LEON UMALE, 

petitioner, 
vs.
HONORABLE ONOFRE VILLALUZ, HONORABLE BENJAMIN AQUINO, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, EDUARDO
FELICIANO, ANTONIO DAVID, CECILIO CHICO, BENJAMIN ESCANDOR, ROLANDO SAMSON, and ALFONSO CO, respondents.

Salonga, Ordoñes, Yap, Parlade, & Associates for petitioner.

Jose W. Diokno for respondents Alfonso Co.

Noel Ramal Salaysay for respondent Benjamin Escandor and Rolando Samson.

MAKASIAR, J.:

Petitioner Leon Umale impugns the validity of the order dated April 15, 1971 of respondent Judge Onofre A. Villaluz of the Circuit Criminal Court
sitting at Pasig, Rizal, disqualifying or inhibiting himself from trying the robbery charge against sixteen (16) accused including the six (6) herein
private respondents Eduardo Feliciano, Antonio David, Virgilio Chico, Benjamin Escandor, Rolando Samson, and Alfonso Co, entitled "People vs.
Marina Geronimo, et al." and docketed as CCC-VII-660-Rizal.

Petitioner Leon Umale is the complainant in the said robbery case, the robbery having been allegedly committed on September 21, 1970 in his
warehouse in Pasig, Rizal from which were assorted textile materials valued at P229,659.904. The original information was dated January 11, 1971,
while the first amended information was dated March 4, 1971. The case was filed by the acting state prosecutor, who conducted the preliminary
investigation directly with the Circuit Criminal Court presided by respondent Judge Onofre A. Villaluz, who from January 19 to April 12, 1971,
issued several orders for the arrest of the accused, fixing their bail bonds, allowing an accused to post cash or surety bond for his provisional liberty,
for their arraignment, or for their commitment to the provincial jail, as well as issued subpoena duces tecum and contempt citations against certain
police officers who failed to appear on the days set for hearing.

However, on April 15, 1971, without any party moving for his disqualification or inhibition, respondent Judge Onofre Villaluz voluntarily inhibited
himself from trying the case "for the peace of mind of the parties concerned and to insure an impartial administration of justice" on the ground that
before the criminal case was filed in his court, he already had personal knowledge of the same; and directed the immediate forwarding of the records
of the case to the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal, for proper disposition. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said
order of inhibition was denied on April 16, 1971 by said respondent Judge. Another motion of petitioner for the deferment of the raffling of the case
in the Court of First Instance of Rizal was denied by the Executive Judge, who likewise rejected petitioner's motion for the return of the case to the
Circuit Criminal Court. The case was, after raffling, assigned to Branch VIII of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, then presided by then Judge
Benjamin Aquino and docketed as Crim. Case No. 2729.

OUR resolution dated May 18, 1971 required respondents to answer and authorized the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon posting by
petitioner of a bond of P1,000. Petitioner posted the bond and a writ of preliminary injunction was issued on June 21, 1971 enjoining respondent
Judge Benjamin Aquino from taking cognizance of and exercising jurisdiction over the criminal case.

Only respondent Alfonso Co, thru counsel, filed an answer.

In a motion dated September 20, 1971 and filed on September 22, 1971, private respondents Benjamin Escandor and Rolando Samson, two of the
defendants in CCC-VII-660 and docketed as Crim. Case No. 2729 on the Court of First Instance, Branch VIII, Pasig, Rizal, prayed for the
modification of the said preliminary injunction so as to allow respondent Judge Benjamin Aquino to act on their motion for bail.

In a resolution dated September 28, 1971, petitioner was required to comment thereon within ten (10) days from notice. Petitioner failed however to
submit the required comment.

In a motion dated October 25, 1971 and filed on November 20, 1971, private respondents Benjamin Escandor and Rolando Samson reiterated the
aforesaid motion.

In a resolution dated November 25, 1971, the Court resolved to defer action thereon until the case is considered on the merits.

On November 4, 1971, petitioner filed his memorandum; while private respondent Alfonso Co filed his memorandum on November 20, 1971.

The issues posed by the petition are:

(1) whether respondent Judge Onofre A. Villaluz of the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, can voluntarily, inhibit himself,
without any motion therefor by the parties, on the ground of his personal knowledge of the case even before the same was filed;
and
 (2) whether, after having acquired jurisdiction over the case, the Circuit Criminal Court can transfer the hearing of the same to
the regular court of first instance.

Undoubtedly, personal knowledge of the case pending before him is not one of the causes for the disqualification of a judge under the first paragraph
of Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court which took effect on January 1, 1964. But paragraph 2 of said Section 1 of Rule 137
authorizes the judge, "in the exercise of his sound discretion, to disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reason other than those
mentioned" in paragraph 1.

Before the rule was amended in 1964, a judge could not voluntarily inhibit himself on grounds of extreme delicacy,1or prejudice or bias or
hostility2 not even when he would be violating Sections 3, 26 and 30 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics because he is a paid professor of law in the
college owned by one of the litigants.3 Neither was a judge disqualified from trying a prosecution for perjury of an accused, who was ordered
investigated and prosecuted as a perjured witness by said judge;4 not even if the judge himself took great interest and an active part in the filing of the
criminal charge to the extent of appointing the fiscal when the regular province fiscal refused to file the proper information.5

But in 1961, We enunciated that a judge can inhibit himself from trying a case on the ground that the opinion he express in a letter addressed by him
as counsel might in some way or another influence his decision in the case at bar and express his fear of not being able to render a truly impartial
judgment.6

In 1962, We also ruled in the case of Del Castillo vs. Javelona7 that a judge may voluntarily inhibit himself by reason of his being related to a counsel
within the fourth civil degree (no expressly included as a ground in par. 1 of Rule 137); because Rule 126 (the old rule) "does not include nor
preclude cases and circumstances for voluntary inhibition which depends upon the discretion of the officers concerned."

