Risk-Return Analysis of Loan Portfolios
Risk-Return Analysis of Loan Portfolios
Javier Mencía
Documentos de Trabajo
N.º 0911
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ASSESSING THE RISK-RETURN TRADE-OFF IN LOANS PORTFOLIOS
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ASSESSING THE RISK-RETURN TRADE-OFF IN LOANS
PORTFOLIOS (*)
(*)
A previous version of this paper has been circulated under the title “Assessing the risk, return and efficiency of
banks’ loans portfolios”. This paper is the sole responsibility of its author. The views represented here do not
necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Spain. I am grateful to Max Bruche, Enrique Sentana and seminar audiences
at the Bank of Austria, Bank of Spain and CEMFI for their comments and suggestions. Special thanks are due to
Alfredo Martín, for his valuable suggestions as well as for his help with the interest rate database. Of course, the
usual caveat applies. Address for correspondence: Alcalá 48, E-28014 Madrid, Spain, tel: +34 91 338 5414,
fax: +34 91 338 6102.
(**)
[Link]@[Link].
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This paper analyses the risk and return of loans portfolios in a joint setting. I develop a model
to obtain the distribution of loans returns. I use this model to describe the investment op-
portunity set of lenders using mean-variance analysis with a Value at Risk constraint. I also
obtain closed form expressions for the interest rates that banks should set in compensation
for borrowers’ credit risk under absence of arbitrage opportunities and I use these rates as
a benchmark to interpret actual loans’ prices. Finally, I study the risk-return trade-off in an
empirical application to the Spanish banking system.
Keywords: Credit risk, Probability of default, Asset Pricing, Mean-Variance allocation, Sto-
chastic Discount Factor, Value at Risk.
2 General framework
Consider an economy with two periods: t = 0, 1. There is a risk-free asset, whose
return is r, and K different types of loans. These loans, which are risky because of the
presence of credit risk, may be interpreted as belonging to different economic sectors, or
just as a means of classifying borrowers with different characteristics (e.g.: corporates vs.
households). In each of these groups, there are Nk loans, for k = 1, · · · , K. I denote the
volume of loan i from group k as Lki , while rk will be the net interest rate required by
the lender at t = 1 for each loan type. Interest rates are set at t = 0.
I now turn to modelling borrowers’ credit risk. Borrowers may default at t = 1,
where default is driven by a binary variable Dki that takes a value of 1 if i defaults
and 0 otherwise. The probability of default of any loan from group k will be given by
the stochastic variable πk . In fact, πk is not even observable at t = 1 unless Nk grows to
infinity.1 In case of default, the lender will obtain a recovery rate δik , which is a proportion
1
Specifically, it can be shown that πk = limNk →∞ i Dik /Nk under standard regularity conditions. I
where
Nkt−1
pk = Ljk , (1)
j=1
denotes the outstanding debt of the k-th category of loans, for k = 1, · · · , K. One period
later, the pay-offs generated by each class of loans can be expressed as
Nk
Nk
Zk = (1 + rk ) Ljk (1 − Djk ) + δjk Ljk Djk . (2)
j=1 j=1
Intuitively, each borrower will either repay the principal plus interests or default, in which
case the lender will only receive the recovery rate times the outstanding amount.
From (1) and (2), it is straightforward to write the return or yield generated by loans
from group k as:
Zk − p k
yk = ,
pk
Nk
j=1 (1 + rk − δjk )Ljk Djk
= rk − , (3)
Nk L̄k
where
Nk
1
L̄k = Ljk .
Nk j=1
Hence, the expected return obtained by the lender may in practice differ from the required
interest rate rk because of the presence of credit risk. Specifically, this value will be smaller
than rk under a positive expected loss given default, which is realised with expected
probability E(πk ). This is a well known feature (see e.g. Feder, 1980). In addition, the
correlation between probabilities of default and recovery rates also affects the expected
return. For instance, a negative correlation would yield a further reduction in expected
returns, since recoveries would then be smaller in bad times, which is precisely when
probabilities of default are higher.
