Showing posts with label housing. Show all posts
Showing posts with label housing. Show all posts

Monday, 7 October 2024

Generation screwed?

I gave a short talk for a new student group last week, Generation Screwed. The event was joint with Students for Liberty, who seem to be setting up in NZ!

They'd asked about debt, tax burden, and intergenerational issues. I put together a few starter-notes to let them know where I was coming from; I've copied those below. 

  1. The cleanest measure of the tax burden is government spending. Governments will try to hide the burden by shuffling it off to future through debt. Always watch spending rather than just taxes. The only real tax cut is a spending cut. The Public Finance Act tries to constrain govt use of debt, but it doesn’t enforce itself.
  2. As a rule of thumb, governments should not spend more than they earn in tax revenue. Fine to take on debt in a crisis or downturn and pay it back on the upswing. But funding normal expenditure through debt is a terrible idea. It only works until it doesn’t. And when it doesn’t, things can get very bad indeed.
  3. Debt for long-term infrastructure, funded by payments from the use of that infrastructure, is of a different category entirely – so long as the accounting is sound. What’s a good way to make sure the accounting is sound? Ban bailouts of that debt from government’s main balance sheet. Interest rates on it will be higher because they reflect real commercial risk. If a project is then not viable, it was a bad project to begin with.
  4. Getting that kind of ring-fenced debt in order is vitally important in bringing housing costs down. Why? It lets the beneficiaries of the infrastructure needed to support new housing pay for that infrastructure over a long period of time, rather than spreading its cost across the entire community over a shorter period of time. The current setup means every other ratepayer has incentive to restrict new infrastructure because they’re stuck paying for it. Going back to basic principles of beneficiary-pays means we’d get to have more nice things. The housing shortage is fundamentally a zoning issue, and it’s a zoning issue because councils experience housing growth as a cost to their balance sheet to be managed through zoning rather than a benefit to be sought through infrastructure provision. Fix that and most of the problem is solved.

Seems like a fun group. I had fun anyway! 


Friday, 26 April 2024

Competition in Consenting

This week's column over in the Stuff papers wonders about getting some competition into building consenting. A snippet:

Getting building consenting authorities out from under joint and several liability would help. And especially where the government is keen on encouraging the use of quality, lower-cost materials certified overseas.

But so too could easing the local monopoly on building consent and code of compliance issuance.

Government has already recognised that building consents and sign-offs are part of the problem. Kāinga Ora, the government’s housing provider, has its own arms-length consenting authority: Consentium. It provides consents for Kāinga Ora developments along with building inspections and code of compliance certificates.

Consentium then provides a small bit of contestability in the market for building inspection certificates. Kāinga Ora developments can ignore idiosyncratic local interpretations of the Building Act and build to a common national standard. It can also decide to try out new and innovative materials to help bring costs down while improving quality.

But only buildings that will be owned and retained by Kāinga Ora can apply for consenting through Consentium. If a private developer is building two adjacent identical houses, one for Kāinga Ora and the other for private sale, Consentium would only provide consenting services for the Kāinga Ora home. One potential reason: Kāinga Ora is not likely to sue Consentium if they discover a problem down the track.

It’s a bit of a shame.

Consentium is hardly perfect. It was reported earlier this month that it took almost two years for Consentium to decide that an above-ground stormwater storage tank didn’t impose a fire risk. But council consenting systems can be even more broken.

If building consenting authorities had to compete for business, outcomes could be different. If private developers had the option to seek consent from Consentium, both Consentium and councils could have reason to improve performance – so long as the liability issue were sorted out.

I recently returned from Vancouver where the Squamish Nation has autonomy over its Sen̓áḵw apartment tower development near Vancouver’s downtown. A New Zealand equivalent could allow iwi to establish themselves as building consenting authority on iwi-held land. In places where councils were underperforming, iwi might take up consenting for their own construction projects. That too would provide greater competitive discipline on building consenting.

Wednesday, 24 April 2024

Afternoon roundup

A closing of some of the tabs

First, a set from closing a pile of the week's accumulated stories from the Stuff papers. I wonder whether the people who complain about the absence of real journalism bother reading what The Post and Sunday Star Times have been putting out lately. 

