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Understanding Pre-Existing Duty in Contracts

This document discusses the doctrine of consideration as it relates to pre-existing duties from contracts or legal obligations. It examines three sources of pre-existing duties: 1) from a contract with a third party, 2) from a contract with the subsequent promisor, and 3) from legal obligations generally. For pre-existing duties from a third party contract, modern case law establishes that performing or promising to perform such a duty can constitute valid consideration. For general legal obligations, courts typically require something beyond the pre-existing duty to find consideration.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
603 views4 pages

Understanding Pre-Existing Duty in Contracts

This document discusses the doctrine of consideration as it relates to pre-existing duties from contracts or legal obligations. It examines three sources of pre-existing duties: 1) from a contract with a third party, 2) from a contract with the subsequent promisor, and 3) from legal obligations generally. For pre-existing duties from a third party contract, modern case law establishes that performing or promising to perform such a duty can constitute valid consideration. For general legal obligations, courts typically require something beyond the pre-existing duty to find consideration.

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Mahdi Bin Mamun
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© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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  • Pre-existing Duty with Third Party
  • Pre-existing Duty in Law

Pre-existing duties 171

further cautioned about the seriousness of their agreement at the modification stage.
There seem to be great dangers which may attend the use of consideration as a 'signal'
to the courts. It has been observed that.72
the consideration signal produced by a party of superior bargaining power can be a
smokescreen for overreaching, often accepted by the courts as conclusive proof that the
agreement should be enforced.

The law relating to contractual modifications comprises several legal doctrines of which
the pre-existing duty doctrine of consideration is only one. The proper policies to be
pursued by the law of contractual modifications are developed in Chapter 12. This
discussion is intended only to emphasise the point that the doctrine of consideration
functions very differently in different contexts.
We will now examine two of the sources of pre-existing obligations. The third source
of pre-existing duty is a contract with the subsequent promisor which raises issues of
contractual modification rather than formation and so is examined in Chapter 12. When
considering pre-existing duties it is useful to bear in mind a further distinction between
factual and legal definitions of consideration. A factual definition of consideration
emphasises the fact of benefit or detriment that may result from the mere performance
of the pre-existing duty. A legal definition of consideration requires something in excess
of the pre-existing legal duty.

The pre-existing duty arises from a contract with a third party


Three cases decided in the 1860s are said to support the proposition that the act of
performing a contractual duty owed to a third party can constitute good
consideration.
The cases are not wholly satisfactory74 and a flavour of this can be obtained by looking
at one: Shadwell v Shadwell. This involved an uncle's promise to his nephew to 'make
up' his earnings to a given level in view of his intended marriage. At the time a promise
to marry was legally enforceable75 and so the consideration provided by the nephew
was the performance of an act he was already obliged to do under the terms of a
contract with a third party (his fiancée). Erle CJ and Keating J held that the nephew
provided good consideration but did so without reference to the pre-existing duty.
Byles J who did refer to the pre-existing obligation held that the promise was not
binding. 76 However, the matter can now be said to be clarified by the Privy Council in
The Eurymedon77 where it was held

