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UNIT-3
SECURITY MODEL-2
3.1 BELL–LAPADULA MODEL:
The Bell–LaPadula Model (abbreviated BLP) is a state
machine model used for enforcing access control in government and military
applications. It was developed by David Elliott Bell and Leonard J. LaPadula,
subsequent to strong guidance from Roger R. Schell to formalize the U.S. Department
of Defence (DoD) multilevel security (MLS) policy. The model is a formal state
transition model of computer security policy that describes a set of access control
rules which use security labels on objects and clearances for subjects. Security labels
range from the most sensitive (e.g."Top Secret"), down to the least sensitive (e.g.,
"Unclassified" or "Public").
The Bell–LaPadula model is an example of a model where there is no clear distinction
of protection and security
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FEATURES: The Bell–LaPadula model focuses on data confidentiality and
controlled access to classified information, in contrast to the Biba Integrity Model
which describes rules for the protection of data integrity. In this formal model, the
entities in an information system are divided into subjects and objects. The notion of a
"secure state" is defined, and it is proven that each state transition preserves security
by moving from secure state to secure state, thereby inductively proving that the
system satisfies the security objectives of the model. The Bell–LaPadula model is
built on the concept of a state machine with a set of allowable states in a computer
network system. The transition from one state to another state is defined by transition
functions.
A system state is defined to be "secure" if the only permitted access modes of subjects
to objects are in accordance with a security policy. To determine whether a specific
access mode is allowed, the clearance of a subject is compared to the classification of
the object (more precisely, to the combination of classification and set of
compartments, making up the security level) to determine if the subject is authorized
for the specific access mode. The clearance/classification scheme is expressed in
terms of a lattice. The model defines two mandatory access control (MAC) rules and
one discretionary access control (DAC) rule with three security properties:
i. The Simple Security Property - a subject at a given security level may not read
an object at a higher security level (no read-up).
ii. The ★-property (read "star"-property) - a subject at a given security level
must not write to any object at a lower security level (no write-down).
iii. The Discretionary Security Property - use of an access matrix to specify the
discretionary access control.
The transfer of information from a high-sensitivity document to a lower-sensitivity
document may happen in the Bell–LaPadula model via the concept of trusted subjects.
Trusted Subjects are not restricted by the ★-property. Untrusted subjects are. Trusted
Subjects must be shown to be trustworthy with regard to the security policy. This
security model is directed toward access control and is characterized by the phrase:
"no read up, no write down." Compare the Biba model, the Clark-Wilson model and
the Chinese Wall model.
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With Bell-LaPadula, users can create content only at or above their own security level
(i.e. secret researchers can create secret or top-secret files but may not create public
files; no write-down). Conversely, users can view content only at or below their own
security level (i.e. secret researchers can view public or secret files, but may not view
top-secret files; no read-up).
The Bell–LaPadula model explicitly defined its scope. It did not treat the following
extensively:
i. Covert channels. Passing information via pre-arranged actions was described
briefly.
ii. Networks of systems. Later modeling work did address this topic.
iii. Policies outside multilevel security. Work in the early 1990s showed that MLS
is one version of boolean policies, as are all other published policies.
Strong ★ Property
The Strong ★ Property is an alternative to the ★-Property, in which subjects may
write to objects with only a matching security level. Thus, the write-up operation
permitted in the usual ★-Property is not present, only a write-to-same operation. The
Strong ★ Property is usually discussed in the context of multilevel database
management systems and is motivated by integrity concerns.[6] This Strong ★
Property was anticipated in the Biba model where it was shown that strong integrity in
combination with the Bell–LaPadula model resulted in reading and writing at a single
level.
TRANQUILITY PRINCIPLE:
The tranquility principle of the Bell–LaPadula model states
that the classification of a subject or object does not change while it is being
referenced. There are two forms to the tranquility principle: the "principle of strong
tranquility" states that security levels do not change during the normal operation of
the system. The "principle of weak tranquility" states that security levels may never
change in such a way as to violate a defined security policy. Weak tranquility is
desirable as it allows systems to observe the principle of least privilege. That is,
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processes start with a low clearance level regardless of their owners clearance, and
progressively accumulate higher clearance levels as actions require it.