And in 1967, We affirmed that a judge may voluntarily disqualify himself on grounds other than those mentioned in paragraph 1 of Section 1 of Rule
137, as amended, such as bias or prejudice engendered by the judge having "lost respect in the manner the prosecutor was handling the case ..."8; or
when the lawyer for a litigant is his former associate.9

Herein respondent Judge, because of his personal knowledge of the case, at least had conducted a careful self-examination after hearing some
incidents on the criminal case wherein petitioner is the complainant, because such personal knowledge on his part might generate in his mind some
bias or prejudice against the complaining witness or any of the accused or in an manner unconsciously color his judgment one way or the other
without the parties having the opportunity to cross-examine him as a witness. Herein respondent Judge therefore harkened to the injunction
announced by this Court in Pimentel versus Salanga 10 that when a Judge "might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice
against a litigant arising out of circumstance reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He
should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he reflect on the
probability that a losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against
him."

It is possible that the respondent Judge might be influenced by his personal knowledge of the case when he tries and decides the same on the merits,
which would certainly constitute a denial of due process to the party adversely affected by his judgment or decision. It is best that, after some
reflection, the respondent Judge on his own initiative disqualified himself from hearing the robbery case filed by herein petitioner and thereby
rendered himself available as witness to any of the parties and therefore maybe subject to cross-examination.

Herein respondent Judge should be commended this time for heeding Our ruling in the case of Geotina vs. Gonzales 11 that "a judge, sitting on a case
must at all times be fully free, disinterested, impartial and independent. Elementary due process requires a hearing before an impartial and
disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to
his fairness and as to his integrity."

And Mr. Justice Fernando, speaking for the Court, in the case of Mateo, Jr., et al. vs. Honorable Onofre Villaluz, etc., supra, added that: "... it is
made clear to the occupants of the bench that outside of pecuniary interest, relationship or previous participation in the matter that calls for
adjudication, there may be other causes that could conceivably erode the trait of objectivity, thus calling for inhibition. That is to betray a sense of
realism, for the factors that lead to preferences or Predilections are many and varied. It is well, therefore, that if any such should make its appearance
and prove difficult to resist, the better course for a judge is to disqualify himself. That way, he avoids being misunderstood. His reputation for probity
and objectivity is preserved. What is even more important, the ideal of an impartial administration of justice is lived up to. Thus is due process
vindicated."

Having thus voluntarily inhibited himself from trying the criminal case in which herein petitioner is the complainant, the respondent Judge has the
discretion likewise to transfer the case to the regular courts of first instance sitting in Pasig, Rizal where he holds court, since the regular Court of
First Instance has concurrent jurisdiction with the Circuit Criminal Court over this case for robbery (Sec. 1, R.A. No. 5179).

This transfer is all the more justified because there is no other judge sitting in the Circuit Criminal Court of Rizal or in the 7th Judicial District which
comprises the provinces of Rizal, Cavite and Palawan, as well as the cities of Quezon, Caloocan, Pasay, Cavite, Tagaytay, and Trece Martires as
there is only one circuit criminal court for each of the 16 judicial districts of the court (Sec. 1, R.A. No. 5179). Furthermore, under Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 5179, the "provisions of all laws and the Rules of Court relative to the judges of the Courts of First Instance and the trial,
disposition and appeal of criminal cases therein shall be applicable to the circuit judges and the cases cognizable by them insofar as they are not
inconsistent with" its provisions. The Judiciary Act and the Rules of Court do not prohibit the raffling or re-raffling among the Judges in the same
station and in the same Judicial District of a case where the Judge to whom it was originally raffled or assigned is disqualified or voluntarily
inhibiting himself for valid and just causes. This has been done in many instances. It was likewise done in the case at bar after the criminal case
transferred to the regular Courts of First Instance sitting at Pasig, Rizal. The validity of the trial and the decision rendered in the case depends solely
on the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the case and over the parties, to whom due process of law has been accorded.

Consequently, herein respondent Judge committed no abuse of discretion..

WHEREFORE THE PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED, WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER.

IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE ILOCOS NORTE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE ON
JUSTICE.

DECISION

PADILLA, J.:

On 4 July 1988, Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, Executive Judge, RTC, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, Branch 19, sent this Court a letter which reads:
"Hon. Marcelo Fernan
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
  of the Philippines
Manila  
     
Thru
Hon. Leo Medialdea
channels:
  Court Administrator
  Supreme Court of the Philippines
 
Sir:
By Executive Order RF6-04 issued on June 21, 1988 by the Honorable Provincial Governor of Ilocos Norte, Hon. Rodolfo Farinas, I was designated
as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to Presidential Executive Order No. 856 of 12 December 1986, as
amended by Executive Order No. 326 of June 1, 1988. In consonance with Executive Order RF6-04, the Honorable Provincial Governor of Ilocos
Norte issued my appointment as a member of the Committee. For your ready reference, I am enclosing herewith machine copies of Executive Order
RF6-04 and the appointment.
Before I may accept the appointment and enter in the discharge of the powers and duties of the position as member of the Ilocos (Norte) Provincial
Committee on Justice, may I have the honor to request for the issuance by the Honorable Supreme Court of a Resolution, as follows:

(1) Authorizing me to accept the appointment and to assume and discharge the powers and duties attached to the said position;

(2) Considering my membership in the Committee as neither violative of the Independence of the Judiciary nor a violation of Section 12, Article
VIII, or of the second paragraph of Section 7, Article IX (B), both of the Constitution, and will not in any way amount to an abandonment of my
present position as Executive Judge of Branch XIX, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, and as a member of the Judiciary; and

(3) Consider my membership in the said Committee as part of the primary functions of an Executive Judge.