And the rest of the tabs. Or some of the rest. I'm drowning here but the computer needs to be rebooted.... 

Tuesday, 5 March 2024

Even Lowerer Hutt

One annoying thing about writing a Saturday column for the Stuff papers is never knowing whether a piece will show up in print.

I'd thought this one was a banger. 

Anyway - the column.

Even Lower Hutt 

Transport historian Dr André Brett has suggested that Wellington be renamed Lowerer Hutt, perhaps to help avoid confusion within the region.   

Economists Matthew Maltman and Ryan Greenaway-McGrevy have been looking at Lower Hutt’s housing boom. Their paper, released this week by the Economic Policy Centre at Auckland University, suggests Brett was onto something.  


Wellington City could use a bit more Huttite thinking. And especially while Wellington’s response to the Independent Hearings Panel’s report on the district plan is still in play. 
 


While Wellington City mulled over whether it should be legal to turn rotting wooden tents into townhouses and apartments, Lower Hutt started building. 
 


From late 2016, Lower Hutt started a sequence of plan changes. They reduced parking requirements and introduced new zones allowing taller mixed-use developments and medium density housing. They allowed greater density within general residential zoning. And they quickly implemented policy changes set as part of Labour’s urban growth agenda – like medium density rules and upzoning requirements near public transport.
 


The paper tests whether those changes to zoning had any effect on building. 
 


It might sound like testing whether water flows downhill. 
 


The New Zealand Association of Economists surveyed its members this month. 96% of economists agreed or strongly agreed that district plan land use restrictions reduce housing supply. 94% agreed or strongly agreed those restrictions reduce affordability. And 98% agreed or strongly agreed that easing district plan restrictions will tend to increase housing supply and affordability.
 


But Wellington’s Independent Hearings Panel instead seemed convinced by one expert’s odd argument that zoning to allow more building, even in an obvious housing shortage, may not lead to more building. 
 


And perhaps the Commissioners saw no reason to believe that evidence from faraway places like Auckland could also apply in Wellington. 
 


So the Lower Hutt evidence is important. At least for those who need very specific local proof that water also flows downhill in the Wellington region. 
 


On notification of the plan changes, and especially after the changes started taking effect, Lower Hutt started issuing a lot more consents for townhouses and rowhouses. In the new zones enabling medium density and mixed use, there was the same jump in consents for townhouses and rowhouses – and also apartments. 
 


But perhaps that was just coincidence and Lower Hutt was only following the same trend as other councils. 
 


The authors used a variety of ways of checking that the zoning changes made the difference. For example, after the plan change, Lower Hutt shifted from being a moderate fraction of overall consents in the Wellington region to overtaking Wellington City. 
 


The economists also built a synthetic Lower Hutt and compared what happened there with the actual city. This method basically sets a complicated average of patterns in other cities that tracks how Lower Hutt’s consenting rates behaved before the change. Following that ‘synthetic’ Lower Hutt after the zoning change gives a comparison. 
 


Lower Hutt consented approximately 3260 more units than expected – a tripling the number of housing starts over the six-year period. More houses. More apartments. A few more retirement village units. And an awful lot more townhouses and rowhouses. 
 


It also affected building in Wellington City. Because it became relatively easier to build in Lower Hutt, some development shifted to the Hutt. Overall, about a quarter of the new consents in Lower Hutt were consents that might have happened in other places otherwise. 
 


This also matters for theories that a region may only have so much ‘absorptive capacity’ – another dubious argument relied on by Wellington’s hearings panel. 
 


The vast majority of new consenting in Lower Hutt, about three quarters of it, was new building. It did not just displace building that would otherwise have happened elsewhere. Lower Hutt’s reforms, all on their own, provided a 12 to 17% increase in housing starts for the whole metropolitan area. 
 


Lower Hutt then helps to keep rents in Wellington lower than they might otherwise be, by providing some of the housing that Wellington City would otherwise block. Every renter in Wellington owes a bit of thanks to Lower Hutt council. 
 


If Wellington Council cannot see fit to propose a district plan more enabling than the economically illiterate plan proposed by the Independent Hearings Panel, the combined Upper and Lower Hutt populations could well wind up exceeding Wellington’s.
 