πk = Φ(xk ), (5)
where θ is a vector of p free parameters, and µ(θ) and Σ(θ) are, respectively, the mean
and covariance matrix of x. Interestingly, despite the flexibility of this framework, it is
still possible to derive general closed form expressions for the moments of (5):
E(πk πj ) = ωkj
µ µj σkj
= Φ2 √ k , , (8)
1 + σkk 1 + σjj (1 + σkk )(1 + σjj )
where E(πk ), E(πj ) and ωkj are defined in (7) and (8).
ω y > τ0 . (9)
This constraint ensures that banks will obtain a return higher than τ0 , which may be
necessary to comply with the minimum capital required by the regulator. For instance, if
(9) is violated, the bank may have to raise additional funds. Alternatively, if it is targeting
a high rating, it may need to satisfy an even more restrictive minimum capital requirement.
In general, though, it cannot be ensured that (9) will hold with probability 1. Hence, I
will set the minimum probability 1 − α with which (9) must hold, which is equivalent to
specifying a maximum admissible VaR. Notice that the higher this confidence level is the
more I will restrict the set of admissible portfolios.
In sum, this maximisation problem can be expressed in the following terms:
such that
ω E(y) = µ0 , (11)
ω ι = 1, (13)
and
0 ≤ ωk ≤ 1, k = 1, · · · , K, (14)
where ι is a vector of K ones. I have introduced (13) and (14) to ensure that banks can
neither short sell nor leverage their investments. If I allow for the presence of a risk-free
asset, I do not need to impose (13). In this case, the mean-standard deviation frontier
would be the straight line that is tangent to the frontier without a risk-free asset and
intercepts the zero standard deviation axis at the risk-free rate return.
Following Sentana (2003), this problem can be decomposed in two simpler ones. First,
the region described by the VaR constraint (12) can be analysed separately by Monte
Proposition 3 Consider K portfolios of loans whose returns are given by (3) for k =
1, · · · , K. Then,
V (yk ) = (1/gk ) E (1 + rk − δk ψik )2 E(πk ) − (1 + rk − E(δk ))2 ωkk
and
for k = j, where
Nk 2
i=1 Lik
gk = Nk 2 . (17)
i=1 Lik
Therefore, both the variances and covariances depend on the moments of recovery
rates and probabilities of default. In the case of the variances, (15) is the sum of two
components. The first one is proportional to the reciprocal of (17), which can be inter-
preted as a granularity parameter. For any finite number of loans, (17) will always be
finite. However, if I let Nk grow to infinity while the size of the loans remains bounded,
i.e.
sup{Lik , 0 ≤ i ≤ Nk } ≤ Lk+ < ∞,
then it can be shown that gk will tend to infinity and the first term in (15) will disappear.
Therefore, gk increases as granularity grows to infinity. Thus, the first component in
(15) comprises a diversifiable risk that can be reduced by just increasing the number of
borrowers in the portfolio. This risk essentially captures what is usually known as “jump
to default” risk (see e.g. Collin-Dufresne et al., 2003).
In practice, banks might not be able to place their loans portfolios on the mean-
variance frontier, since their lending business is constrained by several restrictions. To
For the sake of brevity, I will refer to these portfolios as portfolios 1 and 2. It is not clear
a priory which of them is safer. On the one hand, the first type of assets have a expected
probability of default of 5%, while this value is only 2.5% for the second type of assets.
On the other hand, the behaviour of category 2 is more volatile, since the variance of x2
is ten times larger than the variance of x1 . Figure 1 shows the effect of granularity on the
standard deviations of portfolios 1 and 2. Both portfolios have high standard deviations
for small granularity, because the smaller the granularity, the higher the idiosyncratic
risk. However, portfolio 1 is riskier for small granularity due to its higher unconditional
probability of default. Introducing more loans in each portfolio can reduce their risk. This
reduction is smaller for portfolio 2, since the high standard deviation of x2 dominates over
the larger expected probability of default of 1 as the portfolios become more granular.