See Restatement Contracts 2d 1981, s 89(a), comment


Crocker, 'Contracts. Modification Agreements; Need for New Consideration. Economic Duress: Note' (1975) 50
wash L Rev 960 at 964-5.
73
Shadwell v Shadwell (1860) 9 CB (NS) 159; Scotson v Pegg (1861) 30 LJ Ex225; Chichesterv Cobb (1866) 14 LT
433. In the first two the promisor might have in fact done acts in excess of the duty owed to the third party. In
Pfizer Corp v Ministry of Health [19651 AC 512 at 536 Lord Reid may be taken to suggest the contrary when he
says that the supply of NHS drugs to a patient does not create a contract between the recipient and the chemist
because the latter is already under a contractual obligation to supply them. However, it is likely that at the time
Lord Reid was not thinking about consideration but rather about contractual intention.
And surprisingly remained so until Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1970 s 1(1). As a contract of
'personal service', it could not be specifically performed. See generally Chapter 16.
On the basis that there was no contractual intention. This was approved in Jones v Padavatton [1969]
1 WLR 328 at 333 per Salmon LJ. 77 [19751 AC 154.
172 Chapter 4 The enforceability of agreements: consideration and its alternatives
that the stevedores' act of unloading goods was a sufficient consideration to support an
exemption of liability from damage even though the unloading was something that the
stevedores were already contractually obliged to do by their contract with the carrier.78
In The Eurymedon Lord Wilberforce did not distinguish between the performance of
a pre-existing contractual duty owed to a third party and the promise to perform one.
However, the collateral contract under which the goods owners extended to the
stevedores an exemption from liability for damage to the goods was described as a
unilateral one. A unilateral contract involves the exchange of a promise (here the
exemption) for an act (here the unloading). Therefore, the ratio decidendi of the case
only strictly extends to the proposition that the performance, as opposed to the promise
of performance, of a contractual duty owed to a third party can constitute consideration.
However, the ratio decidendi of a further Privy Council decision addressed this
circumstance.
The exchange contemplated in Pao On v Lau Yiu Lone9 was a very simple one. An
individual, LY, wanted to obtain a property. Unfortunately, the way the transaction was
effected, by an exchange of shares, makes it seem complicated. A property was owned
by a private company (SO) all of whose shares were in turn owned by an individual
(PO). A contract (the main agreement) was entered between PO, SO and a public
company (FC) the majority of whose shares were owned by LY, who was not personally
a party to this contract. The main agreement provided that all the shares in SO (and so
the property) would be transferred to FC in exchange for a number of FC shares. PO
further promised to retain a certain number of these shares for a stipulated period. PO
sought to protect himself against a fall in the value of FC shares during the retention
period by entering a separate agreement with LY under which LY agreed to buy back
the shares at the end of the retention period for the original transfer price. This
arrangement would have been effective to protect PO against any fall in the value of FC
shares but would also have forced him to give up any increase. When he realised this,
PO refused to proceed with the main agreement unless the 'buy-back' arrangement with
LY was replaced with a true indemnity (i.e. which protected PO against a decline in FC
shares but left him with any gains). To protect public confidence In FC, LY agreed to
the indemnity. The main agreement was performed. FC shares fell in value during the
retention period and PO sought to enforce the indemnity.
LY took three objections to the enforcement of the indemnity: the consideration for it
was past,80 the only consideration was the promise to perform a pre-existing contractual
duty owed to a third party (FC) and the agreement was obtained by economic duress. 8
The Privy Council held that the second objection failed because the prormse to perform
a pre-existing contractual duty owed to a third party does constitute good
consideration.82
78
The Eurymedon has been approved in The New York Star [1981] 1 WLR 138 and The Mahkutai [1996] AC 650.
79
[1980] AC 614. This case does not fit easily in the category of pre-existing contractual duties owed to third parties.
Three parties were involved only because of the separate legal personalities of LY and the public company of which
he was a majority shareholder. If the corporate veil is lifted, the case becomes analogous to the cases considered
later involving a modification of an existing contract. See generally the discussion of economic duress in this case
and in Chapter 12.
That is, entering the main agreement which had already occurred. This argument failed because the facts fell
within the exception to past consideration. See above, p. 166.
This argument failed because the pressure was not sufficiently compelling to amount to compulsion. See further
Chapter 12.

Departing from the earlier contrary decision in Jones v Waite (1839) 5 Bing NC 341 at 351.
Pre-existing 1duties 173
The position now seems to be that it is good consideration either to perform
(Eurymedon) or to promise to perform (Pao On) a contractual duty owed to a third party.
Both propositions emerge from cases where practical good sense demands that the
doctrine of consideration should not operate to frustrate an arm's length commercial
agreement. Both decisions categorically reject the application of a legal definition of
consideration described earlier.
Because both are broad-based policy decisions which admit no counter-argument,84 the
principles laid down do not even seem to require the presence of a factual benefit or
detriment. In both cases lip service is paid to the need for consideration but its 'discovery'
does appear to be little more than assertion.

