By Michal Paradowski

Jan III Sobieski and Polish army in relief of Vienna in 1683

                        Polish army led by King Jan III Sobieski played crucial role in relief of Vienna in 1683, with famous winged hussars leading massive charge of allied cavalry at the battle of Kahlenberg. Previous Polish experience from war against Ottoman Turks in 1672-1676 made their contribution vital for coalition war effort. No surprise then, that Sobieski was chosen as commander of joint forces and that Poles deployed on ancient place of honour in army battle order  – on the right wing. There are many books available in English, describing siege of Vienna and relief action, unfortunately they tend to be full of errors and misconceptions regarding Polish army – its organisation, strength and activities during the battle. That’s why I came with idea for new volume for ‘Century of the Soldier 1618-1721’ series, focusing solely on Polish army led by King Jan III to fight Turks at the outskirts of Vienna in 1683. Many Polish researchers, like Jan Wimmer, Leszek Podhorodecki or Zdzisław Żygulski Junior (to name just few), wrote extensively  about the topic, unfortunately their works are not available in English. I think it is very important to present to English-speaking readers with Polish view on the battle and the role of Polish army in the battle.

            Main aspect that I would like to focus on are first of all organisation and strength of the army that Jan III led to Vienna. There will be information about structure, weapons and equipment of the units, with large appendix describing each unit raised for the campaign. Polish ODB will be discussed at length, with estimates of the strength of cavalry regiments and infantry brigades created prior to the battle. Commanders leading the army, not only high ranking like King Jan III, Hetman Jabłonowski and Hetman Sieniawski, but also lower rank officers, especially in cavalry, will be focus of one of the chapters. Polish view of the battle, based on surviving relations of eyewitnesses, will be covered in another chapter. Despite title, book won’t focus solely on relief of Vienna though. Remaining of the 1683’s campaign will be covered as well, with both battle of Párkány and arrival of Lithuanian army. One chapter will also describe organisation and military actions of troops under command of Hieronim Augustyn Lubomirski, raised as Imperial auxiliary division in Poland. Volume will also contains some additional information about Polish and Cossack actions in Podolia and Moldavia, that was always in shadow of main events of 1683.

            In overall, the book will aim to provide comprehensive and in-depth study of Polish army taking part in relief of Vienna. Based on numerous primary and secondary sources, accompanied with illustrations from period and colour plates depicting Polish soldiers, will hopefully be useful work for all those interesting in 17^th century Polish warfare.

You can purchase We Came, We Saw, God Conquered: The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth’s military effort in the relief of Vienna, 1683 here.

You can purchase Despite Destruction, Misery and Privations: The Polish Army in Prussia during the war against Sweden 1626-1629 here.

Renowned historian René Chartrand joins Josh Provan on the Adventures in Historyland YouTube channel to talk about how Louis XIV turned France into a 17th century powerhouse and some of his most impressive Marshals. Other topics include the War of the Spanish Succession and his formidable enemies, Marlborough and Prince Eugene. 

Adventures in Historyland is a blog and online community focused on telling stories from history from the classical past to the 19th century.

https://adventuresinhistoryland.com/

IF YOU’VE GOT IT, DOMINATE EUROPE WITH IT. Louis XIV, & the Economy of War with René Chartrand
https://youtu.be/x_Rf57MVOYQ

The Greatest Marshals of Louis XIV with René Chartrand.
https://youtu.be/5AKmMHcccuQ

Buy The Armies and Wars of the Sun King 1643-1715 Volume 1 : The Guard of Louis XIV here.

Buy The Armies and Wars of the Sun King 1643-1715 Volume 2 : The Infantry of Louis XIV here.

The Armies and Wars of the Sun King 1643-1715 Volume 3 : The Cavalry of Louis XIV here.

The Armies and Wars of the Sun King 1643-1715 Volume 4 : The War of the Spanish Succession, Artillery, Engineers and Militias here.

Updated with new material, A Moonlight Massacre. The Night Operation on the Passchendaele Ridge, 2 December 1917: The Forgotten Last Act of the Third Battle of Ypres Second Edition is available from Helion & Company.

Overlooked by most campaign histories of the Third Battle of Ypres (31 July-10 November 1917), the Night Operation on the Passchendaele Ridge, 2 December 1917 remains a forgotten tailpiece to the controversial Anglo-French offensive. Based on an extensive array of British and German sources, many previously unpublished, and supported by numerous illustrations and maps, A Moonlight Massacre is the first full account of the tragic affair and an important re-interpretation of the discussion surrounding Third Ypres.

