MMDA VS CONCERNED CITIZENS OF MANILA BAY

FACTS:

Respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the RTC in Imus, Cavite against
several government agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and
protection of the Manila Bay.

The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable
standards set by law, specifically PD. 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code. Respondents, as
plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a
concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.

The RTC Ordered Petitioners to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay.

The DENR, DPWH, Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast Guard , PNP
Maritime Group, and five other executive departments and agencies filed directly with this Court a
petition for review under Rule 45.

Petitioners were one in arguing in the main that the pertinent provisions of the Environment Code
relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. And apart
from raising concerns about the lack of funds appropriated for cleaning purposes, petitioners also
asserted that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by
mandamus.

The CA denied petitioners appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto, stressing that the trial
courts decision did not require petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions under
existing laws.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners can be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay.

RULING:

The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus.

Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. A ministerial duty is
one that requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment. It connotes an act in which
nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing it. It is a simple, definite duty arising under
conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law. Mandamus is available to compel action,
when refused, on matters involving discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion
one way or the other.

First off, we wish to state that petitioners obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one
hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different concepts. While the
implementation of the MMDAs mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement
of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be
compelled by mandamus. We said so in Social Justice Society v. Atienza[11] in which the Court directed
the City of Manila to enforce, as a matter of ministerial duty, its Ordinance No. 8027 directing the three
big local oil players to cease and desist from operating their business in the so-called Pandacan
Terminals within six months from the effectivity of the ordinance. But to illustrate with respect to the
instant case, the MMDA’s duty to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste
and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems is ministerial, its duty being a
statutory imposition. The MMDA’s duty in this regard is spelled out in Sec. 3(c) of RA 7924 creating the
MMDA.

The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not only in the
Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper
waste disposal system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion
presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act officially according to their
judgment or conscience.

A discretionary duty is one that allows a person to exercise judgment and choose to perform or not to
perform. Any suggestion that the MMDA has the option whether or not to perform its solid waste
disposal-related duties ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis.

A perusal of other petitioners respective charters or like enabling statutes and pertinent laws would
yield this conclusion: these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to
perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and
preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to perform these duties.

SUNVILLE TIMBER PRODUCTS, INC. VS HON. ALFONSO G. ABAD

FACTS:

The petitioner was granted a Timber License Agreement (TLA), authorizing it to cut, remove and utilize
timber within the concession area covering 29,500 hectares of forest land in Zamboanga del Sur, for a
period of ten years expiring on September 31, 1992.

In 1987, herein private respondents filed a petition with the DENR for the cancellation of the TLA on the
ground of serious violations of its conditions and the provisions of forestry laws and regulations.

The same charges were subsequently made, also by the herein private respondents, in a complaint for
injunction with damages against the petitioner.

The petitioner moved to dismiss this case on three grounds, to wit: 1) the court had no jurisdiction over
the complaint; 2) the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted administrative remedies; and 3) the injunction
sought was expressly prohibited by section 1 of PD 605.

Judge Alfonso G. Abad denied the motion to dismiss and the motion for reconsideration. The petitioner
then elevated the matter to the CA, which sustained the trial court .The CA held that the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without exception and pointed to the several instances
approved by this Court where it could be dispensed with. The respondent court found that in the case
before it, the applicable exception was the urgent need for judicial intervention, which it explained thus:
The lower court found out that sometime on July 1981, the City Council of Pagadian in its Resolution No.
111 requested the Bureau of Forest Development to reserve 1,000 hectares in Lison Valley. This request
remained unacted upon. Instead in 1982, a TLA covering 29,500 hectares, including the area requested,
was given to petitioner.

Then the fear expressed by the City Council of Pagadian in its resolution became reality.

"As averred in the complaint, the erosion caused by the logging operations of the defendant has caused
heavy siltation not only in the Labangan River (as predicted by the City Council of Pagadian City in 1981)
but also in the Tukuran River, Salug River, Sindangan River, and Sibuguey River. In other words, the
adverse effects of the logging operations of the defendant have already covered a wider area than that
feared to be adversely affected by the City Council of Pagadian City.

Floods are unknown phenomena in heavily forested areas years back, particularly in the Island of
Mindanao. When the grant of logging concessions started, so was the denudation of forests. . . . It is
common knowledge that heavy floods have occurred in areas/places adjoining logging concessions.
(Resolution dated December 11, 1987, p. 5).

Thus, it is urgent that indiscriminate logging be stopped. Irreparable damage would ensue unless the
court intervenes. Reliance on the DENR may not be enough, judging from its inaction on the council's
request seven years back.

ISSUES:

Whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not correctly applied.

RULING:

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate
administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the
same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. Non-observance of the doctrine results in lack
of a cause of action, which is one of the grounds allowed in the Rules of Court for the dismissal of the
complaint. The deficiency is not jurisdictional. Failure to invoke it operates as a waiver of the objection
as a ground for a motion to dismiss and the court may then proceed with the case as if the doctrine had
been observed.

