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 Brief Contents

Getting the Most Out of This Book

1 Communication: What and Why

2 The Self, Perception, and Communication

3 Culture and Communication

4 Language

5 Listening

6 Nonverbal Communication

7 Communicating in Interpersonal Relationships

8 Communicating with Friends and Family

9 Communicating with Romantic Partners

10 Communicating to Land a Job

11 Communicating in the Workplace

12 Preparing Speeches

13 Presenting Speeches
14 Speaking to Inform and Persuade

A Informative Speech

B Sample Persuasive Speech

Notes
Glossary
Credits
Index
 Contents

Getting the Most Out of This Book

1 Communication: What and Why

Communication Defined
Communication is symbolic.
Communication is a process.
Communication is irreversible.
Communication is relational.

Models of Communication
Linear Model
Transactional Model
PAUSE TO REFLECT: How “Noisy” Is Your Communication?

Communication Contexts
Intrapersonal Communication
Dyadic/Interpersonal Communication
Small Group Communication
Organizational Communication
Public Communication
Mass Communication
PAUSE TO REFLECT: Which Contexts Suit You Best?

The Unique Context of Social Media

Audience size varies vastly.
 Users generate their own content.
Networks are highly diverse.
TIPS & REMINDERS: 5 Tips for Communicating Well on Social Media

Communication Competence
There is no “ideal” way to communicate.
Competence is situational.
Competence is relational.
Competence can be learned.
Competent communicators are flexible.
Competent communicators are empathic.
Competent communicators are cognitively complex.
Competent communicators self-monitor.
Competent communicators are committed.
PAUSE TO REFLECT: What Are Your Communication Goals?
ASK YOURSELF: What Type of Communicator Are You?

Misconceptions About Communication

Myth 1: Communication requires complete understanding.
Myth 2: Communication can solve all problems.
Myth 3: Communication is good.
Myth 4: Meanings are in words.
Myth 5: Communication is simple.
Myth 6: More communication is always better.
COMMUNICATION TAKE-AWAYS: Communication: What and Why
PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: Show Your Communication Know-How

2 The Self, Perception, and Communication

The Self-Concept Defined
Self-Concept
Self-Esteem

Communication and the Self-Concept

Significant Others
Mass Media
Culture
 Expectations
PAUSE TO REFLECT: What Shapes Your Self-Concept?

Mistaken Attributions and Communication

Individuals typically judge themselves more charitably than they judge others.
People often pay more attention to negative impressions than to positive ones.
When individuals do perceive positive qualities, they tend to overgeneralize.
People gravitate to the familiar.

Myths About Gendered Communication

Myth 1: Sex and gender are the same.
Myth 2: People are either male or female.
Myth 3: Gender is a continuum.

Empathy, Emotional IQ, and Communication

Display empathy.
Understand the difference between empathy and sympathy.
Cultivate emotional intelligence.
TIPS & REMINDERS: 3 Steps to Engage in Perception Checking
ASK YOURSELF: How Emotionally Intelligent Are You?

Identity Management
Individuals have public and private selves.
People engage in facework to manage their identities and the identity of others.
Identity management is collaborative.
People have multiple identities.
Identity management may be deliberate or unconscious.
People differ in their degree of identity management.
Roles influence the identities people display.
Identity management can be goal oriented.
Identity management isn’t necessarily dishonest.
PAUSE TO REFLECT: Which Identities Do You Enact?

Identity Management and Social Media

Social media can boost self-esteem.
Being genuine matters most.
Self-esteem can enhance emotional resilience.
 COMMUNICATION TAKE-AWAYS: Self, Perception, and Communication
PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: Show Your Communication Know-How

3 Culture and Communication

Culture Defined
Salience
In-Group and Out-Group
Coculture

Communication and Cocultures

Intersectionality
Race and Ethnicity
Regional Differences
Sexual Orientation and Gender
Religion
Socioeconomic Status
Political Viewpoints
Ability and Disability
TIPS & REMINDERS: 3 Ways to Discuss Politics Responsibly on Social Media

Age and Generation

Ideas about aging change over time.
Stereotypes discourage open communication.
Being young has its challenges.
Generations regard technology differently.
Differences emerge at work.
TIPS & REMINDERS: 4 Ways to Learn More About Other Cultures

Cultural Values and Norms

Individualism and Collectivism
High and Low Context
Uncertainty Avoidance
Power Distance
Talk and Silence
Competition and Cooperation
PAUSE TO REFLECT: What Cultural Norms Do You Embrace?
 ASK YOURSELF: How Much Do You Know About Other Cultures?

Overcoming Prejudice
We tend to think our culture is the best.
We often prejudge and stereotype others.
Judgments can lead to unfair treatment.
Mindful thinking can help.

Coping with Culture Shock

Don’t be too hard on yourself.
Homesickness is normal.
Expect progress and setbacks.
Reach out to others.
COMMUNICATION TAKE-AWAYS: Communication and Culture
PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: Show Your Communication Know-How

4 Language
The Nature of Language
Language is symbolic.
Meanings are in people, not in words.
Language is governed by rules.

The Power of Language

Names
Accents and Dialects
“Powerful” and “Powerless” Speech
Affiliative Language
PAUSE TO REFLECT: How Does Language Influence You?

Misunderstandings
Language is equivocal.
Meaning is relative.
Language differs by community.
Language is nuanced.
TIPS & REMINDERS: 6 Ways to Avoid Misunderstandings

Disruptive Language
 Don’t confuse fact and opinion.
Don’t confuse facts with inferences.
Don’t present emotions as facts.
Don’t resort to insults.
TIPS & REMINDERS: 3 Ways to Distinguish Between Facts and Opinions

Gender and Language

ASK YOURSELF: How Do You Use Language?
COMMUNICATION TAKE-AWAYS: Communication and Language
PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: Show Your Communication Know-How

5 Listening
The Importance of Listening
People with good listening skills are more likely than others to be hired and
promoted.
Listening is a leadership skill.
Good listeners are not easily fooled.
Asking for and listening to advice makes you look good.
Listening makes you a better friend and romantic partner.
PAUSE TO REFLECT: How Can You Improve as a Listener?

Misconceptions About Listening

Myth: Hearing and listening are the same thing.
Myth: Listening is a natural process.
Myth: All listeners receive the same message.

The Listening Process

Hearing
Understanding
Remembering
Interpreting
Evaluating
Responding

Listening in a Complex World

Message Overload
 Rapid Thought
Psychological Noise
Physical Noise
Cultural Differences
TIPS & REMINDERS: 3 Ways to Limit Social Media Distractions

Gender: Listening and Responding

Women tend to disclose similar experiences.
Men tend to solve or distract.
Empathy from women can feel like a put-down to men.
A man’s well intentioned response can feel like disinterest to a woman.
Awareness can help.

Hurtful Listening Habits

Pretending to Listen
Tuning In and Out
Acting Defensively
Avoiding the Issue
Ignoring Underlying Issues
Being Self-Centered
Talking Too Much
TIPS & REMINDERS: 6 Tips for Listening Nondefensively

Skills for Different Types of Listening

Relational Listening
Supportive Listening
Task-Oriented Listening
Analytical Listening
Critical Listening
TIPS & REMINDERS: 4 Tips for Listening Mindfully
ASK YOURSELF: What Are Your Listening Strengths?
COMMUNICATION TAKE-AWAYS: Listening Effectively
PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: Show Your Communication Know-How

6 Nonverbal Communication
The Nature of Nonverbal Communication
 Nonverbal communication is impossible to avoid.
Nonverbal behavior is part of identity management.
Nonverbal cues help define relationships.
Nonverbal behavior is ambiguous.
Nonverbal communication is essential to success.
PAUSE TO REFLECT: How Nonverbally Savvy Are You?

Functions of Nonverbal Communication

Repeating
Substituting
Complementing
Regulating
Contradicting

Deception and Nonverbal Cues

Kinesic Nonverbal Communication
Posture
Fidgeting
Smiling
Eye Contact
Expressions of Emotion
Voice
Touch
ASK YOURSELF: How Worldly Are Your Nonverbal Communication Skills?

