Showing posts with label local government. Show all posts
Showing posts with label local government. Show all posts

Monday, 24 August 2026

Around the traps

A few bits I've neglected to blog.

Monday, 25 May 2026

SEZs as policy trial areas

A decade ago, I coauthored a report looking at how greater localism and subsidiarity could be achieved in a very centralised country where local councils have variable capabilities

We settled on policy trial areas. 

The basic gist was as follows. 

First, a community would pitch a policy trial area - a special economic zone - with different policy or regulatory settings more suitable for local conditions. The idea would come from the local community. Some national-level policies are really unsuitable to some local conditions. 

That community would work with Treasury to come up with indicators ahead of time. How could we tell if the trial were working? What side-effects might we need to watch as well? 

Successful trials would often mean higher tax revenue for central government, lower dependence, or both. share the gains with the originating community as a 'policy discovery' payment. Then let it extend to other communities asking to take it up. Failed trials would fail at small-scale. 

Central government would rule out any proposals that could not, in principle, be extended to other similar communities if the trial were successful. So tax concession areas would be right out. Different consenting processes could be fine; a successful trial could extend to similar consents in other places. 

I have not read the proposal for Marsden Point. 

But I do not recognise our proposal in Bryce Edwards' critique of what's been proposed at Marden Point. 

Edwards writes:

A lobbyist’s paradise

The economist Michael Reddell saw the obvious problem the moment Jones first floated the idea. If there were any substance to the SEZ concept, Reddell wrote, the policy seemed “likely to be a lobbyist’s paradise, and perhaps that of political party donors & recipients”. He recalled that the New Zealand Initiative had pitched something very similar a decade ago.

Reddell’s lobbyist point is the one that NZ First does not want to engage with. The moment you start designating discretionary zones with bespoke tax treatment and accelerated consenting, you create exactly the kind of high-value, low-transparency politics in which the lines between commercial interest and political access become blurred.

Who decides which company qualifies as being inside the zone? Who decides what activities “achieve the aims of the zone”? Who appoints the panel? On what criteria? Under what review process? These are not pedantic questions. They are the central governance questions, and they are conspicuously absent from anything Peters or Jones have said in public. NZ First, of all parties, used to have something to say about that sort of arrangement.

To answer Edwards' questions within the framework that my shop proposed:

1. Nobody decides which companies qualify as being inside the zone. The zone applies to activities within the zone's boundaries. If the company's activities are inside the zone, then those activities would qualify. 

2. Nobody would be deciding on activities, except when the zone is struck. A proposal to, for example, trial a different version of the minimum wage for piece-rate employers in the zone would apply to all piece-rate employers in the zone. There'd be no assessment of aims.

3. We didn't have panels, so appointments and criteria weren't questions. 

4. We did have review - against the indicators that the community had set with Treasury. Central govt doing the assessment. 

Maybe Edwards' column is better in the half that's on the other side of the paywall.

Tuesday, 21 May 2024

Afternoon roundup

A closing of the browser tabs:

Friday, 3 May 2024

GST back to councils?

If a localist agenda involves punting more responsibility down to councils, then central government assistance in funding some of those responsibilities could make sense. 

If councils were only responsible for core infrastructure, that can and should be covered by rates revenue and user charges on use of the infrastructure. If the resulting rates charges are unaffordable because of low income in the district, that's generally a problem for central government redistribution policy. Central government takes a lot of money from higher earning households and redistributes it to lower earning households, particularly lower income households with children. 

And if central government wants the council to provide infrastructure services to a higher standard than the council's residents would choose for themselves, because of central government priorities, it's appropriate for central government to assist with the cost difference. 

But if a more localist approach would have councils taking on more responsibilities over social services, that should not be funded through rates. Social services are inherently part of the state's vast redistribution mechanism. If local councils funded education, or health, or other such services out of local revenues, then central government would need to look to mechanisms like those used in Canada for topping up the accounts of poorer councils so that comparable bundles of those services could be provided in different places. The education system is already fairly redistributive, with a lot more central government funding for schools serving poorer communities' needs than those serving richer communities - whether it's done through decile measures or the more recent index measure. 

Anyway, that's just background and what I've thought is fairly settled standard local public finance in NZ. 