One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which enjoins upon the
Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming primarily (albeit not exclusively)
within the competence of the other departments. The theory is that the administrative authorities are in
a better position to resolve questions addressed to their particular expertise and that errors committed
by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given a chance to do so. A no
less important consideration is that administrative decisions are usually questioned in the special civil
actions of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, which are allowed only when there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy available to the petitioner. It may be added that strict enforcement of the
rule could also relieve the courts of a considerable number of avoidable cases which otherwise would
burden their heavily loaded dockets.
As correctly suggested by the respondent court, however, there are a number of instances when the
doctrine may be dispensed with and judicial action validly resorted to immediately.

Among these exceptional cases are:

1) when the question raised is purely legal;

2) when the administrative body is in estoppel;

3) when the act complained of is patently illegal;

4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention;

5) when the claim involved is small;

6) when irreparable damage will be suffered;

7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;

8) when strong public interest is involved;

9) when the subject of the controversy is private land; and

10) in quo warranto proceedings.

The private respondents now submit that their complaint comes under the exceptions because forestry
laws do not require observance of the doctrine as a condition precedent to judicial action; the question
they are raising is purely legal; application of the doctrine will cause great and irreparable damage; and
public interest is involved. We rule for the petitioner.

Even if it be assumed that the forestry laws do not expressly require prior resort to administrative
remedies, the reasons for the doctrine above given, if nothing else, would suffice to still require its
observance. Even if such reasons were disregarded, there would still be the explicit language of
pertinent laws vesting in the DENR the power and function “to regulate the development, disposition,
extraction, exploration and use of the country’s forests” and “to exercise exclusive jurisdiction” in the
“management and disposition of all lands of the public domain,” and in the Forest Management Bureau
(formerly the Bureau of Forest Development) the responsibility for the enforcement of the forestry laws
aid regulations here claimed to have been violated. This comprehensive conferment clearly implies at
the very least that the DENR should be allowed to rule in the first instance on any controversy coming
under its express powers before the courts of justice may intervene.

The argument that the questions raised in the petition are purely legal is also not acceptable. The
private respondents have charged, both in the administrative case before the DENR and in the civil case
before the RTC, that the petitioner has violated the terms and conditions of the TLA and the provisions
of forestry laws and regulations.

The charge involves factual issues calling for the presentation of supporting evidence. Such evidence is
best evaluated first by the administrative authorities, employing their specialized knowledge of the
agreement and the rules allegedly violated, before the courts may step in to exercise their powers of
review.
As for the alleged urgent necessity for judicial action and the claimed adverse impact of the case on the
national interest, the record does not show that the petitioners have satisfactorily established these
extraordinary circumstances to justify deviation from the doctrine by exhaustion of administrative
remedies and immediate resort to the courts of justice. In fact, this particular submission must fall flat
against the petitioner’s uncontested contention that it has since 1988 stopped its operations under the
TLA in compliance with the order of the DENR.

CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO VS MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY AKLAN

FACTS:

Boracay Island West Cove Management Philippines, Inc. applied for a building permit covering the
construction of a three-storey hotel over a parcel of land in Malay, Aklan, which is covered by a Forest
Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) issued by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR). The Municipal Zoning Administrator denied petitioner’s application on the
ground that the proposed construction site was within the “no build zone” demarcated in Municipal
Ordinance 2000-131.

Petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the Mayor but despite follow up, no action was
ever taken by the respondent mayor.

A Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal government, enjoining the expansion of the
resort, and on June 7, 2011, the Office of the Mayor of Malay, Aklan issued the assailed EO 10, ordering
the closure and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel.

EO 10 was partially implemented on June 10, 2011. Thereafter, two more instances followed wherein
respondents demolished the improvements introduced by Boracay West Cove.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief with the CA Alleging that the
order was issued and executed with grave abuse of discretion

Contentions of West Cove:

1) The hotel cannot summarily be abated because it is not a nuisance per se, given the hundred million
peso-worth of capital infused in the venture.

2) Municipality of Malay, Aklan should have first secured a court order before proceeding with the
demolition.

Contention of the Mayor: The demolition needed no court order because the municipal mayor has the
express power under the Local Government Code (LGC) to order the removal of illegally constructed
buildings

The CA dismissed the petition solely on procedural ground, i.e., the special writ of certiorari can only be
directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions and since the
issuance of EO 10 was done in the exercise of executive functions, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial
functions, certiorari will not lie.
ISSUE:

Whether the judicial proceedings should first be conducted before the LGU can order the closure and
demolition of the property in question.

RULING:

The Court ruled that the property involved cannot be classified as a nuisance per se which can therefore
be summarily abated. Here, it is merely the hotel’s particular incident, its location and not its inherent
qualities that rendered it a nuisance. Otherwise stated, had it not been constructed in the no build zone,
Boracay West Cove could have secured the necessary permits without issue. As such, even if the hotel is
not a nuisance per se, it is still a nuisance per accidens.

Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such a thing is a
nuisance per se. Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, the LGU may
nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition. This is because, in the exercise of police power and
the general welfare clause, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in
order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Moreover, the Local Government Code authorizes city
and municipal governments, acting through their local chief executives, to issue demolition orders. The
office of the mayor has quasi-judicial powers to order the closing and demolition of establishments.

Petition is denied.