Nonverbal Aspects of Space, Time, and Place

Space
Time
Territory
Environment

Nonverbal Cues and Attractiveness

Attractiveness Advantage
Clothing
Body Art
Overall Effect
TIPS & REMINDERS: 3: Ways to Interpret Nonverbal Cues More Accurately
 Gender and Nonverbal Communication
Gender Differences
Media’s Influence
Social Structure
Commonalities
TIPS & REMINDERS: 3 Ways to Convey Nonverbal Cues More Mindfully
COMMUNICATION TAKE-AWAYS: Nonverbal Communication
PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: Show Your Communication Know-How

7 Communicating in Interpersonal Relationships

Defining Interpersonal Communication
Relational Messages
Affinity
Respect
Immediacy
Control

Metacommunication
Metacommunication is often below the surface.
Metacommunication can be used for more than solving problems.
Metacommunication can be risky.
PAUSE TO REFLECT: What Can Metacommunication Reveal?

Self-Disclosure in Close Relationships

Social Disclosure Defined
Social Penetration Model
The Johari Window
TIPS & REMINDERS: 8 Questions to Consider Before Self-Disclosing

Interpersonal Communication Online

Online communication helps people stay connected.
Online communication can feel nonthreatening.
Online communication can be validating.
Online communication has a pause option . . . sometimes.
Online communication can be distracting.
 Online communication can be overwhelming.
PAUSE TO REFLECT: Do You Overuse Social Media?

Confirming and Disconfirming Messages

Use confirming messages more than disconfirming ones.
Show recognition.
Acknowledge thoughts and feelings.
Show that you agree.
TIPS & REMINDERS: 4 Ways to Avoid Damaging Your Relationships

Relational Spirals
Positive Spirals
Negative Spirals
Cyclical Spirals
PAUSE TO REFLECT: Is Your Relationship Spiraling Up or Down?
ASK YOURSELF: What’s the Forecast for Your Communication Climate?
COMMUNICATION TAKE-AWAYS: Interpersonal Communication
PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: Show Your Communication Know-How

8 Communicating with Friends and Family

Friendships and Family Ties
Friendships
Family Relationships
Friends and Family

How People Evaluate Friendship Potential

You have a lot in common.
You balance each other out.
You like and appreciate each other.
You admire each other.
You open up to each other.
You interact frequently.
You find the relationship rewarding.
TIPS & REMINDERS: 4 Reasons You Don’t Have to Be Perfect to Be a Good Friend

Types of Friendships
 Short-Term Versus Long-Term
Low Disclosure Versus High Disclosure
Doing-Oriented Versus Being-Oriented
Low Obligation Versus High Obligation
Frequent Contact Versus Occasional Contact
TIPS & REMINDERS: 8 Communication Strategies for Being a Good Friend
ASK YOURSELF: What Kind of Friendship Do You Have?

Gender and Friendship

Do men and women do friendship differently?
Can heterosexual men and women be just friends?
Are there advantages to other-sex friendships?
How does gender diversity figure into friendship?

Communicating with Friends Online

There is greater diversity online.
Many people share more in person, at least at first.
Online communication can be less anxiety provoking.
Online communication transcends time and space.
More online communication isn’t always better.

Parenting Relationships
Family Dynamics
Parenting Styles

Sibling Relationships
Supportive
Longing
Competitive
Apathetic
Hostile
TIPS & REMINDERS: 6 Communication Tips for Strengthening Family Ties
PAUSE TO REFLECT: How Does Your Family Communicate?
COMMUNICATION TAKE-AWAYS: Communicating with Friends and Family
PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: Show Your Communication Know-How

9 Communicating with Romantic Partners

Stages of Romantic Relationships
Initiating
Experimenting
Intensifying
Integrating
Bonding
Differentiating
Circumscribing
Stagnating
Avoiding
Terminating
TIPS & REMINDERS: 3 Ways That Communication Influences Romantic Potential
PAUSE TO REFLECT: Where Does Your Relationship Stand?

Gender and Intimacy

Speaking the Languages of Love
Affirming Words
Quality Time
Gifts
Physical Touch
Acts of Service
ASK YOURSELF: What’s Your Love Language?

Dialectical Perspective
Openness Versus Privacy
Connection Versus Autonomy
Predictability Versus Novelty
TIPS & REMINDERS: 9 Strategies for Managing Dialectical Tensions

Deception in Romantic Relationships

Altruistic Lies
Evasions
Self-Serving Lies

Ways That Partners Express Conflict

Nonassertiveness
 Indirect Communication
Assertiveness
Passive Aggression
Direct Aggression
TIPS & REMINDERS: 3 Ways to Protect Yourself from an Abusive Partner

Conflict Patterns That Destroy Relationships

Criticism
Contempt
Defensiveness
Stonewalling
PAUSE TO REFLECT: How Do You Handle Conflict as a Couple?

Applying Win–Win Problem Solving

Identify your problem and unmet needs.
Make a date.
Describe your problem and needs.
Check your partner’s understanding.
Solicit your partner’s needs.
Check your understanding of your partner’s needs.
Negotiate a solution.
Follow up on the solution.
COMMUNICATION TAKE-AWAYS: Communicating with Romantic Partners
PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: Show Your Communication Know-How

10 Communicating to Land a Job

Networking Strategies to Find a Job
View everyone as a networking prospect.
Network online.
Seek referrals.
Conduct informational interviews.
Show appreciation.
TIPS & REMINDERS: 5 Strategies to Build a Career-Enhancing Network

Managing Your Online Identity

Take stock of strengths and goals.
 Build a professional identity.
Avoid embarrassing posts.
Monitor your online presence.
Do damage control.
Beware mistaken identities.
Don’t be scared off.
Don’t stop when you get hired.
TIPS & REMINDERS: 5 Steps to Follow When Applying for a Job

Preparing for a Job Interview

Do your research.
Prepare for likely questions.
Dress for success.
Bring along copies of your résumé and portfolio.
Know when and where to go.
Reframe anxiety as enthusiasm.
TIPS & REMINDERS: 4 Ways to Answer “What Is Your Greatest Weakness?”

Responding to Common Interview Questions

TIPS & REMINDERS: 7 Strategies for Creating a Presentation About Yourself
PAUSE TO REFLECT: What Do You Have to Offer?

Interviewing and the Law

Know the law.
Prepare in advance.

Participating in a Job Interview

Mind your manners.
Follow the interviewer’s lead.
Keep your answers succinct and specific.
Describe relevant challenges, actions, and results.
Ask good questions of your own.
Follow up after the interview.

Interviewing by Phone or Video

Present a professional identity.
Practice with technology in advance.
Ensure that you have the right time for the interview.
 Ask in advance how long the interview will last.
Look at the camera, not at the screen.
Conduct a dress rehearsal.
COMMUNICATION TAKE-AWAYS: Communicating to Land a Job
PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: Show Your Communication Know-How

11 Communicating in the Workplace

Communication Skills Boost Career Success
Good communicators work well in teams.
Good communicators enhance client satisfaction.
Good communicators build public awareness.
Good communicators make good leaders.
Good communicators inspire others.

Communication Mistakes to Avoid at Work

Making Fun of People
Oversharing
Overlooking Cultural Differences
Gossiping
Doing Less Than Your Best
Losing Your Cool
Fixating on a Mistake
TIPS & REMINDERS: 8 Ways to Communicate in a Professional Manner Online

Communication Strategies for Leaders

Characteristics of Effective Leaders
Trait Theories of Leadership
Situational Leadership
Transformational Leadership
Behaviors That Demonstrate Leadership Potential
ASK YOURSELF: What’s Your Leadership Style?

Working with a Difficult Boss

Put in extra effort.
Make up the difference.
Seek advice from others.
 Try to clarify and improve the situation.
Manage your expectations.
Keep a professional demeanor.
Consider moving on.
TIPS & REMINDERS: 5 Steps to Leave a Job Without Burning Bridges
PAUSE TO REFLECT: What Has Shaped Your Leadership Approach?