A couple years before I joined the Initiative, Jason Krupp at the Initiative had been arguing for giving the GST on new housing builds back to councils. I argued against it because it's impossible to track GST that way. But they were simply using GST as shorthand. What they were, and have continued, to suggest is taking the value of new housing construction in a district, multiplying it by the current GST rate, and sending it to council as a grant to help encourage them to build more housing. They could put it toward defraying the cost of necessary infrastructure; they could build a golden statue of the mayor with it. So long as it made councils more likely to say yes to housing. And I think that all makes sense - there are substantial spillover costs on the rest of the country and on central government when councils don't enable enough housing in places where people want to live - up and out.

Yesterday, Politik newsletter reported on some work by Infometrics on returning the GST charged on local council rates back to councils.

This seems a tremendously bad idea. 

Brad Olson was quoted:

"Rates should still be charged GST, as councils are providing goods and services for local residents, ratepayers, and others. But given the constant discussion about the need to fund local Government differently, perhaps GST on rates should be collected and then returned to local councils," says Mr Olsen.

I completely agree with the first line. There's a populist line about GST on rates being a tax on a tax, but if it weren't there, it would cause no end of distortions. There are all kinds of margins on which ratepayers might prefer to shift service delivery from the private sector or from households over to council provision if council-provided services had a preferential tax treatment, and from user-charges set by council to general rates funding for things already provided by council. 

As simple example, Wellington currently charges a per-bag collection fee for trash and people can choose to contract with private waste collection services if they prefer that instead. It's all fine. User charging like this recovers the cost of landfill services while providing incentive to avoid generating more trash than would otherwise be optimal. I don't know whether council is charging the right amount relative to a full cost recovery model, but the bones of the thing are right.

And suppose that an average household spent $100 per year plus GST on trashbags from council for collection services. 

If council shifted that service to just being rates funded - put out as much trash as you like, and it's covered in your standard rates bill! - and if households did not change the amount of trash they put out, then council could charge the $100 extra on rates and get $15 back from central government. Or charge a bit less and get a bit less back such that they were back to cost-recovery. 

If households put out more trash because they faced no marginal cost, council would still be better off - so long as they didn't increase trash generation by more than 15%. But more likely, households would generate more trash than that, and then either rates would have to increase by a greater amount, or councils would start rationing trash bags by non-price mechanisms, or some combination of the two. It would be a mess. 

Don't do this.

Basic drill on local public finance, or as best I've understood it, is:

  1. Set appropriate user charges on everything that can reasonably be user charged.
  2. Use rates to cover the cost of services that cannot reasonably be user-charged. 
Rebating GST on rates to council pushes councils away from user charging on stuff that can reasonably be user-charged. It also distorts toward council over private service delivery - at the margin, some things best provided privately get shifted into council's wheelhouse because council provision is tax-preferred. 

And if you set it instead such that councils get a GST rebate on both rates and user charges, you still have the distortion toward council over private provision. 





Monday, 19 February 2024

Tino Rangatiratanga and localism

My piece for the Saturday papers weekend before last, and now ungated here, went back to a theme that Richard Harman had noticed in the Waitangi speeches
Minister Shane Jones argued fuller debate on the meaning of Tino Rangatiratanga is inevitable, saying, “There is a deep, committed view from Pita Tipene and others that article two is a charter for iwi sovereignty. And at some point in time, that debate is going to be flushed out. It’s not a conception that I share. I conceive it to be more localised.”

Prime Minister Luxon said, “We are a party and particularly a government that is actually about making sure there is localism and devolution and that those closest to the problem should solve the problems. …Our fundamental belief is localism and devolution. We do not believe in centralization and control through Wellington.”

It is certainly not for a Canadian economist to weigh in on Treaty interpretation. I have neither the standing nor the understanding.

But one bit of the Canadian experience might be interesting.

Canada’s overall policies regarding its First Nations have been abysmal. But Canada’s First Nations nevertheless have some rights comparable to Canadian municipalities.

Basically, Canada's First Nations Band Councils have powers on reserves comparable to municipalities, except under federal rather than provincial jurisdiction. 

Decades ago, Manny Jules did the work to get band councils the authority to levy property taxes on reserve to fund band council activities. 

And look at this section of the Indian Act - I've bolded the interesting bits.