If that happens, I think we should look back at the good Dr Brett’s suggestion. The Hutts’ ascendancy ought to be properly recognised. 
 


Wellington would become Lowerer Hutt, as Dr Brett suggested – or perhaps my preferred ‘Even Lower Hutt’. All of it would be part of the Greater Hutt Regional Council. Somes Island would of course become Hutt Island. 
 


And the ‘special character’ that drove Wellington’s residents, and tax base, out to the Hutts could stand as warning to other cities to at least try to be less stupid than the country’s capital.
 

Meanwhile, The Spinoff's suggesting abandoning Wellington for the Hutts and young professionals are abandoning Wellington for points farther afield like Christchurch

Buchanan said Christchurch felt more vibrant and there were plenty of young families who’d moved from the likes of Wellington and Auckland.

“Talking to my peers, former colleagues, family, and being out and about around the city, Wellington has a brain drain.

“Whether it be young teachers, firefighters or psychologists, people are unhappy or moving.”

Christchurch offered about 1000 housing options to choose from, Buchanan said, thanks to an increased supply of medium density homes in suburbs close to the city.

In Wellington, he was left with just 190. Most were in places like Wainuiomata, a Lower Hutt suburb with notoriously poor links to the city centre for commuters. A friend had recently paid $1.1 million for a small section and an old three-bedroom house in Upper Hutt.

...

According to a December 2023 Infometrics report, the average house price in Wellington City is $1,023,966 – roughly $100,000 more than the national average.

By contrast, CoreLogic measured the average house price in Christchurch as $757,881.

Wellington has long fought new-build developments, especially in the older inner city suburbs.

These “character areas” where Victorian villas still cling to the hills were described in a recent opinion piece in The Post by Eric Crampton as “wooden tents”, while by contrast he praised Lower Hutt’s initiative at constructing new-builds.

Buchanan attested to this, arguing the new builds in Christchurch only added to the character of the area.

I also had a podcast chat with Danyl McLauchlan on related issues - though we ranged a bit more broadly.

Friday, 1 March 2024

The Uncompetitive Urban Land Markets Theory of Everything

The Housing Theory of Everything has one of those wonderful self-explanatory titles. A good title matters. The recent and thorough essay explains how the anglosphere’s unnecessarily expensive housing affects, well, everything. Or at least almost everything.

Zoning makes it too hard to build houses where people want to build. Urban containment policies block new subdivisions, so downtown land no longer competes with land further out for developers’ attention and for residents. Land prices then inflate across the whole urban land market. Zoning that blocks new townhouses and apartment towers in places where people want to live further worsens scarcity and affordability.

It's at the root of a host of pathologies.

People aren’t left with much to live on after housing costs; inadequate housing causes misery.

The most productive cities could be even more productive if more people were allowed to live near each other. Bans on density are then taxes on productivity improvement, with existing landowners reaping the rewards. Those bans also make it harder than it should be to reduce carbon emissions.

The essay is superb. And it has been influential.

I’ve heard it cited by both Labour and National MPs, which shouldn’t be surprising as it explains a whole lot about New Zealand.

Uncompetitive urban land markets are at the core of the problem. Current practice requires council plans to demonstrate that they have zoned for about twenty percent more housing supply than expected demand. But expected demand will depend on whether housing is affordable, and tight zoning means unaffordable housing. 

Me over in Newsroom this week. 

I riff on a chat I'd had with Kevin Counsell on our podcast series about the economic consultancy reports that developers have to put up showing that there's massive excess demand if they want to get a building consent. 

A new supermarket then has to prove that there is so much excess demand that the new supermarket will not impinge on existing competitors’ viability.

And maybe that kind of outcome sounds great to the kinds of people who get involved in town planning. There’s already a supermarket, why should there be another one unless there’s enough customers for it?

The result is the neutering of competition, and substantial harm to consumers. If an existing business is seriously underperforming, a new entrant provides a service by driving it out of business. Even the threat of that kind of entry provides competitive discipline.

However, in New Zealand, that kind of entry would have a hard time getting a resource consent. The government likes to wring its hands about poor productivity performance while, at the very same time, making it almost impossible for new competitors to drive unproductive incumbents out of business.