Power in the Workplace

Legitimate Power
Expert Power
Connection Power
Reward Power
Coercive Power
Referent Power

Communication in Small Groups

Definition of a Small Group
Motivational Factors
Rules in Small Groups
Roles in Small Groups
Cohesiveness

Advantages of Group Problem Solving

Groups have more resources than individuals.
Group members can catch errors.
Group work enhances buy-in.
Groups benefit from diverse ideas.
Groups are best at solving some problems.
TIPS & REMINDERS: 4 Stages in Decision-Making Groups
PAUSE TO REFLECT: How Do You Feel About Group Work?

Making the Most of Group Meetings

Encourage equal participation.
Avoid information underload and overload.
Avoid pressure to conform.
Make the most of diversity.

A Structured Problem-Solving Approach

Another Random Scribd Document
with Unrelated Content
deny pleasure to be the sole good and regard what is completely
good as having some complexity, have usually represented a purely
spiritual state of existence as the Ideal. Regarding matter as
essentially imperfect, if not positively evil, they have concluded that
the total absence of all material properties is necessary to a state of
perfection. Now, according to what has been said, this view would
be correct so far as it asserts that any great good must be mental,
and so far as it asserts that a purely material existence, by itself, can
have little or no value. The superiority of the spiritual over the
material has, in a sense, been amply vindicated. But it does not
follow, from this superiority, that a perfect state of things must be
one, from which all material properties are rigidly excluded: on the
contrary, if our conclusions are correct, it would seem to be the case
that a state of things, in which they are included, must be vastly
better than any conceivable state in which they were absent. In
order to see that this is so, the chief thing necessary to be
considered is exactly what it is which we declare to be good when
we declare that the appreciation of beauty in Art and Nature is so.
That this appreciation is good, the philosophers in question do not
for the most part deny. But, if we admit it, then we should
remember Butler’s maxim that: Everything is what it is, and not
another thing. I have tried to shew, and I think it is too evident to
be disputed, that such appreciation is an organic unity, a complex
whole; and that, in its most undoubted instances, part of what is
included in this whole is a cognition of material qualities, and
particularly of a vast variety of what are called secondary qualities.
If, then, it is this whole, which we know to be good, and not another
thing, then we know that material qualities, even though they be
perfectly worthless in themselves, are yet essential constituents of
what is far from worthless. What we know to be valuable is the
apprehension of just these qualities, and not of any others; and, if
we propose to subtract them from it, then what we have left is not
that which we know to have value, but something else. And it must
be noticed that this conclusion holds, even if my contention, that a
true belief in the existence of these qualities adds to the value of the
whole in which it is included, be disputed. We should then, indeed,
be entitled to assert that the existence of a material world was
wholly immaterial to perfection; but the fact that what we knew to
be good was a cognition of material qualities (though purely
imaginary), would still remain. It must, then, be admitted on pain of
self-contradiction—on pain of holding that things are not what they
are, but something else—that a world, from which material qualities
were wholly banished, would be a world which lacked many, if not
all, of those things, which we know most certainly to be great goods.
That it might nevertheless be a far better world than one which
retained these goods, I have already admitted (§ 111 (1)). But in
order to shew that any such world would be thus better, it would be
necessary to shew that the retention of these things, though good in
themselves, impaired, in a more than equal degree, the value of
some whole, to which they might belong; and the task of shewing
this has certainly never been attempted. Until it be performed, we
are entitled to assert that material qualities are a necessary
constituent of the Ideal; that, though something utterly unknown
might be better than any world containing either them or any other
good we know, yet we have no reason to suppose that anything
whatever would be better than a state of things in which they were
included. To deny and exclude matter, is to deny and exclude the
best we know. That a thing may retain its value, while losing some
of its qualities, is utterly untrue. All that is true is that the changed
thing may have more value than, or as much value as, that of which
the qualities have been lost. What I contend is that nothing, which
we know to be good and which contains no material qualities, has
such great value that we can declare it, by itself, to be superior to
the whole which would be formed by the addition to it of an
appreciation of material qualities. That a purely spiritual good may
be the best of single things, I am not much concerned to dispute,
although, in what has been said with regard to the nature of
personal affection, I have given reasons for doubting it. But that by
adding to it some appreciation of material qualities, which, though
perhaps inferior by itself, is certainly a great positive good, we
should obtain a greater sum of value, which no corresponding
decrease in the value of the whole, as a whole, could counterbalance
—this, I maintain, we have certainly no reason to doubt.
124. In order to complete this discussion of the main principles
involved in the determination of intrinsic values, the chief remaining
topics, necessary to be treated, appear to be two. The first of these
is the nature of great intrinsic evils, including what I may call mixed
evils; that is to say, those evil wholes, which nevertheless contain, as
essential elements, something positively good or beautiful. And the
second is the nature of what I may similarly call mixed goods; that is
to say, those wholes, which, though intrinsically good as wholes,
nevertheless contain, as essential elements, something positively evil
or ugly. It will greatly facilitate this discussion, if I may be
understood throughout to use the terms ‘beautiful’ and ‘ugly,’ not
necessarily with reference to things of the kind which most naturally
occur to us as instances of what is beautiful and ugly, but in
accordance with my own proposed definition of beauty. Thus I shall
use the word ‘beautiful’ to denote that of which the admiring
contemplation is good in itself; and ‘ugly’ to denote that of which the
admiring contemplation is evil in itself.
I. With regard, then, to great positive evils, I think it is evident
that, if we take all due precautions to discover precisely what those
things are, of which, if they existed absolutely by themselves, we
should judge the existence to be a great evil, we shall find most of
them to be organic unities of exactly the same nature as those
which are the greatest positive goods. That is to say, they are
cognitions of some object, accompanied by some emotion. Just as
neither a cognition nor an emotion, by itself, appeared capable of
being greatly good, so (with one exception), neither a cognition nor
an emotion, by itself, appears capable of being greatly evil. And just
as a whole formed of both, even without the addition of any other
element, appeared undoubtedly capable of being a great good, so
such a whole, by itself, appears capable of being a great evil. With
regard to the third element, which was discussed as capable of
adding greatly to the value of a good, namely, true belief, it will
appear that it has different relations towards different kinds of evils.
In some cases the addition of true belief to a positive evil seems to
constitute a far worse evil; but in other cases it is not apparent that
it makes any difference.
The greatest positive evils may be divided into the following
three classes.
125. (1) The first class consists of those evils, which seem
always to include an enjoyment or admiring contemplation of things
which are themselves either evil or ugly. That is to say these evils
are characterised by the fact that they include precisely the same
emotion, which is also essential to the greatest unmixed goods, from
which they are differentiated by the fact that this emotion is directed
towards an inappropriate object. In so far as this emotion is either a
slight good in itself or a slightly beautiful object, these evils would
therefore be cases of what I have called ‘mixed’ evils; but, as I have
already said, it seems very doubtful whether an emotion, completely
isolated from its object, has either value or beauty: it certainly has
not much of either. It is, however, important to observe that the very
same emotions, which are often loosely talked of as the greatest or
the only goods, may be essential constituents of the very worst
wholes: that, according to the nature of the cognition which
accompanies them, they may be conditions either of the greatest
good, or of the greatest evil.
In order to illustrate the nature of evils of this class, I may take
two instances—cruelty and lasciviousness. That these are great
intrinsic evils, we may, I think, easily assure ourselves, by imagining
the state of a man, whose mind is solely occupied by either of these
passions, in their worst form. If we then consider what judgment we
should pass upon a universe which consisted solely of minds thus
occupied, without the smallest hope that there would ever exist in it
the smallest consciousness of any object other than those proper to
these passions, or any feeling directed to any such object, I think we
cannot avoid the conclusion that the existence of such a universe
would be a far worse evil than the existence of none at all. But, if
this be so, it follows that these two vicious states are not only, as is
commonly admitted, bad as means, but also bad in themselves.—
And that they involve in their nature that complication of elements,
which I have called a love of what is evil or ugly, is, I think, no less
plain. With regard to the pleasures of lust, the nature of the
cognition, by the presence of which they are to be defined, is
somewhat difficult to analyse. But it appears to include both
cognitions of organic sensations and perceptions of states of the
body, of which the enjoyment is certainly an evil in itself. So far as
these are concerned, lasciviousness would, then, include in its
essence an admiring contemplation of what is ugly. But certainly one
of its commonest ingredients, in its worst forms, is an enjoyment of
the same state of mind in other people: and in this case it would
therefore also include a love of what is evil. With regard to cruelty, it
is easy to see that an enjoyment of pain in other people is essential
to it; and, as we shall see, when we come to consider pain, this is
certainly a love of evil: while, in so far as it also includes a delight in
the bodily signs of agony, it would also comprehend a love of what is
ugly. In both cases, it should be observed, the evil of the state is
heightened not only by an increase in the evil or ugliness of the
object, but also by an increase in the enjoyment.
It might be objected, in the case of cruelty, that our disapproval
of it, even in the isolated case supposed, where no considerations of
its badness as a means could influence us, may yet be really
directed to the pain of the persons, which it takes delight in
contemplating. This objection may be met, in the first place, by the
remark that it entirely fails to explain the judgment, which yet, I
think, no one, on reflection, will be able to avoid making, that even
though the amount of pain contemplated be the same, yet the
greater the delight in its contemplation, the worse the state of
things. But it may also, I think, be met by notice of a fact, which we
were unable to urge in considering the similar possibility with regard
to goods—namely the possibility that the reason why we attribute
greater value to a worthy affection for a real person, is that we take
into account the additional good consisting in the existence of that
person. We may I think urge, in the case of cruelty, that its intrinsic
odiousness is equally great, whether the pain contemplated really
exists or is purely imaginary. I, at least, am unable to distinguish
that, in this case, the presence of true belief makes any difference to
the intrinsic value of the whole considered, although it undoubtedly
may make a great difference to its value as a means. And so also
with regard to other evils of this class: I am unable to see that a
true belief in the existence of their objects makes any difference in
the degree of their positive demerits. On the other hand, the
presence of another class of beliefs seems to make a considerable
difference. When we enjoy what is evil or ugly, in spite of our
knowledge that it is so, the state of things seems considerably worse
than if we made no judgment at all as to the object’s value. And the
same seems also, strangely enough, to be the case when we make a
false judgment of value. When we admire what is ugly or evil,
believing that it is beautiful and good, this belief seems also to
enhance the intrinsic vileness of our condition. It must, of course, be
understood that, in both these cases, the judgment in question is
merely what I have called a judgment of taste; that is to say, it is
concerned with the worth of the qualities actually cognised and not
with the worth of the object, to which those qualities may be rightly
or wrongly attributed.
Finally it should be mentioned that evils of this class, beside that
emotional element (namely enjoyment and admiration) which they
share with great unmixed goods, appear always also to include some
specific emotion, which does not enter in the same way into the
constitution of any good. The presence of this specific emotion
seems certainly to enhance the badness of the whole, though it is
not plain that, by itself, it would be either evil or ugly.
126. (2) The second class of great evils are undoubtedly mixed
evils; but I treat them next, because, in a certain respect, they
appear to be the converse of the class last considered. Just as it is
essential to this last class that they should include an emotion,
appropriate to the cognition of what is good or beautiful, but
directed to an inappropriate object; so to this second class it is
essential that they should include a cognition of what is good or
beautiful, but accompanied by an inappropriate emotion. In short,
just as the last class may be described as cases of the love of what
is evil or ugly, so this class may be described as cases of the hatred
of what is good or beautiful.
With regard to these evils it should be remarked: First, that the
vices of hatred, envy and contempt, where these vices are evil in
themselves, appear to be instances of them; and that they are
frequently accompanied by evils of the first class, for example,
where a delight is felt in the pain of a good person. Where they are
thus accompanied, the whole thus formed is undoubtedly worse
than if either existed singly.
And secondly: That in their case a true belief in the existence of
the good or beautiful object, which is hated, does appear to enhance
the badness of the whole, in which it is present. Undoubtedly also,