For infinite granularity, only the undiversifiable risk remains, which is again higher for x2 .
Figure 2 shows the mapping between the underlying correlation parameter ρ and
the correlation between the returns of portfolios 1 and 2. For very small granularity,
the correlation is approximately zero regardless of ρ, because most of the risk is purely
idiosyncratic in this case. In more granular portfolios, though, ρ becomes increasingly
informative about the return correlation. Eventually, it approximately corresponds to the
actual return correlation on infinitely granular portfolios (g → ∞).
where M is the SDF. The SDF can be related to the marginal rate of substitution between
t = 0 and t = 1 in equilibrium models (see e.g. Gourieroux and Monfort, 2007). Pricing
assets with an SDF is equivalent to working under a different statistical measure Q in
which agents are risk-neutral. Under this new measure, (19) becomes
1
p= E Q (Z). (20)
1+r
Notice that, in the particular case in which the SDF is constant, the actual and the
risk-neutral measures will coincide.
where ν0 and ν 1 are, respectively, a positive scalar and a K × 1 vector. The exponential
structure ensures that the SDF is always positive, which in turn guarantees the absence of
arbitrage opportunities (see e.g. Cochrane, 2001, chapter 4). In addition, this specification
corresponds to the Esscher transform used in insurance (see Esscher, 1932), as well as in
derivative pricing models (Bertholon, Monfort, and Pegoraro, 2003; León, Mencı́a, and
Sentana, 2007). As Gourieroux and Monfort (2007) argue, the SDF of several important
equilibrium models, such as the consumption based CAPM, can be expressed with this
structure. I can also obtain the distribution of x under the risk-neutral measure from the
following result.
Proposition 4 Let the SDF be given by (22). Then, the distribution of x under the
risk-neutral measure Q is multivariate Gaussian with mean vector
Therefore, as in other financial applications (see e.g. Black and Scholes, 1973), I only
have to modify the mean of x to change the measure, whereas the covariance matrix
µk + ν 1 σ •k
E Q (πk ) = Φ √ , (24)
1 + σkk
where σ •k is the k-th column of Σ(θ). In consequence, arbitrage-free spreads are the
result of a combination of data-based information and preference-based factors. To begin
with, they depend on variables from the actual probability measure, such as the recovery
rates or the parameters of the actual probability of default. All these parameters are
specific of each category of loans, except for σ •k , which captures the covariance of the
credit risk of loans from a given type k with the remaining groups. However, the impact
of σ •k on E Q (πk ) depends on ν 1 , which reflects the consensus of the market about how
to map systematic credit risk into prices. As already mentioned, these coefficients are
closely related to the utility preferences of the agents, and in particular to their marginal
rate of intertemporal substitution.
6 Empirical application
I consider an empirical application to the Spanish banking system. I distribute loans
in three categories: corporate, consumption loans and mortgages. Although the empir-
ical evidence suggests that loans from different economic sectors may not have the same
exposures to common shocks (see Jiménez and Mencı́a, 2009), I aggregate all corporate
loans into just one group due to the absence of data about discrepancies between interest
rates across economic sectors.
I use data from the Spanish credit register to estimate the distribution of the probab-
ilities of default. This database has information about every loan with a volume above
e6,000. Since this threshold is very small, I can safely assume that the data is represent-
ative of the whole banking system. There are two variables in the database that are of
particular interest for this paper.2 In particular, I will obtain the volumes of the existing
2
See Jiménez and Saurina (2004) and Jiménez, Salas, and Saurina (2006) for a thorough description
where µ, α, β and γ are k × 1 vectors, diag(α) yields a diagonal matrix whose diagonal
terms are given by α, ft is a latent factor such that
ft = ϕft−1 + 1 − ϕνt ,
while εt and νt are independent standard Gaussian vectors. Hence, correlations in this
model are driven by a common latent factor that may have time series autocorrelation.
In this way, I can account for two important stylised facts: persistence in default rates
and correlation between the rates of default from different categories. Therefore, this
model provides an equilibrium between flexibility in the time series and cross-sectional
correlation structures and parsimony in terms of the number of parameters employed.