81 (1) The council of a band may make by-laws not inconsistent with this Act or with any regulation made by the Governor in Council or the Minister, for any or all of the following purposes, namely,

(a) to provide for the health of residents on the reserve and to prevent the spreading of contagious and infectious diseases;

(b) the regulation of traffic;

(c) the observance of law and order;

(d) the prevention of disorderly conduct and nuisances;

(e) the protection against and prevention of trespass by cattle and other domestic animals, the establishment of pounds, the appointment of pound-keepers, the regulation of their duties and the provision for fees and charges for their services;

(f) the construction and maintenance of watercourses, roads, bridges, ditches, fences and other local works;

(g) the dividing of the reserve or a portion thereof into zones and the prohibition of the construction or maintenance of any class of buildings or the carrying on of any class of business, trade or calling in any zone;

(h) the regulation of the construction, repair and use of buildings, whether owned by the band or by individual members of the band;

(i) the survey and allotment of reserve lands among the members of the band and the establishment of a register of Certificates of Possession and Certificates of Occupation relating to allotments and the setting apart of reserve lands for common use, if authority therefor has been granted under section 60;

(j) the destruction and control of noxious weeds;

(k) the regulation of bee-keeping and poultry raising;

(l) the construction and regulation of the use of public wells, cisterns, reservoirs and other water supplies;

(m) the control or prohibition of public games, sports, races, athletic contests and other amusements;

(n) the regulation of the conduct and activities of hawkers, peddlers or others who enter the reserve to buy, sell or otherwise deal in wares or merchandise;

(o) the preservation, protection and management of fur-bearing animals, fish and other game on the reserve;

(p) the removal and punishment of persons trespassing on the reserve or frequenting the reserve for prohibited purposes;

(p.1) the residence of band members and other persons on the reserve;

(p.2) to provide for the rights of spouses or common-law partners and children who reside with members of the band on the reserve with respect to any matter in relation to which the council may make by-laws in respect of members of the band;

(p.3) to authorize the Minister to make payments out of capital or revenue moneys to persons whose names were deleted from the Band List of the band;

(p.4) to bring subsection 10(3) or 64.1(2) into effect in respect of the band;

(q) with respect to any matter arising out of or ancillary to the exercise of powers under this section; and

(r) the imposition on summary conviction of a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars or imprisonment for a term not exceeding thirty days, or both, for violation of a by-law made under this section.

It is fun to think about what could happen here if iwi had similar authority over building and development on iwi-held land, or Māori land more generally. 

For further fun, look at the 250 page services agreement between Vancouver City and the Squamish First Nation for the Sen̓áḵw development. That development is on Reserve land right next door to downtown Vancouver. 

It's very typical for Kiwi bureaucrats, or bureaucrat-adjacent types, to find the first hurdle that might cause an issue and just give up. Well, here's 250 pages of legal text working through difficulties and finding solutions. 

Back to the column.

A First Nations Band has autonomy over the Band’s land.

It isn’t mere parchment. The listed rights have consequences.

When Sḵwx̱wú7mesh Úxwumixw, the Squamish Nation, finally had five hectares of their land returned to them near downtown Vancouver, the Band had authority over that land. Not the city.

Vancouver has a housing shortage. And Sḵwx̱wú7mesh Úxwumixw wanted to build.

In Auckland, Section H27 of Auckland’s Unitary Plan sets out the Special Purpose - Māori Purpose Zone. A Marae is prescribed by H27.6.2 to be no more than 10 metres in height; height of buildings in relation to boundaries is prescribed by H27.6.3, and even the location of rainwater tanks is prescribed by H27.6.9.

Even if every one of those sections enjoyed the full agreement of every hapū when the rules were written, if a hapū’s needs changed over time, council would have to agree to any change. And City Council issues the consents.

Meanwhile, the Squamish Nation’s website describing the Sen̓áḵw development explains that “Sen̓áḵw is not part of the City of Vancouver, and is not subject to the City's typical development approval process.”

It appears that, in practice, collaboration with Vancouver City has been required in order to effect interconnection to water networks. But bargaining over such things is a bit different when the Band has real autonomy over its own lands.

The service agreement goes well beyond water of course. The Band Council levies a property tax on Sen̓áḵw to pay Vancouver for other services that Sen̓áḵw residents will enjoy. This stuff can be worked out. 

Localist approaches can be more responsive to local needs.

In 2015, the New Zealand Initiative put up a report on devolution. We argued that, if a local community saw central government’s regulations or policies as being unfit for local purposes, they should be able to negotiate their own carve-out. If the policy experiment proved successful, others could take it up. If it failed, the experiment would have been relatively small. Bespoke devolution options can make more sense where councils vary widely in capacity.