as in our first class, the presence of a true belief as to the value of
the objects contemplated, increases the evil. But, contrary to what
was the case in our first class, a false judgment of value appears to
lessen it.
127. (3) The third class of great positive evils appears to be
the class of pains.
With regard to these it should first be remarked that, as in the
case of pleasure, it is not pain itself, but only the consciousness of
pain, towards which our judgments of value are directed. Just as in
Chap. III., it was said that pleasure, however intense, which no one
felt, would be no good at all; so it appears that pain, however
intense, of which there was no consciousness, would be no evil at
all.
It is, therefore, only the consciousness of intense pain, which can
be maintained to be a great evil. But that this, by itself, may be a
great evil, I cannot avoid thinking. The case of pain thus seems to
differ from that of pleasure: for the mere consciousness of pleasure,
however intense, does not, by itself, appear to be a great good,
even if it has some slight intrinsic value. In short, pain (if we
understand by this expression, the consciousness of pain) appears to
be a far worse evil than pleasure is a good. But, if this be so, then
pain must be admitted to be an exception from the rule which seems
to hold both of all other great evils and of all great goods: namely
that they are all organic unities to which both a cognition of an
object and an emotion directed towards that object are essential. In
the case of pain and of pain alone, it seems to be true that a mere
cognition, by itself, may be a great evil. It is, indeed, an organic
unity, since it involves both the cognition and the object, neither of
which, by themselves, has either merit or demerit. But it is a less
complex organic unity than any other great evil and than any great
good, both in respect of the fact that it does not involve, beside the
cognition, an emotion directed towards its object, and also in respect
of the fact that the object may here be absolutely simple, whereas in
most, if not all, other cases, the object itself is highly complex.
This want of analogy between the relation of pain to intrinsic evil
and of pleasure to intrinsic good, seems also to be exhibited in a
second respect. Not only is it the case that consciousness of intense
pain is, by itself, a great evil, whereas consciousness of intense
pleasure is, by itself, no great good; but also the converse difference
appears to hold of the contribution which they make to the value of
the whole, when they are combined respectively with another great
evil or with a great good. That is to say, the presence of pleasure
(though not in proportion to its intensity) does appear to enhance
the value of a whole, in which it is combined with any of the great
unmixed goods which we have considered: it might even be
maintained that it is only wholes, in which some pleasure is included,
that possess any great value: it is certain, at all events, that the
presence of pleasure makes a contribution to the value of good
wholes greatly in excess of its own intrinsic value. On the contrary, if
a feeling of pain be combined with any of the evil states of mind
which we have been considering, the difference which its presence
makes to the value of the whole, as a whole, seems to be rather for
the better than the worse: in any case, the only additional evil which
it introduces, is that which it, by itself, intrinsically constitutes. Thus,
whereas pain is in itself a great evil, but makes no addition to the
badness of a whole, in which it is combined with some other bad
thing, except that which consists in its own intrinsic badness;
pleasure, conversely, is not in itself a great good, but does make a
great addition to the goodness of a whole in which it is combined
with a good thing, quite apart from its own intrinsic value.
128. But finally, it must be insisted that pleasure and pain are
completely analogous in this: that we cannot assume either that the
presence of pleasure always makes a state of things better on the
whole, or that the presence of pain always makes it worse. This is
the truth which is most liable to be overlooked with regard to them;
and it is because this is true, that the common theory, that pleasure
is the only good and pain the only evil, has its grossest
consequences in misjudgments of value. Not only is the
pleasantness of a state not in proportion to its intrinsic worth; it may
even add positively to its vileness. We do not think the successful
hatred of a villain the less vile and odious, because he takes the
keenest delight in it; nor is there the least need, in logic, why we
should think so, apart from an unintelligent prejudice in favour of
pleasure. In fact it seems to be the case that wherever pleasure is
added to an evil state of either of our first two classes, the whole
thus formed is always worse than if no pleasure had been there. And
similarly with regard to pain. If pain be added to an evil state of
either of our first two classes, the whole thus formed is always
better, as a whole, than if no pain had been there; though here, if
the pain be too intense, since that is a great evil, the state may not
be better on the whole. It is in this way that the theory of vindictive
punishment may be vindicated. The infliction of pain on a person
whose state of mind is bad may, if the pain be not too intense,
create a state of things that is better on the whole than if the evil
state of mind had existed unpunished. Whether such a state of
things can ever constitute a positive good, is another question.
 129. II. The consideration of this other question belongs
properly to the second topic, which was reserved above for
discussion namely the topic of ‘mixed’ goods. ‘Mixed’ goods were
defined above as things, which, though positively good as wholes,
nevertheless contain, as essential elements, something intrinsically
evil or ugly. And there certainly seem to be such goods. But for the
proper consideration of them, it is necessary to take into account a
new distinction the distinction just expressed as being between the
value which a thing possesses ‘as a whole,’ and that which it
possesses ‘on the whole.’
When ‘mixed’ goods were defined as things positively good as
wholes, the expression was ambiguous. It was meant that they were
positively good on the whole; but it must now be observed that the
value which a thing possesses on the whole may be said to be
equivalent to the sum of the value which it possesses as a whole,
together with the intrinsic values which may belong to any of its
parts. In fact, by the ‘value which a thing possesses as a whole,’
there may be meant two quite distinct things. There may be meant
either (1) That value which arises solely from the combination of two
or more things; or else (2) The total value formed by the addition to
(1) of any intrinsic values which may belong to the things combined.
The meaning of the distinction may perhaps be most easily seen by
considering the supposed case of vindictive punishment. If it is true
that the combined existence of two evils may yet constitute a less
evil than would be constituted by the existence of either singly, it is
plain that this can only be because there arises from the
combination a positive good which is greater than the difference
between the sum of the two evils and the demerit of either singly:
this positive good would then be the value of the whole, as a whole,
in sense (1). Yet if this value be not so great a good as the sum of
the two evils is an evil, it is plain that the value of the whole state of
things will be a positive evil; and this value is the value of the whole,
as a whole, in sense (2). Whatever view may be taken with regard
to the particular case of vindictive punishment, it is plain that we
have here two distinct things, with regard to either of which a
separate question may be asked in the case of every organic unity.
The first of these two things may be expressed as the difference
between the value of the whole thing and the sum of the value of its
parts. And it is plain that where the parts have little or no intrinsic
value (as in our first class of goods, §§ 114, 115), this difference will
be nearly or absolutely identical with the value of the whole thing.
The distinction, therefore, only becomes important in the case of
wholes, of which one or more parts have a great intrinsic value,
positive or negative. The first of these cases, that of a whole, in
which one part has a great positive value, is exemplified in our 2nd
and 3rd classes of great unmixed goods (§§ 120, 122); and similarly
the Summum Bonum is a whole of which many parts have a great
positive value. Such cases, it may be observed, are also very
frequent and very important objects of Aesthetic judgment; since
the essential distinction between the ‘classical’ and the ‘romantic’
styles consists in the fact that the former aims at obtaining the
greatest possible value for the whole, as a whole, in sense (1),
whereas the latter sacrifices this in order to obtain the greatest
possible value for some part, which is itself an organic unity. It
follows that we cannot declare either style to be necessarily superior,
since an equally good result on the whole, or ‘as a whole’ in sense
(2), may be obtained by either method; but the distinctively
aesthetic temperament seems to be characterised by a tendency to
prefer a good result obtained by the classical, to an equally good
result obtained by the romantic method.
130. But what we have now to consider are cases of wholes, in
which one or more parts have a great negative value—are great
positive evils. And first of all, we may take the strongest cases, like
that of retributive punishment, in which we have a whole, exclusively
composed of two great positive evils—wickedness and pain. Can
such a whole ever be positively good on the whole?
(1) I can see no reason to think that such wholes ever are
positively good on the whole. But from the fact that they may,
nevertheless, be less evils, than either of their parts taken singly, it
follows that they have a characteristic which is most important for
the correct decision of practical questions. It follows that, quite apart
from consequences or any value which an evil may have as a mere
means, it may, supposing one evil already exists, be worth while to
create another, since, by the mere creation of this second, there may
be constituted a whole less bad than if the original evil had been left
to exist by itself. And similarly, with regard to all the wholes which I
am about to consider, it must be remembered, that, even if they are
not goods on the whole, yet, where an evil already exists, as in this
world evils do exist, the existence of the other part of these wholes
will constitute a thing desirable for its own sake—that is to say, not
merely a means to future goods, but one of the ends which must be
taken into account in estimating what that best possible state of
things is, to which every right action must be a means.
131. (2) But, as a matter of fact, I cannot avoid thinking that
there are wholes, containing something positively evil and ugly,
which are, nevertheless, great positive goods on the whole. Indeed,
it appears to be to this class that those instances of virtue, which
contain anything intrinsically good, chiefly belong. It need not, of
course, be denied that there is sometimes included in a virtuous
disposition more or less of those unmixed goods which were first
discussed—that is to say, a real love of what is good or beautiful. But
the typical and characteristic virtuous dispositions, so far as they are
not mere means, seem rather to be examples of mixed goods. We
may take as instances (a) Courage and Compassion, which seem to
belong to the second of the three classes of virtues distinguished in
our last chapter (§ 107); and (b) the specifically ‘moral’ sentiment,
by reference to which the third of those three classes was defined
(§ 108).
Courage and compassion, in so far as they contain an intrinsically
desirable state of mind, seem to involve essentially a cognition of
something evil or ugly. In the case of courage the object of the
cognition may be an evil of any of our three classes; in the case of
compassion, the proper object is pain. Both these virtues,
accordingly, must contain precisely the same cognitive element,
which is also essential to evils of class (1); and they are
differentiated from these by the fact that the emotion directed to
these objects is, in their case, an emotion of the same kind which
was essential to evils of class (2). In short, just as evils of class (2)
seemed to consist in a hatred of what was good or beautiful, and
evils of class (1) in a love of what was evil or ugly; so these virtues
involve a hatred of what is evil or ugly. Both these virtues do, no
doubt, also contain other elements, and, among these, each
contains its specific emotion; but that their value does not depend
solely upon these other elements, we may easily assure ourselves,
by considering what we should think of an attitude of endurance or
of defiant contempt toward an object intrinsically good or beautiful,
or of the state of a man whose mind was filled with pity for the
happiness of a worthy admiration. Yet pity for the undeserved
sufferings of others, endurance of pain to ourselves, and a defiant
hatred of evil dispositions in ourselves or in others, seem to be
undoubtedly admirable in themselves; and if so, there are admirable
things, which must be lost, if there were no cognition of evil.
Similarly the specifically ‘moral’ sentiment, in all cases where it
has any considerable intrinsic value, appears to include a hatred of
evils of the first and second classes. It is true that the emotion is
here excited by the idea that an action is right or wrong; and hence
the object of the idea which excites it is generally not an intrinsic
evil. But, as far as I can discover, the emotion with which a
conscientious man views a real or imaginary right action, contains,
as an essential element, the same emotion with which he views a
wrong one: it seems, indeed, that this element is necessary to make
his emotion specifically moral. And the specifically moral emotion
excited by the idea of a wrong action, seems to me to contain
essentially a more or less vague cognition of the kind of intrinsic
evils, which are usually caused by wrong actions, whether they
would or would not be caused by the particular action in question. I
am, in fact, unable to distinguish, in its main features, the moral
sentiment excited by the idea of rightness and wrongness, wherever
it is intense, from the total state constituted by a cognition of
something intrinsically evil together with the emotion of hatred
directed towards it. Nor need we be surprised that this mental state
should be the one chiefly associated with the idea of rightness, if we
reflect on the nature of those actions which are most commonly
recognised as duties. For by far the greater part of the actions, of
which we commonly think as duties, are negative: what we feel to
be our duty is to abstain from some action to which a strong natural
impulse tempts us. And these wrong actions, in the avoidance of
which duty consists, are usually such as produce, very immediately,
some bad consequence in pain to others; while, in many prominent
instances, the inclination, which prompts us to them, is itself an
intrinsic evil, containing, as where the impulse is lust or cruelty, an