May I please be favored soon by your action on this request.

                                                                                               
        Very respectfully yours,
         
(Sgd) RODOLFO U.
       
MANZANO
        Judge"
An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that Provincial/City Committees on Justice are created to insure the speedy
disposition of cases of detainees, particularly those involving the poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail congestion and improving local jail
conditions. Among the functions of the Committee are

3.3 Receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail warden, fiscal or judge who may be found to have committed abuses in the discharge of
his duties and refer the same to proper authority for appropriate action; 

3.5 Recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed pre-judicial to the proper administration of criminal justice.

It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative functions. Administrative functions are those which involve the
regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry
out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence (Nasipit Integrated
Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc., vs. Tapucar, SP-07599-R, 29 September 1978, Black's Law Dictionary).

Furthermore, under Executive Order No. 326 amending Executive Order No. 856, it is provided that  

"SECTION 6. Supervision. The Provincial/City Committees on Justice shall be under the supervision of the Secretary of Justice. Quarterly
accomplishment reports shall be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Justice."

Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing
quasi-judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).

Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, which discharges administrative functions, will
be in violation of the Constitution, the Court is constrained to deny his request.

Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his concurring opinion in the case of Garcia vs. Macaraig (39 SCRA 106) ably sets forth: 

"2. While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government
precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a member of the judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a duty non-judicial in
character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a plain departure from its command. The essence of the trust reposed in him is to
decide. Only a higher court, as was emphasized by Justice Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative
official, however eminent. It is indispensable that there be no exception to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the task
of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn responsibility no less than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with nothing less."

This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic insensibility or unbecoming indifference to Provincial/City
Committee on Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government. Their integrity and performance in the adjudication
of cases contribute to the solidity of such structure. As public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-members of
Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for which
they exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties.

ACCORDINGLY, the aforesaid request of Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
 DISSENTING OPINION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the judiciary to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. (Section
12, Article VIII, Constitution.

Insofar as the term "quasi-judicial" is concerned, it has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can confidently refrain from participating in the work of any
administrative agency which adjudicates disputes and controversies involving the rights of parties within its jurisdiction. The issue involved in this
case is where to draw the line insofar as administrative functions are concerned. 

"Administrative functions" as used in Section 12 refers to the executive machinery of government and the performance by that machinery of
governmental acts. It refers to the management actions, determinations, and orders of executive officials as they administer the laws and try to make
government effective. There is an element of positive action, of supervision or control.

Applying the definition given in the opinion of the majority which reads: 

"Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the
promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the
organic law of its existence (Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc. v. Tapucar, SP-07599-R, 29 September 1978, Black's Law
Dictionary.)"

we can readily see that membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not involve any regulation or control over the conduct and
affairs of individuals. Neither will the Committee on Justice promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative functions. Its work is
purely advisory. I do not see anything wrong in a member of the judiciary joining any study group which concentrates on the administration of justice
as long as the group merely deliberates on problems involving the speedy disposition of cases particularly those involving the poor and needy
litigants or detainees, pools the expertise and experiences of the members, and limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted or rejected by
those who have the power to legislate or administer the particular function involved in their implementation.

We who are Judges cannot operate in a vacuum or in a tight little world of our own. The administration of justice cannot be pigeonholed into neat
compartments with Judges, Fiscals, Police, Wardens, and various other officials concerned erecting water-tight barriers against one another and
limiting our interaction to timidly peeping over these unnecessary and impractical barriers into one another's work, all the while blaming the
Constitution for such a quixotic and unreal interpretation. As intimated in the majority opinion, we should not be monastically insensible or
indifferent to projects or movements cogitating on possible solutions to our common problems of justice and afterwards forwarding their findings to
the people, public or private, where these findings would do the most good.

The majority opinion suggests the giving of assistance by Judges to the work of the Committees on Justice. Assistance is a vague term. Can Judges
be designated as observers? Advisers? Consultants? Is it the act of being "designated" which is proscribed by the Constitution or is it participation in
the prohibited functions? If Judges cannot become members, why should they be allowed or even encouraged to assist these Committees? The line
drawn by the majority is vague and unrealistic.

The constitutional provision is intended to shield Judges from participating in activities which may compromise their independence or hamper their
work. Studying problems involving the administration of justice and arriving at purely recommendatory solutions do not in any way involve the
encroachment of the judiciary into executive or legislative functions or into matters which are none of its concerns. Much less is it an encroachment
of the other departments into judicial affairs.

As the visible representation of the law and of justice in his community, the Judge should not shy away from public activities which do not interfere
with the prompt and proper performance of his office, but which, in fact, enhance his effectiveness as a Judge. He cannot stop mingling in civic
intercourse or shut himself into solitary seclusion. The Committees on Justice will also be immensely benefited by the presence of Judges in the study
groups. The work of the Committees is quite important. Let it not be said that the Judges the officials most concerned with justice have hesitated to
join in such a worthy undertaking because of a strained interpretation of their functions.