Don’t miss your chance to purchase this classic study of the real end of the Third Ypres campaign.

See link below for recent Western Front Association ‘Mentioned in Dispatches’ podcast interview with author Dr Michael LoCicero:

Ep233 – Moonlight Massacre at 3rd Ypres – Dr Michael LoCicero

By Michael Hinton

My interest in the Crimean War was kindled when I discovered that one of my 2x great grandfathers served in the British Army during the whole conflict. My principal research interest at the time, as a member of staff of the University of Bristol, was infectious diseases and once I appreciated how many of his brothers in arms died of disease I decided to look into the matter in more detail when I retired in 1996. I was lucky enough to enrol at King’s College London to study for a second PhD, and after a long gestation a thesis finally emerged, and it is this that forms the basis for ‘Victory over Disease’.

• 

• 

The book provides a comprehensive assessment of several aspects of the provision of health care for the troops, and comprises eleven chapters. These cover, inter alia, the structure of the Army including the Medical Department, hospital facilities, transportation and evacuation of invalids, diseases and wounds and injuries, repatriation and discharge from the army, and the various commissions of enquiry.

I have concentrated as far as possible on primary sources as my aim was to produce an evidence-based account. There are thus plenty of tables, graphs, and footnotes, but these are intended to support the narrative and not to confuse the reader! However by taking this fresh approach and focusing on what took place in the main Army in the Crimea I found it necessary to question seriously the contributions made by the talented and well-connected Florence Nightingale and the suitably-qualified Sanitary Commissioners – who were sent by the government to investigate matters on the spot. This may prove an unexpected conclusion for some of Nightingale’s many admirers, but the evidence demonstrates conclusively that the mortality in the Scutari hospitals merely reflected the situation in the Crimea. The principal problems were at the front, and not in Turkey, and it was there where matters were rectified. The standards of living and health care were gradually enhanced and the strength and vigour of the men began to improve during the early months of 1855.

• 

• 

• 

The historiography of the campaign has tended to concentrate on the disasters of the first winter and the perceived incompetence of the heads of department, while the contributions made by Nightingale and the Sanitary Commissioners have been over-emphasised. Inevitably this has established an unbalanced view of what actually took place. This has been distorted further by commentators who to have failed to consider events in the strict order of their occurrence, and who have confused matters further by applying the direful knowledge of hindsight. It is to be hope that my creative, and hopefully unbiased, assessment of the many contemporary documents associated with the war will result in a better understanding of what actually took place during those fateful years. In the event the ‘Victory over Disease’ was not due to the contributions of any one person, or even a group of individuals. Rather it represented the involvement in varying degrees of many people in many walks of life who worked, possibly unwittingly, for a common purpose, and with the gratifying result which is illustrated on the front cover of the book by a contemporary lithograph of the men of the 93rd Regiment, of thin red line fame, shortly after their return to England from the Crimea.

• 

• 

By Per Boden

One of my fondest childhood memories is my Dad’s stories about the Great Northern War (1700-1721). He would tell me those stories with so great passion and intensity that I always felt like I was there; feeling the smell of gunpowder, hearing the sounds of battle, the cannons firing, the musket volleys, the horses, the clashing of steel, the drumbeats and the sounds of trumpets.  It created a life-long fascination for the history of the period and those battles.

When I rekindled with the wargaming hobby in my thirties I wanted to recreate those amazing battles on the tabletop and I still remember Dad’s look on his face when I presented the Klissow 1702 game (a game that came to feature on the cover of Miniatures Wargames). Sadly, he would not see the three games covering the Russian Campaign in 1708/09 that Nick Dorrell, I and others from the Wyre Forest Wargaming club presented at Joy of Six 2017 to 2019, and at Salute this year with the Poltava 1709 table.

The Great Northern War was a period that was previously poorly served by English language sources and many of these were outdated and some frankly not very good from a wargamers perspective. However recent publications in the form of the two volumed Great Northern War Compendium by THGC Publishing and the many books by Helion has really helped to plug the gap and long may it continue. In terms of wargaming rules I have tried and I am still playing a wide range or rules that covers the period and the battles that were fought, directly or indirectly including Twilight of the Sun King, Polemos: Great Northern War, Maurice, Might and Reason (using the Sun King module), Gå-På and Under the Lily Banners. For Skirmish level engagement I have used Sharp Practice, Donnybrook and Pikeman’s Lament.  There are now miniatures in most scales to recreate the battles and skirmishes of the period. Perhaps, surprisingly the most complete GNW range is offered by Baccus in 6mm.