anticipatory enjoyment of something evil or ugly. That right action
does thus so frequently entail the suppression of some evil impulse,
is necessary to explain the plausibility of the view that virtue consists
in the control of passion by reason. Accordingly, the truth seems to
be that, whenever a strong moral emotion is excited by the idea of
rightness, this emotion is accompanied by a vague cognition of the
kind of evils usually suppressed or avoided by the actions which
most frequently occur to us as instances of duty; and that the
emotion is directed towards this evil quality. We may, then, conclude
that the specific moral emotion owes almost all its intrinsic value to
the fact that it includes a cognition of evils accompanied by a hatred
of them: mere rightness, whether truly or untruly attributed to an
action, seems incapable of forming the object of an emotional
contemplation, which shall be any great good.
132. If this be so, then we have, in many prominent instances
of virtue, cases of a whole, greatly good in itself, which yet contains
the cognition of something, whereof the existence would be a great
evil: a great good is absolutely dependent for its value, upon its
inclusion of something evil or ugly, although it does not owe its value
solely to this element in it. And, in the case of virtues, this evil object
does, in general, actually exist. But there seems no reason to think
that, when it does exist, the whole state of things thus constituted is
therefore the better on the whole. What seems indubitable, is only
that the feeling contemplation of an object, whose existence would
be a great evil, or which is ugly, may be essential to a valuable
whole. We have another undoubted instance of this in the
appreciation of tragedy. But, in tragedy, the sufferings of Lear, and
the vice of Iago may be purely imaginary. And it seems certain that,
if they really existed, the evil thus existing, while it must detract
from the good consisting in a proper feeling towards them, will add
no positive value to that good great enough to counterbalance such
a loss. It does, indeed, seem that the existence of a true belief in
the object of these mixed goods does add some value to the whole
in which it is combined with them: a conscious compassion for real
suffering seems to be better, as a whole, than a compassion for
sufferings merely imaginary; and this may well be the case, even
though the evil involved in the actual suffering makes the total state
of things bad on the whole. And it certainly seems to be true that a
false belief in the actual existence of its object makes a worse mixed
good than if our state of mind were that with which we normally
regard pure fiction. Accordingly we may conclude that the only
mixed goods, which are positively good on the whole, are those in
which the object is something which would be a great evil, if it
existed, or which is ugly.
133. With regard, then, to those mixed goods, which consist in
an appropriate attitude of the mind towards things evil or ugly, and
which include among their number the greater part of such virtues
as have any intrinsic value whatever, the following three conclusions
seem to be those chiefly requiring to be emphasized:—
(1) There seems no reason to think that where the object is a
thing evil in itself, which actually exists, the total state of things is
ever positively good on the whole. The appropriate mental attitude
towards a really existing evil contains, of course, an element which is
absolutely identical with the same attitude towards the same evil,
where it is purely imaginary. And this element, which is common to
the two cases, may be a great positive good, on the whole. But
there seems no reason to doubt that, where the evil is real, the
amount of this real evil is always sufficient to reduce the total sum of
value to a negative quantity. Accordingly we have no reason to
maintain the paradox that an ideal world would be one in which vice
and suffering must exist in order that it may contain the goods
consisting in the appropriate emotion towards them. It is not a
positive good that suffering should exist, in order that we may
compassionate it; or wickedness, that we may hate it. There is no
reason to think that any actual evil whatsoever would be contained
in the Ideal. It follows that we cannot admit the actual validity of
any of the arguments commonly used in Theodicies; no such
argument succeeds in justifying the fact that there does exist even
the smallest of the many evils which this world contains. The most
that can be said for such arguments is that, when they make appeal
to the principle of organic unity, their appeal is valid in principle. It
might be the case that the existence of evil was necessary, not
merely as a means, but analytically, to the existence of the greatest
good. But we have no reason to think that this is the case in any
instance whatsoever.
But (2) there is reason to think that the cognition of things evil or
ugly, which are purely imaginary, is essential to the Ideal. In this
case the burden of proof lies the other way. It cannot be doubted
that the appreciation of tragedy is a great positive good; and it
seems almost equally certain that the virtues of compassion,
courage, and self-control contain such goods. And to all these the
cognition of things which would be evil, if they existed, is analytically
necessary. Here then we have things of which the existence must
add value to any whole in which they are contained; nor is it
possible to assure ourselves that any whole, from which they were
omitted, would thereby gain more in its value as a whole, than it
would lose by their omission. We have no reason to think that any
whole, which did not contain them, would be so good on the whole
as some whole in which they were obtained. The case for their
inclusion in the Ideal is as strong as that for the inclusion of material
qualities (§ 123, above). Against the inclusion of these goods
nothing can be urged except a bare possibility.
Finally (3) it is important to insist that, as was said above, these
mixed virtues have a great practical value, in addition to that which
they possess either in themselves or as mere means. Where evils do
exist, as in this world they do, the fact that they are known and
properly appreciated, constitutes a state of things having greater
value as a whole even than the same appreciation of purely
imaginary evils. This state of things, it has been said, is never
positively good on the whole; but where the evil, which reduces its
total value to a negative quantity, already unavoidably exists, to
obtain the intrinsic value which belongs to it as a whole will
obviously produce a better state of things than if the evil had existed
by itself, quite apart from the good element in it which is identical
with the appreciation of imaginary evils, and from any ulterior
consequences which its existence may bring about. The case is here
the same as with retributive punishment. Where an evil already
exists, it is well that it should be pitied or hated or endured,
according to its nature; just as it may be well that some evils should
be punished. Of course, as in all practical cases, it often happens
that the attainment of this good is incompatible with the attainment
of another and a greater one. But it is important to insist that we
have here a real intrinsic value, which must be taken into account in
calculating that greatest possible balance of intrinsic value, which it
is always our duty to produce.
134. I have now completed such remarks as seemed most
necessary to be made concerning intrinsic values. It is obvious that
for the proper answering of this, the fundamental question of Ethics,
there remains a field of investigation as wide and as difficult, as was
assigned to Practical Ethics in my last chapter. There is as much to
be said concerning what results are intrinsically good, and in what
degrees, as concerning what results it is possible for us to bring
about: both questions demand, and will repay, an equally patient
enquiry. Many of the judgments, which I have made in this chapter,
will, no doubt, seem unduly arbitrary: it must be confessed that
some of the attributions of intrinsic value, which have seemed to me
to be true, do not display that symmetry and system which is wont
to be required of philosophers. But if this be urged as an objection, I
may respectfully point out that it is none. We have no title whatever
to assume that the truth on any subject-matter will display such
symmetry as we desire to see—or (to use the common vague
phrase) that it will possess any particular form of ‘unity.’ To search
for ‘unity’ and ‘system,’ at the expense of truth, is not, I take it, the
proper business of philosophy, however universally it may have been
the practice of philosophers. And that all truths about the Universe
possess to one another all the various relations, which may be
meant by ‘unity,’ can only be legitimately asserted, when we have
carefully distinguished those various relations and discovered what
those truths are. In particular, we can have no title to assert that
ethical truths are ‘unified’ in any particular manner, except in virtue
of an enquiry conducted by the method which I have endeavoured
to follow and to illustrate. The study of Ethics would, no doubt, be
far more simple, and its results far more ‘systematic,’ if, for instance,
pain were an evil of exactly the same magnitude as pleasure is a
good; but we have no reason whatever to assume that the Universe
is such that ethical truths must display this kind of symmetry: no
argument against my conclusion, that pleasure and pain do not thus
correspond, can have any weight whatever, failing a careful
examination of the instances which have led me to form it.
Nevertheless I am content that the results of this chapter should be
taken rather as illustrating the method which must be pursued in
answering the fundamental question of Ethics, and the principles
which must be observed, than as giving the correct answer to that
question. That things intrinsically good or bad are many and various;
that most of them are ‘organic unities,’ in the peculiar and definite
sense to which I have confined the term; and that our only means of
deciding upon their intrinsic value and its degree, is by carefully
distinguishing exactly what the thing is, about which we ask the
question, and then looking to see whether it has or has not the
unique predicate ‘good’ in any of its various degrees: these are the
conclusions, upon the truth of which I desire to insist. Similarly, in
my last chapter, with regard to the question ‘What ought we to do?’
I have endeavoured rather to shew exactly what is the meaning of
the question, and what difficulties must consequently be faced in
answering it, than to prove that any particular answers are true. And
that these two questions, having precisely the nature which I have
assigned to them, are the questions which it is the object of Ethics
to answer, may be regarded as the main result of the preceding
chapters. These are the questions which ethical philosophers have
always been mainly concerned to answer, although they have not
recognised what their question was—what predicate they were
asserting to attach to things. The practice of asking what things are
virtues or duties, without distinguishing what these terms mean; the
practice of asking what ought to be here and now, without
distinguishing whether as means or end—for its own sake or for that
of its results; the search for one single criterion of right or wrong,
without the recognition that in order to discover a criterion we must
first know what things are right or wrong; and the neglect of the
principle of ‘organic unities’—these sources of error have hitherto
been almost universally prevalent in Ethics. The conscious
endeavour to avoid them all, and to apply to all the ordinary objects
of ethical judgment these two questions and these only: Has it
intrinsic value? and Is it a means to the best possible?—this attempt,
so far as I know, is entirely new; and its results, when compared
with those habitual to moral philosophers, are certainly sufficiently
surprising: that to Common Sense they will not appear so strange, I
venture to hope and believe. It is, I think, much to be desired that
the labour commonly devoted to answering such questions as
whether certain ‘ends’ are more or less ‘comprehensive’ or more or
less ‘consistent’ with one another—questions, which, even if a
precise meaning were given to them, are wholly irrelevant to the
proof of any ethical conclusion—should be diverted to the separate
investigation of these two clear problems.
135. The main object of this chapter has been to define
roughly the class of things, among which we may expect to find
either great intrinsic goods or great intrinsic evils; and particularly to
point out that there is a vast variety of such things, and that the
simplest of them are, with one exception, highly complex wholes,
composed of parts which have little or no value in themselves. All of
them involve consciousness of an object, which is itself usually
highly complex, and almost all involve also an emotional attitude
towards this object; but, though they thus have certain
characteristics in common, the vast variety of qualities in respect of
which they differ from one another are equally essential to their
value: neither the generic character of all, nor the specific character
of each, is either greatly good or greatly evil by itself; they owe their
value or demerit, in each case, to the presence of both. My
discussion falls into three main divisions, dealing respectively (1)
with unmixed goods, (2) with evils, and (3) with mixed goods. (1)
Unmixed goods may all be said to consist in the love of beautiful
things or of good persons: but the number of different goods of this
kind is as great as that of beautiful objects, and they are also
differentiated from one another by the different emotions
appropriate to different objects. These goods are undoubtedly good,
even where the things or persons loved are imaginary; but it was
urged that, where the thing or person is real and is believed to be
so, these two facts together, when combined with the mere love of
the qualities in question, constitute a whole which is greatly better
than that mere love, having an additional value quite distinct from
that which belongs to the existence of the object, where that object
is a good person. Finally it was pointed out that the love of mental
qualities, by themselves, does not seem to be so great a good as
that of mental and material qualities together; and that, in any case,
an immense number of the best things are, or include, a love of
material qualities (113-123). (2) Great evils may be said to consist
either (a) in the love of what is evil or ugly, or (b) in the hatred of
what is good or beautiful, or (c) in the consciousness of pain. Thus
the consciousness of pain, if it be a great evil, is the only exception
to the rule that all great goods and great evils involve both a
cognition and an emotion directed towards its object (124-128). (3)
Mixed goods are those which include some element which is evil or
ugly. They may be said to consist either in hatred of what is ugly or
of evils of classes (a) and (b), or in compassion for pain. But where
they include an evil, which actually exists, its demerit seems to be
always great enough to outweigh the positive value which they
possess (129-133).
 INDEX.

