reign supreme] ‘except as expressly authorized’ by specific grants of power given them
by Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution, relating to home rule in local affairs for Dade
County.” Id.

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 Here, this Court agrees with the Plaintiff. The Young Democratic Club of Dade County opinion
and the other cases cited above compel this Court to find that the express grant of authority
conferred to Miami-Dade County via Article VIII, section 11(1)(g) - to determine by its charter the
“exclusive method” for making, amending or revoking municipal charters in Dade County -
supersedes the statutes cited by the City to the extent that they purport to authorize the City to alter
election dates and terms of office set forth in the City’s charter in any manner other than the
“exclusive’ manner set forth in the Miami-Dade County Charter - which requires a vote of the
electorate.

Moreover, a more recent case issued by the Third District Court of Appeal addressing this issue
further supports the Court’s conclusion. In City of Miami v. Miami Ass’n of Firefighters, Loc.
587, 744 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), the Third District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court’s
decision which held that a general statute, governing the single-subject rule, applied to and
controlled amendments to Miami-Dade’s Home Rule Charter. See Id. at 555–56. As the District
Court observed, the general law the trial court applied “[wa]s inapplicable to amendments to
charters of municipalities located in Miami–Dade County.” Id. As is true here, “[t]his is the case as
the Miami–Dade Home Rule Amendment, Article VIII, section 6, Florida Constitution granted to
the electorate of the county the power to adopt a County home rule charter” that, “[u]pon adoption .
. . shall be exclusive and the Legislature shall have no power to amend or repeal the charter of any
municipal corporation in Dade County.” Id. (emphasis in original). Given “the [Miami-Dade
County] Home Rule Amendment makes the foregoing procedure exclusive, no limiting provisions
may be engrafted on it,” id. (emphasis in original) - not even a “single subject requirement” that
might otherwise be “imposed” by general statute. Id. “[T]he Miami–Dade Charter,” the Third
District stressed, “reign[s] supreme.” Id. (emphasis added).

Collectively, these cases support the conclusion that section 6.03 of the Miami-Dade Charter
controls the election procedures embedded within the City of Miami Charter - and placed there by a
vote of the City’s electorate.

2. The City’s Argument that the Ordinance does not “Amend” the City

Charter is Meritless

As to the City’s contention that the Ordinance - which amends Chapter 16 of the City Code - does
not implicate any constitutional concern, the Court finds that this argument lacks merit. The City
contends the Ordinance is not technically an “amend[ment]” to, or a “repeal,” “revocation,” or
“abolition” of, the provisions in the City Charter; and thus, does not present any constitutional
issue. The City is referring to Art. VIII, section 6(e) of the Florida Constitution (“the Legislature
shall have no power to amend or repeal the charter of any municipal corporation in Dade
County”); and Art. VI, section 6.03 of the Miami- Dade County Charter (prohibiting a “proposed”
municipal “charter amendment, revocation, or abolition” without “submit[ing]” it “to the electors

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 of the municipalities”).

The Court disagrees. This argument ignores the effect the Ordinance has on the pertinent
provisions of the City Charter. It completely nullifies sections 4(b) and (7) of the City Charter.
Indeed, the City concedes that the election dates and term limits imposed by the Ordinance directly
conflict with those mandated by sections 4(b) and (7) of the City Charter, and that the Ordinance
replaces the latter. Under the City’s own reading of the Ordinance, then, sections 4(b) and 7 of the
City Charter are no longer of any force or effect, and thus null and void, such that the Ordinance
has, in effect, repealed, amended, revoked, or abolished those provisions. See, e.g., Repeal,
Black’s Law Dictionary (7th Ed. 1999) (defining “repeal” as the “[a]brogation of an existing law by
legislative act,” including through an “implied repeal,” which is a “[r]epeal effected by
irreconcilable conflict between an old law and a new law”). The prohibition against impermissible
actions that, in effect (rather than technically), amend a statute is well recognized. See, e.g.,
McLaughlin v. State, 721 So. 2d 1170, 1172 (Fla. 1998) (noting that it is impermissible for the
judiciary to “extend, modify, or limit” the “express terms” of a statute through judicial
interpretation); Davidson v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., 797 F. 3d 1309, 1313 (11th Cir. 2015)
(recognizing the prohibition against “rewriting statutes” through judicial interpretation). The City’s
interpretation, therefore, is the very sort of impermissible “strict construction” that “strangle[s]
meaning.” See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts
355 (2012).