Last week, I chatted with NERA director Kevin Counsell for the Initiative’s podcast series. When councils require evidence that a new development provides overwhelming benefits, someone has to write the economic analysis. Counsell writes a lot of the reports demonstrating whether there would be sufficient demand.

It isn’t just supermarkets. Consider potential entrants who need land at the edges of town.

In 2022, the government set a National Policy Statement on Highly Productive Land. That statement sets a very high hurdle if anyone wants to do anything other than farming on the 14% of the country that is classified in the top three soil categories.

Most of that protected land is dairy and sheep paddocks. Converting it to any other use requires proving a substantial benefit from that conversion.

Counsell has been working on a proposed new industrial park outside of Morrinsville. The National Policy Statement on Highly Productive Land requires that there be substantial benefit before anyone can build anything on a paddock.

How can you demonstrate substantial benefit? You have to prove that there is huge demand for the new use. The dynamic benefits of competition in forcing everyone to strengthen their game aren’t enough. They would be harder to prove in any case. Entrants wind up having to show that there is excess demand given current supply.

The effect is harshly anticompetitive. If a group of existing businesses organised in a smoke-filled room to block a new competitor’s entry, they could face criminal cartel prosecution. But resource management provides even stronger protection against competition whenever resource consents are required.

I titled this column ‘The Uncompetitive Urban Land Markets Theory of Everything’, but it’s never easy to tell whether a columnist’s draft headline will survive. The uncompetitive urban land markets theory of everything subsumes the housing theory of everything. Just about everything wrong in housing is downstream of uncompetitive urban land markets. But the same processes that block new housing also block new supermarkets, new commercial premises and new industrial parks. 

Go listen to the podcast. Our resource consenting systems entrench anticompetitive effects by making it difficult to set a new competitor unless the incumbent's existing rents are above a threshold, and dynamic Schumpeterian competition is largely blocked. 

Maybe, just maybe, if the government is worried that NZ markets are often less competitive than they'd like, and if they're also worried that the country's less productive than it should be, it could have a look at this?

Maybe would-be competitors shouldn't have to produce reports like this?

I swear a good third of government activity is creating giant problems, not noticing that they caused the problem, then running endless inquiries about the consequences. 

Monday, 19 February 2024

YIMBY opt-outs

Marko Garlick makes the case for keeping the Medium Density Residential Standards but allowing small blocks to opt out through petition, with deed restrictions expiring within 25-30 years. 

If Houston was anything like cities in New Zealand (or Australia, the UK, or other big US cities) these density-enabling changes would’ve been fiercely resisted by density-hating homeowners. But by most accounts, these changes were largely uncontroversial. Why? Perhaps because Houston allowed pockets of homeowners to ‘opt out’ of these city-wide changes.

Anya Martin’s excellent article in Works in Progress goes through this opt-out process. Landowners within small blocks could collectively opt out of the density-enabling rules via private deed restrictions – similar to covenants in New Zealand – which are automatically recognised by the city. These deeds could be used to, amongst other things, set a higher minimum lot size than the new city minimum – effectively banning townhouses. A simple petition needed to attract just 51% support from landowners. These private deed restrictions would typically expire after 25–30 years.

In short the opt outs:

  • Apply to small geographic areas only; a block, not a whole suburb.
  • Require a majority consent from landowners in that area; a few people can’t decide for everyone.
  • Have a sunset clause; they don’t last forever.

It seems an easier way of operationalising opt-outs from MDRS than having it at district plan level, subject to easy-to-game requirements for immediately releasing 30-years worth of supply. 

Monday, 12 February 2024

Around the traps on housing

Wellington's Independent Hearings Panel put up its recommendations on the Wellington District Plan. 

They note that Council's plan provides far more than the minimum required zoned housing to keep up with projected demand and so scaled it back.

A few bits from me on all this.

Oli Lewis and Dileepa Fonseca at BusinessDesk

Wellington already suffers from infrastructure challenges, and restricting housing development in existing areas may worsen it. 