The pre-existing duty arises from the law generally


This is a residual category for pre-existing duties that do not arise from either a contract
with a third party or a contract with the subsequent promisor. The general approach of
the cases is to apply a legal definition of consideration. On this approach the promise or
performance of a contractual duty owed to a third party will not itself amount to good
consideration. Therefore, a witness who was required under a subpoenas5 to attend to
give evidence at a hearing could not enforce a promise to pay a fee. 2 However, it is true
to say that this old case is out of line with modern practice where expert witnesses are
paid an agreed fee and even other witnesses required to attend are paid compensation.
A further illustration is provided by Glasbrook Bros Ltd v Glamorgan CC 87 where
during a strike of mineworkers the mine owners agreed to pay a sum of money to have
a force of police officers stationed at the mine. This promise was held to be enforceable.
Although the police are under a general duty to protect people and property, the House
of Lords thought that this duty could have been adequately discharged by having a
modest mobile force ready to go to the mine at short notice if trouble was anticipated.
The provision of a larger force billeted at the mine was in excess ofthe police authority's
pre-existing duty and so amounted to legal consideration sufficient to support the mine
owner's promise of payment. The provision of police services IS now regulated by statute
in a way that reflects the common law rule: police authorities are allowed to charge for
'special police services' . 3 In Reading Festival Ltd v West Yorkshire Police Authority84
the Court of Appeal held that the festival organisers who had expressed a hope that, as

1
See, in particular, the hostility of the courts to 'technical' arguments, which might subvert the broad principle
of third-party immunity, established in The Eurymedon. Now called a witness summons.
2
Collinsv Godefroy (1831) I B & Ad 950. [1925]
AC 270.
3
Police Act 1996, s 25(1).
4
[20061 EWCA Civ 524, [20061 1 WLR 2005.
in previous years, police would be deployed at the festival site were not bound to pay for
police stationed in surrounding communities when most on site cpolicing' was carried
out by a private security firm engaged by the organisers. An obligation to pay for 'special
police services' will generally arise either when services are requested and provided
which are beyond what the police would properly consider necessary or they are services
which, if not provided by the police, would need to be paid for by the requestor. No
obligation arises to pay for services which are not requested. On this basis a newly

That is, one which requires something in excess of the pre-existing duty.

Common questions

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The pre-existing duty doctrine plays a critical role in the context of contractual modifications by delineating when a party's promise can suffice as consideration. This doctrine, which is a subset of the broader legal doctrines related to contractual modifications, can often serve as a smokescreen for overreaching when wielded by a party with superior bargaining power . The doctrine of consideration traditionally mandates that something beyond a pre-existing legal obligation must be present for a contract modification to be enforceable, employing both factual and legal definitions of consideration. For instance, performing a contractual duty owed to a third party can constitute good consideration as exemplified in cases like Shadwell v Shadwell . Moreover, the Privy Council in The Eurymedon and Pao On v Lau Yiu Long has held that both the performance and the promise to perform a pre-existing contractual duty owed to a third party are adequate forms of consideration, thus supporting the enforceability of agreements even under complex transactional scenarios .

The enforcement of contracts involving pre-existing obligations to third parties hinges on several arguments both for and against. Proponents argue that recognizing performance or promise of such duties as consideration upholds commercial integrity and respects practical business operations, as illustrated in The Eurymedon and Pao On v Lau Yiu Long, where the Privy Council validated these actions as consideration . Critics, however, might contend that accepting pre-existing duties as consideration undermines the requisite legal principle demanding new consideration for contract enforceability, risking potential overreaching by parties with superior bargaining positions . Nonetheless, the legal trend shows a departure from rigid definitions towards accommodating practical realities in arm's-length agreements .

The Privy Council decisions in The Eurymedon and Pao On v Lau Yiu Long significantly influence modern contract law doctrines by affirming that both the performance and promise of performing a pre-existing contractual duty owed to a third party may serve as consideration. These cases demonstrate a shift towards a practical approach that aligns with the commercial reality of transactions, favoring efficient and fair enforcement of agreements over strict adherence to traditional legal definitions of consideration . By rejecting the previous legalistic constraints on consideration, the Privy Council facilitates greater flexibility in contracting, recognizing the multifaceted nature of modern commercial transactions and allowing nuanced contracts that reflect the intentions and practicalities experienced by contracting parties .