Additionally, the City’s interpretation of the terms “amendment” or “repeal” would frustrate, rather
than effectuate, the purpose of section 11(1)(g) of the Home Rule Amendment and section 6.03 of
the Miami-Dade Charter: to ensure that the Miami-Dade Charter alone dictates the “exclusive
method” by which municipalities in the County may “make, amend or repeal” their
charters—through a vote of the electorate. If a municipality could so easily sidestep this mandate
by simply passing an ordinance that changes or nullifies requirements imposed by their charter,
under the guise that an “ordinance” cannot be construed as an “amendment” to the Charter, it
would reduce the “exclusivity” envisioned in section 11(1)(g) to mere surplusage. See Antonin
Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 174, 176 (2012)
(counseling against an interpretation that results in “the total disregard of a provision” or “an
interpretation that renders it pointless.”).

Our Constitution deals with the substance of matters, not mere semantics. It dictates that the
Miami-Dade County Charter establishes the “exclusive” “method by which each municipality in
the County shall have the power to make, amend or repeal its own charter” and that “the
Legislature shall have no power to amend or repeal the charter of any municipal corporation in
Dade County.” The City’s contention that its Ordinance did not “amend” its City Charter is nothing
more than semantic sleight of hand. In one sense, of course, the City is correct, it did not effectuate
a permissible amendment to its Charter because the Florida Constitution and Miami-Dade County
Charter do not allow the City to amend or repeal its provisions by ordinance. That can only be
accomplished with a vote of the electorate, as the Plaintiff correctly contends. In substance,

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 however, what the Constitution must mean when mandating an “exclusive” method to “amend” the
municipal charter is the process of substantively changing the governing law set forth in that
charter. The Ordinance does just that - substantively replacing the City’s charter provision that
clearly sets elections in odd-numbered years, the next to be this November, and replacing it with
even-year elections, thereby extending the terms in office for existing office-holders and giving the
incumbents an extra one-year unelected term in office - contrary to the express provisions of the
City’s charter and substantively altering those charter provisions.

Finally, Florida’s constitutional provision establishing the exclusive method of amending the City’s
charter (by a vote of the electorate) and also expressly prohibiting the Legislature from directly
amending the City’s charter certainly cannot be read as allowing the Legislature to do indirectly
exactly what the constitution prohibits it and the City from doing directly - authorize a substantive
change in charter provisions without a vote of the electorate. If this were possible, the Legislature
could authorize the City’s elected officials to gut the local “constitution” adopted by the City’s
electorate - in violation of the Florida Constitution.

RULING

For these reasons, this Court finds that Ordinance 14376 constitutes an impermissible amendment
to the City Charter without a vote of the electorate, as required by section 6.03 of the Miami-Dade
County Charter and Article VIII, section 6(e) of the Florida Constitution.

Accordingly, it is hereby ADJUDGED and ORDERED:

1. The City of Miami’s Emergency Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.

2. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

3. The Court declares Ordinance 14376 unlawful, and in violation of Article VIII, section 6(e) of
the Florida Constitution, Article VI, section 6.03 of the Miami-Dade County Home Rule
Charter, and sections 4(b) and 7 of the City of Miami Municipal Charter.

4. The Court declares that the City of Miami cannot change the dates of municipal elections or
the terms of offices for the City’s elected officials without amending the City of Miami
Municipal Charter through the process set forth in section 6.03 of the Miami-Dade County
Home Rule Charter, which requires approval by the electorate.

5. Final summary judgment is hereby entered in favor of the Plaintiff on his claim for declaratory
relief, for which let execution issue.

