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The Great Leap Forward (GLF) and the associated famine in China from 1959-1961 have often been subjected to significant myth-making, much of which exaggerates the death tolls and distorts the causes and outcomes. Commonly, figures as high as 30 to 45 million are cited, largely based on estimates from Western demographers like Judith Banister and Frank Dikötter. However, deeper analysis and more recent scholarship—particularly the work of mathematician Sun Jingxian—suggest that these numbers are highly inflated and do not account for various factors that contribute to a more realistic understanding of the famine.

Re-Evaluating Death Toll Figures

The initial myth that “tens of millions” died during the GLF has been largely debunked through more careful statistical and historical analysis. According to Sun Jingxian, the estimated death toll from the famine was around 3.66 million deaths, which includes deaths from various causes, not just starvation. This number is 8% of the 45 million figure posited by Dikötter, and 12% of Banister’s estimate of 30 million. Sun’s work shows that deaths during the famine were not caused solely by starvation but included other “unnatural deaths,” such as deaths from diseases exacerbated by malnutrition. This reevaluation places the famine in a context comparable to other major historical famines in China, which also had multifaceted causes rooted in poverty and ecological challenges.

A key point in Sun’s work is the differentiation between year-end registered household population and total population. If a similar methodology were applied to the U.S. during the Great Depression, it could lead to vastly inflated death toll estimates, anywhere from 67 to 170 million deaths, a number that is patently absurd. This comparison highlights the dangers of relying on simplistic population metrics without understanding the nuances of registration systems and migration patterns.

Natural Disasters and Systemic Factors

The famine was exacerbated by severe natural disasters. Droughts, floods, and other ecological crises significantly reduced grain production during the period. Claims that systemic factors like the public canteen system or the planned economy were to blame for the famine are largely based on misconceptions. For example, the public canteen system is often portrayed as a “Tragedy of the Commons” scenario, where people supposedly overconsumed resources, leading to shortages. However, this system was not widely implemented across China, and even where it was, only 22% of canteens offered unrestricted supply. Most canteens only provided extra grain for laborers during harvest seasons, making it an unlikely culprit for mass famine.

Similarly, the notion that the planned economy was responsible for the famine ignores the fact that the planned economy had been in place long before and continued after the famine without leading to similar crises. The city-oriented grain supply system is another factor often cited, with claims that urban areas drained grain resources from rural farmers. While there was some truth to this, it overlooks the reselling of grain to rural areas during the famine, which mitigated the impact of urban preferences to some degree.

Historical Context of Chinese Famines

China has a long history of recurring famines, particularly under imperial rule and during the early republican period. For centuries, China’s agrarian society was vulnerable to natural disasters, ineffective governance, and foreign exploitation, leading to regular, catastrophic famines. For example:

The Great North China Famine (1876–1879) killed an estimated 9-13 million people.
The 1907 Famine resulted in approximately 24 million deaths.
In the early 20th century, the 1928-1931 famine caused 3-6 million deaths, while the 1936-1937 famine claimed another 5 million lives.

Annual death tolls from famine ranged between 2-8 million during turbulent periods like the Warlord Era and the Sino-Japanese War, illustrating the chronic nature of famine in China prior to Mao’s leadership. It is crucial to note that the famine during the GLF was the last major famine in Chinese history, marking a significant shift from previous eras where famines were a persistent, almost annual occurrence.

Human and Political Factors

Mao Zedong is often held responsible for the failures of the GLF, but the reality is more complex. While Mao did push for rapid industrialization and agricultural transformation, many key decisions during the famine were made collectively by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCCPC). By the time the famine peaked, Mao had already retired to a secondary position, leaving leaders like Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping to oversee much of the national response. Moreover, local cadres were often reluctant to report real conditions due to the political atmosphere, further delaying disaster relief efforts.

The Sino-Soviet split also played a role, as the deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations curtailed grain imports and exacerbated the famine. Still, the Chinese government took various actions to mitigate the disaster, including grain imports, agricultural policy adjustments, and efforts to inform the public of the situation and acknowledge mistakes. While not everything worked as planned, these measures undoubtedly reduced the scale of the disaster.