Third-party obligations can determine the sufficiency of consideration in contracts by recognizing that performance or promise concerning such obligations may suffice as consideration. This principle is illustrated in landmark cases like The Eurymedon and Pao On v Lau Yiu Long, which underline that fulfilling contractual duties owed to third parties can legitimise contractual agreements by providing a tangible commitment that enhances the relationship's commercial contexts . These cases affirm the viability of fulfilling or promising to fulfill third-party obligations as a consideration, broadening the interpretative scope of contractual agreements to incorporate realistic business dealings and relationships into the evaluation of consideration sufficiency .

Pao On v Lau Yiu Long effectively addresses the issues of past consideration and economic duress. The case revolved around a complex property transfer arrangement involving multiple parties. One of the objections raised against enforcing a contractual indemnity was that the promise under question was premised on past consideration. However, the Privy Council found that the past consideration exception applied, validating the promise . Additionally, the court addressed economic duress by examining the pressure faced by the parties. It concluded that the economic pressure applied was not sufficiently compelling to amount to duress, thus supporting the contract's enforceability . These findings demonstrate a nuanced interpretation of contract law, allowing flexibility in complex commercial transactions while maintaining protection against undue coercion .

The Eurymedon case contributes to the understanding of third-party contractual duties by confirming that the performance of a contractual duty owed to a third party can provide sufficient consideration. In this case, stevedores who were contractually obliged to unload goods from a ship were provided an exemption from liability by the goods' owners. This set precedent by recognizing the sufficiency of performing a pre-existing duty as consideration, thereby broadening the scope of enforceable agreements, even when traditional legal definitions might exclude such arrangements . The decision emphasizes practical implications of contractual actions over strictly abiding by the definition of legal consideration, paving the way for more nuanced interpretations in commercial agreements .

The case of Glasbrook Bros Ltd v Glamorgan CC illustrates that when contractual duties exceed existing legal obligations, they can constitute sufficient consideration. In this instance, during a miners' strike, mine owners paid for a police force greater than what was considered the minimum needed by authorities. The House of Lords concluded that this additional police provision constituted special services, going beyond the general duty to protect, thereby forming legal consideration for the mine owners' payment promise . This case underlines the principle that consideration can arise from acts exceeding statutory duties, encouraging the engagement in additional arrangements when practical needs dictate .

Allowing past consideration to support a contract, as discussed in Pao On v Lau Yiu Long, has notable implications for contract law. Past consideration traditionally does not constitute valid consideration unless falling within specific exceptions. In Pao On, the past consideration was deemed sufficient due to the nature of the ongoing commercial relationship and the continuity of the transaction concerned . This approach underscores the flexibility needed to address modern commercial scenarios where past actions can be directly linked to subsequent contractual commitments. Recognizing past consideration under such conditions prevents the undermining of legitimate business adjustments and respects the realities of a dynamic business environment .

Recent legal interpretations, as shown in the case of Glasbrook Bros Ltd v Glamorgan CC, clarify the understanding and application of 'consideration' in contracts involving public duties. In this case, while police are generally obligated to provide public protection without charge, the provision of a larger force for special circumstances, which exceeds basic obligations, was seen as sufficient consideration to enforce payment promises . This suggests a shift towards recognizing additional services requested as sufficient consideration, even when generally not required, thereby facilitating agreements accommodating specific needs and ensuring that the parties' intentions and additional contributions are considered in contractual obligations .

Shadwell v Shadwell significantly impacts the concept of consideration by supporting the notion that performing a pre-existing duty owed to a third party can be good consideration. In this case, an uncle's promise to supplement his nephew's earnings, contingent on the nephew's engagement, was found to be binding despite the nephew being already bound to marry. Judges Erle CJ and Keating J held that the nephew's performance was good consideration, although Byles J disagreed, noting its pre-existing nature . The case challenges the strict legal definition of consideration, aligning more closely with its factual iteration, emphasizing practical outcomes over rigid legal constraints, thereby influencing how contractual modifications are approached .

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