________________________________________________________________________________________

[1] Given the facts are undisputed, and the legal issues raised in both Motions mirror and overlap, the Court has ruled on these Motions together.

Case No: 2025-012463-CA-01 Page 12 of 16

 [1] The Parties agree that there is no factual dispute, and the case is ripe for adjudication on the merits.

[1] See Ordinance §3 (“Section 3. Extension of Existing Terms of Office[.]” (emphasis added)).

[1] Here, by contrast, Miami-Dade County is a nominal defendant. The Miami-Dade County Supervisor of Elections is likewise named as a party.

[1] Section 6.04 of the Miami-Dade Charter governs changes in municipal boundaries and has no relevance to the analysis herein. See Miami-Dade
County, The Home Rule Amendment and Charter (As Amended Through November 8, 2022) at Article VI, §6.04, Changes In Municipal Boundaries (2022).

[1] This case, in fact, provided the precedent that the Wilson Court consulted in reaching its holding. See Wilson, 386 So. 2d at 560 (pointing to Young
Democratic Club as recognizing “that, even though in conflict with general election laws, Dade County charter provisions dealing with the method of electing
county commissioners were specifically authorized by the Constitution” and, therefore, prevailed against the at-issue general laws”).

[1] See also Miami Heat Ltd. Partnership v. Leahy, 682 So. 2d 198, 202-03 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (emphasizing the supremacy of the Miami-Dade
Charter and holding that Miami-Dade County ordinance imposing a single subject requirement was invalid because it conflicted with §7.01 of the Miami-Dade
Charter); Abreau v. Cobb, 679 So. 2d 1010, 1012 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (upholding a recall provision that did not state grounds for removal in violation of Fla.
Stat. §100.361(1)(b) because “The [Miami-Dade] Charter sets forth the petition form, which does not require a recall petition to state the grounds for removal.
Thus, pursuant to the [Home Rule Amendment], the petition is not required to comply with the statute and the Charter is supreme.”).

[1] The City’s authorities are inapposite. As explained above, Wilson made clear that even a “general law” must yield to “express constitutional
[sections giving] authorization otherwise.” 386 So. 2d 560 (emphasis added). Thus, the particular authority cited by the City does not advance the City’s case;
nor do the other authorities upon which the City relies.

For example, the City cites City of Hialeah v. Martinez, in which the Third District Court of Appeal held that a provision in a city charter
(Hialeah’s) could not override a conflicting “general law” statute governing qualifications for a local office. See 402 So. 2d 602, 605 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
(holding the statute “ma[de] it unlawful for a public office holder” to “run for [an]other office without resigning” from his current office). However, Martinez
falls squarely within the framework set out in Wilson - that municipal ordinances passed through the Miami-Dade Home Rule Charter “must be in accordance
with general law unless there is express constitutional authorization otherwise.” 386 So. 2d 556, 560 (emphasis added). Notably, in Martinez, there were
no constitutional laws saying “otherwise.” That cannot be said about the posture here.

The City also cites Dade County v. Dade County League of Municipalities, 104 So. 2d 512, 517 (Fla. 1958). This case, however, is likewise
inapposite. In that case, the Florida Supreme Court stated that “it is perfectly obvious from an examination of the constitutional provisions that it was intended
and in specific words provided that the making, amending, or repealing of the charters of Dade County municipalities could be accomplished only in the
fashion provided by the county home rule charter.” Id. at 517. However, the facts in the current case are quite the opposite. Significantly, the Court recognized
“Article VIII, Section 11 [1](g)” of the 1885 Constitution made clear that, “upon the adoption of the [Miami-Dade] home rule charter, ‘this method’ (the
method which the charter provides for municipalities to make, amend or repeal their charters) ‘shall be exclusive and the Legislature shall have no power to
amend or repeal the charter of any municipal corporation in Dade County.’” Ibid (emphasis added).

