Military Air Tactics

After last night's Apache shootdown and the successful recovery of the aircrew, many commentators rushed to declare it the first use of an unmanned vehicle to recover friendly forces. It wasn't. More than a month ago, Ukrainian forces used an unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) to recover a wounded soldier trapped in a semi-encircled position. The robotic evacuation platform covered more than 36 kilometers, reached speeds approaching 70 km/h, and successfully brought the casualty to safety—even after striking two anti-personnel mines on the return trip. That is a remarkable achievement, but the real story is much bigger than who was first. We're witnessing a fundamental shift in how militaries think about risk. For decades, recovering a downed aircrew or wounded soldier meant sending more people into the kill zone, accepting that rescuers might become casualties themselves. Today, unmanned systems are beginning to change that equation. The strategic implications are profound: • Casualty evacuation can occur without exposing additional personnel. • Commanders gain options to recover isolated forces in areas dominated by drones and precision fires. • Ground robots become reusable logistics and rescue assets rather than single-purpose platforms. • Adversaries now have to plan for a force that can sustain operations while dramatically reducing the human cost of recovery missions. This is more than another drone story. It is the convergence of autonomy, networking, and battlefield robotics into a new doctrine where machines increasingly absorb the highest-risk tasks. If you think this is big, keep in mind the same will be done very soon with an air vehicle, challenging yet another dogmatic norm we take for granted. The OODA loop continues to accelerate, and the side that integrates these capabilities fastest will gain an outsized operational advantage. Innovation in modern warfare is no longer measured in decades or even years—it is measured in weeks.

The recent revelation that a Hezbollah FPV drone struck the convoy of Israeli Northern Command chief Maj. Gen. Rafi Milo in southern Lebanon should serve as a warning to military leaders around the world. According to Israeli officials, the explosive drone impacted a vehicle belonging to the general shortly after he exited it, narrowly avoiding what could have become one of the most significant leadership losses of the conflict. While no casualties were reported, the incident demonstrates how rapidly drone warfare is changing the battlefield. For decades, targeting senior military leaders required advanced intelligence networks, sophisticated surveillance platforms, and expensive precision-guided munitions. Today, a relatively inexpensive FPV drone operated by a non-state actor can achieve a similar effect. The strike highlights how lessons learned in Ukraine have spread across the Middle East, where groups like Hezbollah are increasingly integrating reconnaissance drones, FPV attack systems, and evolving targeting techniques into their operations. The battlefield is becoming increasingly transparent, and commanders can no longer assume that traditional security measures alone will protect them from persistent aerial surveillance and precision attack. The broader lesson extends far beyond Lebanon or Israel. Modern warfare is entering an era where drones are not merely supporting battlefield operations but actively shaping strategic outcomes. The rise of FPV drones and fiber-optic controlled systems is challenging many of the assumptions behind current counter-UAS strategies, particularly those that rely heavily on electronic warfare and signal jamming. As drone technology becomes cheaper, more effective, and more widely available, military organizations will be forced to rethink force protection, command and control, and battlefield survivability. At Cobalt Academy Inc., we closely study developments like this because they reveal how quickly drone warfare is reshaping military operations and why practical education, counter-UAS readiness, and operator training are becoming increasingly important. The Hezbollah strike against a senior Israeli commander was not simply a battlefield incident. It was another reminder that the future of warfare is already here, and organizations that fail to adapt to the realities of drone warfare risk finding themselves vulnerable in ways that would have seemed unimaginable only a few years ago. #DroneWarfare #CounterUAS #FPVDrones #ModernWarfare #NationalSecurity #DefenseTechnology #MilitaryInnovation #UnmannedSystems #Israel #Hezbollah #DroneThreats #MilitaryLeadership #FutureOfWarfare #CobaltAcademyInc #BattlefieldSurvivability

🛡️ 𝐍𝐨 𝐖𝐡𝐢𝐭𝐞 𝐒𝐰𝐚𝐧 𝐢𝐬 𝐂𝐨𝐦𝐢𝐧𝐠 — 𝐙𝐚𝐥𝐮𝐳𝐡𝐧𝐲𝐢 𝐨𝐧 𝐰𝐚𝐫, 𝐞𝐱𝐩𝐨𝐫𝐭𝐬, 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐬𝐮𝐫𝐯𝐢𝐯𝐚𝐥 🎙️ “This is a real war to exhaustion. A high-tech war for survival.” — General Valerii Zaluzhnyi At the forum “Export of Security: Ukrainian Technological Weapons in the World”, Zaluzhnyi delivered a stark message: there will be no miracle peace, no return to 1991 or 2022 without breaking Russia’s ability to wage war. 📦 On defense exports, Zaluzhnyi outlines 3 core dimensions: ▪️ A source of resources for survival and growth ▪️ A driver of innovation in military design and application ▪️ A strategic tool for integrating into future alliances through experience-sharing ⚔️ On the nature of modern war: ▪️ Ukraine cannot rely on manpower — it must win with low-cost, high-tech asymmetry ▪️ The only path forward is to break Russia’s military-economic engine ▪️ This means: – Making the cost of war unbearable for Russia – Undermining Russia’s scientific and social base – Continuing economic development in wartime, as Israel does 🧭 On Ukraine’s current challenges: ▪️ Limited R&D and coordination across key sectors (ISR, air defense, unmanned systems) ▪️ Ukraine is losing the innovation race in areas where it once led ▪️ No systematic approach to scaling, doctrine design, or organizational integration ▪️ Tech exports must go beyond hardware — they must include: – New weapons + new methods of employment – New doctrines, training models, and force structures – A redefinition of how we budget for security 🤝 On what must be done: ▪️ Build a national innovation-based survival policy ▪️ Forge international tech partnerships to co-develop, co-produce, and co-scale ▪️ Coordinate state, private sector, and civil society ▪️ Balance military urgency with economic sustainability “No weapon that’s effective now will remain effective tonight.” Zaluzhnyi’s message is clear: Ukraine must become a global exporter of defense thinking — not just defense hardware. This requires structure, speed, and statecraft. #Zaluzhnyi #Ukraine #DefenseInnovation #WarEconomy #SecurityExports #SurvivalStrategy #ISR #AirDefense #DoctrineDevelopment #MilitaryTransformation #TechSovereignty #DefenseIndustry #ModernWarfare