That’s the view of Geoff Cooper, general manager for strategy at the Infrastructure Commission, Te Waihanga, who commented to BusinessDesk expressing surprise at recommendations made by an independent hearings panel (IHP) convened to hear submissions on a proposed district plan put forward by the Wellington city council.

...

Cooper said that the NZ infrastructure strategy, produced by the commission, also highlighted a need for national direction to help guide planning decisions. 

“The aim of this national direction is often about balancing economic matters, like enabling housing supply for future New Zealanders, with other factors.” 

Economic considerations needed to be given appropriate weight, he said. 

“We note that as of today, the list of 999 accredited RMA independent commissioners includes just 12 that report having expertise in economics – amounting to 1.2%.” 

Crampton was far more scathing, saying the Wellington IHP clearly needed economic assistance. 

“Their engagement with the economic evidence presented was incredibly poor; they were unable to distinguish academically credible arguments from academically risible arguments, and they provided a series of recommendations that will worsen housing affordability,” he said. 

“All in all, the report discredits the IHP process and the methods used to select panellists. Wellington council would be right in dismissing the IHP report’s conclusions.”

Tom Hunt asked what I'd thought about it:

The New Zealand Initiative chief economist Eric Crampton said the council’s proposed district plan had a larger buffer between planned-for supply and projected housing demand in Wellington in coming decades. The new recommendations significantly reduced that buffer, which particularly mattered when Wellington was starting from a housing shortage.

But he believed the whole system may need to change to rely less on forecasts of whether housing demand would be met by zoned supply. If housing was unaffordable, people could be expected to leave town, reducing forecast demand, he said.

Instead, councils and the Government could watch land values. If those prices showed that zoned land was scarce, as work by the Infrastructure Commission had shown, then the Government could get councils to zone for more development.

There had been 2016 work by Covec and MRCagney for MfE looking at how prices could be used as signals of zoned scarcity. This was part of the prep for the older National Policy Statement on Urban Development Capacity. NPS-UDC was replaced by NPS-UD, and none of it took price signals as seriously as it should have. They're mentioned as one of many possible things to look at when they should be a trigger compelling release of more zoned land. 

I talked about this a bit more over at The Herald. The full column is gated but I've snipped a couple bits. 

In short, it’s a backward kind of way of setting urban plans. Forecasts of demand are not only highly uncertain, they also depend on housing affordability.

If you start with overcrowded, poor-quality housing, you will have a hard time fixing it. And if the resulting unaffordability discourages people from moving here while encouraging young families to flee, projected demand is the wrong measure entirely.

None of it faces a simple sanity check. Land prices can quickly show whether councils have zoned sufficient land for development. Last year, the Infrastructure Commission compared the 2021 price of land just outside of city limits to the price of land just inside the boundary. They accounted for the cost of turning rural land into urban land, like earthworks, surveying, planning, and development contributions. And they found urban zoning quadruples the price of land inside Auckland and Tauranga’s boundaries, while more than tripling land value in Wellington, Hamilton and Queenstown.

Those ratios had increased substantially since 2010.

Since the commission’s work accounted for land development costs, the price multiples at the boundary largely reflect scarcity caused by zoning.

If it were legal to turn rural land around Wellington, like in Ōhāriu, into housing, land zoned for housing in Wellington would not cost $490 per square metre more than land just outside the boundary. As the typical Wellington section is about 600sq m, the commission’s figures mean zoning at the boundary added almost $300,000 to a Wellington section’s price in 2021.

This simply would not happen if the council had really zoned enough land for development.

But the problem is not just at rural-urban boundaries. It will also be at every other zoning boundary where zoning creates scarcity.

On the plus side, the IHP work really didn't mess around. Some reports are just kinda bad. And then inertia sees them adopted. But this one's bad enough that it's unified everyone other than the more hopeless NIMBYs against it. So it's more likely to be tossed.

It also seems to have inspired the latest NZ Association of Economists member's survey. If you're an NZAE member, do check your inbox for that survey. It asks member whether zoning provides a binding constraint against housing supply and consequently affects prices. 

And on the fun side, Twitter urbanist Boxcar Joey mapped the conspiracy of Twitter urbanists against the IHP proposal.

Thursday, 25 January 2024

Afternoon roundup

Sure doesn't take long for the tabs to pile up after summer break.