[1]The City’s argument that the Ordinance is not an amendment to the City Charter, even though it directly nullifies two of the City Charter’s provisions, also
impermissibly elevates form over substance. Cf. Growth Leasing, Ltd. v. Gulfview Advertiser, Inc., 448 So. 2d 1224, 1225 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); IndyMac
Federal Bank FSB v. Hagan, 104 So. 3d 1232, 1236 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012).

Case No: 2025-012463-CA-01 Page 13 of 16

 DONE and ORDERED in Chambers at Miami-Dade County, Florida on this 21st day of July,
2025.

2025-012463-CA-01 07-21-2025 12:50 PM

2025-012463-CA-01 07-21-2025 12:50 PM

Hon. Valerie R. Manno Schurr
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE
Electronically Signed

Final Order as to All Parties UCR #: CA010 (Disposed by Judge)

THE COURT DISMISSES THIS CASE AGAINST ANY PARTY NOT LISTED IN THIS FINAL
ORDER OR PREVIOUS ORDER(S). THIS CASE IS CLOSED AS TO ALL PARTIES.

Case No: 2025-012463-CA-01 Page 14 of 16

 Electronically Served:
• Alan Lawson: Alan@[Link]
• Alan Lawson: leah@[Link]
• Alan Lawson: michelle@[Link]
• Jason B Gonzalez: jason@[Link]
• Jason B Gonzalez: marsha@[Link]
• Jason B Gonzalez: michelle@[Link]
• Paul C Huck Jr: paul@[Link]
• Paul C Huck Jr: michelle@[Link]
• Paul C Huck Jr: leah@[Link]
• Mathew Gutierrez: mathew@[Link]
• Mathew Gutierrez: michelle@[Link]
• Mathew Gutierrez: sarah@[Link]
• Anthony Jose Sirven: anthony@[Link]
• Anthony Jose Sirven: michelle@[Link]
• Anthony Jose Sirven: sarah@[Link]
• Matthew Keating Casbarro: matthew@[Link]
• Matthew Keating Casbarro: michelle@[Link]
• Matthew Keating Casbarro: sarah@[Link]
• Brian Trujillo: brian@[Link]
• Brian Trujillo: michelle@[Link]
• Brian Trujillo: sarah@[Link]
• Benedict P Kuehne: [Link]@[Link]
• Benedict P Kuehne: EFiling@[Link]
• Benedict P Kuehne: IAedo@[Link]
• Michael Terrell Davis: mdavis@[Link]
• Michael Terrell Davis: iaedo@[Link]
• Michael Terrell Davis: efiling@[Link]
• Johan Daniel Dos Santos: johand@[Link]
• Johan Daniel Dos Santos: efiling@[Link]
• Johan Daniel Dos Santos: rparedes@[Link]
• Eric John Eves: eeves@[Link]
• Eric John Eves: CMatthews@[Link]
• Francis A Zacherl: FZacherl@[Link]
• Francis A Zacherl: LMarchante@[Link]
• Francis A Zacherl: TKessep@[Link]
• Marc David Sarnoff: msarnoff@[Link]
• Marc David Sarnoff: mGutierrez@[Link]
• Kevin R. Jones Esq.: KRJones@[Link]
• Kevin R. Jones Esq.: JMDeloro@[Link]
• Kevin R. Jones Esq.: mdelgadillo@[Link]
• Mason A Pertnoy: map@[Link]

Case No: 2025-012463-CA-01 Page 15 of 16

 • Mason A Pertnoy: eservicemia@[Link]
• Mason A Pertnoy: mschneider@[Link]
• Leah Gardner: lg@[Link]
• Michael Beny Valdes: mbv@[Link]
• Michael Beny Valdes: mora@[Link]
• Miguel Angel Gonzalez: gmiguel@[Link]
• Miguel Angel Gonzalez: mpd1@[Link]
• Oren Rosenthal: [Link]@[Link]
• Oren Rosenthal: orosent@[Link]
• Oren Rosenthal: [Link]@[Link]
• Richard Diaz Esq.: rick@[Link]
• Richard Diaz Esq.: liz@[Link]
• Richard Diaz Esq.: janine@[Link]

Case No: 2025-012463-CA-01 Page 16 of 16