But nothing in that report needed to imply that local or regional councils are the only voices of local community. Devolution to iwi or hapū could also fit within the framework.

New Zealand has a housing shortage. Council zoning and consenting rules have obviously been part of the problem.

Devolving zoning, consenting, and rating authority over iwi-held land to iwi wishing that authority may be a longshot. And it would take a lot of work.

But it seems worth thinking about.

I have no expertise or experience in arguments around Treaty interpretation.

I just find it very hard to believe that iwi leaders signing onto the Treaty believed their descendants would wind up needing to beg a bureaucrat’s permission to build houses on their own land.

Friday, 13 October 2023

Afternoon roundup

Eight browser windows each full of tabs. Something's gotta give.

Thursday, 27 July 2023

Morning roundup

The morning's worthies:

Friday, 21 July 2023

A depressing NZAE keynote

Auckland University of Technology’s Professor Rhema Vaithianathan's keynote at the NZAE meetings was depressing. 

Her work is great: better data tools to help child protection workers better triage cases. One result: a one-third reduction in child hospitalisation. 

What's depressing is that it could have been happening here, but the New Zealand government chased the work away. 

I covered it in my column over in the Post; unfortunately, some snafu on their side resulted in a short version in print. The online version has all of it; ungated here

I also summarised it in our Insights newsletter:

The New Zealand Economics Association annual meetings are a great way of keeping abreast of what the country’s economists are working on. 

And sometimes they’re downright depressing. 

At last week’s meetings, Auckland University of Technology’s Professor Rhema Vaithianathan’s keynote explained what she’s been up to over the past decade. 

Her team has been helping American child protection services to do a better job protecting kids.  

Child protection work is grim. Officials balance two terrible kinds of errors.  

Over-zealousness means a lot of families will be put through a painful wringer unnecessarily. But under-intervention means some kids who could have been helped will wind up abused, hospitalised, or killed.  

Unless you can find a way of reducing both types of errors. 

And Prof Vaithianathan’s team found a good one. 

Child protection workers have a mountain of administrative data for making decisions on whether to intervene in response to a call, but only about ten minutes to make each decision – then on to the next case.  

It is impossible to regularly make good decisions faced with that much complexity and that little time. 

Prof Vaithianathan’s team reduced complexity by turning data into a predictive score laying out the risk each case posed, to help child protection workers make the right call.  

They started the U.S. work in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, because Allegheny wanted to use data to make better decisions. The programme’s success inspired others to try it out.  

And a later randomised control trial showed that the system reduced child hospitalisation by a third.  

It also reduced the bias that case workers otherwise bring with them in making assessments. The risk scored meant more high-risk white families received help and fewer low-risk black families had to deal with child protection services. 

It’s a great story.  

The depressing part?  

The work started here in New Zealand. It was killed by Anne Tolley as Minister, who described it as experimenting on kids. And the subsequent Labour government showed even less interest in data-based approaches.  

One third fewer hospitalisations for children in risky families.  

But not here.  

In America instead.  

Thanks to Kiwi researchers, who were chased away from doing the work here.  

An innovative American county can try something new and let others follow. New Zealand’s centralisation means a single bad Ministerial decision can cause a lot of harm for a very long time. 

Far better policy, and outcomes, are possible. Even here. But voters have to demand it. 

I also had a two-part podcast with Prof Vaithianathan about it (Part 1, Part 2).

I take all of it as exemplar of why centralised systems fail relative to decentralised ones.

In New Zealand, MSD botched its handling of the system, leading a risk-averse Minister to kill it.

That kills it for the whole country. 

In the US, all you have to do is find one county that isn't full of freaking idiots. When you find that one county, demonstrate that your idea works. Second-movers pick it up, showing that it can work in other places. And then others follow along. 

And every trend in NZ has been toward greater centralisation. 

Wednesday, 15 March 2023

Afternoon roundup

It's been a while since last posting. The tabs...


Tuesday, 11 October 2022

Afternoon roundup

The afternoon's worthies:

Tuesday, 6 September 2022

Morning roundup

The morning's worthies, on the closing of the tabs:

Monday, 5 September 2022

Local government games

Councils find accommodating urban growth to be costly, so they use what tools they can to restrict it. Until that underlying problem is solved, they'll keep finding new ways to obstruct growth in places where people want to live, but where accommodating growth is just too hard.

Thomas Coughlan picks up on Auckland's move to designate too many houses as being under 'special character areas.'