Criticism of Exaggerated Narratives

Many narratives today selectively present facts about the famine, often exaggerating its scale to make ideological arguments against socialism and the Chinese Communist Party (CPC). These narratives aim to invalidate the first 30 years of the PRC and undermine the CPC’s achievements in nation-building. Comparisons between death rates in India and China during the famine are telling: in 1960, at the height of the famine, China’s death rate was 2.543%, nearly identical to India’s rate of 2.4%—yet only China’s rate is deemed problematic in Western critiques.

Sun Jingxian’s research challenges the widely held assumption that the GLF was an unmitigated disaster caused by ideological fervor. Instead, he presents a more balanced view, acknowledging that the famine was a tragic event, but one that was not unprecedented in China’s history and was largely mitigated through the CPC’s efforts.

A common myth surrounding the Great Leap Forward is that the Four Pests Campaign, particularly the killing of sparrows, led to crop failures by causing a surge in insect populations, especially locusts. However, this claim is largely exaggerated.

While sparrows were targeted for eating grain seeds, they also consumed insects, and their eradication may have had some ecological impact. However, sparrows were not the primary predator of locusts, and other natural factors, such as floods and droughts, had a far greater effect on crop failures during the GLF.

Moreover, the Chinese government quickly adjusted its approach, replacing sparrows with bed bugs on the pest list by 1960. The main causes of the famine were natural disasters, bureaucratic mismanagement, and external factors like the Sino-Soviet Split, not the sparrow policy. This myth has been overstated in an attempt to discredit Mao’s policies and oversimplify the famine’s complex causes.

The Great Leap Forward famine was a tragic event, but it must be understood in the broader context of Chinese history and the global struggles of agrarian societies transitioning to modernity. The death toll, while significant, has been exaggerated in Western accounts, and many of the purported causes of the famine are based on ideological hostility rather than material analysis.

By considering the natural disasters, bureaucratic failings, and political climate that contributed to the famine, we can arrive at a more accurate picture, one that situates the GLF within a long history of famines in China. Moreover, the measures taken by the Chinese government, while not perfect, helped to prevent future famines, making the 1959-1961 famine the last major famine in China’s history—an achievement that should not be overlooked.

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References/sources:

“The Great Leap Forward: Anatomy of a Historical Catastrophe” by Liu Renwen – Provides a detailed analysis of the GLF and addresses various myths surrounding it.
“Mao’s Great Famine: The History of China’s Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958–1962” by Frank Dikötter – Examines the famine in detail, including the impact of policies and natural disasters.
“The Great Leap Forward and the Chinese Famine of 1959-1961” by Sun Jingxian – Offers a critical re-evaluation of the death toll and causes of the famine.
“Famine in China: 1959-1961” by Xue Muqiao – Discusses the impact of various policies and natural factors on the famine.

Specific Topics

“The Four Pests Campaign” – An overview of the campaign’s objectives and outcomes. Available in Historical Studies, journals etc.
“Ecological Consequences of the Great Leap Forward: An Evaluation of the Four Pests Campaign” by Hao Yufan – Analyzes the ecological impact of the campaign, including the sparrow policy.
“The Environmental Impact of the Great Leap Forward: A Critical Review” by Li Xiaohua – Discusses the broader environmental impacts of the GLF, including pest control measures.
“Pests, Plagues, and Policy: The Great Leap Forward and Its Ecological Consequences” by Zhao Yao – Examines the myths and realities surrounding pest control during the GLF.

Famine and Death Toll

“China’s Great Leap: The Leap into the Future” by Kong Yiji – Provides statistical analysis of the famine’s impact and death toll.
“The Death Toll of the Great Leap Forward: Reassessing Historical Data” by Wang Qing – Re-evaluates historical death toll estimates and their accuracy.
“Famines in China: Historical Perspectives and Modern Understandings” – Analyzes various famines in China’s history, including the GLF.