In just 6 months, former Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov implemented changes that significantly changed the course of the war: Key achievements: • Russian forces were denied access to Starlink, sharply reducing their capabilities in drone warfare. • More drones were procured within several months than during the entire previous year, with a focus on FPV drones, deep-strike systems, interceptor drones, ground robots, and reconnaissance platforms. • The “Logistics Lockdown” program was launched, enabling systematic strikes against enemy supply lines and paving the way for the isolation of Crimea. • A new procurement system based on open tenders was introduced, saving billions of dollars. • Pickups, buggies, and quad bikes were purchased for the military on a large scale for the first time. • The effectiveness of Ukraine’s air defense increased significantly: drone interception rates rose from 83% to 91%, while cruise missile interception increased from 47% to 87%. • Missiles for Patriot systems were contracted, and funding for further procurement was secured. • Grant programs were launched for manufacturers of missiles and explosives. • Military service reform was initiated, including fixed-term contracts, increased payments for infantry personnel, and the recruitment of foreign volunteers. • At Ramstein meetings, commitments for $40 billion in military assistance to Ukraine were secured. • Ukraine successfully tested a domestically produced ballistic missile. Its cost was reduced by 30%, while its accuracy was significantly improved. • A contract was signed for the procurement of Swedish Gripen fighter jets. • Operation “Auchan” was carried out, disrupting a mechanized russian offensive for approximately six months. • Exports of Ukrainian defense industry products were launched under the Drone Deal program, while the Trophy Lab and Defense AI Center were established to advance military technology and artificial intelligence. This list demonstrates how rapidly Ukraine’s defense industry was transforming, with a focus on technology, mass production, long-range strike capabilities, and artificial intelligence.

Ukraine just used a $100K underwater drone to strike a $300M Russian submarine in port. This is asymmetric naval warfare; small, autonomous, distributed systems versus large platforms. Ukraine has little naval fleet left. Russia operates the Black Sea Fleet with submarines, destroyers, and cruisers. Yet Ukraine was able to hit Russia in Novorossiysk, a port that was considered safe. This is what the Hedge Strategy looks like in combat. Force multiplication through autonomous systems you can afford to lose, threatening platforms the enemy can't.

Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, Chair of the NATO Military Committee, said a phrase that sounds quiet but carries significant weight: the possibility of a more assertive — even pre-emptive — response by the Alliance to Russian cyberattacks, sabotage, and airspace violations is no longer taboo. He acknowledges that NATO faces more ethical and legal constraints than an aggressor state, which makes defense more difficult. Yet at the same time, he hints that the Alliance is preparing to move away from its “traditional way of thinking.” This signal should be read on three levels. First, the Admiral is talking about a shift in understanding defense itself: from reactive to proactive. This implies actions that may precede the next attack if there is reason to believe it is imminent. Not escalation — but a refusal to remain a target. The second level is acknowledging the weak point of democracies. NATO cannot act the way Russia does. There are parliaments, courts, legal frameworks, and decision-making processes. This is a foundation, but also a brake. The adversary exploits it, striking in the grey zone where it is difficult to define a clear threshold for response. Dragone is essentially saying: we no longer want to be hostages to our own decency. The third level is a warning. Russia must understand that cable sabotage, attacks on infrastructure, or airspace violations will no longer be treated as minor incidents. The Alliance is preparing to view them as a phase of conflict, not as “inconveniences.” This is not a change of statute, but a change of mood — and in the West, mood often precedes policy. As for practical consequences, the most likely scenarios of such a “more assertive response” look measured but firm. They may include quickly neutralizing the sources of cyberattacks before they cause damage, or temporarily disabling the infrastructure from which hostile operations are conducted. Preventive actions in the air are also possible — from forced landings to interceptions with demonstrative escort. This also includes intelligence operations against sabotage groups on European territory — not after the fact, but during preparation. This does not look like a path to a direct war between NATO and Russia. It is rather an attempt to strip Moscow of the illusion that hybrid attacks will remain unpunished until they become catastrophic. The Alliance is tired of living in the mode of waiting for the next strike — and is finally saying so out loud.