It is well for this Court to be generally cautious, conservative or restrictive when it interprets provisions of the Constitution or statutes vesting us with
powers or delimiting the exercise of our jurisdiction and functions. However, we should not overdo it. The basic principles of constitutional
interpretation apply as well to the provisions which define or circumscribe our powers and functions as they do to the provisions governing the other
departments of government. The Court should not adopt a strained construction which impairs its own efficiency to meet the responsibilities brought
about by the changing times and conditions of society. The familiar quotation is apt in this case constitutional provisions are interpreted by the spirit
which vivifies and not by the letter which killeth.

I, therefore, dissent from the majority opinion and vote to allow Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano to become a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial
Committee on Justice.
 DISSENTING OPINION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

I hesitate to give such a restrictive and impractical interpretation to Section 12, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, and thus join the dissent of
Justice Gutierrez, Jr.

What I believe is contemplated by the Constitutional prohibition is designation, for example, to such quasi-judicial bodies as the SEC, or
administrative agencies like the BIR. Those are full-time positions involving running the affairs of government, which will interfere with the
discharge of judicial functions or totally remove a Judge/Justice from the performance of his regular functions.

The Committee on Justice cannot be likened to such an administrative agency of government. It is a study group with recommendatory functions. In
fact, membership by members of the Bench in said committee is called for by reason of the primary functions of their position.

The matter of supervision by the Secretary of Justice provided for under EO NO. 326 amending EO No. 856, need not be a cause for concern. That
supervision is confined to Committee work and will by no means extend to the performance of judicial functions per se

IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE ILOCOS NORTE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE
ON JUSTICE.

An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that Provincial/City Committees on Justice are created to insure the speedy
disposition of cases of detainees.

It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative functions. Administrative functions are those which involve the
regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for; their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry
out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence

Furthermore, under Executive Order No. 326 amending Executive Order No. 856, it is provided that—

Section 6. Supervision.—The Provincial/City Committees on Justice shall be under the supervision of the Secretary of justice
Quarterly accomplishment reports shall be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Justice.

Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by law shag not be designated to any agency performing
quasi- judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).

Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, which discharges an administrative function,
will be in violation of the Constitution, the Court is constrained to deny his request.

Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his concurring opinion in the case of Garcia vs. Macaraig (39 SCRA 106) ably sets forth:

2. While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of
government precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a member of the judiciary being required to assume a position
or perform a duty non-judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a plain departure from its
command. The essence of the trust reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher court, as was emphasized by Justice Barredo, can
pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative official, however eminent. It is indispensable that
there be no exception to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his
sworn responsibility no less than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with nothing less.

This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic insensibility or unbecoming indifference to Province/City
Committee on Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government. Their integrity and performance in the adjudication
of cases contribute to the solidity of such structure. As public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-members of
Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for which
they exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties.

ACCORDINGLY, the aforesaid request of Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, 24
July 2012
FACTS
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte) conducted a series of surveillance operations
against her and her aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a Private Army Group (PAG). Purportedly without the benefit of
data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission, thereby causing her
inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs. Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her
reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their
capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.

ISSUE
Whether or not the petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper when the right to privacy is invoked as opposed to the
state’s interest in preserving the right to life, liberty or security.

RULING
NO.

The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and
freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It
seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being
collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to
be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.

In this case, the Court ruled that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals
maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this regard,
respondents sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted against her were in relation to the criminal cases in which she was
implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome. [T]he state interest of
dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by
the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be
denied.
CONSTI LAW DIGEST

GEORGE ANTIQUERA y CODES, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Facts:
Police officers were conducting a police visibility patrol in Pasay City when they saw two unidentified men rush out of a house and
boarded a jeep. Believing that there was a crime, the police officers approached the house. When they peeked through the partially
opened door, they saw Antiquera and Cruz engaged in a pot session. The police officers entered the house, introduced themselves and
arrested Antiquera and Cruz. While inspecting the vicinity, PO1 Cabutihan saw a jewellery box which contained shabu and unused
paraphernalia. The RTC found them guilty of illegal possession of paraphernalia for dangerous drugs. The court affirmed the decision
of RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not the arrest was invalid.

Held:
Yes, there was unlawful arrest because the circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made in flagrante delicto. Admittedly,
the police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the house from the street where they stood. Indeed, even as they peeked
through its partially opened door, they saw no activity that warranted their entering it. Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the
view of the arresting officers that authorized the arrest of accused Antiquera without warrant under the above-mentioned rule.
Considering that his arrest was illegal, the search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal.

Ruben Del Castillo

vs.
People of the Philippines
Facts:
Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner Del Castillo was engaged in selling shabu, police officers headed by SPO3
Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting surveillance and test-buy operation at the house of petitioner, secured a search warrant from
the RTC. Upon arrival to the residence of Del Castillo to implement the search warrant, SPO3 Masnayon claimed that he saw
petitioner run towards a small structure, a nipa hut, in front of his house. Masnayon chased him but to no avail, because he and his
men were not familiar with the entrances and exits of the place. They all went back to the residence of Del Castillo and requested his
men to get a barangay tanod and a few minutes thereafter, his men returned with two barangay tanods who searched the house of
petitioner including the nipa hut where the petitioner allegedly ran for cover. His men who searched the residence of the petitioner
found nothing, but one of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the nipa hut several articles, including four (4) plastic packs
containing white crystalline substance.