Aesthetic
enjoyments 189-202, 203
judgment 215
temperament 216
Aesthetics 200
Affection
beauty of 204-5
misdirected 195, 198
reciprocal 198
value of 188-9, 203-5
Altruism 96-7, 167
Analytic judgments 7, 29, 33-4, 35, 220-1
Appreciation 189-90, 200, 204-5, 221
Approval 131
Approve 60
Approbation 171
Appropriate, inappropriate 192, 199, 204-5, 209, 211, 220
defined 190
Aristotle 4
definition of virtue 171
valuation of virtues 176-7
valuation of knowledge 199
Art
value of 188
representative, value of 193, 195, 196, 200
Autonomy 127
Bad 5, 27, 28, 95, 140, 143, 157, 178, 181, 188, 209, 210, 213, 214,
216, 218
‘Based on’ 38, 49, 54, 114, 115, 118, 120, 122, 144
Beauty
corporeal 203-4
no criterion of 202
definition of 201-2, 208
mental 203-5
‘seeing’ of 190-1
value of 28, 81-2, 83-5, 86, 94, 188-9, 201-2, 209, 211, 224
Being, dist. from existence 110-11
Belief, value of 193-200, 208, 210-11, 212, 219, 224-5
Benevolence, Sidgwick’s ‘principle of Rational’ 102-3
Bentham 145
naturalistic fallacy 17-19
quantity of pleasure 77-8
Bradley, F. H.
pleasure and desire 70
theory of judgment 125
Butler, Bishop 86, 206