The war is really the beginning of the end of Sweden as a Great Northern European Power, a status brought by several successful wars led by the Kings Gustavus Adolphus the Great and Charles X resulting to dominions in what is today Northern Germany (Pomerania and Bremen), Livonia, Estonia, Ingria (where St Petersburg was later built by Tsar Peter).

The Great Northern War started in 1700 when a coalition formed by the Peter the Great of Russia, Frederick IV of Denmark-Norway and Augustus II the Strong of Saxony-Poland attacked Sweden. The coalition were formed following the death of the Swedish King Charles XI and the belief was that the new and very young King (Charles the XII was 15 when his father died) would not be able to put up an organised fight.  Their motives were mainly to retake lost territories, limit Swedish economic dominance and in Russia’s case also gain access to the Baltic Sea.

However, the King turned out to be a skilled warrior and leader of men and the preparedness, quality and efficiency of battle methods of the Swedish army built up by his father was second to none during this era. However, the King was less able in term of overall under strategic thinking and his stubbornness would eventually be a significant contribution to the overall disastrous outcome of the war.

The King quickly pacified Denmark and a Peace Treaty was signed in Travendal 1700. The Russians were routed at the Battle of Narva in 1700 but then the King turned his attention to Saxony-Poland and Augustus, seeing the Kurprinz Augustus as a bigger problem than Tsar Peter.  It took the King 6 years to defeat the Saxon-Polish and force the abdication of Augustus the Strong from the Polish crown (1705 Treaty of Warsaw and 1706 Treaty of Altranstädt).  This following a decisive Swedish Victory at Fraustadt 1706.

It was time to address the Russian problem once and the King decided to march on Moscow in 1707. The campaign failed following clever scorched earth tactics, and a successful attack leading to loss of the supply column at the Battle of Lesnaya 1708, and a very hard winter 1708/09. On top of this the Russian army had been reorganised by the Tsar through a series of reforms and from experience from the smaller campaigns in the Baltic and Finland during Charles XII focus on Augustus. The Russian army facing the Swedish March towards Moscow was far better led, trained and experienced than the one that routed at Narva in 1700.  It culminated at the battle of Poltava in 1709, the biggest Swedish military defeat ever and most of the Army was lost. After this there was the King’s adventures in Bender trying to convince the Ottoman Sultan to wage war on Russia, the unsuccessful bid by Denmark to take back Scania and the Battle of Helsingborg 1710, and the final great victory at Gadebusch in 1712 having lost most Dominions to the South of the Baltic Sea. The rest sees the stubborn King desperately and erratically seeking alliances to win back what had been lost. In 1718 Charles XII who had now returned to Sweden, invaded Norway and it was here he was hit by a bullet in the head whilst inspecting the enemy fortifications at Fredriksheld. It was fatal and the following 3 years would see a number of peace treaties being signed resulting in the loss of most of the dominions previously in Swedish possession.

I love this period of history and it is a fantastic subject for wargaming and these are some of the reasons why.

(i) The end of the 17^th century saw the development of properly uniformly dressed soldiers with more or less uniform colourful coats with regimental colours on big floppy cuffs. Not as intrinsic as your Napoleonic uniforms or as much lace as later during the Seven Wars period, but still as striking painted up on the battlefield. This type of uniforms was worn by the Saxons, Swedes, Danes and the Russian (and later the Prussians). But there were so many other types of more exotic units like the Polish-Lithuanian forces that in essence where Renaissance type of armies that even fielded Winged Hussars. The Russian always had a large contingent of Cossack and Kalmycks serving as light cavalry. This gives the opportunity to create some rather spectacular battles like the Battle of Kalisz 1706 (where both sides had Polish-Lithuanian Contingents) or Klissow 1702 (with the Polish-Lithuanian main army present, well at least for a while).

(ii) Up to Poltava in 1709 most Russian and Swedish Infantry battalions would carry pikes, the Saxons and Danes fought like “traditional” armies of the period with varying fire drill and bayonets. For any wargame the pike elements add an extra level of flair and was used at great effect in a defensive role against the high concentration of horse units and in the Swedish Shock tactics.

(iii) As mentioned above the fighting styles varied, between the nations and over time, and therefore it creates some interesting clashes. For example, the use of shock tactics by the Swedish Army, both by the infantry (with late firing then charging in with pikes, swords and musket in the reverse) and cavalry (with naked steel and wedge formation charges). These attacks focusing on speed and aggression took advantage of the, still, relatively low firing rates and expectation that the enemy would waiver and flee, which indeed happened on many occasions.