It is understood the Government thinks what Auckland Council notified in August is unlawful, breaching the spirit and the letter of both laws, mainly because of the way the council has applied "special character area" protections liberally in Auckland's villa belt.

Government can keep setting new rules on top of councils, but it's balloon-squeezing. Until and unless they sort out the underlying mess that makes councils behave like this, they'll just keep reaching for other tools. We've already seen Greater Wellington Regional Council pull in greenhouse gas emissions as reason to block new subdivisions. 

How to fix it? 

  • Recognise that it's a deep structural problem in councils caused by decades of misaligned incentives, which have encouraged strongly anti-growth cultures to develop within councils.
  • Change the underlying incentives to make growth a benefit, rather than a cost, for councils. Do so by:
    • Providing grants to councils for every new dwelling built, so they share in the benefits of growth;
    • Enabling councils to issue long-duration revenue bonds to fund infrastructure, financed by revenues from that infrastructure's beneficiaries, separate from council main balance sheets.
  • Recognise that, until those incentives have time to work their way through, councils are going to need constraints. 
One simple set of constraints, until the cultures have time to update, which may require a lot of staff turnover, would set UDAs on top of councils as competitive issuers of resource consents and building consents. 

For councils where the median home sells for more than 8x median household income, UDAs could be instructed to disregard viewshafts, frontage setbacks, height limits, balcony requirements, floor-to-ceiling limits, and whatever it is that design panels normally do when issuing consents. For councils where the median home is between 5-8x median household income, there could be a smaller set of "without regard to" things. 

These are just indicative. Don't ask me; I'm not a property developer. Ask someone like Matty Prasad. Or Arthur Grimes, who'd done the work showing the shadow cost of all the darned restrictions. Void the most costly ones when and where housing is unaffordable. Where housing is less than 5x median household income, the UDA wouldn't be put into operation.

Basically treat it as training wheels. When Council's demonstrated it can't drive the bike without crashing and making a mess of everything, put training wheels on that constrain against the most costly things they get up to. The training wheels come off when housing's affordable. 

Disinformation stuff

The Stuff papers have been checking into which candidates for local government are actually antivax conspiracy theorists.

So why are we doing this? It’s certainly not fun, or enlightening work. Mostly, it’s depressing, tedious and disturbing. In the last fortnight, I’ve swung from despair, to irritation, puzzlement, and occasionally amusement.

But facts and transparency are cornerstones of democracy. Stuff is drawing attention to these candidates because they cannot distinguish fairytales from reality. They are anti-science. They lack critical thinking and sound judgment.

And while they claim the opposite, many seek to disrupt democratic institutions. Many share a common disdain for the rules, procedures, and norms of representative governance. (In the case of VFF, they have made explicit their aims to make the country ungovernable.)

If voters elevate them to decision-making roles, they should do with this knowledge.

There are two separate things going on here.

I agree with Vance that it is dangerous to elect people who cannot distinguish fairytales from reality, and who are anti-science. But local government hasn't got a ton of remit over Covid- or vaccine-relevant stuff. An antivax local government could refuse to set vaccine/mask requirements in council-owned places where those requirements might make sense, but what else could it really do?

On this aspect, I am way more worried about councilors who believe anti-science fairytales about rent-control, zoning, and about the possibility of reducing national net emissions through council measures targeting emissions already covered by the ETS. A lot of them think that stadiums and convention centres are great for economic development. They're all wrong. Anti-science councils can really screw things up when relying on fairytales in those areas. But none of those get picked up in anti-disinformation campaigns.

The second part of Vance's argument is stronger. If those candidates' hidden aims are to throw sand into local government gears, that's a bigger problem to the extent that councils pursue objectives that are worth pursuing. 

Tuesday, 16 August 2022

Morning roundup

The morning's worthies:

Monday, 4 July 2022

Afternoon roundup

Let's get these browser tabs back under control

Wednesday, 16 March 2022

Afternoon roundup

The tab-closing worthies:

Friday, 11 February 2022

Afternoon roundup

The afternoon's closing of the browser tabs:

Monday, 18 October 2021

Morning roundup

 The morning's worthies:

Wednesday, 16 June 2021

Assorted updates

Blogging has been light. These are the bits I've missed telling you about.

Self-recommending. Meaning, I'm in them, and I'm recommending them. Likely not in the better way that Tyler Cowen uses the term.