Casuistry 4-5
Causal judgments
relation to Ethics 21-7, 36, 146-8, 149, 180
Causal relations 31-3, 34-6
Chastity 158
Classical style 215-16
Christ
on value of motives 178
on love 179
Christian Ethics 178
on ‘external’ rightness 177
on ‘internal’ rightness 178-9
on value of motives 177-9
on value of virtue 174
Clifford, W. K. 40
Cognition
of evil 217-19
dist. from knowledge 194
relation to will and feeling 129-30, 133, 135-6, 141
value of 85, 189-92, 194, 199, 208, 212, 224, 225
Commands, confused with moral laws 128-9, 141
Common sense 224
on value of pleasure 86, 91-2, 94-5
on duties 156-9
Compassion 217, 219, 220, 225
Conduct, relation of to Ethics 2-3, 146, 180
Conscience
defined 178
not infallible 149, 180
Conscientiousness 218
defined 179
utility of 180
Contempt 211, 217
Corporeal beauty 203-4
Courage 217
Crimes 161
Criterion
of beauty 202
evolution as 46, 50, 55-6
of goodness 137-8
pleasure as 91-2, 94-5, 108
of right and wrong 223
will as 137-8
of truth 133
Cruelty 209-11, 218

Darwin 47
Definition, nature of 6-9, 18-20
Desirable, meaning of 65-7, 73
Desire, cause and object of 68-70, 73-4
Duty
 = cause of or means to good 24-5, 105, 146-8, 167, 180, 223
fuller definitions of 148, 161, 180-1, 222
incapable of being known 149-50, 181
mainly negative 218
object of psychologicalintuition 148
relations to expediency 167-70, 181
interest 170-1, 181
possibility 150-2
rightness 148
utility 146-7, 167-70
virtue 172
will 160, 161
not self-evident 148, 181
self-regarding 168

Egoistic Hedonism 18
Egoism, as doctrine of end 18, 96-105, 109
contradiction of 99, 101-5, 109
relation to Hedonism 97-8
relation to Naturalistic Hedonism 104-5
Sidgwick’s ‘Rational’ 98-9, 102-4
Egoism, as doctrine of means 96-7, 105, 167
Emotion
aesthetic 190
value of 189-92, 199, 203, 204-5, 208, 209, 211, 212, 217, 224,
225
Empirical 39, 111, 123
Empiricism 103, 124-5, 130
End = effect 32
End = good in itself 18, 24, 64-6, 72, 73, 79-81, 83, 85, 94-5, 184,
216
dist. from ‘good as means’ 24, 72, 74, 79-81, 89, 90, 94-5, 106-
7, 173-4, 178, 216, 223
‘ultimate’ 51, 83, 85, 96-7, 99-102, 183, 189
‘never justifies means’ 147, 163
End = object of desire 68, 70, 71, 72
Enjoyment 77, 96, 188, 208
aesthetic 188-9, 203
of evil and ugly 208-11, 218
sexual 95
Envy 211
Epistemology 133, 140-1
Ethics
Evolutionistic 46, 50, 54, 58
Metaphysical 39, 58, 113-15
Naturalistic 39-41, 58, 59
Practical 115-18, 140, 146, 149, 151, 154, 180, 222
province of 1-6, 21, 24, 26-7, 36, 37, 77, 115, 118, 142-6, 184,
222-4
Eudaemonist 175
Evil 153, 156, 158, 160, 186, 193, 205, 207-14, 224, 225
mixed 208, 209, 211
positive value of 216-22, 225
Evolution 46-8, 54-8
Evolutionistic 46, 50, 52, 54, 58
Existence
dist. from being 110-12
judgments about 123-5
relation to value 115-18, 118-22, 125-6, 194, 196, 197-9, 206,
210, 216, 219, 220, 221, 225
Expediency 167-70, 181