(iv) Some of the most famous battles were fought in winter and with snow present on the battlefield, the victory at Narva in 1700 was helped to at least some degree of the fact that a snow storm blew up that swept towards the Russians. At Fraustadt 1706 the Saxons had been standing in their Battle Iines on a frosty field waiting for the Swedes for the whole night and this would not have been helpful for the overall morale. This gives the opportunity to create some alternative games set on a winter and snowclad battlefield.

Anyway, I am more than excited about getting hold of the latest book from Helion Waking the Bear – A guide to Wargaming the Great Northern War and Turkish Campaigns 1700-1721 (coming soon).

By Paul Sutton

The English (and later British) Empire can boast a pantheon of commonly recognised imperial heroes, such as Raleigh, Clive, Livingstone, Rhodes, and a host of others besides. However, very people would count the name of Edward Doyley amongst this list of individuals and yet Doyley was arguably the first great imperial hero of the State-sponsored expansion of Britain’s empire of the mid-17th century in the West Indies.  For it was Doyley, who never even held a formal appointment as colonial governor for most of his tenure in the nascent colony of Jamaica, who saved Oliver Cromwell’s dream of expansion and who, almost single-handedly, turned disaster into victory and by whose efforts laid the foundations of the later prosperous Jamaican colony.

The second volume of my series of books on the Anglo-Spanish War 1655-1660 focuses on the struggles of the English to survive on Jamaica after the leaders of the expedition, sent by Cromwell to topple the Spanish in the Americas, had fled to England in late 1655. The English were racked by starvation and disease, lacking regular supplies from England and under attack from a growing Spanish military resistance on the island but they overcame these hardships and by 1660 the colony was beginning to thrive.  The English survival had much to do with the tenacity and determination of the unassuming Edward Doyley, for without him the enterprise would surely have failed, and the remnants of the ragged army would have returned home, shattering Cromwell’s imperial dreams and perhaps even changing the course of world history.

Little is known about Doyley’s background, but he had certainly served in the Parliamentary armies during the Civil War.  He was lieutenant-colonel of Robert Venables’s own regiment when it left England in 1654 and then commanded the Barbados regiment when it was raised the following year. After Venables fled to England after the occupation of Jamaica in 1655 Doyley was the second most senior army officer after Richard Fortescue, who had taken over command of the English forces when Venables left during the summer. However, Fortescue quickly died and Doyley, by default, was left in command of the ravaged forces. Nevertheless, he quickly showed decisive leadership by instilling a firmer discipline within the army and by managing their meagre supplies more efficiently. Within weeks a new commander, Robert Sedgwick, arrived from England and he subsequently took over the fledgling colonial administration, relegating Doyley to the role of commander of the army. But when Sedgwick died in early 1656 Doyley once again was thrust into the role of overall commander of the colony. He quickly reacted to the first Spanish incursions and redeployed the army to protect the embryonic colony based between Spanish Town and the sea. But again, his tenure was cut short when yet another new commander, William Brayne, arrived in early 1657 and Doyley was again removed from the role as leader of the colony. Predictably perhaps, Brayne also died within a few months and for the third time Doyley was elevated to the role of commander of the colony.

For the next four years Doyley remained commander of all the English forces in Jamaica and de facto governor of the island, though never formally recognised by the home government as such before 1660. He reorganised the army, he oversaw the effective creation of the plantations that grew the food the English needed to survive, and he reorganised the distribution of supplies from home (when they came). He managed the arrival and settlement of civilian settlers that came to make Jamaica their new home, he dispensed justice on land and at sea and established a functioning (and self-sufficient) colonial administration. He invited French settlers from Tortuga to the island to hunt the wild cattle to provide more food for the islanders and he established a force of privateers that preyed upon Spanish ships at sea as he took the war to the Spaniards. He repulsed two Spanish invasion attempts to re-conquer the island, whilst his warships attacked the Spanish Main in their search for the elusive Plate Fleets. In 1660 he was faced with mutiny from disgruntled elements and characteristically reacted quickly and decisively and was unafraid to execute the ringleaders to maintain order.

For much of this time he was ignored in London as his pleas for assistance fell on deaf ears, especially after the death of Oliver Cromwell in 1658.  When news arrived in the autumn of 1660 of the Restoration, he promptly acknowledged the change of political circumstance and worked with new regime for the good of the colony. But Doyley was smart enough to know his days were numbered, despite finally being officially appointed governor of the colony by the new king in late 1660.  In 1662 a royal governor was appointed, and Doyley was unceremoniously removed and sent to England without so much as grateful thanks for the work he had done for his country.