Some worthies:

Friday, 8 December 2023

A belated look at the coalition agreements

Things got a bit busy after the National-ACT and National-NZ First Coalition Agreements were released. 

A fair few things showed up in those agreements that we've been working on at the Initiative for rather some time, whether through reports, submissions, columns, panels and whatnot.

So that's been a bit busy, and I've been trying to clear through a few other bits before heading back to Canada and the US for a few weeks over the school holidays. So posting has been unduly light.

But I've been particularly pleased that these showed up in the agreements. 
A Rule of Two for Drug Certification

The government will require Medsafe to approve new pharmaceuticals within 30 days of them being approved by at least two overseas regulatory agencies recognised by New Zealand.

Loyal readers may recall series of tweets, blog posts, and columns from me on this one. I worked with a couple student teams at Canterbury to get a report up on the likely effects of a Rule of Two. 

It is in both coalition agreements and will be legislated. No "will investigate" or "will consider". It will happen. 

I am rather pleased about this one. 
Incentives for Growth

Weak incentives for councils to encourage housing development hasn't been the only problem blocking housing growth, but getting more housing despite current incentives requires heroes. And policy can't reliably depend on there being heroes around. The coalition agreements will introduce financial incentives for councils to enable more housing.

This has been core for the Initiative since before I got here. And now it will happen.

Easing Foreign Investment

The Overseas Investment Act will limit ministerial decision-making to national security concerns and make such decision-making more timely.

NZ has one of the OECD's most restrictive FDI regimes. Other places try to attract foreign investment; NZ does the opposite. 

Easing restrictions on FDI have been core for the Initiative since before I got here. Fingers crossed that the legislation interprets this as broadly as is implied by the text of the coalition agreements. 

Market Studies

Commerce Commission market studies will focus on reducing regulatory barriers to new entrants to drive competition. 

So far, ComCom has produced about one giant study per year. But the first-order problem is going to be in areas where ComCom has hitherto been precluded against poking around: matters falling under statutory exception. If a matter is authorised by Parliament, it doesn't get cartel investigation even if it is definitely behaving as a cartel. 

Instead of doing one giant study per year, ComCom would do a larger number of short studies focused simply on checking whether it is actually possible for a new entrant to get through NZ's regulatory and land use hurdles to provide potential competition. 

So here I disagree with my friend Donal Curtin. He worries about instances where the issue isn't regulatory barriers. Maybe I'll agree with Donal after the revised regime has run for a few years. But the low-hanging fruit simply is not going to be in places where ComCom has been able to use other tools. It will be in the place where they've been unable to shorten the way.

This shift in approach is something I've argued for in columns, submissions, at a CLIPNZ session, and in various conversations around town. 

Ben Hamlin and I have been, I think, the only ones really worried about the statutory exceptions. Ben's piece on it in the latest Law Review is very good; his gratuitous citing of my columns is inframarginal to that assessment. 

Monetary Policy

The Remit will be narrowed to focus only on price stability.

This too is excellent. In a normal environment, a dual mandate shouldn't matter. The long-run Philips curve is vertical. Maintaining price stability is the best way the bank has to ensure maximum sustainable long-term employment. 

We have worried about the broad Remit, which includes a preamble that encourages the Bank to give regard to basically the entirety of the government's policy agenda, for some time. 

Employment 

The government will consider setting an income threshold above which a personal grievance could not be pursued.

Our Chair, Roger Partridge, has been writing on this for some time. The measure would make it far simpler for firms to dismiss underperforming high-paid managers who really aren't the people that employment law protections should focus on anyway. 

Pseudoephedrine

The government will allow the sale of cold medicine containing pseudoephedrine.

This is another one that loyal readers may recognise. I think me and Twitter's @BoxcarJoey have been the only ones making the case for this obviously sensible move. And now it will happen. 

There's a lot of other stuff in the agreements, mostly good, some less good. 

As another bit of fun, the Dom Post put out its latest 'Wellington Power' list. I think it needs an accompanying 'Wellington Mystery' list so we can figure out whose power is exceeded only by their mystery, or vice-versa, or both, somehow, simultaneously. 