Feeling
supposed analogy to cognition 129-31, 141
supposed bearing on Ethics 129-31, 141
Fiction 121-2
Freedom, value of 86, 186
Freedom (of Will) 127

God 82, 102-4

love of 113, 194, 195-6, 200
Good
 indefinable 6-16, 41, 79, 110-11, 142-4
= means to good 21, 24
the Absolute 183, 184, 186
the Human 183, 184, 186
mixed and unmixed 208, 209, 214, 215, 217, 219-20, 224
my own 97-9, 101, 170
‘private’ 99
the 8-9, 18
‘Universal’ 99-102
Will 174-5, 179 n. 2, 180
Green, T. H. 139
Guyau, M. 46

Habit 171, 175-6, 177

Hatred 211, 214
of beautiful and good 211, 217, 225
of evil and ugly 178, 217, 218, 220, 221, 225
Health 42-3, 65, 157, 167
Heaven 115, 174, 183, 185, 195
upon Earth 186
Hedonism 39, 52, 59-63, 90-1, 96, 108-9, 174
Egoistic 18
Ethical 70, 144
Intuitionistic 59, 74-6, 144
Naturalistic 46, 50, 53, 54, 68, 104, 105
Psychological 18, 68, 69, 70, 73
Universalistic 103
Hegel 30, 34, 110
Heteronomous 127
Higher 48-9, 78
Hobbes 97
Honesty 175-6
Hypothetical laws 22, 155

Ideal
three meanings of 183-4
 the 183, 185, 205-7, 220-1
Idealistic 130, 205
Imagination, value of 193, 194, 196, 197, 210, 219, 220, 221, 224
Imperative 128
Industry 157, 167
Intention 179 n. 1
Interest 102
meaning of 97-8, 106, 170-1
dist. from ‘duty’ 170-1, 181
Intrinsic
evil 207, 213, 218, 224
value 17, 21, 25-30, 36, 147, 173-7, 187, 189, 207, 214-16, 222-4
Intuition
= proposition incapable of proof 59, 77, 108
in psychological sense 75, 79, 85, 92, 108, 144, 148-9, 173
Intuitionism
in Sidgwick’s sense 59, 76, 144
in proper sense 106, 148

Judgment
error of 192-3
two types of ethical 21, 23-7, 115, 146, 148, 222, 224
Justice 178
Justify 97, 101, 147, 163

Kant 110, 129

‘Copernican revolution’ 133
value of Good Will 174-5, 179 n. 2, 180
value of Happiness 174-5
theory of judgment 125
‘Kingdom of Ends’ 113
‘practical love’ 179
connection of ‘goodness’ with ‘will’ 126-8
Knowledge
involves truth of object 132, 134
involves belief 194
 value of 82, 86, 194, 195, 196, 197, 199, 211, 221

Lasciviousness 209-10
Law
ethical 155
hypothetical 22, 155
legal 126, 128
moral 126-8, 146, 148, 160, 162, 165
natural 26, 29, 57, 126, 183, 186
scientific 22-3, 124, 155
Legal 126, 128
Leibniz 125
Life 15, 46, 50, 52, 156
Logical
dependence 61, 110, 118, 122, 139, 143-4
fallacy 140-1
Love
Christ and Kant on 179
of beautiful and good 177-9, 199, 204, 217, 224
of evil and ugly 209, 210, 211, 217, 225
Lucian 45
Lust 209-10, 218
Lying 154

Mackenzie, Prof. J. S. 114, 120

Material qualities, value of 204, 205-7, 221, 225
Matter, value of 205-7
Meaning, ‘to have no’ 31, 34-5
Means = cause or necessary condition 18, 21-3, 89, 180
dist. from ‘part of organic whole’ 27, 29-30, 32, 220
goodness as, dist. from intrinsic value 21, 24, 26, 27, 37, 72, 74,
79-81, 89, 90, 94-5, 106-7, 115, 118, 173-4, 178, 187, 195-6,
197-8, 216, 223
‘not justified by end’ 147, 163
Mental
beauty of 203-5, 225
 value of 205-7
Mercy 178
Metaphysical 39, 58, 110-15, 139-40
Method
of discovering intrinsic value 20, 36, 59-60, 64, 89, 91, 92, 93,
95, 142-5, 173, 185-6, 187-8, 195, 197-8, 206-7, 209, 223
of discovering value as means 22-3, 146, 148-54, 172-3
Mill, J. S. 145
Hedonism 63-81, 108
naturalistic fallacy 40, 66-7, 69, 72-3, 74, 104, 108
Psychological Hedonism 68, 72, 73-4
quality of pleasure 77-81, 108
Utilitarianism 104-5
Moral
approbation 171
law 126-8, 146, 148, 160, 162, 165
obligation 128
sentiment 168, 178, 217-19
Motive 67, 70, 177, 178-80
Murder 148, 151, 154, 156-7, 178

Natural
laws 26, 29, 57, 126, 183, 186
objects and properties 13-14, 39-41, 58, 110-11
selection 47
Natural = normal 42-4, 58
Natural = necessary 44-5, 58
Naturalism 20, 40, 58, 144
Naturalistic
Ethics 39-41, 58, 59
fallacy 10, 13-14, 18-20, 38-9, 48, 57, 58, 61, 64, 66-7, 69, 72-3,
74, 104, 108, 114, 118, 124, 125, 139, 173, 176, 201
Hedonism 46, 50, 53, 54, 68, 104, 105
Nature 40-1, 110, 111, 112
Nature, life according to 41-2, 113
Nature, value of 188, 193, 195, 200, 206
Necessity
analytic 22, 33-4, 35, 220, 221
causal or natural 29, 31-2, 34, 186, 187
New Testament 177, 178, 179

Object
of cognition 141, 191, 192, 193, 211
of desire 68-70
natural 13-14, 39-41, 58, 110-11
Objective 82, 201
Obligation
moral 103, 128, 147
Obligatory 25, 148, 170
Organic relation, unity, whole
common usage 30-6
my own usage 27-31, 32-3, 36, 93, 96, 149, 184, 187, 189, 190,
202, 206, 208, 212, 215, 220, 223
Ought
to aim at 24-6, 100
to do 26, 105, 115, 116, 117, 127, 128, 140, 146, 148, 173, 180,
223
to be or exist 17, 115, 118, 127, 128, 148, 173, 180, 223

Pain 64, 65, 210, 212-4, 217, 222-3, 225

Particular 3-4
Perception 111, 112, 134, 136
Pessimism 51, 53, 156
Plato
on Egoism 98
on goods 178
on Hedonism 88
on value of Knowledge 199
on universal truths 111
Pleasure 12-13, 16
consciousness of 87-91, 109, 212
as criterion 91-2, 108
 and desire 68-71, 73-4
and ‘pleasures’ 79
‘quality of’ 77-81
value of 39, 46, 50-4, 59-66, 71-2, 74-5, 79-81, 83, 85-96, 144,
146, 171, 173, 174, 188, 205, 212-14, 222-3
Pity 217, 221
Positive science 39
Possible action 150-1
Practical 216, 221
Ethics 115-18, 140, 146, 149, 151, 154, 180, 222
Philosophy 2
Practice 2, 20
Praise 171
Preference 77-9, 131
Promises 157
Property, respect of 157
Propositions, types of 123-6
Prove 11, 65, 66, 74, 75-7, 99, 112, 137, 141, 143, 145, 169, 181
Prudence 168
‘Maxim of’ 102-4
Psychological 11, 130, 140, 148
Hedonism 18, 68, 69, 70, 73
Punishment 164
retributive or vindictive 214, 215, 216, 221

Reason 143-4
Representative art 193
Reward 174
Right 18, 24-5, 105, 146, 180, 216, 218, 223
dist. from ‘duty’ 148
relation to expediency 167
externally 176-7
internally 179 n. 1
Romantic style 215-16
Rousseau 42
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