Doyley kept his head when the challenges he faced would have overwhelmed lesser men. He did not shirk from the responsibilities he never sought in the first place. He proved himself an able administrator and an effective leader of men. Perhaps his greatest moment was his victory at the Battle of Rio Nuevo in 1658 which encapsulated his skills of organisation and military daring. It might have been a small battle in terms of numbers involved but it was a great victory, nonetheless.  The Spanish lost the will to continue the fight and soon evacuated the island. The rest of Europe saw how Doyley had humiliated the mighty Spanish empire when the captured Spanish flags were displayed in London. The English defeat at Hispaniola in 1655 had been avenged and the vengeance was Doyley’s.  There can be little doubt that it was Doyley’s tenacity that prevented disaster in the years after the occupation and it was his refusal to give up that saved the colony from ruin. Despite never getting the recognition he deserved in life he was surely the unsung hero of early English Jamaica. The forthcoming book charts the establishment of the Jamaica colony from later 1655 until the introduction of civilian rule in 1662 but the story is as much the story of a single man, Edward Doyley, as it is the story of a new colony.

You can purchase The Anglo-Spanish War 1655-1660 Volume 2: War in Jamaica here.

By Andrew Bamford

After a two-year Covid-enforced hiatus in live events, and 13 months after it was originally scheduled to take place, the From Reason to Revolution conference to mark the 275th anniversary of the ’45 Jacobite Rising was held on 23 October 2021 at the Town Hall in Prestonpans, a short distance from the site of the Jacobite victory of 21 September 1745. The hall is in the process of being redeveloped into an interpretation centre by our partners in the event, the Battle of Prestonpans (1745) Heritage Trust, and this was the first major event to be held at the new venue. The event was also sponsored by the Society for Army Historical Research and the British Commission for Military History; wargames manufacturers Flags of War were also in attendance with a stall selling figures and artwork.

Some 50 or so attendees heard a total of eight papers during the course of the day, all of them (bar one for reasons which will become apparent) followed by a question-and-answer session, and the day concluded with a plenary discussion of more general points relating to the topic.

Opening the morning session was Jenn Scott, whose paper looked at the Jacobites of Aberdeenshire and the surrounding area, analysing over 150 officers to look at the backgrounds of these men and their fates in the aftermath of the Rising. She was followed by Iain Macintyre, whose medical background as a surgeon allowed him to offer a fascinating insight into the medical issues faced by both armies, highlighting in particular the role of typhus and other camp diseases in weakening the ranks of the Government regiments and stressing the surprisingly high level of medical support available to the Jacobites. Perhaps most importantly, Iain’s paper also emphasised that connections made while playing golf can prove very useful in a sticky situation! Completing the morning’s session, series editor Andrew Bamford and his wife Lucy gave a joint paper looking at the Jacobite occupation of Derby: as they explained, this started life as an attempt to mine local eyewitness accounts for details of the dress and accoutrements of the Jacobite Army, but quickly revealed a fascinating variety of responses to the occupiers, from repulsion and pity, through sympathy, to apparent collaboration.

After a buffet lunch provided by the Prestonpans Gothenburg, proceedings resumed where the morning had left off, with a paper by Keith McLay examining the reasons behind the Jacobite decision to turn back from Derby rather than press on to London. Unfortunately, unlike the Jacobites, Professor McLay was detained in Derby by University business and so obliged to pre-record his paper which sadly prevented a question-and-answer session taking place. This does, however, mean that it is possible to share this paper with a wider audience: https://youtu.be/9okJqyeY5s8. Rather than looking purely at the military situation, the paper examines the political background to the decision and argues for a combination of causes combining to force the choice to retreat.

Returning to live speakers, the two remaining papers of the first afternoon session each looked at a personality from the events of 1745-1746, one from each side. Jonathan Oates began with a look at Captain Caroline Scott, whose unsavoury reputation precedes him. As Jonathan argued, though, Scott was a hero to his own side thanks to his active and successful defence of Fort William, while at least some of the ill-favour with which he is regarded can be traced to Jacobite propaganda. Roger Collins then followed up with an account of the life of James Maxwell of Kirkconnell, Jacobite soldier and author of an early history of the Rising. Having acquired some of Kirkconnell’s family letters, Roger is hoping to produce a new edition of his Narrative of Charles Prince of Wales’ Expedition to Scotland in the Year 1745.