Figure 4a shows the historical evolution of default frequencies. The three series display
a highly cyclical pattern, although corporate loans seem to be the category that was more
sensitive to the 1993 recession. Corporate loans are also the category with higher default
rates at the 2008 crisis. Table 1 shows the maximum likelihood parameter estimates of
of the database.
3
This estimation approach relies on the property that πkt can be recovered from default rates if Nkt is
sufficiently large (see footnote 1). This is a reasonable approximation in this case because I am considering
the whole loans portfolio of Spanish banks. Hence, I have about one million loans on average in each
group.
Altman, E., B. Brady, A. Resti, and A. Sironi (2005). The link between default and
recovery rates: theory, empirical evidence and implications. Journal of Business 78,
2203–2227.
Behr, A., A. Kamp, C. Memmel, and A. Pfingsten (2007). Diversification and the banks’
risk-return-characteristics - Evidence from loan portfolios of German banks. Deutsche
Bundesbank Discussion Paper No. 05/2007.
Bertholon, H., A. Monfort, and F. Pegoraro (2003). Pricing and inference with mixtures
of conditionally normal processes. Mimeo CREST.
Black, F. and M. Scholes (1973). The pricing of options and corporate liabilities. Journal
of Political Economy 81, 637–655.
Collin-Dufresne, P., R. S. Goldstein, and J. Helwege (2003). Is credit event risk priced?
Modeling contagion via the updating of beliefs. mimeo, Carnegie Mellon University.
Embrechts, P., R. Frey, and A. J. McNeil (2005). Quantitative risk management: concepts,
techniques and tools. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Esscher, F. (1932). On the probability function in the collective theory of risk. Skand-
inavisk Aktuariedskrift 15, 165–195.
Fama, E. F. and J. D. MacBeth (1973). Risk, return and equilibrium: empirical tests.
Journal of Political Economy 81, 607–636.
Feder, G. (1980). A note on debt, assets and lending. Journal of Financial and Quantit-
ative Analysis 15, 191–200.
Gimeno, R. and J. M. Marqués (2008). Uncertainty and the price of risk in a nominal
convergence process. Banco de España Working Paper 0802.
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performance of German banks? Evidence from individual bank loan portfolios. Journal
of Financial Services Research 32, 123–140.
Jiménez, G. and J. Mencı́a (2009). Modeling the distribution of credit losses with observ-
able and latent factors. Journal of Empirical Finance 16, 235–253.
Jiménez, G. and J. Saurina (2004). Collateral, type of lender and relationship banking as
determinants of credit risk. Journal of Banking and Finance 28, 2191–2212.
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Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 39, 2021–2040.
Mueller, P. (2008). Credit spreads and real activity. mimeo, Columbia Business School.
Proposition 6 Let Φ(·) be the cdf of the standard normal distribution. Then, if f, z1 , z2
are independent standard normal variables,
2
a1 a2 2
bi
E Φ (ai + bi f + ci zi ) = Φ2 2 2
, 2 2
;
2 2
(A2)
i=1 1 + b 1 + c 1 1 + b 2 + c 2 i=1 1 + b i + c i
where Φ2 (p1 , p2 | ρ) is the cdf of a bivariate normal distribution with zero means, unit
variances and correlation ρ.
Proposition 7 Let Φ(·) be the cdf of the standard normal distribution. Then, if x ∼
N (µ, σ 2 ),
1 2 2 µ + aσ 2
E[exp(ax)Φ(x)] = exp a σ + µa Φ √ (A3)
2 1 + σ2
B Proofs of propositions
Proposition 1
Let us first consider (7). Since xt satisfies (6), I can always express πkt as
√
πkt = Φ(µkt + σkkt εkt ), (B4)
where εkt is a standard normal variable. Then, I can easily obtain (7) from Proposition
5.
