Marxists do not deny that a famine occurred in the Soviet Union in 1932-1933. Soviet archives, along with various Western historians, confirm this. What remains contested is the narrative that this famine was a deliberate, man-made genocide aimed specifically at the Ukrainian people. This portrayal, pushed by nationalist factions and later Cold War propaganda, finds its roots in the disinformation campaigns initiated by Nazi Germany to showcase the “terror” of the so-called “Jewish communists” to the world.
– Socialist Musings. (2017). Stop Spreading Nazi Propaganda: on Holodomor
Anti-Communists and Ukrainian nationalists have framed the Soviet famine of 1932-1933 as “The Holodomor” (which means “to kill by starvation” in Ukrainian). This framing serves two purposes:
- It implies that the famine specifically targeted Ukraine.
- It suggests that the famine was intentional.
The argument posits that because it was intentional and mainly affected Ukraine, it was, therefore, an act of genocide. This interpretation was first promoted by Nazi Germany during World War II, seeking to fracture the relationship between the Ukrainian SSR (UKSSR)and the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic(RSFSR). Since the 2004 Orange Revolution, the Holodomor narrative has regained momentum, serving nationalist goals by reinforcing Ukrainian identity and fostering the country’s independence from Russia.
The Geographical Reality: Famine Across the USSR
A central problem with the Holodomor narrative is its assertion that Ukraine was the primary target. The reality is that famine spread across large swathes of the Soviet Union. Regions like Kazakhstan were, in fact, more devastated on a per capita basis than Ukraine, while Soviet Russia also suffered severe losses. This broader Soviet famine refutes the genocide argument, showing the effects of poor agricultural policies and environmental disaster across multiple Soviet regions, not just Ukraine (Tauger, 1992).
The rise of the Holodomor narrative in the 1980s coincided with Ukrainian post-Soviet nation-building. Some scholars, like Peter Novick, argue that this narrative reflects a form of “Holocaust Envy,” where nationalists attempt to downplay other atrocities (such as the Holocaust) to elevate their own experience as uniquely tragic. The Ukrainian scholar Lubomyr Luciuk has controversially claimed that the Holodomor was “a crime against humanity arguably without parallel in European history,” reflecting the extreme lengths taken to establish this narrative.
Second Issue
Labeling the famine “man-made” implies that it was deliberate, which was not the case. Although human factors contributed, the main causes of the famine were bad weather and crop disease, which resulted in poor harvests and pushed the USSR into crisis.
Furthermore, kulaks (wealthy peasants owning land, livestock, and tools) who resisted collectivization policies played a significant role in worsening the situation. In the early 1930s In response to the state-enforced requisitioning of grain, some kulaks engaged in active sabotage, burning crops, killing livestock and damaging equipment to resist the Soviet government’s efforts. Poor communication and delayed action across various levels of government also compounded the crisis, leading to greater devastation.
Quota Reduction
What undermines the genocide argument most significantly is the Soviet government’s response once the famine began. Contrary to the narrative that the USSR deliberately starved its citizens, evidence shows that the Central Committee reduced grain procurement quotas after realizing the gravity of the 1932 harvest failure. In May 1932, the planned procurement quota was reduced by 30%, and subsequent decrees further reduced the quotas for various agricultural products. Despite the challenges, Soviet authorities made active efforts to address the crisis, although their actions were far from sufficient (Mark Tauger. (1992). The 1932 Harvest and the Famine of 1933).
Notably, revisionist scholars like James Mace and Robert Conquest have downplayed or entirely ignored these quota reductions, instead focusing on the famine as proof of Soviet intent to starve Ukrainians. Conquest’s work, for example, avoids any discussion of the lower grain procurement targets, despite Soviet records showing that the government tried to mitigate the famine’s effects (Davies & Wheatcroft, 2004 Link).
Rapid Industrialization
Soviet policies of rapid industrialization and collectivization contributed directly to the famine. However, had these efforts not been pursued, the Soviet Union would have faced far greater difficulties later. Stalin’s famous statement in 1931—”We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it, or we shall go under”—proved eerily prophetic when Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union just a decade later.
By 1941, the USSR had built a robust industrial base, which was essential in its defeat of Nazi Germany. The rapid industrialization of the early 1930s allowed the Soviet Union to produce the weapons, tanks, and planes that would eventually win the war. In Hitler’s own words from 1942,
“All in all, one has to say: They built factories here where two years ago there were unknown farming villages, factories the size of the Hermann-Göring-Werke. They have railroads that aren’t even marked on the map.”
– Werner Jochmann. (1980). Adolf Hitler. Monologe im Führerhauptquartier 1941-1944.
Thus, while the cost was heavy, including the famine, this industrial base saved the USSR from destruction during World War II.
Collectivization also built resilience among the civilian population:
The experts were especially surprised by the Red Army’s up-to-date equipment… Russians met the German blitzkrieg tactic by two methods, both requiring superb morale. When the German tanks broke through, Russian infantry would form again between the tanks and their supporting German infantry… The Germans found no “soft civilian rear.” They encountered collective farmers, organized as guerrillas and coordinated with the regular Russian army.
– Anna Louise Strong. (1956). The Stalin Era
Conclusion: A Tragedy, Not Genocide
While there is no doubt that the Soviet government mishandled the famine, leading to tragic and widespread suffering, evidence does not support the conclusion that the famine was an act of genocide. The conditions leading to the famine were driven by a mix of environmental crises, poor policies, and sabotage—not by a deliberate attempt to wipe out the Ukrainian population. The Holodomor narrative has been shaped over decades by external propaganda efforts and nationalist revisionism, but a balanced view reveals a broader Soviet tragedy, not an ethnic genocide.
Sources:
Articles, Essays, and Web Archives:
- In Search of a Soviet Holocaust: A 55-Year-Old Famine Feeds the Right | Jeff Coplon
- Current Knowledge of the Level and Nature of Mortality in the Ukrainian Famine of 1931-1933
- By S. G. Wheatcroft
- Archive Link
- The 1932 Harvest and the Famine of 1933
- By Mark Tauger (1992)
- ResearchGate Link
- The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931-1933
- By R. W. Davies and Stephen G. Wheatcroft (2004)
- Book Review (Archive)
- Link
- Holodomor Hoax Invented by Hitler and the West
- Sputnik News (2015)
- Archive Link
- Authors of the Black Book of Communism Reject Claim of 100 Million Dead
- Article (in French, translation required)
- Archive Link
- The Soviet Famine of 1932–1933 Reconsidered – Hiroaki Kuromiya
Video Essays:
- Soviet Famine of 1932: An Overview | The Marxist Project (2020)
- Did Stalin Continue to Export Grain as Ukraine Starved? | Hakim (2017)
- The Holodomor Genocide Question: How Wikipedia Lies to You | Bad Empanada (2022)
- Historian Admits USSR Didn’t Kill Tens of Millions! | TheFinnishBolshevik (2018)
- YouTube Link
- (Holodomor discussion begins at 9:00 mark)
- A Case-Study of Capitalism – Ukraine | Hakim (2017)
Additional Blog/Essay:
- The Holodomor Explained
- By TheFinnishBolshevik (2020)
- ML Theory Link
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