After a short break, the final session began with Albert Parker speaking via video link from the USA about the naval aspects of the Rising. As befits someone working on a monumental two-volume history of the naval side of the War of the Austrian Succession, Albert’s paper placed the Rising very much in the international context. An interesting contrast was made between the success, or otherwise, of the efforts of France and of Spain, and between the initial wave of French shipments and those that followed in 1746: had the latter been as successful as the former, the Jacobites might have gained several hundred reinforcements in time for Culloden. Lastly, we heard from our hosts in the person of Arran Johnston, Executive Trustee of the Battle of Prestonpans (1745) Heritage Trust and author of, amongst other works, On Gladsmuir Shall the Battle Be!, a detailed history of the Prestonpans campaign. Arran drew both on material from his book and from his work with the trust to look at the legacy of the battle, how it has been remembered in popular culture, and how this has shaped the memorialisation of the battlefield itself. As was brought out in the question-and-answer session, might today’s Outlander novels and TV series have the same effect on popular perceptions of the ’45 that Scott’s Waverley did two centuries ago?

The proceedings of the conference, co-edited by Andrew Bamford and Arran Johnston, are to be published in the second half of 2022.

By Andy Copestake

Author Andy Copestake’s book in our From Reason to Revolution series tracks the rise and fall of professional armies on the Indian subcontinent during the late eighteenth century; as he explains here, though, contemporary Britons saw these forces as being inspired not by local concerns but by a French plot for dominance…

When researching for and writing ‘Their Infantry and Guns will Astonish You’, one of the things that became apparent was British paranoia with regard to India and especially regarding the supposed underhand machinations of the French. Never mind Napoleon’s snide remarks regarding Perfidious Albion, Sepoy Generals and Shopkeepers, Britannia’s paranoia concerning her overseas territories was never far from the surface from the middle of the eighteenth century until the end of the Second World War and for much of that time the major portion of British ire was directed firmly towards Paris.

It is not hard to see why this should be so. The British and the French fought a series of wars throughout the eighteenth century which at times spanned the globe – including what would become ‘The Jewel in the Crown’ for the British, the Indian subcontinent. These wars would not end until the Battle of Waterloo in 1815.

To read some British historians of a certain vintage, such as Fortescue or Malleson, you would think that the history of India in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was merely the history of Britain and France in conflict albeit in a rather warmer climate with assorted natives supplying the extras to the drama with, of course, the French being cast as the villains of the piece. This is, at best, a massive oversimplification probably designed to excite the readership and confirm later nineteenth century prejudice.

The facts, as I discovered, were a little different.

The appointment of Richard Wellesley as Governor-General of the British East India Company’s Indian territories in 1798 saw a distinct shift of British policy. Previous Governors had been content, more or less, to follow the policy of the East India Company in its relentless drive for profit. Wellesley took a more ‘Imperial’ line, not infrequently ignoring the ‘guidance’ of the Leadenhall Street headquarters of the HEIC. Again the reasons are obvious, Britain was at war with revolutionary France and France ‘devil a doubt’ was sticking her fingers into Britain’s Indian pie which from Wellesley’s point of view could not be allowed.

There was some evidence for his paranoia. Tipu Sultan of Mysore had French advisors bolstering his armies. The Nizam of Hyderabad has some 13,000 Frenc-trained regular infantry who even had Tricolour flags, and in the north of India, French mercenary General Pierre Cuillier Perron, in the service of  Maratha Prince Daulat Rao Scindia, commanded an army of over 30,000 regular infantry with the most powerful artillery train in the subcontinent, in what, in Wellesley’s mind, was the ‘French State ‘ of Hindustan. Of course, this was all the fault of the French who were plotting to seize India with Indian rulers being mere puppets… or that is what Wellesley would, it appears, have had you believe.

In the event Tipu was defeated when Seringpatam was stormed in 1799, the Nizam’s regulars had already been disarmed without a fight to be immediately replaced with troops under British control, and Perron fled after a mismanaged skirmish outside the city of Koil at the beginning of the Second Maratha War.

Wellesley did not need to exercise his paranoia to convince Leadenhall Street. He struck the most telling blow at his mythical ‘French State’ when he declared that any European Officer who left Maratha (and therefore Perron’s) service could be assured of a pension equal to their pay in that service. Several dozen mercenary officers – mostly of British extraction –immediately came over to the British leaving the Maratha regular forces to fight without their direction.

So the ‘French Plot’ and the ‘French State’ might have served Wellesley’s propaganda purpose but basically neither existed they were both mere manifestations of Britian’s never-far-from the surface desire to blame the French!

You can purchase ‘Their Infantry and Guns will Astonish You’: The Army of Hindustan and European Mercenaries in Maratha Service 1780-1803 here.