Thus, an information was filed against Del Castillo for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by the
RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner filed with the Supreme Court the petition for certiorari contending among others
that CA erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of prohibited drugs, because he could not be
presumed to be in possession of the same just because they were found inside the nipa hut.

Issue:
Can petitioner Del Castillo be held liable for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425 by mere presumption that the petitioner
has dominion and control over the place where the shabu was found?
Held:
No. While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the person against whom the search
warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that the property is under petitioner’s control or possession. The records are void of
any evidence to show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in question nor was it established that he used the said structure as a shop. The
RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed that petitioner used the said structure due to the presence of electrical materials, the
petitioner being an electrician by profession.

The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the existence and presence of the drugs in the place under his control
and dominion and the character of the drugs. With the prosecution’s failure to prove that the nipa hut was under petitioner’s control
and dominion, there casts a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the law’s own
starting perspective on the status of the accused — in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the
contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral
certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence.

PEOPLE VS MALMSTEDT

Facts:

            Captain Alen Vasco, the commanding officer of the first regional command (NARCOM) stationed at camp Dangwa, ordered
his men to set up a temporary checkpoint for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to
establish a checkpoint was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other
prohibited drugs. And an information also was received about a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited
drugs.

            In the afternoon the bus where accused was riding stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that
they were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection. During the inspection CIC Galutan noticed a bulge
on accused waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused’s passport and other identification
papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging o his waist. And it
turned out to be a pouched bag and when accused opened the same bag the officer noticed four suspicious looking objects wrapped in
brown packing tape. It contained hashish, a derivative of marijuana.

            Thereafter, the accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus accused stopped to get
two travelling bags. The officer inspects the bag. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that the accused finally presented
his passport. The two bags contained a stuffed toy each, upon inspection the stuff toy contained also hashish.

Issue:

            Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure

Ruling:

            The Supreme Court held that under Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides:

“Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

a) When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and

c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporary confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another”
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs. A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he
was caught in flagrante delicto, thus the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph 1 of the foregoing
provision of law, which allows a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.

Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed, and that the object sought in connection with the offense are in the placed sought to be searched.
When NARCOM received the information that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him a prohibited
drug, there was no time to obtain a search warrant.

Martinez v. People

FACTS:

On December 29, 2007, while PO2 Roberto Soque, et. al, conducting a routine foot patrol along Balingkit Street, Malate, Manila, they
heard a man shouting Putanginamo! Limangdaannabaito?. For purportedly violating Section 844 of the Revised Ordinance of the City
of Manila which punishes breaches of the peace, the man, later identified as Ramon, was apprehended and asked to empty his pockets.
In the course thereof, the police officers were able to recover from him a small transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance suspected to be shabu. Consequently, Ramon was charged with possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11(3), Article
II of RA 9165.

In defense, Ramon denied the charge and contented that hile walking along Balingkit Street to borrow a welding machine, a man in
civilian clothing approached and asked him if he is Ramon Goco. Upon affirming his identity, he was immediately handcuffed by the
man who eventually introduced himself as a police officer. Together, they boarded a tricycle (sidecar) wherethe said officer asked him
if he was carrying illegal drugs. Despite his denial, he was still brought to a precinct to be detained. Thereafter, PO2 Soque for P20,
000.00 in exchange for his release, unable to give the money asked for, Ramon was brought to the Manila City Hall for inquest
proceedings.

The RTC convicted Ramon of the crime of possession of dangerous drugs; finding all its elements to have been established through
the testimonies of the prosecutions disinterested witnesses. It also upheld the legality of Ramons warrantless arrest, observing that
Ramon was disturbing the peace in violation of the Manila City Ordinance during the time of his apprehension.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the factual findings of RTC and likewise sustained the validity of the body search made on Ramon as an
incident of a lawful warrantless arrest for breach of the peace which he committed in the presence of the police officers,
notwithstanding its (the case for breach of the peace) subsequent dismissal for failure to prosecute.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the warrantless arrest was valid?

HELD:

The petition is meritorious.

POLITICAL LAW: exclusionary rule

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution enshrines a persons right against unwarranted intrusions by the government.
Accordingly, so as to ensure that the same sacrosanct right remains revered, effects secured by government authorities in
contravention of the said provision rendered inadmissible in evidence for any purpose, in any proceeding in relation to Section 3(2),
Article III of the Constitution.

Commonly known as the exclusionary rule, the above-cited proscription is not, however, an absolute and rigid one. As found in
jurisprudence, one of the traditional exceptions, among others, is searches incidental to a lawful arrest which is of particular
significance to this case and thus, necessitates further disquisition.

REMEDIAL LAW: valid warrantless arrest

A valid warrantless arrest which justifies a subsequent search is one that is carried out under the parameters of Section 5(a), Rule 113
of the Rules of Court14which requires that the apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable cause to arrest a person
caught in flagrante delicto. The term probable cause, specifically with respect to arrests has been understood to mean such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested.

Based on the records in the case at bar, PO2 Soque arrested Ramon for allegedly violating Section 844 (breaches of peace) of the
Manila City Ordinance. Evidently, the gravamen of these offenses is the disruption of communal tranquillity. Thus, to justify a
warrantless arrest based on the same, it must be established that the apprehension was effected after a reasonable assessment by the
police officer that a public disturbance is being committed. However, PO2 Soques testimony surrounding circumstances leading to
Ramons warrantless warrant clearly negates the presence of probable cause when the police officers conducted their warrantless arrest
of Ramon.

