Why the Houthis are no longer just Yemen's problem

The entry of the Houthis and Iranian-aligned Shia groups has widened the war, adding new strategic dimensions. After initially remaining silent, the Houthis entered the conflict following the Saudi-backed Yemeni Transitional Government’s strike on Sana’a airport on 10 July. They retaliated by attacking Abha airport, threatening Saudi shipping through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, and striking the Saudi-flagged tanker Encelia. They also claimed attacks on Aramco facilities at Jizan and Yanbu, while Riyadh attributed separate oil infrastructure attacks to Iran-aligned Iraqi militias. The escalation exposed Saudi Arabia’s energy vulnerabilities, sending Brent crude prices to around $100 a barrel amid fears that the conflict could engulf critical global energy chokepoints.Ansar Allah, popularly known as the Houthis, is often portrayed simply as an Iranian proxy. Its origins, however, are more complex. Emerging from Yemen’s Zaidi Shia community—distinct from Iran’s Twelver Shia tradition—the movement was shaped by political marginalisation, economic neglect, state failure and theological contestation. A major catalyst was the Saudi-sponsored spread of Wahhabism, which sought to “Sunni-ise” Yemen’s traditionally moderate Zaidi population. This weakened classical Zaydi identity and eroded the authority of the sada—families claiming descent from the Prophet Muhammad, from whom much of the Houthi leadership has historically emerged.Founded by Husayn al-Houthi, the movement presented itself as the defender of “authentic” Zaydism while linking religious revival with grievances over exclusion, corruption, inequality, foreign intervention and state neglect. A decisive transformation came during the Second Palestinian Intifada in 2000, when the widely publicised killing of 12-year-old Muhammad al-Durrah, who died in his father’s arms after being struck by Israeli gunfire in Gaza, became a powerful symbol across the Arab and Muslim world. The incident influenced Husayn al-Houthi’s political narrative, enabling him to connect Yemen’s local grievances with the broader Palestinian cause, reflected in the movement’s slogan: “God is Great, Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse on the Jews, Victory to Islam.”Despite its inflammatory rhetoric, the slogan helped position the Houthis as champions of a broader Arab and Islamic struggle, allowing them to transcend traditional sectarian boundaries and challenge regimes perceived as aligned with Western and Israeli interests. These shared narratives of resistance created strategic convergence with Iran, despite their distinct theological traditions.The post-9/11 “War on Terror”, Yemen’s security cooperation with Washington and repeated military campaigns transformed the Houthis into a formidable force. The Saudi-led military campaign from 2015 to 2022, supported by the United States, the United Kingdom and several Arab states, failed to dislodge them. Instead, prolonged intervention strengthened their resistance narrative, expanded their military capabilities and compelled Riyadh to pursue negotiations. Today, the Houthis control Sana’a and Yemen’s populous northern and western regions, while the Saudi-backed internationally recognised government retains influence mainly in the south and east, including Aden.The Houthis’ strategic significance stems from their control of territory overlooking the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, a vital maritime chokepoint linking the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean to the Suez Canal, carrying around 10–12% of global trade. Weak regional governance has enabled them to convert geography into leverage. Their attacks raise the risk of simultaneous disruption at Bab al-Mandeb and the Strait of Hormuz, through which over one-quarter of global seaborne oil trade passes.Such a “two-chokepoint crisis” could destabilise energy markets, intensify inflation, disrupt supply chains and slow global growth. India, with significant trade dependence, especially on exports, on the Bab al-Mandeb–Red Sea–Suez Canal corridor, would be particularly vulnerable, facing higher logistics costs, delays and greater exposure to geopolitical shocks.The widening conflict has also brought Iraqi Shia armed groups(al-Hashd al-Shaabi) into sharper focus. Following the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, Iraq’s Shia majority, long excluded from political power, emerged as the country’s dominant political force. The rise of ISIS in 2014 created an existential threat that united competing Shia factions and led to the rapid expansion of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (al-Hashd al-Shaabi). After ISIS was territorially defeated, the Iraqi parliament formally incorporated the Hashd into the state’s security architecture in 2016 as an independent military formation reporting to the Prime Minister. It comprises dozens of brigades with a substantial force presence, although estimates of its size vary.The Hashd, however, occupies an ambiguous position: it is formally part of Iraq’s state security architecture, yet several of its constituent factions continue to retain significant military, political and economic autonomy. In this respect, it bears similarities to Hezbollah in Lebanon, functioning simultaneously as a recognised political-security actor and as a parallel centre of power with independent networks and capabilities.Its constituent groups broadly include factions aligned with Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the doctrine of wilayat al-faqih, and those influenced by Iraq’s Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who rejects the Iranian model of clerical authority. Several pro-Iran factions retain independent command structures, external supply links, political influence and extensive economic interests, limiting successive Iraqi governments’ ability to bring them fully under state control.The recent joint US–Saudi airstrikes, reportedly linked to drone attacks on Saudi oil facilities launched from Iraqi territory, signal a shift in the regional escalation calculus. Having exercised restraint in response to Iranian strikes on its territory, Saudi Arabia launched retaliatory attacks for the first time. By acting openly alongside the United States, Riyadh is signalling that it will no longer remain passive in the face of such attacks and is prepared to raise the costs of further escalation.The entry of these two forces will further complicate an already volatile regional conflict. Iran’s partnership with the Houthis is rooted in shared political and strategic interests, while its ties with the Iraqi Shia groups draw on deeper ideological, religious and institutional linkages. Saudi Arabia’s inability to defeat the Houthis after years of military campaign along with the US raises a larger question: can Riyadh now effectively confront a coordinated challenge from the Houthis and al-Hashd al-Shaabi, who have a long history of fighting American forces and ISIS.The Houthi intervention presents Pakistan with a difficult geopolitical dilemma. Islamabad’s defence partnership with Saudi Arabia could constrain its ability to maintain stable relations with neighbouring Iran, especially if it seeks to preserve its role as a mediator. Any Saudi request for active support could provoke Tehran and inflame sectarian tensions, while refusal could strain ties with a key partner. As the conflict expands, Pakistan’s policy of strategic neutrality will face mounting diplomatic, security and economic pressures.