Kargil to Sindoor: Restructuring Artillery Firepower for Future Warfare

The character of warfare is changing faster than military organisations. From Kargil to Operation Sindoor, and from Ukraine to the Middle East, one lesson stands out: firepower is becoming a principal instrument of war. Precision weapons, drones, electronic warfare, satellites, and networked sensors now enable deep strikes without committing large ground formations. The battlefield is increasingly transparent and non-contact.For India, the issue is not whether artillery remains relevant, but whether it is being used at the level modern warfare demands. India needs a three-tier architecture: tactical, operational, and strategic fires integrated with the Air Force.The Kargil War remains India’s clearest demonstration of what concentrated artillery can achieve. In mountainous terrain, armour was unsuitable, while infantry had to assault well-prepared positions at great heights. Artillery became the principal instrument for neutralising positions and enabling infantry to advance.Artillery was the Prime Killer & Workhorse: By massing 400+ guns and firing continuous direct-fire missions, artillery provided most of the explosive volume around 85%, inflicted largest enemy casualties and severely degraded the defenders' physical ability to resist. Infantry carried the Ultimate Decision: Firepower alone could not capture ground. Infantry reclaimed every peak after enemy defences had been degraded. Air Force was the Force Multiplier: Precision strikes against high-altitude logistics hubs disrupted the supply chain sustaining the intrusion.While indicative rather than precise measures, these observations underline a central reality: Kargil was won through the synergy of Artillery firepower and Infantry.Yet this lesson was never fully institutionalised. Artillery continued to be viewed differently, rather than accepting as an independent instrument capable of shaping operational and strategic battles.Operation Sindoor points towards a different model. Its emphasis was on stand-off precision strikes, missiles, rockets, drones, electronic warfare, and air power rather than large-scale infantry assaults. The objective was to impose costs and degrade capability without extensive ground combat.The Air Force and Artillery both played equally predominant roles in striking terrorist infrastructure, although artillery's contribution was never acknowledged and less visible because of the prominence and publicity of air power.The contrast is striking. Kargil showed firepower enabling infantry to capture ground; Sindoor showed firepower creating decisive effects without ground manoeuvre, of course with a different objective..If war begins with long-range strikes against command centres, airfields, logistics nodes, missile sites, air-defence systems and artillery positions, the distinction between artillery fires and deep strike by air becomes increasingly blurred.This is not an argument against the Air Force. Aircraft provide air superiority, reconnaissance, and dynamic targeting.But when predictable targets lie within the range of precision rockets or missiles, ground-based fires may offer significant advantages. Launchers can be dispersed, concealed, and rapidly relocated, while multiple launchers can generate concentrated salvos without risking aircraft and aircrew.If a ground-launched weapon can destroy a target with comparable precision and effect, should an aircraft be risked simply because deep strike has traditionally been associated with air power?This does not imply that any aircraft loss during Sindoor, if any which are not known, could have been avoided by artillery or missiles. The broader lesson is that target allocation must be joint and based on operational effectiveness.India has traditionally allocated and assessed artillery force level in support of brigades, divisions, and corps. That approach worked when the battlefield was linear and manoeuvre formations dominated combat.Assessing artillery primarily through neutralisation ratios tied to manoeuvre formations is increasingly outdated. Artillery requirements should instead be determined by the degree of neutralisation or destruction required against specific target sets, akin to the logic of accretion of Airforce to 42 fighter squadrons. Long-range rocket forces and theatre missile threats require task-organised and concentrated firepower complexes.Calculating artillery only for ground manoeuvre ignores the reality that massed precision fires can disrupt an adversary's operational system before ground forces engage.The combat arms are evolving. Infantry will increasingly hold positions, secure terrain, conduct surveillance and target acquisition, prevent infiltration, and protect critical nodes. Armour will serve primarily as an operational reserve and strategic deterrent, ready to exploit breakthroughs or counter major penetrations if conflict escalates. Long-range fires can become the primary strike mechanism, engaging command nodes, logistics hubs, air-defence networks, and missile sites without exposing large ground formations to direct threat.If warfare is moving from firepower facilitating manoeuvre towards firepower potentially making manoeuvre unnecessary during opening phases, investment priorities must change.India needs more than additional guns: The decisive capability is no longer merely the gun, rocket, or missile, but the ability