To elucidate, it cannot be said that the act of shouting in a thickly populated place, with many people conversing with each other on
the street, would constitute any of the acts punishable under Section 844 of the said ordinance. The words he allegedly shouted
"Putangina mo! Limang daan na ba ito?" are not slanderous, threatening or abusive, and thus, could not have tended to disturb the
peace or excite a riot considering that at the time of the incident, Balingkit Street was still teeming with people and alive with activity.
Further, no one present at the place of arrest ever complained that Ramons shouting disturbed the public. On the contrary, a
disinterested member of the community (a certain Rosemarie Escobal) even testified that Ramon was merely standing in front of the
store of a certain Mang Romy when a man in civilian clothes, later identified as PO2 Soque, approached Ramon, immediately
handcuffed and took him away.

In its totality, the facts and circumstances could not have engendered a well-founded belief that any breach of the peace had been
committed by Ramon at the time that his warrantless arrest was effected. Thus, no probable cause existed to justify Ramons
warrantless arrest.

POLITICAL LAW: inadmissible evidence

Consequently, since it cannot be said that Ramon was validly arrested, the warrantless search that resulted from it was also illegal.
Thus, the subject shabu purportedly seized from Ramon is inadmissible evidence.

The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside.
 Republic Act No. 4200
Anti Wire-Tapping Law.
 
 
 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4200
 
AN ACT TO PROHIBIT AND PENALIZE WIRE TAPPING AND OTHER RELATED VIOLATIONS OF THE PRIVACY
OF COMMUNICATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken
word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-
talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence,
to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any
communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this
law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in
writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of such
record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in Sec. 3 hereof, shall
not be covered by this prohibition.
Sec. 2. Any person who wilfully or knowingly does or who shall aid, permit, or cause to be done any of the acts declared to be
unlawful in the preceding Sec. or who violates the provisions of the following Sec. or of any order issued thereunder, or aids,
permits, or causes such violation shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not less than six months or
more than six years and with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification from public office if the offender be a
public official at the time of the commission of the offense, and, if the offender is an alien he shall be subject to deportation
proceedings. chan robles virtual law library
Sec. 3. Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall render it unlawful or punishable for any peace officer, who is authorized
by a written order of the Court, to execute any of the acts declared to be unlawful in the two preceding Sec.s in cases involving
the crimes of treason, espionage, provoking war and disloyalty in case of war, piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion,
conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, inciting to sedition,
kidnapping as defined by theRevised Penal Code, and violations of Commonwealth Act No. 616, punishing espionage and
other offenses against national security:Provided, That such written order shall only be issued or granted upon written
application and the examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and a showing:
(1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed or is being
committed or is about to be committed: Provided, however, That in cases involving the offenses of rebellion, conspiracy and
proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, and inciting to sedition, such
authority shall be granted only upon prior proof that a rebellion or acts of sedition, as the case may be, have actually been or
are being committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence will be obtained essential to the conviction
of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily
available for obtaining such evidence.  chan robles virtual law library
The order granted or issued shall specify: (1) the identity of the person or persons whose communications, conversations,
discussions, or spoken words are to be overheard, intercepted, or recorded and, in the case of telegraphic or telephonic
communications, the telegraph line or the telephone number involved and its location; (2) the identity of the peace officer
authorized to overhear, intercept, or record the communications, conversations, discussions, or spoken words; (3) the offense
or offenses committed or sought to be prevented; and (4) the period of the authorization. The authorization shall be effective
for the period specified in the order which shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the date of issuance of the order, unless
extended or renewed by the court upon being satisfied that such extension or renewal is in the public interest.
All recordings made under court authorization shall, within forty-eight hours after the expiration of the period fixed in the
order, be deposited with the court in a sealed envelope or sealed package, and shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the
peace officer granted such authority stating the number of recordings made, the dates and times covered by each recording,
the number of tapes, discs, or records included in the deposit, and certifying that no duplicates or copies of the whole or any
part thereof have been made, or if made, that all such duplicates or copies are included in the envelope or package deposited
with the court. The envelope or package so deposited shall not be opened, or the recordings replayed, or used in evidence, or
their contents revealed, except upon order of the court, which shall not be granted except upon motion, with due notice and
opportunity to be heard to the person or persons whose conversation or communications have been recorded.  chan robles
virtual law library
The court referred to in this Sec. shall be understood to mean the Court of First Instance within whose territorial jurisdiction
the acts for which authority is applied for are to be executed.
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or
any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding Sec.s of
this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
Sec. 5. All laws inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or accordingly amended.  chan robles virtual law
library
Sec. 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
 MORFE V MUTUC

Facts:

 The Law: Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 (RA No. 3019)
 Every public officer within 30 days after its approval or after his assumption of office “and within the month of January of every year
thereafter”, as well as upon termination of his position, shall prepare and file with the head of the office to which he belongs, “a true detailed and
sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family
expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year”.
 Plaintiff Morfe, a judge of a CFI, contends that the periodical submission “within the month of January of every other year thereafter” of their sworn
statement of assets and liabilities (SAL) is violative of due process as an oppressive exercise of police power and as an unlawful invasion of the
constitutional right to privacy implicit on the ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the prohibition against self-
incrimination.
 Executive Secretary and DOJ Sec:
 Acceptance of public position = voluntary assumption of obligation
 Merely seeks to adopt a reasonable measure of insuring the interest of general welfare in honest and clean public service and is therefore a
legitimate exercise of police power.
 CFI of Pangasinan held that the requirement exceeds the permissible limit of the police power and is thus offensive to the due process clause

Issue/s:

Whether the periodical submission of SAL for public officers is: 1. An oppressive exercise of police power; 2. Violative of due process and an unlawful
invasion of the right to privacy implicit in the ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the prohibition against self-incrimination; 3.
An insult to the personal integrity and official dignity of public officials.