By Alberto Raúl Esteban Ribas

The 17th century is an exciting time in European History. Throughout those 100 years in the Old Continent there were political and warlike events that shaped the countries throughout the following century and until the French Revolution: the decline of Spain as a world power and its replacement by the France of Louis XIV; the consolidation of Dutch independence and its mercantile power; the English Civil War and the bases of England’s expansion during the following century; the defense of the Holy Empire and the end of Ottoman expansionism.

I have always been passionate about military history, and since childhood I had always dreamed of studying and recreating the glorious episodes of the Tercios of Spanish Infantry. Their dominance on the battlefields for almost 150 years is a model hardly comparable in other armies, and despite this, they are relatively little known in European historiography, which generally imagines them as monolithic blocks of pike-armed infantry.

The reality, however, was quite different: the Tercio is an administrative unit and in battle escuadrones (squadrons) were formed, very versatile and versatile, with autonomous offensive and defensive capabilities. The Spanish learned and influenced their Dutch, French and English rivals, and the loss of their hegemony was not caused by the appearance of a superior tactical model, but by the numerical collapse of their armies, which could not follow the gigantic growth of the France of Louis XIV, and the enormous logistical difficulty of operating in distant war scenes (Flanders, Italy, Germany), where there was no territorial continuity to be able to send troops. I set out to investigate Spanish tactics and compare them with those of their enemies, analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of one and the other.

It was a great satisfaction for me that the prestigious publishing house Helion contacted me and offered me the possibility of explaining a battle as interesting as Nördlingen, where the armies of Sweden and their German allies fought against the Imperial troops, the Catholic League and Spain (formed by Spanish, Walloons, Italians and Germans troops).

The Spanish and Swedish military tradition were formed by various influences and events, perhaps under a single common nexus such as the fighting style of the Dutch, in their war of independence against Spain, which exported its deployment model in “battalions” and with companies with a lot of firepower and a very high proportion of officers. Although, it must be said that the continuous confrontations between the Spanish and Dutch infantry motivated innovations on both sides equally.

The Swedes stormed Germany in the 1630s with a highly professional, very experienced, well-equipped army with very high morale. The resounding victories of King Gustavus Adolphus II increased his power and aura of superiority.

The Spanish had been successfully fighting the French and their Swiss and German mercenaries since the end of the 15th century, combining pikes and arquebuses. In addition, they had a lot of experience and logistical capacity to send armies of thousands of men beyond their territories: since 1567 the Spanish Road was used, which allowed troops to be brought from Italy to Flanders. A proof of the strength of the Hispanic military machine was that both in 1633 and 1634 it was possible to recruit armies of more than 10,000 men to enter Germany: first the Duke of Feria, and later the Cardinal-Infante, were able to lead both armies in territories that the Spanish had not previously entered, and were able to face the Protestant armies successfully.

The Swedes were famous for their formation in squadrons, in T-shape, combining companies from the battalions of their regiments. This deployment, in which an important nucleus of pikemen was still maintained, had great firepower, and its musketeers had great fire discipline, which made them very effective on the battlefield. Furthermore, the introduction of regimental cannons was a real boost for firepower in close combat.

On the Spanish side, the constant struggles against the Dutch and the English caused them to understand from very early on the importance of firepower: the detachments of harquebusiers and musketeers, called mangas, which acted independently of the main detachment, or they could also deploy in front of its own Tercio, allowing great tactical flexibility to adapt to any circumstance. As happened in so many battles, and Nördlingen happened the same, the mangas of any Tercio were sent to support another unit, while the pikemen continued to maintain the formation and, therefore, on the defensive against any threat. This great flexibility allowed the Spanish high command to be able to send reinforcements to any point of the battle line, maintaining the general formation if it impaired security.

Having well-fed, trained and motivated troops are essential elements for victory, but they are not enough. The choice of terrain, the weather, the schedule of reinforcements, the evaluation of risks and unforeseen events, etc. they are elements that should always be valued. Napoleon Bonaparte said that “If the Art of War were nothing but the art of avoiding risks, Glory would become the prey of mediocre minds… I have made all the calculations; Fate will do the rest.” For this reason, it is necessary to take into account the “instinct” of the High command, a “psychological quality” that allows generals to know when the right moment has arrived, to execute a certain movement. And this is very difficult to apply…

From the perspective that allows us to analyze the battle four centuries later, we can assess the performance of the generals of the two armies: Gustav Horn was too cautious and conceived no other maneuver than a frontal attack; Bernard of Saxe-Weimar remained inactive too long, waiting for the decisive moment that never came, with the intention of gaining his own glory by the victory obtained by others. The Marquis of Leganés acted responsibly, sending the necessary reinforcements to maintain the defense of the Albuch hill and thus force the enemy to commit all his troops; General Gallas was patient and waited for Bernard’s attack, and then he knew that the time was right to respond with all his troops.