to find, identify, prioritise, and continuously track targets across the battle space. Investments in space-based surveillance, UAVs, electronic intelligence, and resilient sensor-to-shooter networks will therefore be as important as investments in platforms and munitions.The aim should be precision mass at the decisive point. Simply counting artillery regiments against manoeuvre formations is an outdated measure of combat power.India should restructure artillery into three complementary levels operating as one integrated system:IBGs fight the close battle; Theatre Operational Firepower shapes and dominates the operational battle; and Theatre Strategic Firepower reaches into the adversary’s strategic depth.The principle should be simple: the lowest capable echelon engages the target, while the Theatre Commander retains the ability to mass fires wherever decisive effects are required.At tactical level, firepower must be organic, mobile, and immediately responsive. An IBG commander should have a suitable mix of light and medium artillery, mortars, tactical UAVs, and counter-UAS systems. The emphasis should be mobility, precision, survivability, and rapid sensor-to-shooter cycles.Tier Two: Operational Firepower - Transform the Artillery DivisionsIndia's existing Artillery Divisions possess trained personnel, command experience, and established fire-control systems. They should be transformed into Theatre Operational Firepower (TOF) Divisions, capable of concentrated theatre fires and reinforcement of Corps Fire Strike Groups. This preserves an existing capability while adapting it to contemporary operational requirements.Beyond operational fires, India should build Theatre Strategic Firepower (TSF) Divisions of conventional forces, different from the SFC units, for precision strikes against command centres, air bases, logistics hubs, missile sites, air-defence systems, and other critical infrastructure.Systems such as Pralay, BrahMos, Extended Pinaka and long-range loitering munitions should be integrated within a common command, targeting, and doctrinal framework. Longer-range conventional missiles currently associated with Strategic Forces Command may also require review.Future campaigns may be decided less by who mobilises larger forces and more by who delivers the most effective first salvo against critical operational systems. The opening strike is becoming increasingly decisive. The ability to rapidly locate, target and engage command centres, logistics hubs, air-defence networks, and long-range strike assets may determine the trajectory of a campaign before major ground manoeuvre begins.Theatre reform should not become an exercise in redrawing boundaries or creating headquarters. Its test must be straightforward: does it generate greater combat power, faster decisions, and better joint effects?An evolutionary approach is preferable. Strengthen organic artillery at IBG level, transform existing Artillery Divisions into TOF Divisions, develop dedicated TSF Divisions, and integrate all three levels with the Air Force, space, cyber, electronic warfare, and intelligence capabilities. Theres an imperative need to increase the deep strike formations in artillery and not some haphazard cost cutting.The future artillery battlefield will be extraordinarily dangerous. Drones, satellites, and counter-battery systems can rapidly detect and engage firing units, while electronic warfare disrupts communications.India must build depth in ammunition production, dispersed storage, logistics and indigenous precision munitions. A superb gun without ammunition and a reliable supply chain is little more than an expensive platform. Sensor-to-shooter networks must remain functional even when satellites are degraded, communications jammed and headquarters attacked.The greatest obstacle may not be technology but mindset. Artillery has been neglected as a combat arm; modern warfare demands thinking in terms of effects rather than platforms.The question should no longer be whether artillery, missiles, or aircraft "own" a target. It should be: Who can produce the required effect fastest, most accurately, most economically and with the least risk?That change is essential for genuine jointness.Kargil demonstrated the power of concentrated artillery. Ukraine reinforced the centrality of massed fires, drones, and precision targeting. Sindoor points further: opening phases may increasingly be decided by long-range fires before large formations engage.This does not make infantry and armour obsolete; it changes their relationship with firepower. Infantry will continue to hold and capture ground. Armour will continue to provide manoeuvre and shock. But increasingly, firepower may determine where and when manoeuvre becomes possible.Give IBGs stronger organic fires. Preserve and upgrade Artillery Divisions as TOF Divisions. Create a dedicated rocket and missile force through TSF Divisions. Integrate the entire architecture with the Air Force, drones, space, cyber and electronic warfare.Match the weapon to the target. Do not risk an aircraft against a target that can be destroyed equally effectively by a ground-launched weapon. But do not ask artillery to do what only an aircraft can do.The future battlefield will belong to the commander who detects first, decides fastest, and delivers decisive firepower. For India, artillery must become a principal instrument through which the battle is decided.