As for (8), I can use the properties of the Gaussian distribution to express πjt as
⎡ ⎤
σkjt σkkt σjjt − σkjt
2
πjt = Φ ⎣µjt + √ εkt + εjt ⎦ , (B5)
σkkt σkkt
where εjt is independent of εkt . Hence, from Proposition 6, I can show that the expected
value of the product of (B4) and (B5) satisfies the required result.
I can easily compute the remaining cross moment by exploiting the conditional independ-
ence Dkit and Djit given πkt and πjt :
E(Dkit Djit |It−1 ) = E[E(Dkit |πkt , πjt , It−1 )E(Djit |πkt , πjt , It−1 )|It−1 ],
Proposition 3
V [ykt |It−1 ; θ] = E [V [ykt |πkt , It−1 ; θ]|It−1 ; θ] + V [E[ykt |πkt , It−1 ; θ]|It−1 ; θ] , (B6)
where
Hence, (15) follows directly from introducing the results of Proposition 1 in (B6). Sim-
ilarly, I can also exploit the law of iterated expectations to express cov[ykt , yjt |It−1 ; θ]
as
+cov [E[ykt |πkt , πjt , It−1 ; θ], E[yjt |πkt , πjt , It−1 ; θ]|It−1 ; θ] ,
where
cov[ykt , yjt |πkt , πjt , It−1 ; θ] = 0
cov [E[ykt |πkt , πjt , It−1 ; θ], E[yjt |πkt , πjt , It−1 ; θ]|It−1 ; θ] = (1 + rkt − δk0 )(1 + rjt − δj0 )
If I introduce (22) and (B8) in (B7), it is straightforward to show the required result when
I substitute ν0t for
Proposition 5
where φ(·) is the pdf of the standard normal distribution. By means of the change of
variable t = s − bz, I can obtain
∞ a+bz ∞ a
φ (s) φ(x)dsdx = φ (t + bz) φ(z)dtdz.
−∞ −∞ −∞ −∞
It is straightforward to show that φ (t + bz) φ(z) is the pdf of the bivariate normal distri-
bution:
z 0 1 −b
∼N ; .
t 0 −b 1 + b2
This proves the result.
Proposition 6
By means of the changes of variables ti = si 1 + c2i − bi f , for i = 1, 2, I rewrite (B10) as
∞ a1 a2
t1 + b1 f t2 + b2 f
φ φ φ(f )dt1 dt2 df
−∞ −∞ −∞ 1 + c21 1 + c22
It can be shown that this is the integral of the pdf of the following trivariate distribution:
⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎤
f 0 1 −b1 −b2
⎣ t1 ⎦ ∼ N ⎣⎝ 0 ⎠ ; ⎝ −b1 1 + b21 + c21 b1 b2 ⎠⎦ .
t2 0 −b2 b1 b2 2 2
1 + b2 + c2
Proposition 7
where Pr[ω t yt > τ0 |It−1 ; θ] is estimated for each ω t by computing the proportion of times
that M replications of the DGP of ω t yt given It−1 is above τ0 . I use M = 100000 in the
empirical application.
Model:
Notes: Two asterisks indicate significance at the 5% level. xt are probit transformed default frequencies
for the whole Spanish banking system, where εt ∼ N (0, I3 ) and νt ∼ N (0, 1) are iid independent variables.
1.2
Loans type 1
Loans type 2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0 1 2 3 4
10 10 10 10 10
Granularity Parameter
Notes: Example based on two types of loans whose defaults are conditionally independent given the evolution of
their respective probabilities of default π1t = Φ(x1t ) and π2t = Φ(x2t ), where
√ √
x1t Φ−1 (0.05) √ 1.01 √0.01 ρ 0.001
xt = ∼ N ; .
x2t Φ−1 (0.025) 1.1 ρ 0.001 0.1
0.8 Granularity=1
Granularity=10
0.6 Granularity=100
Granularity=1000
0.4
Granularity=∞
0.2
−0.2
−0.4
−0.6
−0.8
−1
−1 −0.8 −0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
ρ
Notes: Example based on two types of loans whose defaults are conditionally independent given the evolution of
their respective probabilities of default π1t = Φ(x1t ) and π2t = Φ(x2t ), where
√ √
x1t Φ−1 (0.05) √ 1.01 √0.01 ρ 0.001
xt = ∼ N ; .