Without a doubt, the battle of Nördlingen constitutes an interesting lesson to learn about the Art of War of the 17th century, but also to learn about the mentality and personality of the people of that time and question whether the adage that “Audaces Fortuna iuvat”.

You can purchase The Battle of Nördlingen: The Bloody Fight Between Tercios and Brigades here.

By Martyn Bennett

It seems extraordinary that after 35 years my thesis on the royalists (and to a lesser extent the parliamentarians) in the Midlands has seen the light of day outside of university libraries. I am pleased to say that it still has a contribution to make. In the popular imagination the civil wars were a battle between Oliver Cromwell and Charles I – two contending behemoths of our collective histories. That it was much more than this still seems to be missed by documentary makers and the writers of fictional accounts of the war. It is a mark of the how Cromwell only rose to prominence during the war itself that he hardly appears in this book at all. In the Midst of the Kingdom is not just a study of the first civil war in the North Midland counties but also a look at who fought it and who paid for it.

There are two central elements to the work, both of which I carried through into my later studies of the civil wars. I was keen to find out how the royalists managed to fight a war for so long, given the traditional perception that it was parliament, based in the great city and port of London which had the ace up its sleeve as far as resources went. Both sides had established financial structures to fund the war, somewhat belatedly – i.e. after the war had begun and exhausted loans and ad hoc funding. These organisations, with some modifications, would go on to be the basis of funding a standing army after the Restoration. The tentacles of these systems stretched further into the social strata than most methods of taxation which preceded them, and for many years, those that followed. We can see this effect through the eyes of the men and women responsible for the collection of resources needed for the armies. County-based committees collected taxation in the form of cash and goods from people like William Cullen and Jane Kitchen of Upton in Nottinghamshire using troops of horse as the collectors. Constables Cullen and Kitchen in turn levied the collections on their fellow villages purchasing everything from cash to beer and beds. The midlands proved a rich ground for surviving constables’ account books which recorded their work in minute detail enabling us to view the war from new perspectives.

A second major theme was identifying the royalist soldiers and administrators who comprised the royalist war effort. This involved prosopographical work – collecting as much detail as possible about the lives and war records of these activists – to explore who and what they were. Their social standing, their experience and war-time careers were analysed. This revealed that the royalists were a mixed bunch largely speaking, neither drawn from the upper social stratum nor the lowest. So many of them have disappeared into the darkness of history that I was surprised to conclude that the familial success which got them an officer’s appointment in the first place was so fragile that few if any records survive of a good number of them.

I used my experience of hunting out the costs of war in later work, when I expanded my studies across the British Isles, seeking out similar information for the rest of England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland, showing how neither the North Midlands nor England was alone in finding the material resources and money to support the civil wars. In many ways this confirmed what I had found in the Midlands, but it also expanded my understanding of how people coped and how they recorded their experience of paying for the war whilst trying to maintain local administration methods not to mention their property, income and even lives.

It was only in the early years of this century that I began to look at Cromwell; firstly for a biographical dictionary which I completed just as the American company that commissioned it cancelled all of its foreign contracts! Luckily Routledge asked me to write his biography so not everything was wasted although the dictionary still rests in a folder on my laptop. A second book on Cromwell proved to be one of those ‘more questions than answers’ experiences, as the more I found out about how he became a general –  the comparatively less I knew about the other generals. Thus I began a project to explore the histories/biographies of all the civil war generals – a project called Cromwell’s Rivals. At present, I am looking at 197 people, all but one of them men. I have returned to using prosopography to understand the backgrounds and experiences of these generals. It will be a long project and I have been helped along the way by enthusiastic students who have all made important contributions to the work. I want the project to have multiple outcomes. There will be a book, a database and magazine articles, etc. I also want the project to have some value for wargamers too. One of the aims is to understand military leadership and how it was exercised by these generals and how their contemporaries viewed success and failure. This could quite naturally be translated from both quantative and qualitative analysis into ‘fighting qualities’ for each and every one of the generals. In turn this might be used to interpret the capacities of wargames generals – special rules of staff rating – encompassed in many rulesets. At the very least it will introduce to a wider world a range of lesser and even unknown civil war general officers!

I haven’t given up on local and regional history on which I cut my teeth; I am still happy to discuss the civil war with local history enthusiasts, but wherever possible I bring into the discussion at least one of the 197 generals!

You can purchase In the Midst of the Kingdom: The Royalist War Effort in the North Midlands, 1642-1646 here.