Ruling: Decision reversed.

Ratio:

1. Presumption of validity

 Plaintiff asserted that the submission of SAL was a reasonable requirement for employment so a public officer can make of record his assets and
liabilities upon assumption of office. Plaintiff did not present evidence to rebut the presumption of validity.
 “If the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and
exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.” (Ermita-Malate Hotel v.
Mayor of Manila)

1. Exercise of Police power and the defense provided by the Due Process Clause

 “inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society” (Justice Malcolm)
 The power of sovereignty, the power to govern men and things within the limits of its domain  (Justice Taney, going beyond curtailment of rights)
 Anyone with an alleged grievance regarding the extension of police power to regulatory action affecting persons in public or private life can invoke
the protection of due process.
 It has been held that due process may be relied upon by public official to protect the security of tenure which in a limited sense is analogous to
property. Therefore he could also use due process to strike down what he considers as an infringement of his liberty.
 Under the Constitution, the challenged provision is allowable as long as due process is observed.
 The standard for due process is REASONABLENESS. Test: Official action must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer
oppression.
 “It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to ignore the harsh and compelling realities of public service with its ever-present temptation
to heed the call of greed and avarice to condemn as arbitrary and oppressive a requirement as that imposed upon public officials and employees to file
such sworn statement of assets and liabilities every two years after having done so upon assuming office…There was therefore no unconstitutional
exercise of police power.”

1. Right to privacy

 Right to be let alone

 “It cannot be said that the challenged statutory provision calls for disclosure of information which infringes on the right of a person to
privacy. It cannot be denied that the rational relationship such a requirement possesses with the objective of a valid statute goes very far in precluding
assent to an objection of such character. This is not to say that a public officer, by virtue of position he holds, is bereft of constitutional protection; it is only
to emphasize that in subjecting him to such a further compulsory revelation of his assets and liabilities, including the statement of the amounts of personal
and family expenses, and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year, there is no unconstitutional intrusion into what
otherwise would be a private sphere.”

1. Unreasonable Search and Seizure

 The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure does not give freedom from testimonial compulsion.

1. Right against self-incrimination

 We are not aware of any constitutional provision designed to protect a man’s conduct from judicial inquiry, or aid him in fleeing from justice.

1. Insult to personal integrity and official dignity

 Only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, mey be the basis for declaring a statute invalid.

Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, Sr.

FACTS:

On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria Hing filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City a
Complaintfor Injunction and Damages with prayer for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction/Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO), docketed as Civil Case MAN-5223 and raffled to Branch 28, against respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan
Choachuy.

Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land (Lot 1900-B) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 42817 situated in Barangay Basak, City of Mandaue, Cebu;that respondents are the owners of Aldo Development & Resources,
Inc. (Aldo) located at Lots 1901 and 1900-C, adjacent to the property of petitioners;that respondents constructed an auto-repair shop
building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on Lot 1900-C; that in April 2005, Aldo filed a case against petitioners for Injunction and
Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TRO, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-5125;that in that case, Aldo claimed that
petitioners were constructing a fence without a valid permit and that the said construction would destroy the wall of its building, which
is adjacent to petitioners property;that the court, in that case, denied Aldos application for preliminary injunction for failure to
substantiate its allegations;that, in order to get evidence to support the said case, respondents on June 13, 2005 illegally set-up and
installed on the building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec two video surveillance cameras facing petitioners property;that respondents,
through their employees and without the consent of petitioners, also took pictures of petitioners on-going construction;and that the acts
of respondents violate petitioners right to [Link], petitioners prayed that respondents be ordered to remove the video
surveillance cameras and enjoined from conducting illegal surveillance.

In their Answer with Counterclaim,respondents claimed that they did not install the video surveillance cameras,nor did they order their
employees to take pictures of petitioners [Link] also clarified that they are not the owners of Aldo but are mere
stockholders.

On October 18, 2005, the RTC issued an Ordergranting the application for a TRO.

Respondents moved for a reconsiderationbut the RTC denied the same in its Orderdated February 6, 2006.

Aggrieved, respondents filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with application for a TRO
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

On July 10, 2007, the CA issued its Decisiongranting the Petition for Certiorari. The CA ruled that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
was issued with grave abuse of discretion because petitioners failed to show a clear and unmistakable right to an injunctive [Link]
CA explained that the right to privacy of residence under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code was not violated since the property subject of
the controversy is not used as a residence. The CA alsosaid that since respondents are not the owners of the building, they could not
have installed video surveillance [Link] are mere stockholders of Aldo, which has a separate juridical [Link], they
are not the proper parties.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not there is a violation of petitioners right to privacy?

2. Whether or not respondents are the proper parties to this suit?

HELD: Court of Appeals decision is reversed.

POLITICAL LAW: right to privacy

The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitutionand in our laws. It is defined as "the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation
of ones person or from intrusion into ones private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a persons ordinary sensibilities."It
is the right of an individual "to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted interference by the public in matters
in which the public is not necessarily concerned."Simply put, the right to privacy is "the right to be let alone."