x2t Φ−1 (0.025) 1.1 ρ 0.001 0.1
4.9
Portfolio 2
ρ=0
4.8 ρ=.4
ρ=.8
4.7
4.6
Mean
4.5
4.4
4.3
4.2
Portfolio 1
4.1
0.05 0.1 0.15
Standard Deviation
Notes: Infinite granularity. Two types of loans whose defaults are conditionally independent given the evolution of
their respective probabilities of default π1t = Φ(x1t ) and π2t = Φ(x2t ), where
√ √
x1t Φ−1 (0.05) √ 1.01 √0.01 ρ 0.001
xt = ∼ N ; .
x2t Φ−1 (0.025) 1.1 ρ 0.001 0.1
Interest rates are r1 = 4.5% and r2 = 5% for the first and second types of loans, respectively.
1.5
0.5
0
Dec84 Sep87 Jun90 Mar93 Dec95 Sep98 May01 Feb04 Nov06
12
10
2
Jun90 Mar93 Dec95 Sep98 May01 Feb04 Nov06
BANCO DE ESPAÑA
′
39
Pr(w yt−r>0)=99.9% Pr(w′ yt−r>0)=99.9%
2 2
cons
1.5 1.5
mort
1 1
µ0−r
µ0−r
0.5 0.5 mort
corp
−0.5 −0.5
−1 −1
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
σ0 σ0
mort
1 mort 1
µ0−r
µ0−r
0.5 0.5
corp
−0.5 −0.5
−1 −1 corp
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
σ0 σ0
Notes: Excess returns with respect to the Spanish treasury rates. A star denotes the situation of the Spanish aggregate loans portfolio at the four periods.
“corp”, “cons” and “mort” denote corporate loans, consumption loans and mortgages, respectively. 100,000 simulations have been employed to estimate
the the border of the area that yields positive returns with 99.9% probability.
Figure 6a: Risk vs. expected returns (%)
16
199012
199112
14
199212
199312
12
199412
199512
10
199612
µ0
8 199712
199812
199912
200012
6 200112
200212
200312 200712 200812
4 200612
200412
200512
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
σ0
Figure 6b: Risk vs. expected excess returns (%)
3
199112
199812
2.5 199712 199312
199912 199412
2
199212
µ0−r
1.5 199612
200112
200212
200312
1 200012
200512 199012
200712
0.5 200412
200812
200612
199512
0
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
σ0
Note: for the sake of clarity, only the fourth quarter of each year is plotted in the figures.
6 2
4 1
2 0
Jun90 Mar93 Dec95 Sep98 May01 Feb04 Nov06 Jun90 Mar93 Dec95 Sep98 May01 Feb04 Nov06
(c) Consumption. Interest rates (d) Consumption. Spread over treasury rates
20 8
Data Data
18 Arbitrage−free closest fit 7 Arbitrage−free closest fit
16
6
14
5
12
4
10
3
8
6 2
4 1
2 0
Jun90 Mar93 Dec95 Sep98 May01 Feb04 Nov06 Jun90 Mar93 Dec95 Sep98 May01 Feb04 Nov06
(e) Mortgages. Interest rates (f) Mortgages. Spread over treasury rates
20 8
Data Data
18 Arbitrage−free closest fit 7 Arbitrage−free closest fit
16
6
14
5
12
4
10
3
8
6 2
4 1
2 0
Jun90 Mar93 Dec95 Sep98 May01 Feb04 Nov06 Jun90 Mar93 Dec95 Sep98 May01 Feb04 Nov06
Notes: The arbitrage-free rates have been obtained from an exponentially affine stochastic discount factor whose
parameters minimise the sum of square errors between the model based rates and the actual ones.