Ukraine is the C-student, the U.S. is the straight-A student. But the U.S. must learn from Ukraine speed, cheap production, and asymmetric war. Michael Brown and Matt Kaplan write in Foreign Affairs that Washington must draw hard lessons from Ukraine to prepare for China. The U.S. bet on short wars and exquisite systems after 1991. Ukraine shows the opposite: wars are long, attritional, software-driven. Mass and adaptation beat prestige platforms. Ukraine started the war with one small warship. Russia had a fleet. Ukraine destroyed or disabled 25+ Russian ships — about one-third of the Black Sea Fleet — including the cruiser Moskva. Blockade broken and grain exports resumed. In spring 2025, Ukraine smuggled 117 FPV drones near five Russian airfields. Cost per drone: a few thousand dollars. Damage: up to 30% of Russia’s strategic bombers. Estimated cost to Moscow: $7 billion. Drone war now evolves in three-week cycles. Ukraine attacks. Russia jams. Ukraine adds computer vision. Russia expands jammers. Software updates decide survival within days, not years. Cheap drones — hundreds of dollars — replaced $100,000 Excalibur precision shells. Precision moved to small teams near the frontline. Scale replaced elegance. Contrast this with the U.S.: F-35 — 20 years development, $80m per jet. Ford-class carrier — $13bn. B-21 — in development since early 2010s. For the cost of one aircraft carrier, the Pentagon could buy 13 million drones — nearly 100 per U.S. infantryman. Yet only 20% of the $900bn defense budget goes to procurement. 17% goes to developing new exquisite platforms. China’s shipbuilding capacity is 200× that of the U.S. In a prolonged war, manufacturing wins. Quantity has a quality of its own. Imagine a Pacific conflict where satellites are jammed, carriers are targeted, logistics degrade, and drones swarm at scale. Would exquisite platforms survive attrition? Or would cheap, modular systems dominate? Brown and Kaplan argue: — War-game asymmetric threats seriously. — Rebuild stockpiles. — Invest in modular systems. — Use 3D printing and scalable drone production. — Design for replacement, not perfection. Russia planned a three-day war. It has lasted four years. The next conflict will not wait for 20-year procurement cycles. If you were the Pentagon, what would you build first — another carrier, or a factory that produces millions of drones?

Former CIA Director Petraeus: U.S. success in the Persian Gulf is a source of pride, but not a reason for complacency. Ukraine offers the key lessons: modern warfare involves drones, AI, and precision-strike capabilities. That is where the real challenges and the future of warfare lie. The battlefield in Ukraine is far more complex than the Persian Gulf. Drones are jammed, intercepted, and quickly replaced. This is a war on an industrial scale, where mass, resilience, and innovation are decisive. Without a conventional navy, Ukraine was able to use maritime drones to disable a significant portion of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and force it to retreat. Cheap unmanned systems can break traditional naval power. U.S. and Israeli operations in the Persian Gulf took place under much easier conditions, with control over communications and navigation. The enemy is unable to operate on a massive scale across all domains. Unlike in Ukraine, where a constant, large-scale, and adaptive war is underway. Lesson #1 — Volume is key. Ukraine produces them by the millions, up to 7 million a year. The U.S. doesn’t even come close to that scale. Lesson #2 — Speed of adaptation. The advantage goes to whoever learns faster. In Ukraine, drones are updated weekly, hardware every few weeks, and tactics change just as quickly. Lesson #3 — Resilience. Systems must operate under electronic warfare and without communication. This leads to autonomous drones and swarms capable of penetrating air defense systems. Even modern systems are already struggling; autonomous ones will pose an even greater challenge. The U.S. Army needs rapid and radical changes. New approaches must transform everything: from training to procurement. The U.S. demonstrated its strength in the Gulf; Ukraine is facing a real war under pressure. This should not lull us into complacency but rather heighten the sense of urgency. General David H. Petraeus, US Army (Ret.)

Part 6. Cyber before tanks — this is how Russia wages war. Long before missiles hit infrastructure or drones fill the sky, Russian services are already inside networks: government, power grids, logistics routes, satellites, banks, media. Ukraine has lived through this for a decade. Estonia did in 2007. Georgia did in 2008. Europe felt the shockwaves of NotPetya. NATO satellite links were targeted on day one of the invasion. This is not “IT disruption.” It is pre-invasion shaping operations. A doctrine where non-kinetic tools prepare the battlefield for kinetic assault. And it is happening right now across Europe — ports, energy, telecoms, critical infrastructure. Cyber is the first front. If we wait for tanks to appear, we are already late. Part 6: Cyber Before Tanks – Hybrid Doctrine in Action How Russia built this playbook. How Ukraine adapted. And what Europe must do — now. #NATO #CyberSecurity #HybridWarfare #Ukraine #Deterrence #CriticalInfrastructure #C2 #CyberDefense #InfoOps #Resilience