But in any case, I made the cut for inclusion this time. But only barely. And possibly only because I also write a column for them. 
45. Eric Crampton

The stocks of think tank New Zealand Initiative’s chief economist have soared, with the ascendancy of ACT into Government. The Canadian is a prolific report-writer and commentator, with a free market bent, and incoming ministers are sure to be paying attention to his sharp, original (and often witty) thinking.

Thursday, 16 November 2023

Afternoon roundup

The tabs!

Friday, 13 October 2023

Afternoon roundup

Eight browser windows each full of tabs. Something's gotta give.

Monday, 9 October 2023

The NIMBY Problem

Standard drill in a lot of the urban econ lit is that governments need to pull planning up to higher levels to get around local NIMBYs. The small number of loud people with infinite time to stall local planning just don't get the same hearing if planning's decided at a regional or state-level rather than at town council. 

And there's some decent evidence for that. Auckland's Unitary Plan is more enabling than the prior underlying plans were. A pile of apartments were built because of it. 

David Foster and Joseph Warren go through a countervailing force in the Journal of Theoretical Politics.

Nimbyism is widely thought to arise from an inherent tradeoff between localism and efficiency in government: because many development projects have spatially concentrated costs and diffuse benefits, local residents naturally oppose proposed projects. But why cannot project developers (with large potential profits) compensate local residents? We argue that local regulatory institutions effectively require developers to expend resources that cannot be used to compensate residents. Not being compensated for local costs, residents therefore oppose development. Using a formal model, we show that when these transaction costs are high, voters consistently oppose development regardless of compensation from developers. But when transaction costs are low, developers provide compensation to residents and local support for development increases. We conclude that nimbyism arises from a bargaining problem between developers and local residents, not the relationship between local decision-making and the spatial structure of costs and benefits. We suggest policy reforms implied by this theory.

Ben Southwood goes through it here, arguing that when NIMBYs can't be paid off at the margin, they instead aim to wreck everything: throw so much sand into every set of gears that nobody can ever build anything anywhere because building is just too hard. 

I've liked the idea of giving councils a share of the upside that central government enjoys when councils facilitate growth, so that councils can both find ways of dealing with costs they have to face in facilitating growth, and so they have the resources to provide whatever local amenity improvements are needed to overcome local opposition. 

Tuesday, 26 September 2023

Afternoon roundup

The tabs. There are too many.

Monday, 18 September 2023

Afternoon roundup

The closing of a few tabs. 

  • Tim Harford's cautionary tale about the Sydney Opera House and how megaprojects bring heartbreak is a must-listen. One bottom line: if you're not real clear at the outset just what problem you're trying to solve, you're going to be causing problems. 
  • My weekend column in the Stuff papers compares the current draft Government Policy Statement on Transport to the old 1998 proposed reforms - Better Transport Better Roads. The column also echoes a lot of what turned up in my submission on the draft GPS - which I don't think is yet on our website.
  • Central Banking covers The Initiative's proposals around RBNZ: split prudential regulation off into its own separate institution, focus the monetary authority on inflation-alone, and not go ahead with deposit insurance. With comments from former RBNZ Chair Arthur Grimes and Mike Reddell. 
  • Labour promises rebates for rooftop solar. Weird thing to promise when there's a lot of grid-scale solar going in without subsidies. The balance between grid-scale and rooftop shouldn't depend on subsidies to the latter. 
  • Great piece in Quilette on the 2003 BMJ controversy over passive smoking and mortality. I remember having pointed at this literature when the Helen Clark Labour Government was banning smoking in pubs; I'd figured it should be for the venue owner to decide, especially where the risks from second-hand smoke really seemed nebulous. Not a popular view it turned out. The trendy 'let's get more government grants' people had banked their wins on second-hand smoke and were trying to argue that third-hand smoke (residue on surfaces, basically) was its own new terrible thing that needed a lot of grants. Ah well. 
  • Kainga Ora is doing some really neat work in getting construction cost and build times down. The kind of thing that you'd normally expect the private sector to have led ages ago. But when councils allow very little building, who'd have the scale to front that fixed cost in process systems? Nobody would have invented automotive assembly lines if the global market for cars was a thousand a year...