LIMITATIONS:
i. Only addresses confidentiality, control of writing (one form of integrity), ★-
property and discretionary access control
ii. Covert channels are mentioned but are not addressed comprehensively
iii. The tranquility principle limits its applicability to systems where security
levels do not change dynamically. It allows controlled copying from high to
low via trusted subjects.
2.2 THE BIBA MODEL:
The Biba Model or Biba Integrity Model developed by
Kenneth J. Biba in 1977,[1] is a formal state transition system of computer
security policy that describes a set of access control rules designed to ensure
data integrity. Data and subjects are grouped into ordered levels of integrity.
The model is designed so that subjects may not corrupt objects in a level
ranked higher than the subject, or be corrupted by objects from a lower level
than the subject.
In general the model was developed to circumvent a weakness in the Bell–
LaPadula model which only addresses data confidentiality.
FEATURES:
` In general, preservation of data integrity has three goals:
i. Prevent data modification by unauthorized parties
ii. Prevent unauthorized data modification by authorized parties
iii. Maintain internal and external consistency (i.e. data reflects the real
world)
This security model is directed toward data integrity (rather than
confidentiality) and is characterized by the phrase: "no read down, no write
up". This is in contrast to the Bell-LaPadula model which is characterized by
the phrase "no write down, no read up".
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In the Biba model, users can only create content at or below
their own integrity level (a monk may write a prayer book that can be read by
commoners, but not one to be read by a high priest). Conversely, users can
only view content at or above their own integrity level (a monk may read a
book written by the high priest, but may not read a pamphlet written by a
lowly commoner). Another analogy to consider is that of the military chain of
command. A General may write orders to a Colonel, who can issue these
orders to a Major. In this fashion, the General's original orders are kept intact
and the mission of the military is protected (thus, "no read down" integrity).
Conversely, a Private can never issue orders to his
Sergeant, who may never issue orders to a Lieutenant, also protecting the
integrity of the mission ("no write up").
The Biba model defines a set of security rules similar to the
Bell-LaPadula model. These rules are the reverse of the Bell-LaPadula rules:
i. The Simple Integrity Axiom states that a subject at a given level of
integrity must not read an object at a lower integrity level (no read
down).
ii. The * (star) Integrity Axiom states that a subject at a given level of
integrity must not write to any object at a higher level of integrity (no
write up).
SEA VIEW MODEL
The Sea View formal security policy model admits a range of
designs for a multilevel secure relational database system. The requirement for a near-
term implementation suggests that the design should utilize existing technology to the
extent possible. Thus the design uses an existing database management system ported
to an existing TCB (trusted computing base) environment. A pre processor translates
key constructs of the Sea View multilevel relational data model to those of the
standard relational model used by the commercial database system. The underlying
reference monitor enforces mandatory and basic discretionary controls with A1
assurance. By combining single-level data into a multilevel view, it is possible to use
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a commercial database system and classify data at the relation level to implement the
Sea View model, with element-level classification.
In Sea View the design approach is built on the notion of a
reference monitor for mandatory security. Sea View provides the user with the basic
abstraction of a multilevel relation in which the individual data elements are
individually classified. This design approach implements multilevel relations as views
stored over single level relations, transparent to the user. The single-level relations are
stored in segments managed by an underlying mandatory reference monitor. This
underlying mandatory reference monitor performs a label comparison for subjects and
the segments for which they request access, to decide whether to grant access. The
access class of any particular data element in a multilevel relation is derived from the
access class of the single-level relation in which the data element is stored, which in
turn matches the access class of the segment in which it is stored, which is known to
the reference monitor. Thus, labels for each individual data element do not have to be
stored, as was supposed prior to Sea View
In Sea View, every database function is carried out by a
single-level subject. Thus, a database system subject, when operating on behalf of a
user, cannot gain access to any data whose classification is not dominated by the
user's clearance. The use of only single-level subjects for routine database operations
provides the greatest degree of security possible and considerably reduces the risk of
disclosure of sensitive data. This approach means that there must be at least one
database server instance for each active access class. Thus, the database system
consists of multiple database server instances that share the same logical database.
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