2.5
1.5
0.5
0
0 0.05 0.1 0.15
σ0
2.5
1.5
0.5
0
0 0.05 0.1 0.15
σ0
Notes: The solid line indicates the envelope of all the quarterly investment opportunity sets in mean-standard
deviation space implied by the pricing model.
WORKING PAPERS1
1. Previously published Working Papers are listed in the Banco de España publications catalogue.
Unidad de Publicaciones
Alcalá, 522; 28027 Madrid
Telephone +34 91 338 6363. Fax +34 91 338 6488
e-mail: publicaciones@[Link]
[Link]
The document uses empirical evidence from Spanish loans, analyzing quarterly data from the Spanish credit register between 1984.Q4 and 2008.Q4. It applies a dynamic probit model to estimate probabilities of default and obtains granularity measures for empirical loan portfolios. The document further evaluates deviations of actual mean-variance frontiers from those expected in an arbitrage-free setting, illustrating the model's practical application through historical mean-variance analysis .
The document suggests that while theoretical interest rate spreads above the risk-free rate should be determined by risk-adjusted probabilities of default and expected recovery rates, the market power of banks can cause significant deviations from these theoretical spreads. This market power allows banks to influence actual mean-variance frontiers, potentially achieving higher expected returns in certain market conditions .
The document's model incorporates stochastic variables by representing default probabilities with a dynamic probit model linked to a multivariate Gaussian vector of state variables. This approach allows the model to account for systematic risk factors and correlate them with default outcomes. Furthermore, recovery rates are treated as stochastic by including both systematic components, common across loan categories, and idiosyncratic components for individual loans .
The model derives closed form expressions for loan pricing under the condition of no arbitrage. It requires that the interest rate spreads over the risk-free rate are functions of the risk-adjusted probabilities of default, expected recovery rates, and covariance between default probabilities and recovery rates. An exponentially affine stochastic discount factor is used to ensure the absence of arbitrage by aligning model-based rates with actual spreads .
The document characterizes the risk-neutral measure in loan pricing by utilizing an exponentially affine stochastic discount factor (SDF). This approach fully characterizes the risk-neutral measure as one deriving from a Gaussian distribution with the same covariance matrix as the actual distribution but different means. This transformation into a risk-neutral measure allows the models to accurately price loans under the condition of risk-adjusted returns that reflect true economic risks .
In the model, portfolio granularity affects the diversification of risk. The variance of returns in the model can be decomposed into diversifiable and non-diversifiable risk, where the diversifiable component can be minimized by increasing the granularity of the portfolio. This means that by having a larger number of loans in the portfolio, the impact of individual defaults is reduced, leading to lower overall portfolio risk .
The model employs mean-variance analysis to evaluate bank loan portfolios by first obtaining closed form expressions for expected returns, variances, and covariances among different loans. The analysis then uses the mean-variance framework, as established by Markowitz (1952), to determine a set of efficient portfolios. This is done through the computation of mean-variance frontiers to examine the historical evolution of expected values and loan return standard deviations. Additionally, it introduces a constraint using Value at Risk (VaR) to account for regulatory requirements, which impacts the investment opportunity set on the mean-variance space .
The document describes a method to model default probabilities as a stochastic variable expressed through a dynamic probit model applied to a multivariate Gaussian vector of state variables. These probabilities are further adjusted with recovery rates, which are modeled with a systematic component common to all loans in a category and an idiosyncratic component. This approach allows the model to capture the correlation between different categories of loans and their associated default and recovery characteristics .
The document proposes that future research could explore the effect of macroeconomic variables on the mean-variance frontier. This would involve extending the analysis to understand how changes in macroeconomic conditions might impact the risk-return trade-offs of loan portfolios, providing a deeper insight into the dynamics of lending practices across different economic cycles .
The document concludes that mortgages in the Spanish banking system represent the safest category of loans but yield lower returns compared to other categories. Conversely, corporate loans are identified as riskier and more sensitive to economic fluctuations, such as recessions. The analysis using the model suggests that the risk-return profiles of loans are heavily influenced by the underlying economic environment .