The Bill of Rights guarantees the peoples right to privacy and protects them against the States abuse of power. In this regard, the State
recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their houses. No one, not even the State, except "in case of overriding social need and
then only under the stringent procedural safeguards," can disturb them in the privacy of their homes.

CIVIL LAW: right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code covers business offices where the public are excluded
therefrom and only certain individuals are allowed to enter.

Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an individuals right to privacy and provides a legal remedy against abuses
that may be committed against him by other individuals. It states:
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The
following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention
and other relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of anothers residence;

This provision recognizes that a mans house is his castle, where his right to privacy cannot be denied or even restricted by others. It
includes "any act of intrusion into, peeping or peering inquisitively into the residence of another without the consent of the latter."The
phrase "prying into the privacy of anothers residence," however, does not mean that only the residence is entitled to privacy. As
elucidated by Civil law expert Arturo M. Tolentino:

Our Code specifically mentions "prying into the privacy of anothers residence." This does not mean, however, that only the residence
is entitled to privacy, because the law covers also "similar acts." A business office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is
excluded therefrom and only such individuals as are allowed to enter may come in.

Thus, an individuals right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to his house or residence as it may
extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny them access. The phrase "prying into the privacy of anothers
residence," therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private. And as long as his right is
recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application
of Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences.

POLITICAL LAW: the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test to determine whether there is a violation of the right to
privacy.

In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test. This test
determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the expectation has been [Link] Ople v.
Torres,we enunciated that "the reasonableness of a persons expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his
conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable."
Customs, community norms, and practices may, therefore, limit or extend an individuals "reasonable expectation of privacy." Hence,
the reasonableness of a persons expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual
circumstances surrounding the case.

In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone. The
installation of these cameras, however, should not cover places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of
the individual, whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained. Nor should these cameras be used to pry into the privacy of
anothers residence or business office as it would be no different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under Republic Act No. 4200 or
the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

In this case, the RTC, in granting the application for Preliminary Injunction, ruled that:

After careful consideration, there is basis to grant the application for a temporary restraining order. The operation by respondents of a
revolving camera, even if it were mounted on their building, violated the right of privacy of petitioners, who are the owners of the
adjacent lot. The camera does not only focus on respondents property or the roof of the factory at the back (Aldo Development and
Resources, Inc.) but it actually spans through a good portion of the land of petitioners.

Based on the ocular inspection, the Court understands why petitioner Hing was so unyielding in asserting that the revolving camera
was set up deliberately to monitor the on[-]going construction in his property. The monitor showed only a portion of the roof of the
factory of Aldo. If the purpose of respondents in setting up a camera at the back is to secure the building and factory premises, then
the camera should revolve only towards their properties at the back. Respondents camera cannot be made to extend the view to
petitioners lot. To allow the respondents to do that over the objection of the petitioners would violate the right of petitioners as
property owners. "The owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person."

The RTC, thus, considered that petitioners have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in their property, whether they use it as a
business office or as a residence and that the installation of video surveillance cameras directly facing petitioners property or covering
a significant portion thereof, without their consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy. As we see then, the issuance of a
preliminary injunction was justified. We need not belabor that the issuance of a preliminary injunction is discretionary on the part of
the court taking cognizance of the case and should not be interfered with, unless there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the
[Link], there is no indication of any grave abuse of discretion. Hence, the CA erred in finding that petitioners are not entitled to an
injunctive writ.

This brings us to the next question: whether respondents are the proper parties to this suit.
REMEDEIAL LAW: A real party defendant

Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 2. Parties-in-interest. A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended
in the name of the real party-in-interest.

A real party defendant is "one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of the
defendants act or omission which had violated the legal right of the former."

In ruling that respondents are not the proper parties, the CA reasoned that since they do not own the building, they could not have
installed the video surveillance cameras. Such reasoning, however, is erroneous. The fact that respondents are not the registered
owners of the building does not automatically mean that they did not cause the installation of the video surveillance cameras.

In their Complaint, petitioners claimed that respondents installed the video surveillance cameras in order to fish for evidence, which
could be used against petitioners in another [Link] the hearing of the application for Preliminary Injunction, petitioner Bill
testified that when respondents installed the video surveillance cameras, he immediately broached his concerns but they did not seem
to care,and thus, he reported the matter to the barangay for mediation, and eventually, filed a Complaint against respondents before the
[Link] also admitted that as early as 1998 there has already been a dispute between his family and the Choachuy family concerning
the boundaries of their respective [Link] these factual circumstances in mind, we believe that respondents are the proper
parties to be impleaded.

Moreover, although Aldo has a juridical personality separate and distinct from its stockholders, records show that it is a family-owned
corporation managed by the Choachuy family.

Also quite telling is the fact that respondents, notwithstanding their claim that they are not owners of the building, allowed the court to
enter the compound of Aldo and conduct an ocular inspection. The counsel for respondents even toured Judge Marilyn Lagura-Yap
inside the building and answered all her questions regarding the set-up and installation of the video surveillance [Link] when
respondents moved for reconsideration of the Order dated October 18, 2005 of the RTC, one of the arguments they raised is that Aldo
would suffer damages if the video surveillance cameras are removed and [Link], in these instances, the personalities of
respondents and Aldo seem to merge.

All these taken together lead us to the inevitable conclusion that respondents are merely using the corporate fiction of Aldo as
a shield to protect themselves from this suit. In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents are the proper parties to this
suit.